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Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity

Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity

Title: Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity
Author: Unnsteinsson, Elmar   orcid.org/0000-0001-5333-1784
Date: 2016-04
Language: English
Scope: 204-227
University/Institute: Háskóli Íslands
University of Iceland
School: Hugvísindasvið (HÍ)
School of Humanities (UI)
Department: Heimspekistofnun (HÍ)
The Institute of Philosophy (UI)
Series: Canadian Journal of Philosophy;46(2)
ISSN: 0045-5091
1911-0820 (eISSN)
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2016.1153994
Subject: Philosophy; Confusion; Identity; Millikan; Grice; Frege puzzle; Implicit believe; Heimspeki; Rökfræði; Sjálfsvitund
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11815/1983

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Unnsteinsson, E. (2016). Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46(2), 204-227. doi:10.1080/00455091.2016.1153994


Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.


Post-print (lokagerð höfundar)


This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Canadian Journal of Philosophy on Apr 2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00455091.2016.1153994.

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