Title: | Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity |
Author: | |
Date: | 2016-04 |
Language: | English |
Scope: | 204-227 |
University/Institute: | Háskóli Íslands University of Iceland |
School: | Hugvísindasvið (HÍ) School of Humanities (UI) |
Department: | Heimspekistofnun (HÍ) The Institute of Philosophy (UI) |
Series: | Canadian Journal of Philosophy;46(2) |
ISSN: | 0045-5091 1911-0820 (eISSN) |
DOI: | 10.1080/00455091.2016.1153994 |
Subject: | Philosophy; Confusion; Identity; Millikan; Grice; Frege puzzle; Implicit believe; Heimspeki; Rökfræði; Sjálfsvitund |
URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11815/1983 |
Citation:Unnsteinsson, E. (2016). Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46(2), 204-227. doi:10.1080/00455091.2016.1153994
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Abstract:Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.
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Description:Post-print (lokagerð höfundar)
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Rights:This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Canadian Journal of Philosophy on Apr 2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00455091.2016.1153994.
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