Opin vísindi

Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet

Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet

Title: Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet
Author: Unnsteinsson, Elmar   orcid.org/0000-0001-5333-1784
Date: 2018-02-06
Language: English
Scope: 610-615
University/Institute: Háskóli Íslands
University of Iceland
School: Hugvísindasvið (HÍ)
School of Humanities (UI)
Department: Heimspekistofnun (HÍ)
The Institute of Philosophy (UI)
Series: Australasian Journal of Philosophy;96(3)
ISSN: 0004-8402
1471-6828 (eISSN)
DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2018.1432666
Subject: Singular terms; Pragmatics; Confusion; Communication; Reference; Málnotkunarfræði
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11815/1980

Show full item record


Elmar Unnsteinsson (2018) Referential Intentions: A Responseto Buchanan and Peet, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96:3, 610-615, DOI:10.1080/00048402.2018.1432666


Buchanan [2014] argues for a Gricean solution to well-known counterexamples to direct reference theories of content. Peet [2016] develops a way to change the counterexample so that it seems to speak against Buchanan's own proposal. I argue that both theorists fail to notice a significant distinction between the kinds of cases at issue. Those appearing to count against direct reference theory must be described such that speakers have false beliefs about the identity of the object to which they intend to refer, beliefs that appear relevant to the determination of what constitutes communicative success. This suggests, further, that cases of this sort do not provide a basis for robust generalizations about singular reference.


Post-print (lokagerð höfundar)


This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy on 6. Feb 2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00048402.2018.1432666.

Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)