Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet

Unnsteinsson, Elmar

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dc.contributor	Háskóli Íslands
dc.contributor	University of Iceland
dc.contributor.author	orcid.org/0000-0001-5333-1784 Unnsteinsson, Elmar
dc.date.accessioned	2020-08-12T12:45:51Z
dc.date.available	2020-08-12T12:45:51Z
dc.date.issued	2018-02-06
dc.identifier.citation	Elmar Unnsteinsson (2018) Referential Intentions: A Responseto Buchanan and Peet, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96:3, 610-615, DOI:10.1080/00048402.2018.1432666
dc.identifier.issn	0004-8402
dc.identifier.issn	1471-6828 (eISSN)
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11815/1980
dc.description	Post-print (lokagerð höfundar)
dc.description.abstract	Buchanan [2014] argues for a Gricean solution to well-known counterexamples to direct reference theories of content. Peet [2016] develops a way to change the counterexample so that it seems to speak against Buchanan's own proposal. I argue that both theorists fail to notice a significant distinction between the kinds of cases at issue. Those appearing to count against direct reference theory must be described such that speakers have false beliefs about the identity of the object to which they intend to refer, beliefs that appear relevant to the determination of what constitutes communicative success. This suggests, further, that cases of this sort do not provide a basis for robust generalizations about singular reference.
dc.description.sponsorship	I acknowledge the support of the Icelandic Centre for Research (163132-051) and the Irish Research Council (GOIPD/2016/186) at different stages of this research.
dc.format.extent	610-615
dc.language.iso	en
dc.publisher	Informa UK Limited
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Australasian Journal of Philosophy;96(3)
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	Singular terms
dc.subject	Pragmatics
dc.subject	Confusion
dc.subject	Communication
dc.subject	Reference
dc.subject	Málnotkunarfræði
dc.title	Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dcterms.license	This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy on 6. Feb 2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00048402.2018.1432666.
dc.description.version	Peer reviewed
dc.identifier.journal	Australasian Journal of Philosophy
dc.identifier.doi	10.1080/00048402.2018.1432666
dc.relation.url	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00048402.2018.1432666
dc.contributor.department	Heimspekistofnun (HÍ)
dc.contributor.department	The Institute of Philosophy (UI)
dc.contributor.school	Hugvísindasvið (HÍ)
dc.contributor.school	School of Humanities (UI)