The interlinkages of design and effectiveness of governing bodies in the United Nations development system

Abstract

Multilateralism is encountering strong political headwinds at both the global and national level. The high economic, social and environmental costs of recurrent crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and climate change, have led to growing questions about the performance legitimacy of multilateralism. Many multilateral institutions are no longer felt to be able to deliver the public value which was their original reason for being. The UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, in Our Common Agenda, has called for a reinvigoration of multilateralism, including the institutions that sustain it like the United Nations. The dissertation focuses on governance of the UN development system, a group of 43 entities that receive contributions for operational activities for development that collectively accounted for about 75 per cent of all the work of the Organization in 2021. More specifically, the dissertation examines whether the design of governing bodies in the UN development system is correlated with their performance and, if so, which institutional rules may be particularly important in this regard. There has been limited research on the interlinkages of design and performance of governing bodies of international organizations like those that are part of the UN development system, and the dissertation aims to contribute to addressing this lacunae. A mixed method approach is applied to the research process by relying on a combination of literature review, new data collection and UN management information systems. Since 1969, Member States, the Secretary-General and other stakeholders have regularly commissioned expert reports and studies on reform of the UN development system. The dissertation shows that the governance related recommendations that are common to this large number of expert reports and studies and advocating for consolidation of governance structures, more precise rules stipulating representation and participation in governing bodies, and enhanced working methods of governing bodies, have strong support from both academic theory and empirical evidence. The liberalization of funding rules and practices since the 1990s, resulting in an overwhelming share of voluntary, strictly earmarked contributions for operational activities of the UN system, has been a major causal driver of the many governance challenges facing the Organization. While the liberalization of funding rules and practices has led to high growth in the volume of contributions, it has also fundamentally weakened the ability of governing bodies to perform their mandated role and functions such as providing strategic guidance and vision, ensuring policy implementation, monitoring organizational performance and having an effective overview of the work of both entities and the UN development system as a whole. The volume, quality, substantive focus and destination of operational activities of the UN system are now primarily determined by the donors individually, not Member States collectively at the level of governing bodies. As a result, most governing bodies in the UN development system no longer retain the authority to set programme priorities, distribute funds, create new programmes, and provide oversight and accountability of programme delivery at the country and global level. Another corollary of the liberalization of funding rules and practices has been increased fragmentation, overlaps and duplication of activities, as UN entities have a strong incentive to continuously expand their mandates and functions as a strategy to reduce resource uncertainty. This has led to rapid growth in non-core functions, i.e., those activities not directly related to the core purposes and central mandates of UN entities. The design of most governing bodies in the UN development system has been underpinned by the principle of equitable geographical representation. The application of this principle, however, doesn´t enable all Member States to contribute equitably to intergovernmental decision-making. A review of the composition of governing bodies in the UN development system reveals that a sizeable number of Member States do not participate in II the work of any governing body; the least-developed countries are significantly under-represented in governing bodies; and high-income countries are much more likely to participate in the governance of UN entities. In addition, the top programme and donor countries, which bear almost all the cost of intergovernmental decision-making on operational activities, account for only a small share of the seats on governing bodies in the UN development system. The ability of central governing bodies like the General Assembly and ECOSOC to provide effective guidance, coordination and oversight of the UN development system, including the implementation of system-wide mandates, is limited, as their resolutions are not automatically implemented by entity-specific governing bodies. The non-hierarchical character of inter-agency mechanisms like the United Nations Sustainable Development Group, relying on voluntary participation and decision-making by consensus and not formally accountable, through the Secretary-General, to central governing bodies, has also provided little incentives for UN entities to capitalize on opportunities for synergy in programming and operations in the delivery of operational activities. Member States have been reluctant to make inter-agency mechanisms like the UN Sustainable Development Group formally accountable, through the Secretary-General, to central governing bodies such as ECOSOC for the implementation of system-wide mandates. The performance of governing bodies in the UN development system, when measured as their engagement and ownership of the strategic planning process, varies significantly. Of the fourteen governing bodies subject to a performance assessment, those of ICAO, IMO, WHO and FAO stood out in terms of their engagement and ownership of the strategic planning process. In these four entities, the strategic planning process is led and owned by the respective governing body (principal) rather than the organizational leadership (agent). Other governing bodies play a less influential role in this process vis-à-vis the organizational leadership. Seven institutional rules appear to be particularly important in explaining the strong ownership and engagement of governing bodies of the strategic planning process, namely: (a) form of funding, (b) participation by technical experts, (c) establishment of technical subsidiary bodies, (d) a technical decision-making process, (e) decisions adopted by majority voting, (f) technically-oriented decisions and (g) criteria-based composition. The findings of the research and analysis conducted in the dissertation show that many governing bodies in the UN development system are not able to perform their mandated role and functions; representation in governing bodies is often not equitable, transparent and effective; and central governing bodies like the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council are not equipped to ensure that UN entities operate as a coherent system. Looking ahead, it may be particularly important for Member States to consider establishing a unified governance arrangement for the UN development system; adopting equitable, transparent and effective rules for the composition of governing bodies; ensuring the participation of experts in governance processes; and strengthening the working methods of governing bodies, including the efficiency of meetings and documentation and the quality of secretariat support.