„Hið þanda segl, hinn rennandi lækur ...“: Athygli, ást og lotning í siðfræði náttúrunnar

Abstract

Greinin fjallar um mikilvægi athygli, lotningar og ástar í siðferðilegri hugsun, eink-um er varðar náttúruna. Greinin hefst á umfjöllun um algengan heimspekilegan skilning á siðferðilegu gildi og siðferðilegri stöðu manna, dýra og náttúrunnar í heild. Samkvæmt þessum skilningi ræðst siðferðilegt gildi og staða vera af því hvaða hugrænu eiginleikum þær eru gæddar. Færð eru rök fyrir því að þessi skilningur sé ófullnægjandi, og að dýpri skilningur á siðferðilegri þýðingu fyrirbæra fáist í ljósi hugtaka á borð við athygli, lotningu og ást. Rætt er um það hvernig þessi hugtök tengjast sýn á gildi manna og náttúru, og hvernig þau geta einnig hjálpað okkur að hugsa um blindu okkar á innra líf annarra og á það sem aðrir sjá af veruleikanum. loks eru náttúruskrif Henrys Davids Thoreau tekin sem dæmi um djúpa sýn á nátt-úruna og gildi hennar sem er í ríkum mæli mótuð af athygli, lotningu og ást. Hugsun Thoreaus leiðir í ljós að siðferðilegt samband okkar við aðrar verur er í grundvall-aratriðum mótað af þessum hugtökum

in this article i discuss the importance of the concepts of attention, reverence and love in ethics and moral thought, especially in relation to nature. Firstly, i examine a view that may be considered as a standard view in moral philosophy. According to this view the moral value of humans, animals and other natural beings depends on the mental and nonmoral characteristics, such as reason, consciousness or sentience, they may possess. Some proponents of the standard view make a sharp distinction between it and other standpoints in moral philosophy, claiming that the standard view rests on rational grounds, while other viewpoints rely merely on emotions, insight, and so forth. However, as i point out, the standard view usually rests on an insight into the elevated value or importance of one or another of mental charac-teristics. The standard view is therefore unsatisfactory in so far as its proponents do not acknowledge the basis of moral thought in deeper emotional insight. i consider, secondly, one aspect of this emotional insight by considering the virtue of reverence. Reverence is a capacity to see and have appropriate feelings toward something of great worth. Reverence is an important source of moral understanding, but also of moral disagreement since we do not always see eye to eye as to what has great worth. We are often blind to the worth others see in things. i argue that one of the main tasks of moral agency is to seek to lessen the influence of this kind of blindness, i.e. to try to see the world in the light of other people’s reverence and love. i argue also, following William James, that when it comes to seeing the true worth of things it is the side that feels the more, and not the side that feels the less, that we should pay greater attention to. This claim leads to the final part of my paper which deals with the nature-writings of Henry David Thoreau. in his meditations on nature Thoreau often uses words like wonder, awe, reverence and love to convey his thought. His thought on nature is, furthermore, charged with these notions and feelings. i argue that Thoreau shows us in his writings how our ability to see nature in all her starkness, beauty and worth depends on our reverence and love for her; nature is most significant to a lover, as he puts it.