Háskóli ÍslandsUniversity of IcelandUnnsteinsson, Elmar2020-08-122020-08-122016-04Unnsteinsson, E. (2016). Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46(2), 204-227. doi:10.1080/00455091.2016.11539940045-50911911-0820 (eISSN)https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11815/1983Post-print (lokagerð höfundar)Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.204-227eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPhilosophyConfusionIdentityMillikanGriceFrege puzzleImplicit believeHeimspekiRökfræðiSjálfsvitundinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleCanadian Journal of Philosophy10.1080/00455091.2016.1153994