Háskóli ÍslandsUniversity of IcelandUnnsteinsson, Elmar2020-08-122020-08-122018-05-23Unnsteinsson, E. (2019), Frege's Puzzle is About Identity After All. Philos Phenomenol Res, 99: 628-643. doi:10.1111/phpr.125160031-82051933-1592 (eISSN)https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11815/1978Pre-print (óritrýnt handrit)Many philosophers have argued or taken for granted that Frege's puzzle has little or nothing to do with identity statements. I show that this is wrong, arguing that the puzzle can only be motivated relative to a thinker's beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the relevant object. The result is important, as it suggests that the puzzle can be solved, not by a semantic theory of names or referring expressions as such, but simply by a theory of identity statements. To show this, I sketch a framework for developing solutions of this sort. I also consider how this result could be implemented by two influential solutions to Frege's puzzle, Perry's referential‐reflexivism and Fine's semantic relationism.628-643eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSingular ThoughtMental FilesMillianismHeimspekiRökfræðiinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research10.1111/phpr.12516