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Browsing by Department "The Institute of Philosophy (UI)"

Browsing by Department "The Institute of Philosophy (UI)"

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  • Unnsteinsson, Elmar (Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2016-04)
    Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that ...
  • Unnsteinsson, Elmar (Informa UK Limited, 2018-03-21)
    I argue for a theory of the optimal function of the speech act of referring, called the edenic theory. First, the act of singular reference is defined directly in terms of Gricean communicative intentions. Second, I propose a doxastic constraint on the ...
  • Unnsteinsson, Elmar (Wiley, 2018-05-23)
    Many philosophers have argued or taken for granted that Frege's puzzle has little or nothing to do with identity statements. I show that this is wrong, arguing that the puzzle can only be motivated relative to a thinker's beliefs about the identity or ...
  • Unnsteinsson, Elmar (Wiley, 2017-07-14)
    Gricean intentionalists hold that what a speaker says and means by a linguistic utterance is determined by the speaker's communicative intention. On this view, one cannot really say anything without meaning it as well. Conventionalists argue, however, ...
  • Unnsteinsson, Elmar (Informa UK Limited, 2018-02-06)
    Buchanan [2014] argues for a Gricean solution to well-known counterexamples to direct reference theories of content. Peet [2016] develops a way to change the counterexample so that it seems to speak against Buchanan's own proposal. I argue that both ...
  • Unnsteinsson, Elmar (KruZak, 2017)
    In response to Stephen Neale (2016), I argue that aphonic expressions, such as PRO, are intentionally uttered by normal speakers of natural language, either by acts of omitting to say something explicitly, or by acts of giving phonetic realization to ...
  • Harris, Daniel W.; Unnsteinsson, Elmar (Informa UK Limited, 2017-12-05)
    Many philosophers have assumed, without argument, that Wittgenstein influenced Austin. More often, however, this is vehemently denied, especially by those who knew Austin personally. We compile and assess the currently available evidence for Wittgenstein’s ...