



**UNIVERSITY
OF ICELAND**

Postwar Mnemonic Anti-Fascism

The Nordic Committees against the Greek Junta, 1967–1974

Pontus Järvstad

Dissertation towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2024

**SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY**

Deild heimspeki, sagnfræði og fornleifafræði við Háskóla Íslands
hefur metið ritgerð þessa hæfa til varnar
við doktorspróf í sagnfræði

Reykjavík, 14 maí 2024.

Sverrir Jakobsson
deildarforseti

The Faculty of Philosophy, History, and Archeology
at the University of Iceland
has declared this dissertation eligible for a defence
leading to a Ph.D. degree in History

Doctoral Committee:
Valur Ingimundarson, supervisor
Ragnheiður Kristjánsdóttir
Johan Lundin

Postwar Mnemonic Anti-Fascism: The Nordic Committees against the Greek Junta, 1967–1974

© Pontus Järvstad
Reykjavík 2024

Dissertation for a doctoral degree at the University of Iceland. All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form
without written permission of the author.

ISBN 978-9935-9736-6-5
ORCID 0009-0005-7842-6321

Abstract

The 1967 military coup in Greece brought a brutal Junta to power, which gained international notoriety for its use of torture against political opponents during its seven-year rule. The coup shocked Western European public opinion, evoking memories of past right-wing dictatorships and historical fascist regimes. This sentiment was especially felt in Scandinavia, where organized struggle for the restoration in democracy in Greece became the strongest. This thesis deals with the transnational activities and political agitation of a Nordic social movement that was created to fight the Junta and whose far-reaching influence has largely been overlooked in historical narratives. The main focus is on the anti-fascist aspects of the opposition movement. It is shown that the individual committees, which were created in all the Nordic countries, framed their acts of resisting the military regime as a continuation of past resistance against fascism. Thus, despite the centrality of the ideological clash between two empires—the Soviet Union and the United States—Nordic politicians and activists also transcended political dogmas during the Cold War.

While spanning a broad political spectrum, the Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish Committees, in particular, were dominated by social democratic members. As a testimony to their political influence, they helped shape Nordic foreign policies on the Greek issue through attempts to isolate the Junta in international institutions. This political pressure forced the military regime, in 1969, to withdraw from the Council of Europe before Greece's formal expulsion. It is, furthermore, shown that despite close links with social democratic governments, these anti-fascist activists were prepared to go beyond legal means as part of their covert efforts to unite the Greek democratic opposition, calling for the assassination of Junta members and for engaging in direct resistance activities in Greece.

The thesis puts the anti-Junta movement within the historical context of post-war anti-fascism in the Nordic countries. Besides this movement, from 1945 to 1975, organized Nordic anti-fascism revolved around three main issues: Francoist Spain, the Portuguese dictatorship, and a global antisemitic episode dubbed the "Swastika Epidemic." The opposition to Franco's regime was strongest in the late 1940s and the 1950s, with Norway leading the way. Building on continuities from earlier anti-fascist social movements, it represented the first postwar attempt at forming an anti-fascist memory regime. As a social movement, however, it remained fractured. Scarred by Cold War tensions, it never succeeded in creating a unified Nordic network of committees that opposed Franco. Yet Norway

managed to keep Spain out of NATO as long as it was under a dictatorship, using anti-fascist arguments to make its case. And the idea of broad-based political committees designed to organize anti-fascist activities lived on, resurfacing, in a powerful way, during the years of the Greek Junta from 1967 to 1974.

It is argued in the thesis that the Nordic Committees on Spain and Greece formed a collective anti-fascist identity. By labeling these regimes as fascist, the activists sought to resume the historical struggle against fascism in a post-war setting. This transnational social movement garnered support for its cause by summoning memories of this past, especially of the Spanish Civil War and the Nazi occupation of Denmark and Norway. The military coup in Greece was seen as an “event of critical juncture,” which unsettled the existing democratic order, and which raised the specter of fascism in Europe. Undercutting a Cold War paradigm, it formed the basis for the establishment of a social movement, which sought the “social appropriation” of the past to make sense of the present. Referring to scholarly writings on fascism and anti-fascism, memory, and social movements, the dissertation shows how through mnemonic practices, legitimacy and respectability were brought to a struggle that objectively concerned itself with a distant military dictatorship.

What is stressed is that the dynamic of this Nordic movement enabled as well as constrained its activities, when it came in contact with split memories of the past—between Scandinavians, whose wartime experiences evoked a solidarity discourse against a common fascist foe, and the Greeks steeped in a different political past dominated by a communist/anti-communist struggle during their Civil War. Thus, this memory work not only unleashed mobilizing and legitimizing potential in opposing fascism; it also had a debilitating effect in cases where there was no consensus on a shared collective identity and memory. Even if the transnational Nordic anti-Junta network was led by the Swedish, Danish and Norwegian Committees, their anti-fascist line failed to attract full support from Greek committees in other countries. Thus, Greek Marxist intellectuals struggled to adopt an anti-fascist discourse against the Junta since they did not define the regime as fascist. In the Nordic countries, interest in the Greek case began to wane when it became clear that Greek opposition groups were powerless to topple the military regime. The Nordic Committees’ strained relationship with the Greek exiles and immigrants and their organizations also contributed to their decline. In the end, it was not resistance against the dictatorship but a failed Greek attempt to annex Cyprus in 1974, which led to fall of the Junta following a full-scale Turkish invasion of the island.

The thesis posits that the longevity and resilience of anti-fascist narratives can be explained through mnemonic functions. By calling for an active remembrance of the catastrophe that historical fascism produced in Europe, anti-fascism represents a powerful collective identity. The argument is made that the academic interpretation of anti-fascism as containing a minimum of defense of democracy must be complemented with memory. It also means that the fascist epithet should be viewed as more than a pejorative. Authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes that do not identify themselves as fascist might still be classified in such terms because they trigger memories of fascism through their behavior and actions. Thus, the study contributes to the growing field of anti-fascist studies by emphasizing the need for engaging with the important role played by collective and cultural memory in political movements.

Ágrip

Eftir valdaránið í Grikklandi árið 1967 settist herstjórn við stjórnvölinn sem varð alræmd fyrir að beita stjórnarandstæðinga pyntingum á sjö ára valdatíma sínum. Valdaránið var harðlega gagnrýnt víða í Vestur-Evrópu og vakti upp sögulegar minningar um hægri einræðisstjórnir og stjórnarhætti fasista. Slík viðbrögð voru sérstaklega áberandi í Skandinavíu þar sem skipulagðar pólitískar aðgerðir til að koma aftur á lýðræði í Grikklandi náðu lengst. Þessi ritgerð fjallar um starf þverþjóðlegrar norrænnar félagshreyfingar sem barðist gegn herforingjastjórninni í Grikklandi. Greind er sú pólitíska barátta sem hún háði og fjallað um þær aðgerðir sem hún stóð fyrir. Megináherslan er lögð á andfasíska þætti í starfsemi hreyfingarinnar, sem hafði mun víðtækari áhrif en ráða má af fyrri rannsóknum á pólitískri andstöðu gegn herforingjastjórninni.

Á öllum Norðurlöndunum voru stofnaðar nefndir til að berjast fyrir endurheimt lýðræðis í Grikklandi og töldu þær að hér væri um að ræða framhald á sögulegri baráttu gegn fasisma. Með því að taka slíka afstöðu gengu norrænir stjórnáamenn og aðgerðasinnar stundum gegn ráðandi hugmyndafræði kalda stríðsins sem birtist í hugmyndabaráttu tveggja heimsveldi, Bandaríkjanna og Sovétríkjanna. Jafnaðarmenn fóru með tögl og haldir í nefndunum í Noregi, Svíþjóð og Danmörku, þótt þær spönnuðu vítt pólitískt svið. Sýnt verður að þeir höfðu bein pólitísk áhrif á utanríkisstefnu þessara ríkja í Grikklandsmálinu, ekki síst með því að beita sér fyrir einangrun herforingjastjórnarinnar í alþjóðastofnunum. Þessi pólitíski þrýstingur skilaði þeim árangri að herforingjastjórnin ákvað að ganga úr Evrópuráðinu árið 1969 áður en Grikklandi yrði vísað formlega úr því. Norrænu aðgerðasinnarnir voru þó reiðubúnir að ganga mun lengra en löghlýðnir sósíaldemókratískir ráðamenn. Til að sameina gríska stjórnarandstæðinga var t.d. hvatt til þess að ráðherrar í herforingjastjórninni yrðu ráðnir af dögum og að gripið yrði til virkrar andstöðu, þar sem ofbeldi yrði beitt, í Grikklandi.

Í ritgerðinni er starf norrænu andstöðuhreyfingarinnar sett í samhengi við andfasíska baráttu á Norðurlöndum eftir síðari heimsstyrjöld. Á tímabilinu 1945–1975 hverfðist hún um þrjú mál: Franco-stjórnina á Spáni, „faraldri gyðingahaturs“ í formi veggjakrots víða um heim og einræðisstjórnina í Portúgal. Mest bar á andstöðunni gegn einræðisstjórn Francos á fimmta og sjötta áratug síðustu aldar, þar sem Norðmenn voru í forystu. Hér var um að ræða fyrstu tilraunina eftir stríð til að byggja pólitíska baráttu á minningunni um sögulega andstöðu gegn fasisma. Ekki tókst þó að stofna sameinaða þverþjóðlega hreyfingu á Norðurlöndum í þessu skyni vegna áhrifa kalda stríðsins, þar sem baráttan gegn kommúnisma gekk fyrir. Engu að

síður tókst Norðmönnum, sem beittu andfasískum rökum, að koma í veg fyrir að Spánn fengi aðild að NATO svo lengi sem einræðisstjórn væri þar við völd. Hugmyndin um breiða andfasíska hreyfingu var því ekki dauð og hún gekk í endurnýjun lífdaga á valdatíma grísku herforingjastjórnarinnar.

Í ritgerðinni eru færð rök fyrir því að norrænu nefndirnar sem stofnaðar voru til að berjast gegn einræðisstjórnunum á Spáni og í Grikklandi hafi verið reistar á sameiginlegri andfasískri sjálfsmynd. Með því að skilgreina þessar stjórnir sem fasískar reyndu þær að endurvekja baráttuna gegn fasisma eftir síðari heimsstyrjöld. Þessi þverþjóðlega hreyfing sóttist eftir stuðningi með því að vísa til sögulegra minninga, einkum spænsku borgarastyrjaldarinnar og hernáms Danmörku og Noregi. Litið var svo á að valdaránið í Grikklandi markaði pólitísk þáttaskil sem græfi undan lýðræðisskipulaginu og yki hættuna á að fasismi næði aftur fótfestu í Evrópu. Þessi túlkun var ekki aðeins í ósamræmi við ráðandi pólitísk viðmið í kalda stríðinu, heldur skapaði grundvöll fyrir stofnun hreyfingar sem gerði sér far um að „eigna“ sér fortíðina til að skilja samtímamann. Með vísun í fræðiskrif um fasisma, andfasisma, minni og félagshreyfingar er sýnt hvernig andfasískt minni var notað til ljá þessari baráttu gegn fjarlægri herstjórn lögmæti og virðingu.

Lögð er áhersla á að þessi sögulega minnisnalgun jók ekki aðeins áhrif hreyfingarinnar heldur takmarkaði þau einnig. Þannig var vonlaust að samhæfa ólíkar minningar Skandinava, sem rekja mátti til eigin andstöðu gegn fasisma á stríðsárunum og reist var á orðræðu um samstöðu ólíkra pólitískra afla, og Grikkja sem höfðu gengið gegnum annars konar reynslu í borgarastríðinu eftir síðari heimsstyrjöld þar sem andkommúnísk og kommúnísk öfl tókust á. Minningapólitík, sem þjónaði því markmiði að virkja fólk í nafni réttláts sögulegs málstaðar, gat því dregið úr baráttuvirkni þegar engin sátt náðist um sameiginlega sjálfsmynd og minni. Hinni þverþjóðlegu norrænu andstöðuhreyfingu, sem var leidd af nefndunum í Svíþjóð, Danmörku og Noregi, mistókst að fá nefndir í öðrum ríkjum til að fylkja sér um andfasískt minni í baráttunni gegn einræðisstjórninni í Grikklandi. Grískir menntamenn úr röðum marxista voru meðal þeirra sem áttu í erfiðleikum með að samþykkja þessa pólitísku baráttuaðferð vegna þess að þeir litu ekki svo á að herforingjastjórnin væri fasísk. Áhugi á Grikklandsmálinu fór þverrandi á Norðurlöndum þegar ljóst varð að grísk stjórnarandstöðuöfl voru ekki nægilega öflug til að steypa stjórninni af stóli. Togstreita í samskiptum við grískra flóttamanna og samtaka þeirra varð til þess að veikja enn frekar starf norrænu nefndanna. Að lokum var það þó ekki andstaðan gegn herforingjastjórninni sem felldi hana, heldur misheppnuð tilraun hennar til að innlima Kýpur sem leiddi til innrásar Tyrkja á eyjuna.

Í ritgerðinni er því haldið fram að minni gegni lykilhlutverki í að viðhalda andfasískum frásögnum og endurnýja þær. Með því að hvetja til þess að minnast með virkum hætti þeirra hörmunga sem fasisminn leiddi yfir Evrópu var skapaður grundvöllur fyrir sameiginlegri and-fasískri sjálfmynd sem hefur haft veruleg pólitísk áhrif frá lokum síðari heimsstyrjaldar. Einnig eru færð rök fyrir því að finna þurfi stað fyrir minni í fræðilegri skilgreiningu á andfasisma sem lágmarksvörn lýðræðisins. Unnt er að flokka valdboðsstjórnir og annars konar andlýðræðislegar stjórnir undir fasisma, þótt þær kenni sig sjálfar ekki við þá hugmyndafræði og stefnu, vegna þess að stjórnarhættir þeirra vekja upp slíkar minningar. Í þeim skilningi er þessi ritgerð framlag til fræðilegra rannsókna á andfasisma, sem hafa eflst mjög á undanförunum árum. Hér er sýnt hve nauðsynlegt það er að vísa til hlutverks sameiginlegs minnis og menningarminnis í starfi pólitískra hreyfinga.

Table of Contents

Abstract	1
Ágrip	4
Preface	8
Introduction	10
The Historiography of Anti-Fascism	19
Theorizing Memory, History, and Social Movements	38
The Structure and Sources of the Thesis.....	48
The Background: Postwar Anti-Fascist Sentiments in the Nordic Countries	51
Engaging with the Spanish Question through Memory.....	52
Opposing Franco and the “Swastika Epidemic”	63
Opposing Fascism in Southern Europe and Africa	76
Anti-Fascism as a Praxis: The Nordic Committees for Democracy in Greece	86
The Political Context: A Visit by a Danish Social Democrat in Athens	89
Nordic Reactions to the Greek Coup	95
Confronting the Junta: A Nordic Parliamentary Fact-Finding Mission to Greece.....	101
Scandinavian Party Politics and the Nordic Committees	111
Conflicting Interpretations of Fascism.....	122
Anti-Imperialism or Anti-Fascism? The Norwegian Split and Greek Refugees	135
Committees on the Margins: Iceland and Finland	142
Debating Nordic Participation in the European Athletic Championship in Athens.....	151
Nordic Actions against Greece in NATO and the Council of Europe.....	156
Collective Memory and Political Practice: Norwegian Attempts to Unify the Greek Opposition.....	174
The Decline of the Nordic Committees	192
Conclusion	206
Epilogue	217
Addendum: The Lives of the Nordic Protagonists after the Fall of the Greek Junta	222
Bibliography	226

Preface

This Ph.D. project did not start out as a study on the Nordic Committees for Democracy in Greece; the idea came to me later when I delved into their fascinating political work during my archival research. I discovered that not much thought had been given to the question of how anti-fascism developed after the Second World War in the Nordic countries. The bulk of the historical research had focused on the interwar period and the 1980s and 1990s, with the emergence of neo-Nazism. Yet I soon realized that there was a plethora of anti-fascist expressions during the entire postwar period. What stood out when it came to popular political engagement was the Spanish Question and the Greek Junta.

This is the first comprehensive historical study of the Nordic opposition against the Greek military regime. The Spanish Question will also be accounted for but only as a background to the main case study. Initially, my idea was to write a general history of Nordic anti-fascism, with a focus on historiographical questions. Yet, given the rich primary source material I examined in four Nordic countries, I concluded that the history of the anti-Junta committees had to be told. While the project developed into an empirical study with a specific time frame, it is also a historiographical contribution to the developing field of anti-fascist studies. By applying concepts from the field of memory studies, I hope that that thesis will open up new understandings of the nature and anatomy of anti-fascism. Thus, even as the project went through many changes, the seed of the original question of how to interpret anti-fascism remains pivotal.

The power of memory for identity formation is enormous. An encounter with cultural memory informed my own political awakening when growing up in a small town in Southern Sweden. My very first political engagement was in 2002, when I was fifteen years old. In the local town square, I gave a speech together with a friend in front of a torchlit march remembering the 1938 November Pogroms in Nazi Germany. During these years, the Swedish public was educated about the Holocaust through an information campaign to counter neo-Nazism. In those years, violent neo-Nazi activism was a real problem in the country, especially in the South. Thus, as is always the case with historians, I am not impartial in the production of the historical knowledge presented in this thesis, even if I have strived to be non-tendentious and nuanced.

When I was working on my doctoral dissertation, there was a global pandemic, and I became a father of two lovely children. It is my hope that I did the subject justice despite these challenges. I was privileged to receive funding from the Nordic ReNEW research

hub—through the EDDA Research Center at the University of Iceland (UI)—from the University of Iceland Research Fund, and from the Educational Fund of the UI’s School of Humanities.

I want to express my outmost thanks to the invaluable guidance and support offered by my supervisor Professor Valur Ingimundarson in writing this thesis. I am also grateful for the support and encouragement from my doctoral committee, Ragnheiður Kristjánsdóttir, a Professor of History at the University of Iceland, and Johan A. Lundin, a Professor of History at the University of Malmö. All three encouraged me to pursue a Ph.D. degree. My thanks go to historian Kasper Braskén for enabling me to participate in a book project, while I was working on this thesis. I would like to express my appreciation to the staff of the Nordic archives I visited; without their invaluable assistance, historical research would be impossible. I want to thank my brother Gunnar A.K. Järvstad for assisting me in collecting some archival material—and my friend Tarmo Tähtinen for helping with the translation of Finnish source material. I also want to express my gratitude to my extended family Maj Britt Pálsdóttir, Jóhannes Blöndal, and Karlotta Blöndal for their invaluable help with the kids. Finally, I would like to thank Anna Kristín B. Jóhannesdóttir, the love of my life. Her support and encouragement have been invaluable. This thesis is dedicated to her and our two children.

“We look at the world once, in childhood. The rest is memory.”
–*Louise Glück*¹

“We remember – *but we do not remember enough.*”
–*Georg Branting*²

Introduction

The Greek military coup in 1967 did not only lead to widespread condemnation but also to the formation of organized opposition to it. In all the Nordic countries, committees were established to oppose the Greek Junta and to agitate for the restoration of democracy in Greece. Together, they constituted a transnational social movement that mobilized civil society and the labor movement for the Greek cause through demonstrations, public meetings, conferences, and petitions. As a sign of its political reach, the movement managed to influence the foreign policies of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden by lobbying Social Democratic governments in its efforts to isolate the Greek Junta in international institutions. Through its political networks, it also established contacts with the opposition inside and outside Greece with the aim of uniting it. All this was done with the explicit understanding that the military regime was fascist and that the resistance movement against it was part of a broader anti-fascist struggle. To drive home the point, the collective memory of the historical battles against fascism during the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War was used to organize an anti-fascist collective identity. Such remembrance also served ideological and didactic purposes: By tapping into the reservoir of the past, it was thought to be possible to make sense of the present and to offer guidance for the future.

Louise Glück’s idea, as expressed in her 1996 poem “Nostos,” is that we look at the world once—when we are young—and then for the rest of our lives, we perceive it through memory. Such an understanding of memory may sound quaint, but it echoes, in fact, the practice of historians who engage with the past as traces in the present.³ To account for continuities and discontinuities,⁴ they usually opt for periodizations that shape historical

¹ “Nostos” – Louise Glück, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://drunkenlibrary.com/2019/01/09/nostos-louise-gluck/>.

² Georg Branting, *Bryt med Franco* (Stockholm: Arbetarnas Tryckeri, 1947), 4. From the original Swedish: “vi minns – men minns ick tillräckligt!”

³ Paul Ricoeur, “History and Hermeneutics,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 73, no. 19 (1976): 691.

⁴ Alexander Gershenkron, “On the Concept of Continuity in History,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 106, no. 3 (1962): 195–196.

narratives and naturalize assumptions of the past.⁵ Some political divisions of time look self-evident: Following the Second World War, a new geopolitical constellation—the Cold War—emerged and took root. It replaced a global struggle between fascism and anti-fascism with that of communism and anti-communism. Yet sharp narrative breaks can also foster a sense of memory loss or “forgetting” by limiting what can be thought of, and asked about, as historical developments. The Swedish Social Democrat Georg Branting urged the Swedish public in 1947 to remember more about the past. For him, the struggle against fascism did not end with the demise of Hitler and Mussolini, for Franco’s dictatorship had not been toppled. Those in the Nordic countries that felt the same decided to form an anti-fascist social movement to work toward this end, with the founding of committees in Sweden (*Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien*) and Norway (*Den norske Spaniakomiteen*).⁶ They encouraged people to look back, especially to the Spanish Civil War, to correct the historical mistakes that had led to the catastrophic rise of fascism on the European Continent. Thus, for the first time, anti-fascism became mnemonic in the sense that it assisted in remembering the past.

After the Second World War, the survival of two right-wing dictatorships in Spain and Portugal—within the Western camp—complicated the Cold War binary of a free and democratic world fighting totalitarian communism on a global scale. Similarly, the West’s resistance to the national aspirations of colonized people—in countries such as South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau—raised probing questions about its commitment to human rights outside the communist orbit. The democratic credentials of the West took another blow in 1967 when the military seized power in the cradle of democracy: Greece. A month before scheduled elections were to take place—where Georgios Papandreou’s party, Center Union, was predicted to win—a group of colonels toppled a caretaker government. The Greek coup led to another wave of anti-fascist mobilization in the Nordic countries, which was rationalized on the grounds that the Junta posed an existential threat to European democracy. One of the founders of this social movement, the Swedish Social Democrat Hans Göran Franck, argued that there was an acute need to emulate and resume the work of previous anti-fascist organizations against the dictatorship in Spain by forming new committees against the Greek Junta.⁷ As was the case with the post-war social movement, the new one challenged the idea that fascism was a thing of the past and deviated from the dominant Cold War metanarrative, centering on the

⁵ Ludmilla Jordanova, *History in Practice* (London: Hodder Education Publishers, 2000), 105–107, 113.

⁶ Branting, *Bryt med Franco*, 1–14.

⁷ “Tyst demonstration mot regimen i Grekland,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 3, 1967.

cleavage between democracy and communism. Through memory, it, thus, questioned essentialized assumptions of historical time by referring to the continuity of both fascism and anti-fascism.

This thesis explores Nordic post-war anti-fascism from 1945 to 1975: how the movement constituted itself, how it used memory in its activism, how it interpreted fascism, and how it practiced politics. In the case of Spain, Cold War tensions and ideological divisions affected attempts to establish a broad-based Nordic anti-fascist movement. While the Portuguese colonial empire was often conceptualized as fascist by the Nordic Committees, the struggle against it was also tied to the anti-Apartheid movement, which was a separate social movement, emphasizing anti-racism and anti-colonialism, rather than anti-fascism. There were other instances—such as the so-called Swastika Epidemic in 1959–1960 the first global antisemitic campaign since the Second World War—where racism and antisemitism were understood as an intrinsic part of the history of fascism. Yet, as was the case during the interwar period (Finland excluded), anti-fascist movements primarily viewed fascism as an external threat to the Nordic countries, not as a domestic one.⁸ This started to change in the mid-1970s, with the reemergence of far-right parties and neo-Nazi movements in the Nordic countries. In the 1980s and 1990s, this political force engaged in racist violence, prompting a more activist and militant response, which differed greatly from previous anti-fascist organizing. Inspired by anarchism and autonomism, it did not seek the assistance of the state in facing fascism. Instead, activism and direct action informed their political practice, envisioning utopian futures rather than seeking out broad democratic alliances.

This thesis is a case study of the Nordic Committees that opposed the Greek Junta. Instead of approaching this movement from a national perspective, the focus will be on its transnational aspects, especially the attempt to forge Nordic networks and cooperation on the Greek issue. The movement was Nordic in the sense that there were committees in all the Nordic countries. Nonetheless, it was dominated by those in the three Scandinavian countries: Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. The committees in Finland and Iceland were only marginal participants. Yet, although the movement was more Scandinavian, it chose to portray and identify its transnational cooperation in Nordic terms. Several core questions will be addressed here: What motivated Nordic participants in the struggle against the military

⁸ Kasper Braskén and Johan A. Lundin, “Introduction,” in *Anti-fascism in the Nordic Countries: New Perspectives, Comparisons and Transnational Connections*, eds. Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey, and Johan A. Lundin (London: Routledge, 2019), 7.

regime? How did the movement's anti-fascist, Nordic, and transnational characteristics manifest themselves? How did it view the Greek Junta as a political formation and how did differing ideas about fascism play in this interpretation? What kind of ideological tensions arose within the Committees and how were they connected to the wider fault lines of the Cold War? What was the role of Greek exiles and immigrants? What were the connections between the Committees and political elites? How did the Committees influence international actions taken against the Greek Junta in the Council of Europe and NATO? In what ways did the use of anti-fascist historical memory enable or constrain the work of the Committees? What were the differences between the Nordic Committees when it came to legitimizing and mobilizing civil society through memory politics? What were the main explanations for the eventual decline of the Committees and for receding political interest in the Greek issue in general? Finally, the general role of memory in post-war anti-fascist activism will be evaluated by grappling with the question of whether it constituted a mnemonic social movement.

The focus of the thesis will be on Nordic anti-fascist social movements in the postwar and Cold War periods. Their far-reaching influence has been largely overlooked in historical narratives of the period, which focus on issues such as the Vietnam War and the Prague Spring. Studies about the movements that opposed Francoist Spain and the Greek Junta open the narrative to further inquiry and call into question fixed assumptions about the Cold War. The thesis will demonstrate that despite the centrality of the ideological clash between two empires—the Soviet Union and the United States—politicians and activists sometimes transcended Cold War dogmas in the Nordic countries where the resonance of anti-fascism was also stronger than elsewhere.

It will be argued in the thesis that the Nordic Committees on Spain and Greece formed a collective anti-fascist identity through mnemonic practices centering on collective memories of the Spanish Civil War and on the experiences of Nazi occupation in Scandinavia. This collective identity was about who their members were, what they fought for, and who they fought against. It was meant to convey how they identified with anti-fascism, and, in more general terms, how they classified their opponents as fascist. Mnemonic practice is used here to account for the committees' calls for the remembrance of the historical struggle against fascism; it is also conceptualized as an active form of memory work. A central claim made here is that anti-fascism is mnemonic: People participate in—or identify with—anti-fascist social movements because they remember and want others to do the same. Legitimacy and relevance are intertwined with this remembrance and inform political practice. Such collective memory is not only forged and transmitted through

socialization and communication but also through lived experience. Many members of the Nordic anti-fascist movements had direct experience with the past they evoked as memories—either as direct participants or as children growing up. The concept of cultural memory has less relevance in this context than collective memory since it tends to explain the memory work of texts and cultural products over a long period of time. It is, however, more applicable to later stages of anti-fascism with generational shifts and fewer instances of direct experience of historical fascism.

The military coup in Greece was seen as an “event of critical juncture,” which unsettled the existing political order, and which raised the specter of fascism in Europe. Undercutting a Cold War paradigm, the event became a basis for a new anti-fascist social movement, involving the “social appropriation” of the past to make sense of the present or what has been termed “memory in movements.” By relying on methods in political and social history, the thesis will deal with the discourses and practices of this anti-fascist movement and the chronology of events it affected and was shaped by. The dynamic of mnemonic work, it will be shown, was both a source of agency and passivity, especially when the movement encountered split memories of the past. On the one hand, it unleashed enormous mobilizing and legitimizing potential in opposing fascism; on the other, it had a debilitating effect in cases where there was no consensus on a shared collective identity and memory.

The thesis makes the case that the longevity and resilience of anti-fascist narratives can be explained through the evocation of memory and calls for active engagement with the catastrophe that fascism produced in Europe. Anti-fascism still represents a powerful collective identity and memory not only by facing up to perceived fascists but, simultaneously, by conjuring up past struggles against fascism. In some cases, the foes do not identify with fascism but might still be classified as such because of the memory they trigger through their behavior and actions. Thus, it was not strange that anti-fascists in 1967 viewed an anti-democratic, right-wing military dictatorship, which sought to eradicate dissent by building concentration camps, as fascist. Likewise, even if one does not agree with the characterization of Donald Trump as a fascist, his actions evoke the memories of intrinsic aspects of historical fascism such as racism and anti-democracy. Apart from inciting xenophobia, he displays authoritarian tendencies by calling into question a democratic transition of power. At the same time, there is a need to be aware that classifying someone as fascist often marks the end of a democratic debate. To put it differently, the fascist label has less to do with theoretical interpretations than with viewing the world through the memory of the horrors it caused. Anti-fascism is, thus, mnemonic, for it assists in remembering fascism.

This thesis will be the first historical study of the Nordic Committees for Democracy in Greece. No scholarly work has been done on them, and when they have been referred to, it has mostly been through autobiographies⁹ and newspaper articles. Nordic scholarship on the Greek issue following the military takeover in Greece has concentrated on activist foreign policy, royal connections, and human rights. In contrast, the primary focus here is on the anti-fascist aspects of the social movement opposing the Junta. The Committees fought, as noted, through transnational activism for a cause in a distant land.

Historian Kim Christiaens has shed much light on the under-studied history of European solidarity movements with Greece by emphasizing the transnational cooperation between groups on both sides of the Iron Curtain. He maintains that the Greek issue contributed to visions of *détente*, which made it possible to tie the struggle against the Greek Junta with that against colonialism in the “Third World.” Christiaens shows how the anti-fascist struggle blurred Cold War divisions in Europe by uniting communists and social democrats. He argues that the European Left saw the Junta primarily in colonial rather than anti-fascist terms: either as a South American “banana republic” or an African “development country.” In addition, Christiaens avers that the communist-controlled committees, such as the Soviet one, dominated the opposition to the Greek military regime. Indeed, many of the organizations he explores were dominated by communists, including the British League for Democracy in Greece that traces its origins to the Greek Civil War (1946–1949). The marginal influence of this British organization can partly be explained by its close connection to the British Communist Party. In France, West Germany, and Belgium communists also tended to dominate the social movements that opposed the Junta. This was understandable since before the Greek military coup, communists led campaigns against the anti-communist political repression in post-Civil War Greece. Hans Göran Franck even participated in an international conference in Paris on the subject in 1963.

Nonetheless, Christiaens overlooks the significance of the Nordic Committees, claiming—incorrectly—that the campaign for the expulsion of Greece from the Council of Europe was international when it clearly originated in the Nordic countries. He singles out the importance of the Soviet committee, although it was founded a half year later than the

⁹ See Mogens Camre, *Knus tyrannerne, Erindringer og selvbiografi* (Odense: Trykkefrihedsselskabets Bibliotek, 2011); Pierre Schori, *Minnets och elden. En politisk memoar med samtida synpunkter* (Leopard förlag: Stockholm, 2014); Einar Gerhardsen, *Mennesker og politikk. Erindringer 1965–78* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1978); Berit Ruud Retzer, *Jens Evensen: Mannen som gjorde Norge større* (Trondheim: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2017); Sigurður A. Magnússon, *Á hnífsins egg. Átakasaga* (Reykjavík: Mál og menning, 2001), Ragnar Stefánsson, *Það skelfur. Endurminningar* (Reykjavík: Skrudda, 2013).

Nordic ones. Although he is right in crediting the role of exiled Greeks in the movement, he exaggerates their willingness to cooperate with each other. And except for mentioning the split among the Greek Communists, he fails to take into account how the divisions within the Greek opposition had a paralyzing effect on the anti-Junta movement. Finally, he does not account for the work of the Nordic Committees. Even if he mentions Hans Göran Franck's contribution, he portrays him as a minor political figure compared to those of the Committees from the Soviet Bloc.¹⁰ In contrast, it will be argued here that the activities of the Nordic Committees differed fundamentally from those of the non-Nordic organizations analyzed by Christiaens: that they were much more dominated by social democrats and anti-fascist narratives than by communists and anti-colonial agitation.

By privileging the role of the communists in opposing the Chilean Junta (1973–1990), Christiaens leaves out the significant contribution of the Nordic Social Democrats in this struggle. He argues that the Italian and French Communist Parties turned their capitals into centers for Chilean exiles,¹¹ but Sweden, under the social democratic prime minister Olof Palme, had by far the largest Chilean diaspora in Europe. What partly explains it were two factors: Palme's emphasis on international solidarity and pre-coup cooperation between the Swedish and Chilean labor movements. Many prominent Chilean dissidents, such as the president of the union federation CUT (*Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Chile*), Luis Figueroa, fled to Sweden after the military takeover.¹² As for the opposition to the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, Christiaens acknowledges the dominance of anti-fascist framework in the human rights campaigns he explores. Indeed, they contained stronger references to the memories of fascism and the fight against the dictatorships of Southern Europe than to political struggles in the Third World.¹³

Historian Kristine Kjærsgaard has researched the joint efforts of Scandinavian governments to exclude Greece from the Council of Europe in response to the coup. She emphasizes the dynastic link between the Danish and Greek royal families and self-

¹⁰ Kim Christiaens, "'Communists Are No Beasts': European Solidarity Campaigns on Behalf of Democracy and Human Rights in Greece and East–West Détente in the 1960s and Early 1970s," *Contemporary European History* 26, no. 4 (2017): 621–646.

¹¹ Kim Christiaens, "European Reconfigurations of Transnational Activism: Solidarity and Human Rights Campaigns on Behalf of Chile during the 1970s and 1980s," *International Review of Social History* 63, no. 3 (2018): 419–422.

¹² Peter Winn, "Flyktingar och emigranter: Chiles historia och chilensarna i Sverige," *Arbetshistoria* 134–135, no. 2–3 (2010): 8–17.

¹³ Christiaens, "European Reconfigurations," 425.

conceptions of Scandinavians as advocates of human rights.¹⁴ While these perspectives played a role, they do not fully explain why the Greek issue became so prominent in the Nordic countries. Hanne Hagtvedt Vik and Skage Alexander Østberg have explored the role of activists from the Swedish chapter of Amnesty International as well as that of “legal entrepreneurs” within the Swedish government who helped draft the UN Convention against Torture.¹⁵ Amnesty International has received disproportional credit for the work against the Greek Junta. It is true—as historian Barbara Keys has shown—that opposition to torture became the primary driving force in the U.S. movement against the regime, making human rights a powerful a-political narrative.¹⁶ Yet it will be stressed here that anti-fascist narratives often preceded those of human rights.

Historian Effie Pedaliu has researched extensively the position of the Greek Junta within NATO by focusing on Danish and Norwegian opposition to it.¹⁷ Historians Neovi M. Karakatsanis and Jonathan Swarts have also written on the NATO issue as well as on U.S. policy towards the military regime.¹⁸ The thesis will complement this excellent research by showing how the Norwegian Committee worked behind the scenes to prod Nordic action within NATO. Pedaliu has also explored the failure of the United Nations to investigate or condemn the human rights abuses of the Greek Junta. In the 1960s, the issue of human rights became intrinsically linked to anti-colonialism and anti-racism. Newly independent Third World states, with Tanzania taking the lead, opposed raising the question of human rights of individuals in Greece because it was seen as an interference in domestic affairs. It was feared that such a precedent would prompt criticism of their own policies after having become sovereign nations. It also explains why the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which was tasked with bringing cases of abuse to the UN Commission on Human Rights, repeatedly failed to raise concerns over human rights in

¹⁴ Kristine Kjærsgaard, “Confronting the Greek Military Junta Scandinavian Joint Action under the European Commission on Human Rights, 1967–70,” in *The ‘Long 1970s’: Human Rights, East-West Détente and Transnational Relations*, eds. Poul Villaume, Rasmus Mariager, and Helle Porsdam (New York: Routledge, 2016), 51–71.

¹⁵ Hanne Hagtvedt Vik and Skage Alexander Østberg, “Sweden, Amnesty International and Legal Entrepreneurs in Global Anti-Torture Politics, 1967–1977,” *The International History Review* 44, no. 3 (2022): 633–53.

¹⁶ Barbara Keys, “Anti-Torture Politics: Amnesty International, the Greek Junta, and the Origins of the Human Rights ‘Boom’ in the United States,” in *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History*, eds. Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 201–221.

¹⁷ Effie G. H. Pedaliu, “‘A Discordant Note’: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 22, no.1 (2011): 101–120.

¹⁸ Neovi M. Karakatsanis and Jonathan Swarts, *American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels’ Greece Uncertain Allies and the 1967 Coup d’État* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 146–168.

Greece.¹⁹ Yet, in the early days after the Greek coup, a British UN envoy told a journalist that it was reminder of “what took place in Spain in 1936;” several other UN representatives described the new military dictatorship as expressing “shades of Fascism”.²⁰

Historian Mogens Pelt has studied the West German emollient, pro-American attitude towards the Greek Colonels, contrasting it with the confrontational stance of the Scandinavians.²¹ It provided the backdrop for political attempts to bring West Germany over to the position of the Scandinavians. Pelt has also compared the Greek coup to those in Turkey in 1960 and 1971, respectively. One of the main differences was that there was support among Kemalist political elites for a military takeover in Turkey, whereas no political party supported the coup in Greece.²² Sarah B. Snyder has written about the United States Committee for Democracy in Greece, which was mainly concerned with lobbying and letter-writing campaigns—that were mostly unsuccessful, it turned out—to change U.S. policy on the Greek Junta. It is unclear whether the U.S. Committee was, in any way, inspired by Nordic engagement with Greece,²³ but there was no substantial correspondence between the Nordic Committees and the U.S. Committee.

Constantine Arvanitopoulos defines the nature of the Greek military dictatorship as a “praetorian military regime of the ruler type,” which was not only bent on transcending the status quo but on enacting fundamental societal changes. This interpretation does not rule out aspects of conservatism, but Arvanitopoulos does not expand on the ideological nature of the Junta’s “revolutionary” political program.²⁴ He acknowledges, however, that international aversion to the Greek military regime was based on an “unequivocal rejection of fascism and military rule.”²⁵ He also claims that the Junta lacked popular support, with anti-communism no longer playing a major role in Greek society.²⁶ As will be further elaborated on in the

¹⁹ Effie G. H. Pedaliu, “A clash of cultures? The UN, the Council of Europe and the Greek dictators,” in *The Greek Junta and the International System: A Case Study of Southern European Dictatorships, 1967–74* eds. Antonis Klapsis, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou and Effie G. H. Pedaliu (New York: Routledge, 2020), 88–96.

²⁰ Darius S. Jhabvala, “Fascist Shadow in Greece: How U.N. Envoys View Power Grab,” *Boston Globe*, May 7, 1967.

²¹ Mogens Pelt, “West Germany’s Policy toward Greece during the Junta Period in the Context of ‘Burden-Sharing,’” in *The Greek Military Dictatorship: Revisiting a Troubled Past, 1967–1974*, eds. Othon Anastasakis and Katerina Lagos (New York: Berghahn Books, 2021), 295–319.

²² Mogens Pelt, “The Colonels’ coup of 1967 and the military takeovers in Turkey in 1960 and 1971,” in *The Greek Junta and the International System*, 174–177.

²³ Sarah B. Snyder, “‘The situation in Greece’ American human rights activism in the wake of the 1967 coup*,” in *The Greek Junta and the International System*, 137–139.

²⁴ Constantine Arvanitopoulos, “Praetorian military regimes: The Greek case,” in *The Greek Junta and the International System*, 229–230, 236–241.

²⁵ Arvanitopoulos, “Praetorian military regimes,” 239.

²⁶ Arvanitopoulos, “Praetorian military regimes,” 238.

thesis, these two claims are tenuous at best, considering the absence of large uprisings and the obstacles posed by anti-communism to a unified democratic opposition.

In Iceland, not much has been written specifically about the Greek issue, even though historian Valur Ingimundarson had dealt extensively with Icelandic foreign policy in the Cold War and how issues related to the Vietnam War and the Greek Junta influenced domestic politics.²⁷ Historian Guðni Th. Jóhannesson has explored government surveillance of the Icelandic radical left from the late 1940s to the 1970s.²⁸ The autobiography of the Icelandic geologist and activist Ragnar Stefánsson deals with the cooperation of Icelandic left-wing activists with Swedish ones over the solidarity movement with Greece.²⁹

The Historiography of Anti-Fascism

There is an ongoing scholarly debate over how anti-fascism should be interpreted historically. Popular understanding is primarily based on the notion that anti-fascism is a movement on the political Left—an understanding that was reinforced during the Trump presidency when there was a strong revival of anti-fascist organizing in the United States. Writing in this tradition, historian Mark Bray argues—in a handbook targeted at current and future anti-fascist activists—against reducing anti-fascism to a mere negation or opposition to fascism. To him, such an interpretation cannot explain the political methods of anti-fascism, its self-identity, and transnational manifestations as a movement steeped in pre-existing socialist, communist, and anarchist traditions.³⁰ In contrast, one of the leading historians in the new field of anti-fascist studies, Nigel Copsey, approaches the phenomenon from a much broader perspective. He makes the point that anti-fascism reflects a diversity of political expressions and practices—both on the Left and Right—including conservatives, social democrats, communists, feminists, and Christians.³¹

This interpretation allows for both active and passive manifestations of anti-fascism. Traditionally, anti-fascism has been described in terms of mobilization and confrontation. In

²⁷ Valur Ingimundarson, *Uppgjör við umheiminn: Samskipti Íslands, Bandaríkjanna og NATO 1960-1974: Íslensk þjóðernishyggja, vestrænt samstarf og landhelgisdeilan* (Reykjavík: Vaka-Helgafell, 2001); Ingimundarson, *The Rebellious Ally: Iceland, the United States, and the Politics of Empire, 1945–2006* (Dordrecht and St. Louis: Republic of Letters Publishing, 2011).

²⁸ Guðni Th. Jóhannesson, *Óvinir ríkisins. Ógnir og innra öryggi í kalda stríðinu á Íslandi* (Reykjavík: Mál og menning, 2006).

²⁹ Ragnar Stefánsson, *Það skelfur. Endurminningar*.

³⁰ Mark Bray, *Antifa: The Anti-fascist Handbook* (Brooklyn New York: Melville House, 2017), xiv.

³¹ Nigel Copsey, “Preface: Towards a New Anti-Fascist ‘Minimum’?” in *Varieties of Anti-Fascism. Britain in the Inter-War Period*, eds. Nigel Copsey and Andrzej Olechnowicz (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), xiv–xxi.

its passive form, however, it encompasses political articulations and performances that resist—indirectly—the spread of fascism. What complicates this broad understanding is that anti-fascism has been used as a weapon against opponents that have nothing to do with it. A classic case is the communist ideological line—in the late 1920s and early 1930s—of equating social democrats with social fascists. Copsey believes that irrespective of such absurd examples, a historian still needs to account for historical subjectivity. To be able to study anti-fascism as a historical phenomenon, the definition of fascists must be left to the anti-fascists, even in those cases where strong counterarguments can be made. Apart from viewing anti-fascism as an oppositional force, he proposes that it be defined in terms of a minimum set of ideas and values³²—a commonality of “political and moral opposition to fascism rooted in the *democratic* values of the Enlightenment tradition.”³³

His point is that democracy can unite such liberals, conservatives, social democrats, and communists, especially when confronted with a mortal political danger. All these political ideologies share a positive conception of democracy. Copsey argues that democracy can be conceptualized as liberal, social, or even as a communist “peoples” democracy. Anti-fascism is according to this interpretation not a fixed political ideology because there was a great difference in who used it, even if it was instrumentalized by states, as was the case with East Germany. Yet anti-fascism could be seen as an antithetical response to the values of fascism based on a reaction against the Enlightenment—expressed in irrational, chauvinistic, and elitist terms—and as a revolutionary movement in search of an alternative modernity. In other words, because fascism represents a negation of the French Revolution, it also negates the roots of all democratic ideologies.³⁴

The search for a scholarly consensus on how to define anti-fascism mirrors that of the debate over the definition of fascism. Copsey’s conceptualization of anti-fascism is a reversal of the minimum definition of fascism put forward by political theorist Roger Griffin, who sought to create more clarity—and even a consensus—about the definition of fascism as a generic ideology, encompassing different fascist movements and regimes. According to Griffin’s “minimum,” fascism contained a mythical core of palingenetic ultra-nationalism rooted in anti-enlightenment ideas and was a revolutionary phenomenon rather than a reactionary or conservative one. While fascist ideology contained many contradictions and

³² Copsey, “Preface,” xiv–xviii.

³³ Copsey, “Preface,” xviii.

³⁴ Copsey, “Preface,” xviii–xx.

ambiguities, it could still, in Griffin's view, be included in the minimum.³⁵ The obvious difference between the fascist and anti-fascist minimums is that, in a strict sense, Copey does not view anti-fascism as an ideology.

Diverse scholars of fascism, including Stanley Payne, Roger Eatwell, and Geoff Eley, have accepted Griffin's definition of fascism, which has buttressed his case for having established a "consensus" on it. Yet, among the skeptics is Robert O. Paxton, who has found fault with Griffin's ideologically centered analysis for offering an interpretation of fascist thought that ignores fascist practice. Paxton emphasizes the "anatomy" of fascism rather than the mystical "nature" of its ideology. To him, the portrayal of fascism as a revolutionary ideology obscures one of its core features: Since fascists always came to power with the assistance of anti-democratic, conservative elites, there is little room in the interpretation for the uneasy alliance between these two forces. Paxton divides the trajectory of historical fascism into five stages and shows that it had to navigate ideological priorities at each stage to survive. By highlighting the praxis of fascism, Paxton defined it as a "political behavior" obsessed with society in decline, a mass party of militant nationalists collaborating with traditional elites in an anti-democratic pursuit for "redemptive violence," "internal cleansing," and "external expansion."³⁶

While scholars have refrained from borrowing Paxton's teleological schema to analyze anti-fascism, some have focused on praxis or behavior rather than ideas in their works. Thus, historian Hugo García sees anti-fascism primarily as a transnational movement with networks and organizations that went beyond national and ideological boundaries.³⁷ As he put it, "ultimately, there is no such thing as anti-fascism: there are only anti-fascists, a dizzyingly varied set of political and social actors who persistently refused to conform to any ideal type, as their antifascism coexisted – and often clashed – with other ideological, national and even religious identities."³⁸ Anti-fascist thinkers and activists—such as Willi Münzenberg, Henri Barbusse, Leon Trotsky, Carlo Rosselli, and Luigi Sturzo—sought to halt the spread of fascism by establishing networks and organizations. But this transnational strand of anti-fascism could also be detected in the policies of the Popular Front governments of France and Spain, Stalinist Soviet Union, the Roosevelt Administration in the United States, and the Cárdenas Government in Mexico. To be sure, there were profound political

³⁵ Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London: Routledge, 1991), 11–36.

³⁶ Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (London: Penguin, 2005), 218–219.

³⁷ Hugo García, "Transnational History: A New Paradigm for Anti-Fascist Studies?," *Contemporary European History* 25, no. 4 (2016): 567–70.

³⁸ García, "Transnational History," 570.

and cultural differences between these countries. In the 1930s, Spain had the world's largest anarchist movement, which—together with the Civil War—influenced a revolutionary brand of anti-fascism. This was in contrast to its more counter-revolutionary manifestation in Western states such as France and the United States. As a transnational movement, anti-fascism spread globally, contributing to a global civil society that had been built in the nineteenth century in a similar way as other social movements rooted in pacifism, anti-colonialism, feminism, and anti-capitalism. Putting anti-fascism in such a broad historical and social context also helps explain its re-emergence—even after the Second World War. It highlights an understanding of fascism as an international menace, which called for a concerted response across national boundaries based on a tradition that the anti-fascists had inherited from nineteenth-century movements for democracy and from the labor movement.³⁹

Both global and regional studies have been done on the transnational reach of anti-fascism. A recent anthology, which explores the manifestations of anti-fascism in a geographic space extending from the Caribbean to India, offers new perspectives on how anti-fascism coalesced or came into conflict with anti-colonial movements in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. In an introductory chapter, historians Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey, and David Featherstone reinforce the view that anti-fascism should not be seen as a rigid ideology but analyzed⁴⁰ as “a cultural and political project that above all manifested itself in the formation of a left-liberal political identity that was neither defined by a nation, a people, a race, nor a party.” Thus, anti-fascist campaigns “had the potential at least momentarily to unite communists, anarchists, socialists, democrats, liberals and anti-colonialists against fascism across borders and in diverse metropolitan spaces.”⁴¹ This global perspective partly came as a response to claims made by historian Tom Buchanan that 1930s anti-fascism meant that anti-imperialism/colonialism was forgotten, having been dwarfed by the Spanish Civil War. Buchanan even argues that anti-fascism eventually became antithetical to anti-imperialism because a concerted global response to fascism rested on imperialism.⁴² In a 2019 anthology on Nordic anti-fascism, Braskén and Johan A. Lundin suggest an even more practice-based understanding. They argue that anti-fascism can be understood as “a field of

³⁹ García, “Transnational History,” 567–571.

⁴⁰ Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey, and David Featherstone, “Introduction: Towards a Global History of Anti-Fascism,” in *Anti-Fascism in a Global Perspective: Transnational Networks, Exile Communities, and Radical Internationalism*, eds. Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey, and David Featherstone (Oxon: Routledge, 2021), 1–8.

⁴¹ Braskén, Copsey and Featherstone, “Introduction,” 8.

⁴² Tom Buchanan, “The Dark Millions in the Colonies are Unavenged’: Anti-Fascism and Anti-Imperialism in the 1930s,” *Contemporary European History* 25, no. 4 (2016), 645–647.

contentious activity taking place in various places and spaces.”⁴³ This approach allows for a close reading of diverse practices of anti-fascist street politics that produced “both specific and general ‘enemy images’ and critical understandings of the fascist ‘other’.”⁴⁴

These recent interpretations of fascism within the field of anti-fascist studies can be traced to the late 1990s, when historians, such as Bruno Groppo, Anson Rabinbach, and Enzo Traverso, expanded the historical interpretations of anti-fascism, illustrating the plurality of its practitioners while simultaneously maintaining a critical distance toward the subject.⁴⁵ Inspired by historian Eric Hobsbawm, Anson Rabinbach interprets anti-fascism in terms of an ethos or a way of being in the world. Instead of a doctrine or ideology, it is rooted in the belief that anti-fascists belonged to a common humanity. Thus, fascism had to be resisted from the start and could include a broad coalition of democrats, liberals, socialists, and communists.⁴⁶ Rabinbach acknowledges the problematic uses of anti-fascism in justifying state repression by the postwar Eastern European communist governments. But it would be foolish to engage in such a simplification, for “there was more than one anti-fascist trajectory.” He specifically mentioned two variants: that of the Austrian Social Democrats and that of the republican democratic anti-fascism of Heinrich Mann. Thus, the intellectual and cultural tradition of anti-fascism simply cannot be reduced to communism.⁴⁷

Similarly, Enzo Traverso has written forcefully against the revisionism of anti-fascist histories that explain it in terms of communist machinations. Without anti-fascism, he claims, there is no “decency”—that is, different shapes of resistance—in the histories of Italy, Germany, Spain, and Portugal during the periods of dictatorship. He sees the denunciation of anti-fascism as closely related to the contemporary rise of the far right in Europe. For him, it is important to remain an anti-fascist intellectual. But he stresses the need to understand both the greatness and pitfalls of a political tradition of democracy and rationalism, which stood in opposition to the romantic, apocalyptic and nihilist rebellion against modernity. The latter intellectual strand stands in opposition to the revolutionary legacy of the French Revolution and is based on nationalism, antisemitism, conservative anti-democracy, and fascism. It was part of a tradition that was quite popular in Europe and was countered by anti-fascist intellectuals.⁴⁸

⁴³ Kasper Braskén and Johan A. Lundin, “Introduction,” 6.

⁴⁴ Kasper Braskén and Johan A. Lundin, “Introduction,” 6.

⁴⁵ García, “Transnational History,” 565.

⁴⁶ Anson Rabinbach, “Introduction: Legacies of Antifascism,” *New German Critique* 67 (1996): 7–8.

⁴⁷ Rabinbach, “Introduction: Legacies,” 10, 3.

⁴⁸ Enzo Traverso, “Intellectuals and Anti-Fascism: For a Critical Historization,” *New Politics* 9, no. 4 (2004): 91–93.

When fascists took power in Italy and Germany, many anti-fascist intellectuals went into exile. The fascination with the Soviet Union also stemmed from the belief that it was seen as being more effective in resisting fascism than the West, with conservatives and liberals having facilitated the fascist’ “seizure of power” in Italy and Germany. To Traverso, it is, however, more difficult to understand why anti-fascists were so ignorant of the importance of antisemitism in fascist ideology, seeing it as a propaganda tool rather than reflecting genocidal intent. Although the true scale of the Holocaust only became known much later, it was already clear before the Second World War that fascism triggered persecution of Jews, with as many as 400,000 having fled Central Europe in the period of 1933–39. In the postwar period, there was a general intellectual blindness to the Holocaust—and it never received the same level of attention as the Spanish Civil War before it or the Vietnam War after it. Traverso argues that the genocidal aspects of fascism cannot be comprehended by viewing them exclusively in anti-modern and reactionary terms since they relied, partly, on highly industrial, “rationalized,” and modern methods. For him, it is impossible to be democratic without being anti-fascist. After all, the success of fascism took place in “non-anti-fascist democracies” that facilitated and enabled its rise.⁴⁹

Rabinbach’s and Traverso’s views must be put within the context of shifts in historiographical interpretations of anti-fascism. In the immediate post-war period, anti-fascism was portrayed positively and without a critical distance and was closely linked to national foundational myths and narratives of European states. This development was especially strong in Italy, where it became known as the anti-fascist paradigm, a master narrative that embellished the history and public memory of the resistance. It overshadowed more problematic aspects, such as the widespread public support for—and collaboration with—fascist and Nazi regimes. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, this metanarrative was challenged by historians such as Renzo de Felice, François Furet, and Antonia Grunenberg as part of an anti-communist triumphalism. They reduced anti-fascism to Stalinism, viewing communist anti-fascists as no better than the fascists they fought. To them, anti-fascism was a Soviet state ideology, a propaganda tool, and a subjugation technique, which helped keep Eastern Europe under the influence of the Soviet Union. The current field of anti-fascist studies can be seen as a response to such historical simplifications.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Traverso, “Intellectuals and Anti-Fascism,” 96–98.

⁵⁰ García, “Transnational History,” 565.

Furet divided anti-fascism into two forms of communist articulations. The first one saw fascism as another form of capitalism or bourgeoisie rule. This interpretation stemmed from the “Third Period” (1928–1935) in Comintern policies, which stigmatized those who did not actively oppose capitalism as potential fascists. Hence, the characterization of social democrats as social fascists. This policy had a detrimental effect on the possibility of a unified response on the part of the German Left against the rise of the Nazis. The second one stems from the Popular Front period (1935–1939), which conceded that fascism was a different—and a more severe form—of governance than that of liberal democracy. Thus, cooperation with liberals and social democrats to resist fascism was warranted.

Controversially, Furet claimed that the Popular Front was the product of pure communist machinations, with all the non-communist actors joining it out of political convenience rather than anti-fascist convictions.⁵¹ To his credit, Furet accounts for the history of the Spanish Civil War in a nuanced way, describing both the betrayal of the republic by the Western democracies as well as by internal communist repression—ordered by the Soviet Union—which led to purges of anarchists, syndicalists, and POUM members (non-Stalinist communists) during the 1937 May Days. What Furet does not mention, however, is that these political forces had their own conception of anti-fascism. Despite the tragedy of the Spanish Civil War—and the role played by Britain and France in the defeat of the republic—Furet argued that a myth of the war as a united front against fascism has lived on.⁵² Yet, a more credible argument is that the war served as an anti-fascist lesson on the importance to strike before it was too late and to remain united and not to fall victim to appeasement and division. Indeed, the British and French non-intervention in Spain prefigured the policy of appeasement, which was sealed by the 1938 Munich Agreement. The enormous sacrifice of the Soviet Union during the struggle against Nazi Germany earned it popularity and good will after the war. It contributed to the postwar image of the Soviet Union as a democratic force through the wartime alliance. And it paved the way for the expansion of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.⁵³ In Furet’s words: “The ideological nature of World War II was unprecedented in history (with the exception of civil wars), for two reasons: it was waged against Hitler, who sought to destroy both democracy and Communism, and it constituted an

⁵¹ François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 209–10, 238–40.

⁵² Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion*, 247–265.

⁵³ Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion*, 257, 315–25, 358–363.

event both too gigantic and too universal not to have a simple meaning that could also be universal.”⁵⁴

Furet did not concede that anti-fascism could give the war a universal meaning. Such an interpretation would, of course, debilitate his explanation of anti-fascism as an exclusive communist product. Nonetheless, Soviet triumphalism and prestige were reflected in the proliferation of communist-centered, anti-fascist Western narratives in the postwar period. Max Horkheimer famously argued that those who were not willing to speak about capitalism should be quiet about fascism. Furet argues, not without merit, that the Left overemphasized the appeasement of Britain and France, while ignoring Soviet collaboration with the Nazis at the outset of the war as exemplified by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and the secret protocol dividing Europe into Soviet and Nazi spheres of influence. Such a form of anti-fascism viewed itself as democratic and anti-capitalist at the same time. It entailed a criticism of Western democracy for not being democratic enough because of capitalism but let the Soviet Union off the hook. Considering the New Left’s criticism of the Soviet Union, this was an oversimplification. Still, Furet correctly pointed out that neither Western anti-Nazism nor communist anti-fascism could accommodate a narrative of the particularity of the Holocaust. While the Jews that were massacred in the East were put under the rubric of Soviet citizens, widespread French participation in the Holocaust was either hidden, forgotten, or explained away by referring to a few collaborators.⁵⁵ Still, Furet’s fervent anti-communism led him to denounce communism as being on par with Nazism. This led him to equate the Holocaust with the Great Purge and the famine in Ukraine under Stalin⁵⁶ thereby, intentionally or not, denying the particularity of the Holocaust.

Historian Dan Diner also argues that anti-fascism should also be seen in purely communist terms. To him, the biggest crime of East-German anti-fascism was the portrayal of Nazism as fascism, which denied the singularity of the Holocaust. Victims that were killed merely for their origin rather than their participation in the resistance, or their exploitation as part of the labor force, was inconceivable within the East German memory polity. Diner seemingly forgets that the denial of the specificity of the Holocaust was not limited to East Germany as illustrated by frequent anti-communist attempts to equate it with communist atrocities. Diner also blames the West German political Left for complicity in keeping the

⁵⁴ Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion*, 364.

⁵⁵ Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion*, 368–369, 395.

⁵⁶ Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion*, 29; see also Ronald Aronson, “Review Article: Communism’s Posthumous Trial,” *History and Theory* 42 (May 2003): 224-225

East German regime alive because it used anti-fascist rhetoric to criticize West Germany. Diner argues that only East Germany had a foundational myth built on anti-fascism; West Germany, in contrast, represented a careful historical reconsideration of the major faults of the Weimar constitution.⁵⁷

These claims are tenuous—to say the least. Anti-fascist narratives criticizing the credibility of the West German state should not have come as a surprise given the flawed and, ultimately, abortive denazification process in the postwar period; after all, many members of the judiciary in Nazi Germany retained their positions after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany. West German courts had a staggering 88 percent acquittal rate in war crime cases against Wehrmacht soldiers compared to that of 17 percent in East Germany. To claim that West Germany did not have foundational myths disregards the highly problematic resistance myth of the Wehrmacht; the officers involved in different assassination plots against Hitler were anti-democratic conservatives, some of whom had participated in atrocities, including the Holocaust.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, it was not in the German Democratic Republic but rather in the Federal Republic that the uniqueness of the Holocaust was ultimately recognized.

During the 1986 “historians’ debate” (*Historikerstreit*), scholars such as Jürgen Habermas confronted conservative German historians Ernst Nolte and Andreas Hillgruber, who had relativized the Holocaust either by comparing it to Stalinist crimes or to the deaths of non-Jewish German civilians who were expelled from Eastern Europe after the Second World War. In the 1980s and 1990s, a dominant memory regime was cemented in Germany, which, to this day, forcefully resists any relativization of the Holocaust and the pivotal role played by antisemitism in it. This position has, however, become so entrenched among the political elite that it often confuses a defense of the memory of the Holocaust with the unconditional support for the actions of the state of Israel. In some cases, protest actions against the Israeli occupation and the siege of Palestinian territories have been equated with antisemitism. In 2020–2021, a new “historians’ debate” erupted in Germany—dubbed *Historikerstreit 2.0*—between those with an absolutist understanding of the Holocaust as unique and those who sought to introduce new historical research on Germany’s colonial legacy and ideas of continuities between different expressions of racial violence. Historian Jürgen Zimmerer was attacked because he explored possible continuities between the 1904

⁵⁷ Dan Diner, “On the Ideology of Antifascism,” *New German Critique* 67, (1996): 123–129.

⁵⁸ Nathan Stoltzfus and R.J.B. Bosworth, “Memory and Representations of Fascism in Germany and Italy,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism*, ed. R. J. B. Bosworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 566–569.

Herero and Namaqua genocide and the Holocaust. Part of these post-colonial inquiries reflected trends in memory studies, which highlighted cultural memory and transnational memory, with a focus on the lingering influence of colonialism.⁵⁹

The English literary scholar Michael Rothberg has argued that Germany should open up the memory regime to immigrants and to colonial experiences. Calling for “multidirectional” approaches to understanding genocide, he does not expand on how colonialism might have informed or created an imagination for fascist genocidal violence. Yet he thinks that the dominant Holocaust memory should not shy away from an engagement with other memories of extreme human suffering such as colonialism and slavery. He has also—controversially—made the point that cases where Syrian refugees compare their suffering to those killed in the Holocaust might serve as an example of this multidirectionality. Instead of discouraging an instrumentalization of the Holocaust, he seems to propose exchanging unconditional support for Israel with a “commitment to Palestine.” For him, this is a civic duty on par with a “commitment to Holocaust memory.”⁶⁰

How the rigid German memory regime has stifled civil discourse was perhaps best illustrated by absurd decision to cancel an award ceremony for Adania Shibl, a famous Palestinian author, at the 2023 Frankfurt Book Fair because of the October 7 Hamas massacre of Israeli civilians. This atrocity was so readily put within the context of the Holocaust that all attempts to contextualize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were seen as relativizing genocidal violence against Jews. When philosopher Slavoj Žižek defended the right of Israel to defend herself—while, at the same time, pointing out that right-wing extremists among Israelis and Palestinians were responsible for the deterioration of relations—he was heckled by the State Commissioner against Antisemitism in Hesse, Uwe Becker.⁶¹

In general, when it came to racism and antisemitism, anti-fascist agitation in the interwar labor movement sidelined the danger of racism in fascism. One key reason was that fascists were primarily considered agents of capitalism whose task was to suppress the labor movement. In other words, fascism was viewed as a more brutal form of capitalism. As noted, even after the horrendous reality of the Holocaust became clear, the pivotal role of antisemitism in Nazi ideology was not recognized.⁶² Still, while anti-racism was not a central

⁵⁹ Michael Rothberg, “Lived multidirectionality: “Historikerstreit 2.0” and the politics of Holocaust memory,” *Memory Studies* 15, no. 6 (2022): 1316–1326.

⁶⁰ Rothberg, “Lived multidirectionality,” 1316–1326.

⁶¹ Slavoj Žižek, “Saying, Keeping Silent, and Showing: Notes on a Scandal in Frankfurt,” *The Philosophical Salon*, October 30, 2023, accessed November 15, 2023, <https://thephilosophicalsalon.com/saying-keeping-silent-and-showing-notes-on-a-scandal-in-frankfurt/>.

⁶² Rabinbach, “Introduction: Legacies,” 15–16.

aspect of early anti-fascism, it was still present in some articulations. Kasper Braskén has, for example, shown that German communist publications in the 1930s emphasized anti-racism as part of its anti-fascist agitation. Anti-racist critiques of German fascism and antisemitism were also introduced as part of anti-colonial politics and studies of racist movements in the United States, especially that of the KKK.⁶³ Yet a serious debate over the Holocaust as a singular crime did not take place until the 1980s—a fact that cannot be solely blamed on the East German communist regime.⁶⁴ Therefore, it may be argued that it is a mistake to anchor historical anti-fascism firmly within a conception of a wider anti-racist struggle. Anti-racism could be included in anti-fascism, but it was far from being intrinsic to it.⁶⁵

John Munro has convincingly argued that with the outset of the Popular Front and the prioritization of the fight against fascism, major concerns about European colonialism and empire among African Americans, such as W.E.B. Du Bois, was put on the back burner. Still, in the United States, solidarity against fascism included opposition to the Jim Crow system, with many African Americans describing the Second World War as a struggle to defeat both fascism and racial segregation. From that perspective, the Popular Front was also about anti-racism.⁶⁶ In the immediate post-war period, African Americans, who had served in the war, pointed to the contradiction posed by the continuation of European colonial empires after a war that they associated, directly, with national liberation. It was a legacy that was, in other words, interpreted in anti-colonial terms. Moreover, the claim to democracy was seen as questionable as long as large parts of the world still suffered under the colonial yoke. Du Bois argued that a social democratic post-war reconstruction of Europe would be dangerous if it ignored colonialism. The foundation of welfare states built on exploitation of colonial peoples would make them structurally unsound. As participants in anti-colonial “networks,” Du Bois and socialist pan-African thinkers and activists, such as C.L.R. James and George

Kasper Braskén and Johan A. Lundin, “Introduction,” 3.

⁶³ Kasper Braskén, “‘Whether black or white – united in the fight!’ Connecting the resistance against colonialism, racism, and fascism in the European metropolises, 1926–1936,” *Twentieth Century Communism* 18, no. 1 (2020): 143–144.

⁶⁴ Aronson, “Review Article,” 238; Rabinbach, “Communist crimes and French intellectuals,” *Dissent* 45, no. 4 (1998): 63.

⁶⁵ Jan Jämte, “Antirasismens många ansikten” (PhD diss., Umeå University, 2013), i–vii; this dissertation on the history of anti-racism in Sweden includes a whole chapter on the interwar anti-fascist movement in Sweden, which he labels anti-racist, even though it was far from its defining character; Seidman correctly points out that many of the old anti-fascists probably shared widely accepted cultural norms of the times, such as ideas about racial supremacy or male chauvinism, and many more defended vast colonial empires; see Michael Seidman, *Transatlantic Antifascisms: From the Spanish Civil War to the End of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 254.

⁶⁶ John Munro, *The Anticolonial Front: The African American Freedom Struggle and Global Resistance to Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 19–27.

Padmore, espoused global solidarity between African Americans and Africans, which should be extended to the working class in general. Ideas of the old Popular Front were infused with anti-colonialism to protest segregation in the Southern United States. American segregationists were seen as no better than Hitler or Tojo. This African American movement evoked the memory of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War as a powerful anti-fascist legitimization for black emancipation.⁶⁷ Munro argues that this post-war pan-African network could be characterized as an anti-colonial front. It related to the political concerns of anti-fascism but was still autonomous, stressing the anti-imperial in its activities. Thus, he seeks to reconceptualize the Cold War as part of a new binary between the imperial and anti-imperial, as “another phase of the struggles around race, colonialism, and capitalism.”⁶⁸ By doing so, however, he may have ventured too far into the hagiographical domain at the expense of that of the historiographical. Apologia for the Soviet empire was, after all, dominant within anti-colonial movements.

Historian Michael Seidman divides anti-fascism into two types, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, according to different goals and periods. The revolutionary strand equated fascism with capitalism and opposed property rights and organized religion. The counterrevolutionary one was a defense of the old regimes built on the transatlantic Enlightenment tradition, which protected individual and property rights. Seidman sees anti-fascism as an all-important ideology coming out of the Western world, perhaps the most influential one during the twentieth century. He argues that the ideology was rooted in a “tripartite minimum.” The first part was the absolute priority of opposing fascism, which also made it necessary to fight appeasement. This stance necessitated the rejection of uncompromising anti-communism, or anti-capitalism. Anti-fascists could be specific about those whom they considered “friends” but not when it came to allies. The second part involved turning down antisemitic conspiracy theories that blamed the Jewish people for negative social, economic, and political developments. The third part took aim at pacifism, seeing the need for state power and military involvement in defeating fascism. This involved a concrete sacrifice, risking empires in the long war against fascism.

Seidman’s analysis focuses on the Second World War and does not equate anti-fascism with communist plots. His definition suggests a demarcation of the anti-fascist concept. But more controversially, he argues that Western non-intervention in the Spanish

⁶⁷ Munro, *The Anticolonial Front*, 37–47, 63, 79–80, 93.

⁶⁸ Munro, *The Anticolonial Front*, 8, 10.

Civil War represented conservative anti-fascism because the republic was revolutionary and because its defeat spawned future counterrevolutionary, anti-fascist agitation. He also makes the point that early attempts to make Mussolini's Italy and Franco's Spain turn against Hitler was a part of this conservative reaction since the conservatives always saw Nazism as a bigger threat. The counterrevolutionary anti-fascist narrative ultimately prevailed after the collapse of communism in 1989. Yet, by its own definition, it would be strange to call it a victory of anti-fascism, since uncompromising anti-communism won the day. Seidman views the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as anti-fascist since the Soviets viewed all the warring states as either fascist or potentially fascist. The argument is spurious, however, considering the abrupt discontinuity of the German-Soviet rapprochement when juxtaposed against the Popular Front line.⁶⁹ Strangely, Seidman also views Charles de Gaulle's retreat from Algiers and that of Richard Nixon from Vietnam as constituting counterrevolutionary anti-fascism because it was meant to prevent revolutions at home.⁷⁰ Arguably, the subject should, at a minimum, characterize the object of opposition as fascist, for it actually to constitute anti-fascism. Likewise, it could be seen as a conceptual overstretch to incorporate Cold War anti-communism or anti-totalitarianism into a larger anti-fascist strategy or ideology.

Still, historians such as Geof Eley and Dan Stone have theorized post-war anti-fascism outside such clearly defined political parameters. The question is about the legacy of anti-fascism after the war, with both scholars arguing in favor of the concept of an anti-fascist consensus in Europe. Eley periodizes it from 1943 until the advent of the Cold War in 1947. It was a realization of an earlier Popular Front promise: that large coalitions that included communists fought not only for democracy but also egalitarianism. According to Eley, the influence of anti-fascism could be detected in Western European reconstruction policies after the war, which often proved radical, with far-reaching social reforms that strengthened welfare states. The prominence of communists in the resistance movements led to social respectability, even in the eyes of conservatives and liberals. Thus, the anti-fascist resistance created a legacy that had much influence on the post-war order. The brutality of Nazi occupation regime against civilian populations meant that the resistance movement became acutely aware of societal needs and aspirations. And since the success of the war against Nazi Germany was so dependent on the Soviet Union, it meant that the fate of all European states was closely connected to the political Left in general. Eley highlights the existence of a

⁶⁹ Michael Seidman, *Transatlantic Antifascisms: From the Spanish Civil War to the End of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1–7, 48.

⁷⁰ Seidman, *Transatlantic Antifascism*, 253.

radical potentiality, which was expressed in impressive social legislation, such as that enacted by the British Labor government. Both in Britain and France, these aspects of emancipatory reconstruction were severely restricted by the continuation of Empire. These states relentlessly followed imperial, traditional, and anticommunist foreign policies. Thus, the consensus around ideas of unity and reconstruction broke down with the onset of the Cold War, when previously influential communist parties lost their grounding. Yet, the anti-fascist imagination of a radical future persisted, especially the desire to expand democracy into the economic sphere. Yet, as Eley argues, this imagination declined markedly in the wake of the neoliberal reconstructions—in the late 1970s—and ceased to exist after “the post-communist transitions of the 1990s.”⁷¹

Stone sees the Western anti-fascist consensus less in radical leftist terms than in reformist social democratic ones during the period of 1945–1989. The purpose was to build large welfare states through class cooperation, high taxation, and democracy as a response to the greatest catastrophe that had befallen the European Continent. For Stone, the rise and fall of this consensus can be traced to the interplay between memories and interpretations of the war. He uses anti-fascism to reinterpret the Cold War but without ignoring the major battle between capitalism and communism. Thus, anti-fascism explains why so many states, even those dominated by Christian and conservative parties accepted a postwar settlement based on a welfare state model. Many right-wing parties had been uneasy about mass politics and parliamentary democracy before the war. But the new social contract was built on an anti-fascist narrative that gave “shape and significance” to human sacrifices and mass deaths during the Second World War. Hence, Stone argues that such a positive understanding of anti-fascism needs to be rescued from the dustbin of history. Equally important was the need not to lose sight of the negative side of the post-war order as exemplified by political developments in Eastern Europe where anti-fascism became a total ideology, a state dogma based on the Soviet Union’s victory over fascism. Yet, what anti-fascism did was to facilitate the destruction of an order that was collectively judged as a product of fascist collaborators. The social transformation was justified by the huge human losses of the Soviet Union, which were unmatched by its allies. But, from the late 1940s on, it was impossible to stick to such a narrative of legitimacy with the increase in state repression in the Eastern Bloc.⁷²

⁷¹ Geoff Eley, “Legacies of Antifascism: Constructing Democracy in Postwar Europe,” *New German Critique* 67 (1996): 73–91.

⁷² Dan Stone, *Goodbye to All That? A History of Europe Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 8–11.

Within the Western camp, Spain, Portugal, and Greece were not part of this postwar anti-fascist consensus. Instead, they were the West's uncomfortable anti-communist allies that built their regimes on fascist associations but emphasized conservative, nationalist sentiments. As Stone makes clear, they did not fit the narrative of a successful anti-fascism—with its promotion of parliamentary democracy—and had more in common with Soviet-sponsored authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe. Historian Helen Graham stresses that Western states never pressured Spain to account for the brutally violent Franco regime because it would have questioned its own sense of moral superiority and its democratic credibility as well as put a dent to a triumphalist narrative of a Cold War victory.⁷³

Arnd Bauerkämper agrees with some aspects of the idea of a post-war anti-fascist consensus. He claims, however, that the use of the anti-fascist concept was dominated by communists after 1947–1948 and continued to be an integral part of communist ideology until the 1980s. For him, the concept became entangled with a “Marxist historical culture” and instrumentalized in a wide array of political struggles in Western Europe—ranging from opposing neo-fascist movements, discrediting non-communists, and the student protests, to environmentalism and feminism in the last decade of the Cold War. Any sense of a consensus or alliance over anti-fascism was, thus, lost at the outset of the Cold War. It was only “the protest movements of the 1960s that lent ‘antifascism’ a new lease of life,”⁷⁴ he states, and here it was also used to celebrate the communist dictatorships of the East and Far East. The concept, then, eventually degenerated into a justification for the violence of the numerous left-wing urban guerillas in Italy and Germany. Yet, paradoxically, Bauerkämper also views anti-fascism as part of broader Western European “historical cultures” and as a way of dealing with the past.⁷⁵ He closes this circular argument by ultimately viewing even non-communist anti-fascism as being “tainted with Soviet-style dictatorships.”⁷⁶ For him, anti-fascism is a “code” dependent on Marxist historical and political cultures. It is not entirely clear in what ways Bauerkämper feels that anti-fascism constituted a part of Marxist thought, but one can assume that he simply means communist interpretations of fascism.⁷⁷

⁷³ Stone, *Goodbye to All That?*, 63–64, 274.

⁷⁴ Arnd Bauerkämper, “Marxist Historical Cultures, ‘Antifascism’ and the Legacy of the Past: Western Europe, 1945–1990,” in *Marxist Historical Cultures and Social Movements during the Cold War Case Studies from Germany, Italy and Other Western European States* eds. Stefan Berger and Christoph Cornelissen (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 33–36.

⁷⁵ Bauerkämper, “Marxist Historical Cultures, ‘Antifascism,’” 36–49.

⁷⁶ Bauerkämper, “Marxist Historical Cultures, ‘Antifascism,’” 58.

⁷⁷ Bauerkämper, “Marxist Historical Cultures, ‘Antifascism,’” 36–58.

Ben Mercer has studied how the widespread application of fascism as a pejorative term devalued it in Western Europe during the 1960s. He argues that this tendency overrode any clarifying or critical use. The concept was adopted by the student movement but also against it, most famously by Jürgen Habermas against the West German student leader Rudi Dutschke.⁷⁸ The student movement of the 1960s was mainly concerned with the limitations of post-war democracies and a perceived underlying threat of fascism. Mercer claims that this was more important than dealing with the past and the heritage of fascism. Nonetheless, he still mentions the resistance against neo-fascist movements, the confrontation with antisemitism in West Germany and how the Southern European dictatorships generated fears of rekindled fascism.

Mercer points out that theoretical texts of the student movement were dominated by concepts such as anti-authoritarianism, anti-capitalism, and anti-imperialism, which dwarfed that of anti-fascism. Broad formulations of fascism as authoritarianism meant that the meanings of the term could be expanded ad infinitum. Thus, brutal police repression against the students saw the greatest increase in its use. Paradoxically, as the students sought to attack the remnants of fascism, they were also critical of states that had modelled themselves on their own ideas of anti-fascism. While the students were steeped in a tradition of anti-fascism, they rejected the bland anti-fascism of their parents. They acted from within this tradition as well as against it, targeting anti-fascists as much as fascists. Yet, Mercer also accounts for a more thoughtful use of the term, for example, when students complained that society was obsessed with calling them fascist but less frightened when real fascists took power in Greece. Despite the repression of the student movements, Mercer claims, “there was no imposition of a fascist dictatorship in the 1970s in Western Europe [Italy included].”⁷⁹ This assertion contradicts, however, what many thought about the military dictatorship in Greece, which generated political activism that used the term fascism in an arguably more deliberate and serious way.

For historians, the West’s relationship with the dictatorships in Southern Europe can serve as an instructive antidote to the conceptual overstretch of anti-fascism during the postwar and Cold War eras. After all, the continuities between the anti-fascist movements that opposed Franco during the Spanish Civil War and subsequent ones that stressed the importance of the anti-fascist struggle after the Second World War should be clear. In his

⁷⁸ Ben Mercer, “Specters of Fascism,” *The Journal of Modern History* 88, no. 1 (2016): 125–128.

⁷⁹ Mercer, “Specters of Fascism,” 96–102, 107–108, 120–128.

work on the anti-fascism of European socialists and social democrats, historian Jens Späth argues that the Second International was not an ideological stronghold for anti-fascism in the immediate postwar period. This is illustrated by the British Labor Party's support for "the brutal military" intervention in the Greek Civil War, where it supported old Nazi collaborators in the fight against "the Greek anti-fascist movement." Späth claims that it had not fared much better during the Spanish Civil War, even though it proclaimed its sympathy for the republic. Since Labor had supported non-intervention, it failed to take concrete steps to support the fight against Franco.⁸⁰ Späth traces the failure of a unified leftist anti-fascism back to the communist "social fascist" theory, which was not fully abandoned until 1935. The German Social Democrats (SPD) also refused to heed the call of the Labor and Socialist International (LSI) to cooperate with the communists in 1933. Other reasons include the Moscow show trials and Soviet participation in the repression of the Spanish Left during the Spanish Civil War and the French Popular Front government's nonintervention policy vis-à-vis Spain. All these factors undermined the Left.⁸¹ As Späth puts it:

Anti-fascism was definitely pushed to the back of many socialist minds by anticommunism and anti-totalitarianism at the beginning of the Cold War. In fact, this trend had started much earlier, during the Spanish Civil War and especially after the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939. But in 1947 even convinced socialist anti-fascists changed the discourse and partially repressed the memory of anti-fascism because it did not correspond with the *Zeitgeist*.⁸²

This shows the analytical usefulness of viewing anti-fascism in mnemonic terms in the postwar era. Anti-fascist organizers had to confront the hegemonic anti-communist and anti-totalitarian paradigm by evoking memories of past struggles against fascism and pointing to fascist practices in the present. For this reason, one should not reject communist articulations of anti-fascism just because of its misuse in Eastern Bloc states. As Nigel Copsey has stressed, there is a need to avoid anti-communist simplifications that equate communism and fascism because they obscure more than they explain. These were opposite ideologies: Fascism was ultra-nationalist and anti-egalitarian, while communism was internationalist and egalitarian. Anti-fascist studies should acknowledge that many anti-fascists were communists

⁸⁰ Jens Späth, "The Unifying Element? European Socialism and Anti-Fascism, 1939–1945," *Contemporary European History* 25, no. 4 (2016): 703–706.

⁸¹ Späth, "The Unifying Element?," 692–693.

⁸² Späth, "The Unifying Element?," 706.

without forgetting those of other political persuasion. No single ideology can claim ownership over anti-fascism.⁸³ In Copsey's words:

Anti-fascists are simply those of any non-fascist conviction who, cognizant of the barbarous dystopian nature of fascism and the threat that fascism poses to humanity, are deeply opposed to it.⁸⁴ ... For sure, as events in the US and elsewhere attest, anti-fascism has remained a remarkably durable tradition, but its longevity, its ebb and flow, is a consequence of its reactive dynamic. In this sense, anti-fascism is not some artificial construct of the post-Marxist left. At its root is the perception, whether overblown or not, that fascism represents a serious and ongoing danger to equality, liberty, fraternity, progress, toleration, and universality. As such, today's anti-fascists will insist, we need pushback against this fascism, or at least against forms derivative of it.⁸⁵

While Copsey makes a passionate case for the anti-fascist tradition, other scholars—such as Samuel Moyn and Tom Buchanan—highlight, instead, the human-rights tradition. Moyn claims that human rights are utopian: They aspire to bring about a new world where state borders will be penetrated by international law. Thus, human rights are currently the main inspiration for engagement in social movements since they evoke hope. Still, he argues that human rights were not important to the struggles of decolonialization, that they were only a minor influence on the American civil rights movement, and that they were not a factor in the 1968 student revolts. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was published in 1948, it only became influential in world politics during the second half of the 1970s. When Amnesty International won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977, “Westerners” abandoned the dream of revolution, with human rights becoming their last utopia.⁸⁶

In the 1970s and 1980s, the human rights framework experienced significant growth in response to the military dictatorships in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentine. Somewhat controversially, Moyn states that leftist dissidents had no other choice because their radicalism was denied in the extremely repressive political climate. Demands for political transformation that did away with military dictatorship were replaced with moralism and moral a-political claims to alleviate the suffering of political prisoners. Added to this was Amnesty International's principle not to advocate for individuals who were committed to violence, that is, armed struggle against oppression.⁸⁷

⁸³ Nigel Copsey, “Afterword: Are you a communist? No, I am an anti-fascist,” in *Anti-Fascism in European History. From the 1920s to Today*, 270–273.

⁸⁴ Copsey, “Afterword,” 273.

⁸⁵ Copsey, “Afterword,” 279.

⁸⁶ Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 1–9.

⁸⁷ Moyn, *The Last Utopia*, 140–146, 172.

Moyn as well as Buchanan greatly admire Amnesty International, which was established in 1961, for bringing about this change in world politics. As deeply religious Christians, Peter Benenson and the other founders of the organization, deliberately chose a name for the organization to lay claim to the word “amnesty,” which had been associated with leftist- and communist-led campaigns for political prisoners in Spain, Greece, and Portugal. These campaigns, which were fought under the banner of human rights, had started in 1959 and enjoyed broad political support. Yet, it was the anti-fascist memory of the Spanish Civil War that attracted most support as demonstrated by the fact that the Spanish campaign dwarfed the other two. Benenson was against this tradition and sought to universalize the human rights concept to divorce it from left-wing connotation. Still, Amnesty International took advantage of the registries of prisoners that the leftist campaigns had collected. Buchanan claims that by the late 1960s, these specific leftist-led campaigns began to fade out of existence and were replaced by Amnesty International.⁸⁸

In 1961, Benenson expressed his open hostility to what could be seen as the long tradition of leftist solidarity, claiming that campaigns concentrating on one country achieved little more than an increase in persecution. This stance outraged Betty Ambatielos, a long-time veteran of the solidarity movement with political prisoners in Greece. She knew from her own experience that concerted efforts were often the most successful ones. Ambatielos was involved in the British League for Democracy in Greece, which would lead the opposition against the Greek Junta in Britain, branding it a fascist military dictatorship. Buchanan also argues that the activists of Amnesty International did not play a dominant role in left-wing political campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s, although they were important in collecting accounts of torture in Greece.⁸⁹

Another probable reason for the nominal participation of Amnesty International in campaigns directly following the Greek coup was a series of scandals exposed in the spring 1967, which brought to light that British intelligence agencies had infiltrated the organization. This direct interference led to attempts to stop the publication of a report on human rights violations in the British Crown Colony of Aden (Yemen) against the Arab independence movement. This report, it happened, had been collected by the Swedish Section of Amnesty and was eventually published. The scandals caused a crisis within the organization, which resulted in a decline in Amnesty’s membership, and in calls from members of the Swedish

⁸⁸ Tom Buchanan, *Amnesty International and Human Rights Activism in Postwar Britain, 1945–1977* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 71, 99–102, 119.

⁸⁹ Buchanan, *Amnesty International*, 103, 184–186, 229.

section for a new leadership and for the relocation of the organization's headquarters from Britain to a neutral country. A year later calm was restored after a new secretary general was elected, but the headquarters remained in London. It was later revealed that a secret anti-communist propaganda unit within British intelligence—the so-called Information Research Department—had vetted potential staff members for the British section of Amnesty to rule out potential communists. It had already classified the Swedish section as being under “strong Communist influence.”⁹⁰

Although the issue of human rights assumed significance during the resistance against the Greek Junta, it was not a pivotal one. Oppositional activities of social movements were driven by—and based on—a longer tradition of anti-fascism and solidarity work on the Left. The human rights paradigm did not become central until later, or during the 1970s. It was deeply influenced by middle class and religious sensibilities, providing a stark contrast to the previous leftist tradition, where the labor movement played a significant role. Yet, around 1980, human rights activists lost influence and were, eventually, replaced as a dominant social group, by professional international lobbyist and human rights lawyers.⁹¹

Theorizing Memory, History, and Social Movements

The systematic study of memory as an aspect of social relations—or collective memory—can be traced back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The writer Hugo von Hofmannsthal described the enormous force of “mysterious ancestors” within the population, piling up and seeping through as an expression of collective memory. With the French Annales school, in the 1920s, the term collective memory was used by historians such as Marc Bloch and, especially, by the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs.⁹² During World War II, Bloch was murdered by the Nazis in occupied France and Halbwachs died in the Buchenwald concentration camp. Halbwachs made a sharp distinction between collective memory and history. He argued that historical inquiry commenced only when collective memory faded. If there was remembrance, there would be no need for history. History could not be a form of memory given the “break in continuity” between those reading history and those who experienced the events directly.

⁹⁰ Buchanan, *Amnesty International*, 129–150.

⁹¹ Buchanan, *Amnesty International*, 229–234.

⁹² Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins, “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 24, no. 1 (1998): 106.

To Halbwachs, the specialized craft of historians—the collection, ordering, and the chronological processing of a vast amount of information by a small professional group—hampered attempts to preserve views of the past relevant to a contemporary collective memory.⁹³ Collective memory represented “a current of continuous thought whose continuity is not at all artificial”⁹⁴ since the past lives on as memories in the consciousness of the group. In contrast, history focused on periodic breaks, difference, and change. Although history could be produced from a multitude of perspectives and subjects, it was still a singular enterprise that could be consumed universally. Collective memories, on the other hand, were divided and dispersed into a plethora of groups contingent on the physical existence of their members and transmission of memories to new members.⁹⁵ Halbwachs stressed the essentiality of social contexts for memory constructions because they could not be atomized and ascribed to individuals. Thus, he went beyond philosophical—and against psychological—understandings of memory. People acquired memories in societies, where they were recalled, recognized, and localized. Historian Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi adopted Halbwachs’s division between collective memory and history. He made the point that while collective memory was selective and denied paradoxical narratives, history reintroduced these contradictions but did it at the risk of becoming sterile and non-memorable. Hence, the need for history to aspire to be memorable.⁹⁶

Halbwachs’s seminal work on collective memory remained largely forgotten in academia for half a century, or until Pierre Nora revived it with his seminal multi-volume work on French sites of memory in the 1970s. At first, Nora contended that he was carving out a new field of studies, but he eventually recognized his theoretical indebtedness to Halbwachs.⁹⁷ Nora, a conservative, writes romantically about a peasant culture of the past, which embraced and sustained a collective memory. He laments that this is no longer the case, arguing that societies based on memory are gone. What is left is only history. While memories are always embedded in the present, he argues, history is only a representation of the past. Nora also claims that this change came with the decline in nationalist epic histories and with the advent of social history in the interwar period. Earlier, historians were concerned with the “fate of nations,” with narratives “full of memory.” In the new historical inquiries,

⁹³ Maurice Halbwachs, “From the Collective Memory,” in *Theories of Memory: A Reader*, eds. Michael Rossington and Anne Whitehead (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 139–40.

⁹⁴ Halbwachs, “From the Collective Memory,” 140.

⁹⁵ Halbwachs, “From the Collective Memory,” 140–43.

⁹⁶ Olick and Robbins, “Social Memory Studies,” 109–10.

⁹⁷ Erika Apfelbaum, “Halbwachs and the Social Properties of Memory,” in *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates*, eds. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 77–78.

however, memory becomes merely an “object” of study. Nora sought an antidote to this trend by cataloguing “places” or “spheres” of memory in French society, which inspired further studies on such forms of remembrance.⁹⁸ Nationalism and conservatism informed Nora’s obsession with a France in decline—and his methodological nationalism restricted his scope. Critics pointed to the absence of transnational aspects of European culture, connections between France and her colonies, and the influence of memories of migrants. To correct this deficiency, memory scholars have increasingly sought to theorize “transnational and transcultural sites of memory.”⁹⁹ One example is the “cosmopolitan memory” of the Holocaust—how that catastrophe has been universalized as a common point of reference.¹⁰⁰

These new and seminal inquiries about memory stem from the theoretical work of Jan and Aleida Assmann who developed the concept of cultural memory. Instead of discarding collective memory entirely they go beyond it, reducing it to oral transmission or communicative memory. It is, then, contrasted with the term cultural memory, which contains “accumulated residues” or the entire store of knowledge in societies rooted in distant pasts. To Jan and Aleida Assmann, communicative or collective memory is, in temporal terms, restricted to an 80–100-year period, equaling three or four generations. Cultural memory, on the other hand, is about an intergenerational discourse—textual production and intertextual communication—often with fixed monuments and institutions to support it. It is part of national identities as well as myths that societies live by.¹⁰¹

Cultural memory is an extremely expansive concept and is susceptible to the charge of conceptual overstretch. Aleida Assmann argues that cultural memory includes the totality of culture because memory is intrinsic to it. Yet, even if culture transcends time, memory (and forgetting) can be active or dormant. In its active form, cultural memory is about *the past as present*—about a selective “canon” on display in societies. The passive or dormant part is *the past as past*, that is, memory that is hidden away in storages such as archives. Aleida Assmann believes that archives cannot be separated from institutions of power—of bureaucracy and the state. Yet such a categorical understanding ignores the rich tradition of archives operated by other institutions such as the labor movement. To her, totalitarian states

⁹⁸ Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, Vol. 1 – Conflicts and Divisions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1–8.

⁹⁹ Astrid Erll, “Traumatic pasts, literary afterlives, and transcultural memory: new directions of literary and media memory studies,” *Journal of Aesthetics & Culture* 3, no. 1 (2011): 4–5.

¹⁰⁰ Steffi Hobuß, “Aspects of memory acts: transnational cultural memory and ethics,” *Journal of Aesthetics & Culture* 3, no. 1 (2011): 3.

¹⁰¹ Jan Assmann, “From Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism and Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” in *The Collective Memory Reader*, eds. Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 209–214.

do not store memory—only destroy or falsify them—in reference to George Orwell’s novel *1984*. This is a controversial claim considering the obsession of totalitarian states with preserving their records. The question in such cases is about access to archives rather than the authenticity of their material contents.¹⁰²

Given the overexpansion of the concept of cultural memory, it only has a partial applicability in this thesis. Memory work within social movements is, indeed, a communicative process, a collective memory, especially considering the short time span between the postwar period and that of historical fascism. Cultural memory can, to be sure, explain transnational and longevity aspects, which elude collective memory. Yet, a clear demarcation between the two concepts is not necessarily warranted, since they influence each other. This does not mean that collective memory will be subsumed, in its totality, under cultural memory. Crudely speaking, one could argue that a collective memory becomes cultural when it is put in writing or in “organized” or institutionalized form. And since this thesis engages with memory that was partly hidden in the archives, it also involves cultural memory.

Halbwachs’s and Nora’s sharp distinction between memory and history also needs to be questioned. A superficial understanding of historiography will confirm that the craftsmanship of historians has changed since the Halbwachs’s time, not least through the introduction of half of humanity—women—into historical narratives. There has been an enormous expansion of historical subjects and perspectives that have offset official histories with fields of history that incorporate the social, cultural, and memory aspects. It is also undeniable that historians sometimes fall victims to hegemonic memory politics. Thus, a strict demarcation between memory and history obscures the reality where historians themselves employ memory in their construction of historical narratives. Historians are by no means non-partisan to the past, for they can provide legitimation to nationalism, social movements, and identities. Indeed, as Peter Novick and Georg Iggers have argued, historians construct “truths” as much as they uncover them. In other words, history is a situated enterprise where the subjectivity of the historian cannot be ignored.¹⁰³ Yet, such perspectives, although useful, also run the risk of being vulgarized to a point where truth is relativized and even exorcised from the past, with no separation made between history and literature.

¹⁰² Aleida Assmann, “Canon and Archive,” in *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, eds. Astrid Erll, Ansgar Nünning, Sara Young, and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 97–105.

¹⁰³ Olick and Robbins, “Social Memory Studies,” 110.

In their attempt to outline a historical approach to social memory studies, sociologists Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins argue in favor of studying “mnemonic practices” in different locales rather than viewing collective memory as an object. Mnemonic practices can be found in institutional fields—whether political or cultural—with memories emerging at particular times for particular purposes.¹⁰⁴ In this sense, such practices are closely tied to collective identity, whose role in social movements has been theorized by sociologists Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper. It helps explain why and when people come together for collective action and how they secure resources to further a cause or an issue, giving clarity to the macro-historical context in which movements emerge. Collective identity differs from personal identities, which are more complex bundles of traits, although it might be part of them. It is the understanding of a shared status or relation—perceived and constructed—which reflects directly experienced communities or imagined ones.¹⁰⁵

Collective identity is usually expressed in material culture that includes names, narratives, and symbols. Being fluid and relational, it is influenced not only by the socio-political context but also by audiences, allies, opponents, media, and state authorities.¹⁰⁶ Complementing the concept of collective identity with theories of mnemonic practices adds to the versatility of both. Sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel argues that identity is tied to memory in a process, which he terms “mnemonic socialization” that creates “mnemonic communities.” In this way, memory is continuously reproduced, with even early recollections being reinterpreted through a social setting. Social conditions presuppose that people “remember” things that they might not have experienced personally but are associated with communities or societies to which they belong. Through this process, humans feel pride, pain or shame about events that happened to their group or identity in the past.¹⁰⁷

Historical figures such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Nelson Mandela have become universally celebrated. Nonetheless, the selectiveness of memory politics tends to ignore how much hate they faced from their contemporaries. Apart from obscuring the vision and radicalism of their politics, it also downgrades social movements by an exclusive focus on individuals and their idolization. Another example of this process is how global the memory of events associated with the American 1969 Stonewall Riots has become to the modern LGBTQIA+ movement. Thus, the representation of the riots—as an original event—has been

¹⁰⁴ Olick and Robbins, “Social Memory Studies,” 112.

¹⁰⁵ Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 27, no. 1 (2001): 284–285, 298.

¹⁰⁶ Polletta and Jasper, “Collective Identity,” 284–285, 298.

¹⁰⁷ Olick and Robbins, “Social Memory Studies,” 123–24.

contested by activists who point to other, similar cases of unrest elsewhere and the diversity of the participants at the time, especially people of color and transgender persons. The memory of the riots is often used to push for more contentious politics within the movement, expressed with slogans such as “the first pride was a riot.” In a similar way, the International Workers Day on May 1 is memorialized,¹⁰⁸ with activists calling for more radical and audacious politics and pointing to the importance of the 1886 Haymarket Riots to the modern labor movement.

The combination of collective memory and collective identity means that such representations of the past are not merely a reflection of it but also a guidance for the present and future. It poses questions about the make-up of society and how it ought to be structured. States employ, for example, mnemonic practices through centennials, bicentennials, museums, and national anthems. Social movements are rife with these dynamics as well, which is illustrated in practices such as commemorations.¹⁰⁹ In a simple but clear definition, social movements are collective forms of action for social change. Sociologist Ron Eyerman simplifies them into a progressive or reactionary binary. Essential to them is the formation of a collective identity, which informs the world of who they are and what they represent. It functions as an inspiration to participants and as a way to mobilize new members or the larger public. Sociologist Charles Tilly theorized a linguistic abbreviation to measure how successful a social movement might become by naming it “WUNC”—for worthy, united, numerous, and committed. Worthiness might be claimed by evoking the past as a source of legitimacy or by drawing inspiration from it as well as by referring to historical movements and inherited rituals. Thus, social movements empower individual participants by identifying with history and with its making. The same is true for their collective action. Reactionary movements on the far right might subscribe to historical fascism through the use of symbols. Progressive movements on the Left might borrow protest repertoires, such as marching, singing, chanting, and placards, from previous movements of anti-fascism. What social movements do is to take part in the contested struggle over the meaning of the past. They use the past strategically in an attempt to bring it towards the future. As Eyerman puts it: “They are bearers and shapers of individual and collective memory.”¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Ron Eyerman, “Social movements and memory,” in *Routledge International Handbook of Memory Studies*, eds. Anna Lisa Tota and Trever Hagen (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), 80–82.

Priska Daphi and Lorenzo Zamponi, “Exploring the Movement-Memory Nexus: Insights and Ways Forwards,” *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (2019): 399.

¹⁰⁹ Olick and Robbins, “Social Memory Studies,” 123–24.

¹¹⁰ Eyerman, “Social movements and memory,” 79.

To systematize the study of memory and social movements, sociologists Piska Daphi and Lorenzo Zamponi propose a nexus of three different areas: *memories of movements*, *movements about memory*, and *memory in movements*. The first area has to do with researching how social movements of the past are remembered in the present and how such remembrance is facilitated or suppressed. It also illustrates the temporal limitations of oral sources that reflect on the past. In her interviews with Portuguese activists, political scientist Guya Accornero, discovered that their recollections of the struggle against the dictatorship in Portugal did not match lived experiences in the past. The activists recounted, instead, the content of current public commemorations.¹¹¹

The second research area deals with how social movements challenge official memories of the past. A case in point are social movements in Latin American countries, which during or after the transitions to democracy struggled for recognition and remembrance of the victims of right-wing authoritarian regimes. These movements performed a “memory work” in that they challenged naturalized assumptions of the past. Through demands for restorative justice—such as truth commissions, truth reports or memory sites—they sought to open up narratives of a troubled past and push for further inquiry.

The third research area is concerned with describing how memories are less an issue of contestation than a context for oppositional activities of social movements in the present. This category is the most relevant for this thesis as it delineates how memories affect the movement—how they become a reservoir from which it is possible to adopt ideas and symbols. Thus, memories shape the collective identity of the group and are a resource for mobilization—whether they are associated with national historical events or previous phases of organization and/or past experiences. The distance in time can be quite significant in this process. The 2011 austerity protests in Greece evoked, for example, memories of the Nazi occupation of the country, and student protests in the 2000s sparked reminiscences of the 1968 student revolts.¹¹²

Together with several colleagues, sociologist Donatella della Porta has studied such social movements in Southern Europe. In the austerity protests in Portugal, the demonstrators made constant references to the 1974 Carnation Revolution. These connections were easy to make because the event had already been memorialized by the state as part of an annual

¹¹¹ Daphi and Zamponi, “Exploring the Movement-Memory Nexus,” 399, 404–406; Guya Accornero, *The Revolution before the Revolution Late Authoritarianism and Student Protest in Portugal* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016), 1–15.

¹¹² Daphi and Zamponi, “Exploring the Movement-Memory Nexus,” 399, 404–406.

ritual. Thus, the protest movement made use of songs and slogans, such as “never again fascism” from an earlier period; it was a memory considered “worthy” of emulation and a standard to match. Della Porta argues that because Portugal went through an eventful transition from dictatorship to democracy, it was reflected in an active civil society that shared positive memories of the process. In Spain, however, the memory is split, which led to fragile “participated pacts” between the Left and Right due to their separate understanding of the past. The same applies to Italy: The Right has tended to view the transition from fascism to democracy in terms of a devastating civil war. In contrast, the Left has portrayed the same process as a patriotic class war and an integral part of an anti-fascist collective identity, which underpinned a dominant memory for decades. Such a shared identity became a unifying element in Italian social movements, where everybody was welcome except for fascists. The evocation of a resistance memory was used to legitimize democracy and to prevent the far right from immersing itself into the political culture. Such mnemonic practices were highlighted in the environmental struggle against a train tunnel in the Susa Valley in Italy. In the words of one activist involved:¹¹³

In Val Susa [Susa Valley] we made reference to the image of the Resistance a lot, because it is a legitimizing reference in the Valle, because the Resistance was strong there, many families had a partisan in the Resistance movement, but we used this image in a creative way, we know that identities and memories are always to be reconstructed . . . you always emphasize some aspects, and this image fits very well the history of the Valle, the identity, the mountains, the woods, it was a reconstruction which the movement operated, by linking the actual mobilization with the Resistance, and by vindicating it. (IIT10)¹¹⁴

What is on display here is a rare instance of self-reflection about the organized use of mnemonic practices. Some scholars have argued that social movements in general should work actively for such a “social appropriation” of the past since it is not an “automatic outcome of protest.”¹¹⁵ Movements in Southern Europe have, indeed, instrumentalized acts that occurred well before their time to make sense of new events that, in della Porta’s words, are “perceived as critical junctures, unsettling the then existing order and becoming the basis for a new one.”¹¹⁶ She argues that memory offers a “cultural program” that helps shaping

¹¹³ Donatella della Porta, Massimiliano Andretta, Tiago Fernandes, Eduardo Romanos, and Markos Vogiatzoglou, *Legacies and Memories in Movements: Justice and Democracy in Southern Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 111–117, 133–134.

¹¹⁴ Della Porta, et al., *Legacies and Memories in Movements*, 117.

¹¹⁵ Daphi and Zamponi, “Exploring the Movement-Memory Nexus,” 400.

¹¹⁶ Della Porta, et al., *Legacies and Memories in Movements*, ix.

moods, intentions, and actions, which is especially important for social movements in their attempts to create solidarity and identity. Complex events that seem chaotic are made into a narrative with heroes and villains. Social movements can create knowledge, or counter visions, to persuade the public to reinterpret the meaning of events.¹¹⁷ Taking ownership of the past can help them stake claims in the present. Thus, the past becomes a well to draw lessons from—lessons of victories to emulate and disasters to avoid.

Lorraine Ryan has argued that it is important to view mnemonic resistance as a constant possibility when faced with a dominant collective memory.¹¹⁸ In a Foucauldian sense, she makes the point that since hegemonic memory is a site of power, there is also resistance. Stressing that resistance—in the form of counter memory—is often practiced by individuals or repressed groups, she reintroduces the individual into the collectivist Halbwachsian tradition.¹¹⁹ Thus, as individuals encounter official memory, they either accept it as dominant, respond in a negotiated manner where some aspects are accepted, or oppose it entirely and construct an alternative memory. Therefore, collective memories are negotiated in their public interaction and the reaction of individuals. At the same time, changes in public memory can lead to a reevaluation of personal memory of individuals. One should, however, be careful about viewing collective memories in too malleable terms. Ryan sees the simultaneous celebration of both Marshal Pétain and the French resistance fighters as an example of an “inclusive memory culture” with opposing and minority memory challengers.¹²⁰ The problem with this example is that it parrots the “shield and sword” thesis or the postwar nationalist historical narrative, which interpreted Vichy collaboration with the Nazi regime as being a necessary factor in enabling French resistance. To describe it as a form of inclusive memory culture is misleading, for it can be seen as exonerating and whitewashing the Vichy regime.

It should be noted, however, that mnemonic practices do not always serve as enabling tools for social movements to mobilize, create legitimacy, or offer guidance; they can also constrain organizing and stifle possibilities for political action through a process that sociologist Timothy B. Gongaware terms “collective memory anchoring.”¹²¹ It takes the form

¹¹⁷ Della Porta, et al., *Legacies and Memories in Movements*, ix–xii.

¹¹⁸ Lorraine Ryan, “Memory, power and resistance: The anatomy of a tripartite relationship,” *Memory Studies* 4, no. 2 (2011): 154–169.

¹¹⁹ See also Susan A. Craine, “Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory,” *The American Historical Review*, 102, no. 5 (1997): 1372–1385.

¹²⁰ Ryan, “Memory, power and resistance,” 159–162, 165–166.

¹²¹ Timothy B. Gongaware, “Collective Memory Anchors: Collective Identity and Continuity in Social Movements,” *Sociological Focus* 43, no. 3 (2010): 214–215.

of a movement continuity, which is achieved through introducing remembrance of the past into present interactions within a group. In this way, collective identity and collective memory can curb the present by giving meaning to actions that mirror past actions of the group. Gongware sees collective identity as a dialectic where the past is used to interpret the present and the present to interpret the past. In his ethnographic study on Native American social movements, he shows that institutionalized habits were legitimized by evoking historical events. In the process, however, these visions and habits of the past arrested future potentials and hampered the organizations' freedom of action.¹²² Since "we have always done it this way," it is impossible to do things differently.

Gilles Vergnon argues that anti-fascism is intrinsically constraining because it is based on a "rear-view mirror in politics."¹²³ While admitting that it can be useful to adopt a backward-looking approach to interpret the present, he claims that we should avoid viewing the past "without turning around" or validating a myth of the past or interpretations that have been inherited and repeated. Echoing a French tradition, the Left's tendency, for example, to classify Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front as a Nazi or fascist party is part of this tradition that turned fascism into what he sees as a reductive avatar to describe both the extreme right and anti-democratic right, even when such movements did not self-identify with it. Thus, to Vergnon, anti-fascism becomes a Sorelian rallying myth,¹²⁴ which implies a willful appropriation of the past. Yet, such an instrumentalization of an anachronism does not account for the role of memory in the process. It is not only about "looking at" the past; it is also about remembering it through lived experiences and collective and cultural memory. Without using the term memory, Vergnon, nonetheless, touches upon it, when he explains that French anti-fascism lives on in popular opinion and influences ideas of republican patriotism, signifying both spontaneity as well as instrumentality.¹²⁵

Other scholars have also avoided using the concept of memory when interpreting the present through the lens of the past. Djouaria Ghilani and others prefer the concept of historical analogy as a comparison between the present and the past. It is summoned when there seems to be a resemblance, with the comparison, then, being used to clarify the present. Experiments in social psychology have illustrated that comparing a hypothetical event to the

¹²² Gongware, "Collective Memory Anchors," 215–216, 233–234.

¹²³ Gilles Vergnon, "The Burden of the Rear-View Mirror: Myth and Historiography of Republican Antifascism in France," in *Rethinking Antifascism History: Memory and Politics, 1922 to the Present*, eds. Hugo García, Mercedes Yusta, Xavier Tabet, and Cristina Clímaco (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016), 229.

¹²⁴ Vergnon, "The Burden of the Rear-View Mirror," 228–231.

¹²⁵ Vergnon, "The Burden of the Rear-View Mirror," 237.

Vietnam War or the Second World War will elicit different responses. Applying the Vietnam War as an analogy is, for example, less likely to favor military interventions than that of the Second World War. These scholars categorize the use of historical analogies as representing the present and as defining the roles of actors, who make decisions and persuade others. The persuasive effect of an historical analogy is achieved through appealing to a “historical truth.”¹²⁶ The problem with this approach is that it does not account for how “historical truths” are constructed in the first place; nor does it consider already existing collective and cultural memories of a society—or mnemonic practices. Without having a conception of memory and lived experience, we cannot explain why some analogies become persuasive, for example, why generations of Americans grew up with a purely negative association with the Vietnam War. Historical analogy can also be used—in terms of a purely scholarly exercise—to compare historical periods or phenomenon. Classifying the Greek Junta as fascist was made almost instinctively because the regime evoked the memory of fascism. Yet, comparing and contrasting the Junta to historical fascism in an analytical discourse was made when the classification was called into question. Finally, Ghilani and others avoid defining history, treating it simply as the past. In contrast, historians would argue that history is knowledge produced by historians. And, it goes without saying that historical research is often not part of a popular understanding of the past.

As a study of a social movement that formed a collective identity through mnemonic practices, the thesis will make ample use of the concepts of memory, especially in relation to “events of critical juncture.” While the research field is that of *memory in movements*, the emphasis here is on a mnemonic social movement, whose dynamic enabled as well as constrained its activities, especially when it came in contact with split memories of the past.

The Structure and Sources of the Thesis

The central part of the thesis focuses on the Nordic Committees for Democracy in Greece as a case study. Following this introductory chapter, where the topic is put within a historiographical and theoretical context, and a general background chapter on post-war Nordic anti-fascist agitation, it starts with an engagement with the political relationship between Scandinavian Social Democrats and the Greek Center Union politician Andreas

¹²⁶ Djouaria Ghilani, Olivier Luminet, Hans-Peter Erb, Christine Flassbeck, Valérie Rosoux, Ismee Tames and Olivier Klein, “Looking forward to the past: An interdisciplinary discussion on the use of historical analogies and their effects,” *Memory Studies* 10, no. 3 (2017): 274–281.

Papandreou before the Greek colonels seized power. It is followed by a treatment of the Nordic reactions to the demise of democracy in Greece. Then the focus turns on the political activities of individual Committees and on the politicians involved in them. It includes an exploration of conflicting Nordic interpretations of fascism within a Greek context as well as of the ideological split in the Norwegian Committee, where interactions between individual committee members and Greek immigrants and refugees played a role. What ensues is an analysis of the two smaller Finnish and Icelandic Committees and the nature of their activism. The narrative then deals with Nordic political engagement abroad, such as the response to controversial decision to hold the European Athletic Championship in Greece, the involvement of the Committees in Danish and Norwegian actions against the Junta in the Council of Europe and NATO, and Norwegian attempts to unite the Greek political opposition at home and in exile. Finally, the decline of the committees is examined, which coincided with declining political and public interest in the Greek issue before the fall of the Junta and the restoration of democracy in Greece. Following the conclusion, there will be an epilogue on the contemporary relevance of the topic of anti-fascism and an addendum on the fates of the main Nordic activist protagonists, which the thesis focuses on.

The work is based on extensive research in several Nordic archives: the *Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek* (the Labor Movement's Archives and Library) and the *Riksarkivet* (the National Archives) in Sweden; the *Rigsarkivet* (National Archives) and *Arbejdermuseet og Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv* (the Workers Museum Library and Archive) in Denmark; the *Arbejderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek* (the Labor Movement Archives and Library) and the *Riksarkivet og Statsarkivet* (the National Archives) in Norway; the *Þjóðskjalasafn Íslands* (National Archives) and *Landsbókasafn Íslands – háskólabókasafn* (the archives at the National and University Library) in Iceland. Key primary sources were the meeting protocols, letters, reports, and other documents stemming from the Nordic Committees. Ample use was also made of newspaper clippings, which are kept in the above-mentioned archives as well as digitalized newspapers where available. Interviews with two individuals, who were involved in the Greek cause during the 1960s, were conducted: Theodor Kallifatides, a Swedish-Greek author, who took part in actions against the Greek Junta in Sweden and other countries, and Ragnar Stefánsson, who was one of the organizers of demonstrations against NATO and the Greek Junta in Iceland. Since all the leaders of the Nordic Committees have passed away, it was not possible to interview them.

The Committees in Denmark and Iceland did not hand over their records to public archives; hence, the sources about their work stem from personal archives. It also explains

why more time was spent in archives of parties and youth organizations in Denmark than in the other countries. The records of the Swedish Committee were made available to public archives, but since they are so disorganized, the use of personal archives proved to be important here as well.¹²⁷ Since the thesis is a study of a transnational social movement, it is, generally, not based on archival material on the foreign policies of the Nordic countries in the 1960s and 1970s—a topic that has been covered extensively by scholars. The exception is Iceland, but the analysis of its position on Greece merely compliments the existing research. Much use is, however, made of documentary material and letters—dealing with the Nordic Committees—on contacts with government ministries and agencies as well as with parliamentarians. The lack of proficiency in the Finnish language prevented archival research in Finland—and the thesis only superficially accounts for the work of the Finnish Committees. It should be pointed out, however, that they were far less active than the Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish Committees and that their relationship with their Scandinavian counterparts were only sporadic. This opens for further research on the Finnish Committees in the future.

There are challenges raised by comparative and transnational histories. When emphasizing networks, contacts, and exchanges between groups in a large geographical area, some of the particulars of national histories are inevitably downplayed. It is also clear that it is hard to account for local initiatives throughout a region as the transnational tends to emphasize the level of leadership where the cooperation takes place. Nonetheless, as a historical methodological framework, the transnational can help deepen the knowledge of even specific national histories. Within Nordic as well as European contexts, the campaigns discussed in this study are cases in point. The usefulness of emphasizing the dictatorships in Spain and Greece, together with Portugal, lies in the fact that they were consistently grouped together by political actors that claimed that fascism lived on in Europe after the Second World War.

¹²⁷ Personal archives of Mogens Camre, *Rigsarkivet* – RA [the Danish National Archives], DK/RA/07680, 10-14, Sigurður A. Magnússon, *Landsbókasafn Íslands* – LBS [Archives of the National and University Library of Iceland], ICE/LBS/710-NF and Hans Göran Franck, *Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek* – ARAB [the Swedish Labor Movement's Archives and Library], SWE/ARAB/28-4, 1-31. Franck's personal archive is not systematically organized.

The Background: Postwar Anti-Fascist Sentiments in the Nordic Countries

Before the 1967 Greek Military Coup, post-war anti-fascism organizing in the Nordic countries revolved around three main issues: Francoist Spain, an antisemitic domestic fascist threat scenario, and the Portuguese dictatorship. First, the most influential movement coalesced around opposition to Franco's regime in the late 1940s and the 1950s. Building on continuities from earlier anti-fascist social movements, it represented the first postwar attempt at forming an anti-fascist memory regime through references to the Spanish Civil War. Among the Nordic countries, anti-fascist engagement with Spain was most successful in Norway, where the collective memory of the Nazi occupation during the Second World War played a significant role. To be sure, there were Nordic transnational connections on the Spanish question, but they were frail and sporadic. And anti-fascist resistance became increasingly mixed up with humanitarianism when it became clear that the "international community" was not willing to challenge the Franco dictatorship.

Second, in 1959–60, fascism was, for a brief period of time, seen as a domestic threat rather than an international one. What explained it was the outburst of antisemitic vandalism in the so-called Swastika Epidemic, which affected many countries. Nordic anti-fascist activists responded to it by pointing to the danger of the revival of racist and antisemitic politics of historical fascism and by calling for increased public education on the Nazi extermination of European Jews. This form of anti-fascism was mnemonic but included new perspectives and memories that had been previously overlooked.

Third, the dictatorship in Portugal—together with the white minority settler regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia—spurred anti-fascist agitation in the Nordic countries. The Salazar dictatorship never received the same attention as Spain, not least due to the legacy of the Spanish Civil War and its impact on anti-fascist engagement to this day. Nonetheless, a more intense focus on Portugal coincided with the advent of the anti-Apartheid movement in the 1960s. The Portuguese dictatorship was not as brutal as that of its Spanish neighbor, but the same cannot be said of how it behaved in its vast colonial empire. Its response to the Angolan War of Independence in 1961 is a case in point. Thus, the opposition towards what was seen as a fascist regime would become subsumed under the rubric of the wider anti-Apartheid movement. The South African and Rhodesia regimes were characterized by opponents as fascist, but the main focus was always on racism. Thus, the struggle against them were conceptualized in terms of anti-colonial national liberation.

Engaging with the Spanish Question through Memory

After the Second World War, the earliest anti-fascist articulations in Europe dealt with the so-called Spanish Question, or whether the last surviving regime associated with fascism should be welcomed into a reconstructed world order. In the 1930s, Nordic committees had been created in response to the Spanish Civil War to substitute for what anti-fascists considered the failure of Nordic social democratic governments to support the Spanish Republic. The reemergence of the Spanish Question in the postwar period led to the reconstitution of this anti-fascist movement in the Nordic countries based on the memory of the Spanish Civil War as well as on the Nazi occupations of Denmark and Norway. This legacy—and the idea of broad-based committees resisting the Franco dictatorship—also proved to be the main inspiration for the committees that were established to resist the Greek Junta twenty years later. The Norwegian Committee for Spain not only became the most influential one in the Nordic countries but arguably in the world. It also played an important part in making Norway's foreign policy—after the country's liberation from Nazi occupation—a concern for the general population. In this sense, it contributed to the democratization of Norwegian postwar foreign policy. The Nordic anti-fascist mobilization was, to be sure, undercut by the new political reality of the Cold War. In Sweden and Denmark, for example, rivalries between social democrats and communists paralyzed attempts to set up broad-based committees. Yet, as proof of its enduring strength, the Norwegian Committee was active until the end of the 1970s.

When the United Nations was created in 1945, the three allied powers—the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union—intended to exclude Spain from membership in the organization if Franco remained in power. Yet, as tensions between West and East increased in 1946–1947, the Americans and the British came to prefer the status quo of the Franco dictatorship to the ideological uncertainty of a regime change, which they thought could serve Soviet interests.¹²⁸ As early as 1947, the hope of saving Spanish democracy was betrayed (for a second time) when the United States moved away from the ostracization of Spain and towards the Truman Doctrine, which was adopted in response to the Greek Civil War, with the aim of providing political, economic, and military assistance to democratic states facing communist encroachments.

¹²⁸ Helge Øystein Pharo, "Small State Anti-Fascism: Norway's Quest to Eliminate the Franco Regime in the Aftermath of World War II," *Culture & History Digital Journal* 7, no. 1 (2018): 3–4.

Thus, coinciding with the U.S. involvement in the Greek Civil War (1946–1949), the Truman Administration gradually began working towards normalization with the Francoist regime, seeing the dictator as a potentially valuable anti-communist ally. At that point, the Americans believed that communism had to be contained at all costs, even unilaterally without consulting the United Nations. The normalization of diplomatic relations with Spain ran counter to former President Franklin Roosevelt's views on the matter. Shortly before his death in 1945, he refused to forget how the Spanish had assisted the Axis during war. For him, there was no room for fascists in the UN.¹²⁹ The Soviets were also responsible for turning the UN into a geopolitical instrument for national interest by using it to gain acceptance of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Thus, the world organization became a forum where international tensions played out instead of a symbol for great power unity and collaboration.¹³⁰

In Norway, the question of how to deal with the Franco regime became one of the major foreign policy concerns of the post-war social democratic government. Norway became Franco's main Western adversary in his quest to gain international diplomatic recognition—and it was the last Western state to accept it in 1949.¹³¹ Having just been liberated from the Quisling regime and Nazi occupation, the Norwegians were hostile to a continued existence of a fascist-inspired dictatorship in Southern Europe.¹³² The large number of political prisoners in Spain—and periodic executions of regime opponents—also influenced public opinion. The historian Helge Pharo mentions an additional explanation for Norway's exceptionalism—namely, the lived experience of social democratic leaders before and during the war. Norwegian Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen, Foreign Minister Halvard Lange and Party Chairman Haakon Lie had all been involved in the anti-fascist movements against Franco during the Spanish Civil War. And during the Nazi occupation of Norway, they were active in the resistance movement, resulting in Gerhardsen's and Lange's internment in German concentration camps. Later, Gerhardsen also played a role in the opposition against the Greek Junta.

¹²⁹ Giles Tremlett, *The International Brigades: Fascism, Freedom and the Spanish Civil War* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing: 2020), 529; Edward Johnson, "Early Indications of a Freeze: Greece, Spain and the United Nations, 1946-1947," *Cold War History* 6, no. 1 (2006): 56.

¹³⁰ Johnson, "Early Indications of a Freeze," 53–55, 43–46.

¹³¹ Pharo, "Small State Anti-Fascism," 1–2.

¹³² Hilde Haraldstad, *Norsk nei til Franco i NATO, Forsvarsstudier* 4 (1995), 5–6, 9.

Edgeir Benum, *Maktsentra og Opposisjon: Spaniasaken i Norge 1946 og 1947* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969), 35–36; see also "Spanienkommittén startar på nytt," *Svenska Dagbladet* January 13, 1947: 10.

Norway's idealistic foreign policy competed with the pragmatism of its trade policy vis-à-vis Spain whose economic benefits were seen as important for the country's post-war reconstruction. The Norwegian Social Democrats hoped that a concerted international effort at the UN—where Norway would not be isolated—could lead to the removal of Franco by peaceful means.¹³³ Yet the Norwegian government was pressured to act more forcefully against Spain after a parliamentary intervention in March 1946. A communist MP, Randulf Dalland, who was a former volunteer in the International Brigades,¹³⁴ not only challenged the government to break of all diplomatic and economic relations with Spain but also to engage, internationally, in the struggle to topple the Spanish fascist regime. Branding Franco as the first Quisling of Europe, he averred—correctly—that the Spanish dictator was harboring German Nazis. When the Norwegian Parliament debated the issue, feelings ran high, with one liberal MP arguing against Dalland's motion on the grounds that there was no real difference between communism and Nazism. A social democratic MP, however, came to Dalland's defense, contending that if the liberal MP had been imprisoned in a German concentration camp (as he himself had been), he would have met veterans of the Spanish Civil War and never dared to speak ill of them.¹³⁵

A similar intervention in the Swedish Parliament was met with a furious response by the Social Democratic Prime Minister Per Albin Hanson, who described any hostile measure against Spain as constituting interference in the internal affairs of another state. It was not the business of the Swedish government to engineer a change of government in Spain. The Minister of Trade joined in, emphasizing the importance of Sweden's trade relationship with Spain. Prominent left Social Democrats—like Georg Branting—took issue with the government's stance, but their influence was limited because they made up a minority within the Social Democratic Party.¹³⁶ Branting had been one of the founders of the first Swedish Aid Committee for Spain (*Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien*), which was active during the Spanish Civil War. To honor his commitment to the Spanish cause, a Scandinavian company in the International Brigades was even named after him.¹³⁷

Branting had been a staunch critic of the non-interventionist policies of the Per Albin Hanson government during the war and was instrumental in creating the Committee in

¹³³ Pharo, "Small State Anti-Fascism," 7-8.

¹³⁴ Pharo, "Small State Anti-Fascism," 7; see also Jo Stein Moen, "Aktivisme og avmakt. Norsk fagbevegelse of den spanske borgerkrigen," *Arbeiderhistorie* 1, no. 7 (2011): 177–178.

¹³⁵ "Stortinget fordømmer Franco-regimet," *Friheten*, March 6, 1946: 1, 8.

¹³⁶ "Sverige och Franco-Spanien," *Svenska Dagbladet*, March 14, 1946: 4.

¹³⁷ Folke Olsson, "Solidaritetsens soldater," in *No Pasarán! Spanska inbördeskriget och uppgörelsen med fascismen*, eds. Patrik Helgeson, Richard Jändel, and Nils Weijdegård (Linköping: Nixon, 2008), 188.

response to it. Since it included a broad spectrum of the Left—social democrats, communists, and syndicalists—it became an irritant in the Social Democratic coalition government with the Farmers Party (*Bondeförbundet*). Historians Johanna Sköld and Ingrid Söderlind, who have researched Swedish aid organizations in the 1930s and 1940s, have shown that saving children became one of the main mobilizing factors in their work. Branting’s Committee was, however, more ideologically engaged and partisan in its humanitarian mission than the other organizations. Sköld and Söderlind show that the Swedish Aid Committee for Spain saw itself as fighting fascism and saving Spanish democracy, but they do not engage with the role of anti-fascism as a collective identity or mobilizing force.¹³⁸ In the post-war period, what was striking was the difference between Norway and Sweden in the realm of foreign policy, with the former remaining committed to its war-time anti-fascist stance, while the latter continuing with its problematic neutrality policy. This difference signified a split memory of the past. What this meant was that those Swedes who favored active opposition to Franco were totally marginalized in contrast to their Norwegian counterparts. They had to organize through a transnational memory of the Spanish Civil War rather than the national collective memory of Swedish neutrality.

In December 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 39, which stated that in “origin, nature, structure and general conduct, the Franco regime is a fascist regime patterned on, and established largely as a result of aid received from, Hitler’s Nazi Germany and Mussolini’s Fascist Italy.”¹³⁹ Recommending that all UN members withdraw their ambassadors from Spain, it rejected Spanish membership in the organization until the Franco regime had been replaced with a democratic government.¹⁴⁰ The Norwegian foreign ministry and its UN delegation played an important part in this initiative. Yet, as it happened, the Resolution represented the apex of UN commitment to an anti-fascist agenda on the Spanish Question. What followed were serious rifts between those UN members that wanted to stick to the Resolution and those that sought to revoke it.¹⁴¹ Nonetheless, it was a confirmation—by the most important international organization—that the Spanish regime was fascist. Referring to the historic support from Hitler and Mussolini, it was also mnemonic because it

¹³⁸ Johanna Sköld and Ingrid Söderlind, “Vi måste rädda barnen’. Svenska hjälpkommittéer för krigsdrabbade barn i andra länder under 1930- och 1940-talen,” *Historisk tidskrift* 142, no. 4 (2022): 533–535, 541, 560.

¹³⁹ UN General Assembly Resolution 39, *Relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/39(I)* (12 December 1946), accessed October 16, 2023, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/671249?ln=en>.

¹⁴⁰ UN General Assembly Resolution 39.

¹⁴¹ Pharo, “Small State Anti-Fascism,” 4–5.

called for a remembrance of this past. In this sense, the Resolution played a role in cementing an anti-fascist collective identity among those that fought the Franco regime.

The Norwegian Spanish Committee (*Den norske Spaniakomiteen*) was established in September 1946—with firm support from the labor movement—based on the tradition of the Spanish Aid Committee (*Den norske hjelpekomite for Spania*) in the 1930s. Its activities had in 1939 led to the creation of the Norwegian People’s Aid (*Norsk Folkehjelp*), a labor movement humanitarian aid organization, which is still active.¹⁴² Members of these committees constituted what may be termed a mnemonic social movement based on the ideology of anti-fascism. Their message was that they were anti-fascists because they had fought fascism and because they believed that it was important to keep anti-fascist collective memory alive after the war. In their words:

During the years of occupation, we all felt a deep connection between the struggle in Norway and the struggle that was being fought on the fronts and behind the fronts all over Europe. This was the struggle against the Nazi tyranny. Eventually, peace came, and we regained our freedom. Hitler is gone; Mussolini is gone. However, the third man in the Nazi triumvirate, General Franco, is still in power in Spain. There the struggle is not over. Nazism is unfolding; oppression and the Gestapo-regime is ravaging like never before; human rights have been replaced by political terror, champions for freedom and the legitimate democratic regime are executed, imprisoned, in hiding or in exile.¹⁴³

Furthermore, the appeal stressed that a decade had elapsed since Franco started the rebellion, which led to the destruction of Spanish democracy. The struggle of Spanish democrats to reclaim freedom was compared to that of the Norwegian people under Nazi occupation. In both countries, the resistance was divided between those who were fighting at the “home front” and those in exile. Thus, the time was ripe to assist those standing up for democracy in Spain just as the Norwegians had received support for their fight against fascism during the Second World War. It was not only a question of Norwegians helping those who were facing a similar experience after the war; it was also about stopping the spread of “Nazism” before it

¹⁴² Kåre B. Werner, *Spania 1946–1979 Norsk støtte til Spanias frihetskamp*. Samlet og redigert av i samråd med Knut Werner og Kjell Lien (Fjellhamar: O.K.-Trykk A/S, 1987), 5–7.

¹⁴³ *Spania 1946–1979. Norsk støtte til Spanias frihetskamp*, 7. In the original Norwegian: “I okkupasjonsårene følte vi alle at det var en nær sammenheng mellom kampen i Norge og den kamp som ble ført ved frontene og bak frontene i hele Europa, – kampen mot det nazistiske tyranni. Freden kom, og vi har fått vår frihet igjen. Hitler er borte. Mussolini er borte. Men ennå sitter tredjemann i det nazistiske triumviratet, general Franco, ved makten i Spania. Der er ikke kampen slutt, – nazismen er i full utfoldelse, undertrykkelsen og gestapo-regimet herjer som aldri før, menneskerettighetene er erstattet med politisk terror, forkjemperne fort friheten og det lovlige demokratiske regime er henrettet, fengslet, i dekning eller i landflyktighet.”

was able to “hibernate” in Spain and threaten democracy in Europe again. The first task was to support the 130,000 Spanish refugees in France and then, in Spain itself after Franco had been deposed.¹⁴⁴ The appeal encapsulated how a mnemonic social movement constituted itself by drawing legitimacy from the past. In this case, it was not a distant past expressed in culture or history but a recent one experienced collectively by the individuals themselves. Thus, this expression of anti-fascism was about remembrance as well as a premonition. It was an existential struggle because fascism had happened, and it could happen again. It was, in short, an issue that transcended pure humanitarian concerns. This narrative strand became a reoccurring one in Nordic anti-fascist agitation after the Second World War.

While distrustful of each other, the social democrats and communists cooperated on the formation of the Norwegian Spanish Committee. The call to reestablish such a committee had originated from two organizations of actors and writers (*Norsk Skuespillerforbund* and *Den norske Forfatterforening*). The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (*Landsorganisasjonen I Norge – LO*) had initial doubts about the initiative, but it became clear that there was strong public support for it. What eventually helped alleviate lingering tensions was that the *LO*, which was controlled by the social democrats, together with the Norwegian People’s Aid became the dominant force within the Committee.¹⁴⁵ The communists seem to have accepted this arrangement since the committee was based in the labor movement and performed important humanitarian work. Nonetheless, when the communist press published statements stemming from the Norwegian Spanish Committee, they often added its own criticism of the United States and NATO.¹⁴⁶

In Denmark, the Spanish Question became a major political issue following one of the largest demonstrations in the country’s history. In mid-April 1947, up to 100,000 people demonstrated against the Franco regime in Copenhagen.¹⁴⁷ While there were also demonstrations in Oslo and Stockholm, they were much smaller.¹⁴⁸ The Danish one was organized by the Danish Communist Party, which managed to mobilize a large number of labor unions, if not their social democratic leadership. The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (*De Samvirkende Fagforbund*), which was under social democratic control, advised all its members to stay at home and the social democratic press did the same. The

¹⁴⁴ Werner, *Spania 1946–1979. Norsk støtte til Spanias frihetskamp*, 7.

¹⁴⁵ Werner, *Spania 1946–1979. Norsk støtte til Spanias frihetskamp*, 6, 9–15; see also “Vårt bidrag til Spanias frihetskamp,” *Friheten*, September 21, 1946.

¹⁴⁶ “Tortur og misshandling av politiske fanger i Spania,” *Friheten*, April 27, 1970.

¹⁴⁷ “Den store Demonstration mod Franco-Spanien,” *Politiken*, April 15, 1946;

”Ca. 100,000 demonstrerede i Gaar mod Franco-Styret,” *Berlingske Tidende*, April 15, 1946.

¹⁴⁸ “Hele den demokratiske Verden demonstrerade i Gaar mod Franco,” *Land og Folk*, April 15, 1946.

communists sought to capitalize on the controversy by arguing that they were the only real political formation willing to oppose Franco, as had been the case during the Spanish Civil War.¹⁴⁹ Thus, the Spanish Question became enmeshed in domestic party politics, where unified action was also hampered by left-wing factionalism. It did not, however, stand in the way of the establishment of a Danish Committee on Spain with representation from all political parties. But the leadership of the Committee did not seem to appreciate the value of a unified platform against Franco. The work was plagued by inactivity, and the Committee became moribund when a leading individual was accused of having worked for the Gestapo.¹⁵⁰

In Sweden, the Swedish Aid Committee for Spain (*Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien*) was created in November 1946. The founding members were a small group of prominent left-wing social democrats and communists, including veterans of the Spanish Civil War, such as the Social Democrat Conny Andersson and the Communist Sixten Røgeby. Branting became the chair of the Committee. Unlike its Norwegian counterpart, the Swedish Committee did not enjoy as much visible support from the labor movement. The Swedes, who greatly admired the resolve of the Norwegian government on the Spanish Question, wanted to push their own government into the same direction through public action and outreach.¹⁵¹ Branting was an effective public speaker, and—together with other Committee members—he traveled around the country to mobilize against the Franco regime. Yet there was a lack of public interest in the issue, which was underscored by the small audiences at many public meetings.¹⁵² There were exceptions, to be sure. One of Branting's most famous speeches, which was later published under the title "Break-up with Franco" (*Bryt med Franco*), was given at a large public meeting in March 1947 in Stockholm with members of three Nordic Committees. At the time, the Stockholm representative of the Spanish Republican government in exile, Ernesto Dethorey, attended many of the meetings, which the Swedes organized. There were regular contacts with both the exiled governments of José

¹⁴⁹ Letter, Central Committee of the Danish Communist Party to party members, April 22, 1946, *Arbejdermuseet og Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv* – ABA [the Danish Workers Museum Library and Archive], DK/ABA/255/104, Nørlund, Jørgen Ib, Spaniensdemonstration, April 14, 1946.

¹⁵⁰ "Social-demokraten atter uheldig med at sabotere Kampagnen mod Franco" *Land og Folk*, April 11, 1946.

¹⁵¹ Protocol, "Nordisk Spaniakonferanse," April 8–9, 1948, SWE/ARAB/1247/6, Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien, 12–13. It is unclear what came of the accusations against the Committee member Manuel Berga. It inhibited the work of the Committee, and the Danish Communist Party spent time investigating the issue. See "Spanien – Komitee Berga-sagen," DK/ABA/921/472, Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti, Solidaritet med modstand i Grækenland og Spanien, 1947–1948.

¹⁵² Meeting protocol, "Svenska Hjälpkommittén för Spanien," November 26, 1946, SWE/ARAB/1247/1, Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien, 1–2.

¹⁵³ Meeting protocol, February 25, 1948, SWE/ARAB/1247/1, Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien.

Giral and later Rodolfo Llopis.¹⁵³ Branting expressed concern that there was a whole generation that had been too young to remember the crimes of Hitler and Franco. This generation had to be taught to remember. While the rest of the Swedish population might remember, Branting argued that *we do not remember enough*:¹⁵⁴

We do not dig up the past as a dramatic historical relic – no, this is a question that concerns the world today! To be able to deal with the past and to move on, the young generation must be made to remember the context that has led us to this point in time, in Spain and in the world in general. *It holds true for today as much as ten years ago; the struggle for the world is between fascism and democracy.* Just like it was back then, the battlefield is still *Spain!*¹⁵⁵

Thus, the final victory over fascism had not yet been achieved. Branting lamented the increase in international trade with Spain and saw the current course of normalization being driven by business elites. Democracy was often incompatible with the interests of commerce, with Spain being the base for hibernating Nazis and fascists. Branting castigated the Swedish government as well as the labor movement for not acting against Franco. The only light in the tunnel were the current policies of the Norwegian government, which Branting characterized as “anti-fascist politics.”¹⁵⁶ At a Nordic conference on Spain a year later, Branting acknowledged how small the Swedish Committee was compared to the Norwegian one, which he partly explained by the failure to mobilize the entire labor movement for the cause. Instead, the Swedes were content with seeking to change government policy through public education and mobilization. It was a case of split memory. As Branting pointed out, the Swedes lagged because they had not experienced Nazi occupation like the Norwegians. Therefore, there was a sense of urgency about the cause in Norway, which was absent in Sweden.¹⁵⁷

By 1948, Branting had concluded that the Great Powers were no longer interested in international action on Spain, which made the work of the Nordic Spanish Committees purely

¹⁵³ Report, “Verksamhetsberättelse för Svenska Hjälpkommittén för Spanien,” 26/11 1946 – 25/2 1948, SWE/ARAB/1247/1, Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien, 2, 11.

¹⁵⁴ Georg Branting, *Bryt med Franco* (Stockholm: Arbetarnas Tryckeri, 1947), 4. In the original Swedish: “vi minns – men minns icke tillräckligt!”

¹⁵⁵ Branting, *Bryt med Franco*, 4. In the original Swedish: “Men vi gräver icke upp detta förflutna såsom ett stycke dramatisk historia – nej, det gäller nu vår värld av i dag! För att kunna gripa oss an med den och komma vidare, måste också den unga generationen erinras om det sammanhang, som lett fram till dagens läge, i Spanien och i världen för övrigt. Det gäller i dag likaväl som för tio år sen världskampen mellan fascismen och demokratin. Slagfältet är nu liksom då – Spanien!”

¹⁵⁶ Branting, *Bryt med Franco*, 1–4, 6–14. In the original Swedish: “antifascistiska politik!”

¹⁵⁷ Protocol, “Nordisk Spaniakonferanse,” April 8–9, 1948, SWE/ARAB/1247/6, Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien, 7.

humanitarian.¹⁵⁸ As part of what had been thought of as a Nordic network, the Norwegian and Swedish Committees cooperated on humanitarian aid and on establishing orphanages for Spanish children in France. The Danish Committee chose not to participate on the grounds that Spain should not be singled out for such an action; because of the heightening tensions between West and East, it saw no point in fighting just one dictatorship. Moreover, the Norwegians failed in their efforts to involve the Finns in cooperation on the Spanish Question; and the remote Icelanders were not even mentioned in this context.

The Norwegians and the Swedes established a center in Paris, with the goal of acting as an intermediary between the Spanish exile government and Spanish refugees, on the one hand, and the Norwegian and Swedish Committees, on the other. This collaborative humanitarian work continued until 1950 when it was put on hold. The last orphanage in France that the Swedish Aid Committee for Spain operated was taken over by the Norwegians in 1951. It was renamed *Narvik* in honor of the Spaniards who gave their lives in the Battles of Narvik.¹⁵⁹ While it is unclear what specifically led to the withdrawal of the Swedish Committee, it was known that it had financial problems. The Swedes and the Norwegians also disagreed over which Spanish exile group, they should cooperate with.¹⁶⁰ Another explanatory factor may have been that Branting was publicly expressing increasingly pro-Soviet views; he wanted closer relations with the Soviet Union, and he even opposed the Marshall Plan.¹⁶¹ The difficult relationship between the committees persisted. When the Norwegians attempted, again, to organize Nordic cooperation on the Spanish issue in 1951 they seemingly sidelined the Swedish Committee by contacting the social democratic Cooperation Committee of the Nordic Worker's Movement (SAMAK). The Norwegians put forward an extensive proposal for an ambitious campaign for Spanish democracy and humanitarian aid. The proposal was met with much skepticism from the Swedish and Danish representatives in SAMAK who doubted the usefulness of a common Nordic campaign

¹⁵⁸ Protocol, "Nordisk Spaniakonferanse," April 8–9, 1948, 7.

¹⁵⁹ Werner, *Spania 1946–1979. Norsk støtte til Spanias frihetskamp*, 24–25, 36–37; Protocol, "Nordisk Spaniakonferanse," April 8–9, 1948, 13.

¹⁶⁰ Meeting protocols, December 22, 1948, and January 11, 1949, SWE/ARAB/1247/1, Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien. The Swedish Aid Committee for Spain could not freely dispose of the money it collected for the Spanish cause because the donations would go to a different organization *Europahjälpen*. The Committee would, then, use some of that money together with the Swedish chapter of Save the Children to operate the costs of orphanages in France. The Swedish *LO* did not extend donations to the Committee because it had already supported the other organizations. What started the disagreement with the Norwegians was that the Swedes did not want to cooperate with the exiled government of Spain but with Spanish aid organizations.

¹⁶¹ "Branting slutter seg til Sheffieldkongressen," *Friheten*, November 4, 1950; "Advokat Georg Branting hyller Sovjets fredsinnsetning," *Friheten*, December 6, 1950.

specifically focused on Spain, preferring the general humanitarian work they were doing on their own.¹⁶²

Historian Guðmundur Hálfðanarson has convincingly argued that both in terms of memory and historiography Iceland was, and still is, a Nordic outlier in the sense that it has not really dealt with the legacy of the Second World War. Iceland's experience of the war was overwhelmingly positive; it witnessed rapid economic growth due to the British occupation and U.S. military presence and, while a sovereign state since 1918, it prioritized the severing of the remaining constitutional ties with the Danish King, which it managed to do in 1944 while Denmark was still under Nazi occupation. The allied occupation meant that Iceland was never forced to confront painful memories of fascism and collaboration with, or resistance against, it. Even though it was the war, colloquially named the “beloved war,” that facilitated unprecedented Icelandic economic growth, it was never remembered as a contributing factor in the nationalist narratives about the independence struggle. Even under occupation, the Icelandic government stubbornly stuck to its formal neutrality policy. And, since it refused as a non-armed state to declare war on the Axis, it did not become a founding member of the United Nations in 1945 (it was granted admission in 1946).¹⁶³ These nationalist narratives also explain the Icelandic indifference with the postwar legacy of the war, in general, and fascism, in particular. There were no memories of struggles against fascism. Feminist scholars and literary theorists have tried to bring nuance to this history by exploring how the Icelandic state tried—through repressive measures—to curtail sexual relations between Icelandic women and British and American servicemen.¹⁶⁴ The war was much more consequential to Iceland's economic and social development than it was for Denmark. But there was much more commemoration and engagement with the memory in Denmark because of the Nazi occupation. Norwegian and Danish patriotic narratives of wartime resistance portrayed the whole populations as fighting fascism, ignoring the dark chapters of collaboration with the Germans. In all the Nordic countries, except for Sweden and Iceland, the war experience played a seminal part in a national master narrative about the past. Perhaps, the most complex of these was that of the Finns who first defended themselves

¹⁶² Report, “Den norske Spaniakomiteens virksomhet,” May 1, 1951 to May 1, 1952, *Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek* – AAB [the Norwegian Labor Movement Archives and Library], NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0011, Den norske Spaniakomiteen, 2.

¹⁶³ Guðmundur Hálfðanarson, “‘The Beloved War.’ The Second World War and the Icelandic National Narrative,” in *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited*, eds. Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, and Johan Östling (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011), 68–81.

¹⁶⁴ Daisy Neijmann, “The Allied Occupation of Iceland: Indriði G. Þorsteinsson's *North of War*,” in *Nordic War Stories: World War II as History, Fiction, Media, and Memory*, ed. Marianne Stecher-Hansen (New York: Berghahn Books, 2021), 224.

against a Soviet invasion (the “Winter War”) and then later joined the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union (“the Continuation War”). According to the master narrative, Finland experienced its own separate war that was forced upon the country,¹⁶⁵ thereby exonerating it from its alliance with Nazi Germany.

No Spanish committee was established in Iceland. But the Icelandic Confederation of Labor (*Alþýðusamband Íslands – ASÍ*), which was controlled by the radical left in the immediate postwar period, responded to the 1946 call of the *World Federation of Trade Unions* to block the unloading of Spanish cargo in Icelandic ports after the Spanish government had executed twelve political prisoners. The blockade was a communist initiative, and it was not well received by the Icelandic public that did not show much interest in—or care for—the legacy of the Spanish Civil War or the brutality of the Franco regime.¹⁶⁶ Nonetheless, the 1946 Icelandic blockade was followed by the Norwegians dockworkers, declaring a blockade against Spanish merchant ships in Norwegian harbors.¹⁶⁷ In contrast, the Swedish Transport Workers Union refrained from such action.¹⁶⁸ The Norwegian blockade backfired, spectacularly, as hundreds of housewives in Oslo took it upon themselves to unload Spanish tomatoes; the episode became known as the “battle of the tomatoes” (*Tomatslaget*). The Norwegian *LO* opposed the blockade and was troubled by the anti-fascist labor militancy that was spreading within some left-leaning unions at the time. The leadership clamped down on isolated union labor actions, arguing that a blockade had to be internationally coordinated. Moreover, the social democratic leadership made the point that it was not the task of labor unions to conduct foreign policy.¹⁶⁹ This episode prompted historian Edgeir Benun to argue that the Norwegian Spanish Committee was merely set up as a safety valve to direct labor militancy away from the labor market to controlled protests against Spain.¹⁷⁰ This conspiratorial interpretation, however, leaves out two important factors: the persistence of the anti-fascist legacy of the Scandinavian Spanish Committees and the support of both communists and social democrats for their reconstitution in the postwar period.

¹⁶⁵ Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, and Johan Östling, “Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: An Introduction,” in *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War*, 7–22.

¹⁶⁶ Stefán Svavarsson, “Frá saltfiski til sólarferða. Stjórn mála- og viðskiptatengsl Íslands og Spánar 1939–1959” (MA thesis, University of Iceland, 2017), 22–24.

¹⁶⁷ Svavarsson, “Frá saltfiski til sólarferða,” 22–24.

¹⁶⁸ “Kommunaliserad stuverirörelse,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, August 16, 1947: 5.

¹⁶⁹ Jo Stein Moen, “Aktivisme og avmakt. Norsk fagbevegelse of den spanske borgerkrigen,” 174–177.

¹⁷⁰ Edgeir Benun, *Maktsentra og opposisjon: Spaniasaken i Norge 1946 og 1947* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969), 35–36.

Opposing Franco and the “Swastika Epidemic”

International criticism of Francoist Spain reached its highpoint in 1946, or shortly before the onset of the Cold War. The Soviet-sponsored communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the Chinese revolution in 1949, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 buttressed the view of those in the West that believed that the normalization of relations with Spain was a necessary step in the struggle against communism.¹⁷¹ In contrast to Norway’s activist foreign policy, Iceland was one of the first Western countries to seek political rapprochement with Spain mainly due to pressure from the all-important fishing industry, which saw Spain as a lucrative market for Iceland fish exports. To gain access to its market, however, Spain demanded, in return, that Iceland support its efforts to gain international recognition. From the late 1940s to the early 1950s, Iceland provided Spain with political support at the UN—a position that prompted heavy criticism by the Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange when he visited Iceland in 1949.¹⁷² Yet it soon became clear that Norway’s hardline stance on Spain lacked international support. UN Resolution 39 was nullified in 1950, which led to the normalization of diplomatic relations with Spain and paved the way for Spanish membership in the UN five years later. Norway’s abstention in the 1950 vote signified a retreat in its policy vis-à-vis Spain; Denmark and Sweden also abstained, leaving Iceland as the only Nordic country to vote in favor of nullifying the resolution.¹⁷³

The Social Democratic Youth International (IUSY), which was based in Copenhagen, was outraged that the social democratic Scandinavian governments had abstained in the UN vote. This position also evoked fierce public debates in Denmark and Norway. The IUSY’s point was that the only way to retain the credibility of European anti-communism was to make sure that it was, at the same time, anti-fascist in an anti-totalitarian sense. Historian Anders Dalsager argues that the controversy exemplified how two bipolarities came to blows, one centering on the West-East binary and the other on juxtaposing democracy against fascism and dictatorship. IUSY attempted to retain its commitment to Cold War anti-communism by placing it within an anti-fascist framework, where fascism was also seen as

¹⁷¹ Johnson, “Early Indications of a Freeze,” 56; Svavarsson, “Frá saltfiski til sólarferða,” 36.

¹⁷² Svavarsson, “Frá saltfiski til sólarferða,” 4, 55.

¹⁷³ Anders Dalsager, “Framing anti-fascism in the Cold War: the Socialist Youth International and Franco’s regime after the Second World War,” in *Anti-fascism in the Nordic Countries: New Perspectives, Comparisons and Transnational Connections*, 230; General Assembly Resolution 386, Relations of States Members and specialized agencies with Spain: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/386(V) (November 4, 1950), accessed October 16, 2023, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/670295?ln=en>.

an international threat.¹⁷⁴ Based on universalist principles, the UN was increasingly viewed as an organization for all states irrespective of the nature of their regimes. When the United States and Spain concluded the hugely important Pact of Madrid in 1953, which formalized US military and economic cooperation with Spain, it was primarily France and the UK that objected because a Spanish-American Mediterranean presence went against their own interests in the region.¹⁷⁵

Having been silent on the Pact of Madrid—for which it was criticized by the Norwegian Spanish Committee—the Norwegian government, nonetheless, stuck to its hostile public stance towards Spain, which differentiated it from other Western states. This was most clearly illustrated when the question of Spain's NATO membership was floated in the mid-1950s. Franco himself portrayed Norway as one of Spain's main obstacles to its accession to the Alliance.¹⁷⁶ Norway's position was firm and non-compromising: Since NATO was a political and military alliance in the defense of democracy, the membership of Spain under Franco was unacceptable. It was also a way for the Norwegian Social Democrats to retain integrity in their support for Norway's NATO membership, which had not been uniformly backed by the domestic labor movement. It was the only time Norway, which was joined by Denmark, used NATO's consensus decision-making rule to block a country from joining the Alliance. Spain was not admitted to NATO until 1982 following the restoration of democracy in the country.¹⁷⁷ The key Norwegian and Danish politicians involved in the efforts were those who had formerly been organized in social democratic youth organizations with strong anti-fascist agendas.¹⁷⁸

During the 1950s, political persecution of communists and leftist in post-civil war Greece spurred political activism in the Nordic countries. After the banning of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), Greeks suspected of being leftists were hounded by extremist right-wing mobs. The trial against the communist politician Nikos Beloyannis gained world-wide attention. He was tried on trumped up charges of espionage and executed together with three other prisoners in 1952. He was one of many thousands communists and leftists who were either imprisoned or executed. International calls to save his life were spurred by letter-writing campaigns, which attracted the signatures of famous individuals, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Charles de Gaulle, Charlie Chaplin, and Pablo Picasso. Many British MPs joined the

¹⁷⁴ Dalsager, "Framing anti-fascism in the Cold War," 219–220, 228–229, 232–233.

¹⁷⁵ Haraldstad, *Norsk nei til Franco i NATO*, 9–11, 12–20.

¹⁷⁶ Haraldstad, *Norsk nei til Franco i NATO*, 9–11, 12–20.

¹⁷⁷ Haraldstad, *Norsk nei til Franco i NATO*, 52–54.

¹⁷⁸ Dalsager, "Framing anti-fascism in the Cold War," 233.

plea,¹⁷⁹ and The British League for Democracy in Greece was involved in these political activities as well. According to a report published by the League, 20,000 political prisoners and veterans of the resistance against the Nazi occupation languished in Greek prisons. It pleaded with the UN to stop these persecutions. In Norway the committee *Den Norske Hellaskomiteé* published the League's report to draw attention to the situation in Greece.¹⁸⁰ This committee, which was founded by the famous socialist architect Carsten Boysen, lobbied the UN to demand an amnesty for political prisoners.¹⁸¹ Both the Norwegian and Icelandic communist press viewed the Beloyannis case as an example of fascists persecuting anti-fascists. Communists were the driving force behind the Greek campaign, even if it was supported by other political formations.¹⁸² It is unclear what became of the Norwegian committee, but none of the main members were involved prominent in the activism against the Junta in the 1960s. The Danish committee, *Grækenlandskomiteen*, sought to educate people on the situation in Greece and organize humanitarian assistance to those affected. It consisted of many famous cultural personalities, such as author Kjeld Abell. The social democratic MP Bodil Koch was also involved in this campaign, and she later became an active participant in the opposition against the Junta together with Mogens Camre.¹⁸³

In the 1960s, another attempt was made to establish a Nordic network of Spanish Committees—this time by young social democrats. The Norwegians had no understanding for the passivity on the part of the Swedish and Danish labor movements on the Spanish issue. Conversely, the Swedes and Danes could not comprehend the Norwegian preoccupation with Spain. In December 1960, the Norwegian Spanish Committee was informed through Nordic social democratic channels that the reason for the paralysis of the Swedish and Danish Committees was that they had been so heavily infiltrated by the communists who used them for their own purposes. Hence, the withdrawal of the labor movements from the committees. Given these circumstances, the Swedes and the Danes saw no point in trying to replicate the work of the Norwegian Spanish Committee.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁹ André Gerolymatos, *An International Civil War Greece, 1943–1949* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 297–298.

¹⁸⁰ “20 000 demokrater i fangeleirene,” *Friheten*, November 21, 1953.

¹⁸¹ “Den norske Hellas-komiteen vender seg til FN,” *Friheten*, November 5, 1953; “Carsten Boysen,” *Store norske leksikon*, accessed May 6, 2024, https://snl.no/Carsten_Boysen.

¹⁸² “Livsvarig fengsel for 2000 dødsdømte grekere,” *Friheten*, April 8, 1952; “Verða grísku dómsmorðin framkvæmd,” *Þjóðviljinn*, March 12, 1952.

¹⁸³ Flyer, “Undertegnede kreds af danske kvinder og mænd,” published by Grækenlandskomiteen [1948-1949], digitalized by Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv, restricted access (<https://abm.reindex.net/ABA/main/T.php?Ifm=Pz&Zoomed=1108&qe=id=GG2014-11-18094>).

¹⁸⁴ Letter, Reiulf Steen to “Den norske Spaniakomiteen,” January 2, 1961, NOR/AAB/ARK-1409/Da/L0091, Arbeidernes ungdomsfylking.

It is true that the Norwegian persistence in establishing a platform for transnational Nordic cooperation on Spain succeeded, if modestly, from 1962 to 1965. But the Swedish and Danish Social Democrats were uncomfortable with coalescing specifically around the Spanish Question. As for the former, it could only muster two local committees—a large one in Gothenburg and a smaller one in Stockholm—which were both organized by the Swedish Social Democratic Youth (*SSU*). These committees were able to convene an international IUSY conference on Spain in Gothenburg. Yet the goal of having a Nordic cooperative council on Spain came to nothing since the Danish Social Democratic Youth (*DsU*) did not succeed in organizing a committee after protracted meetings with the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (*LO*) and the Danish Social Democratic Party.¹⁸⁵ The President of the Danish *LO*, Eiler Jensen, was quick to point out that the labor movement was already supporting the Spanish cause and questioned the need for a specific committee on Spain.¹⁸⁶ As he put it, we “understand the motive in establishing a Spanish Committee, but why only for Spain? Why not one for East-Germany (Berlin Wall) or South Africa – or perhaps for [resisting] local authorities in Mississippi?”¹⁸⁷ Evidently, this kind of “whataboutism” was not fruitful when attempting to organize around a specific political issue. The president of *LO*, Eiler Jensen had, as noted, back in 1947 urged Danish workers not to participate in demonstrations against Franco. Anti-communism was seemingly higher on the agenda than anti-fascism for many Nordic Social Democrats.

The fear of communists preoccupied the members of the Swedish *SSU* Spanish Committees as well. They started out as open organizations, but when communists joined in, they were quickly purged, with ensuing access restrictions.¹⁸⁸ The communists were even compared to Nazis by the *SSU* activist Hans Ove Carlqvist, who stated that it was as dangerous for social democrats to cooperate with them as it was for Christian democrats to open up to Nazis.¹⁸⁹ The Swedish *SSU* activists were not even willing to cooperate with the liberal youth organization, as *SSU* openly attacked the Liberal Party (*Folkpartiet*) for

¹⁸⁵ Werner, *Spania 1946–1979. Norsk støtte til Spanias frihetskamp*, 25; Protocol, “Spanienkonferens i Göteborg,” October 3-4, 1964, NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0010, Den norske Spaniakomiteen.

¹⁸⁶ Letter, Eiler Jensen to *DsU*, December 15, 1964, DK/ABA/570/25, Danmarks socialdemokratiske Ungdom.

¹⁸⁷ Letter, Eiler Jensen to *DsU*, December 15, 1964. In the Danish original: “Vi forstår godt bevæggrunden til at etablere en Spaniens-komit , men hvorfor kun Spanien? Hvorfor ikke overfor  st-Tyskland (Berlin-muren) eller Sydafrika – ja eller m ske endog overfor den locale ledelse i Mississippi?”

¹⁸⁸ Letter, Helge Nilsson to Einer H.C. and Keld  kj r, December 14, 1964, Spanienshj lpen, DK/ABA/570/25, Danmarks socialdemokratiske Ungdom.

¹⁸⁹ “SSU-are brevsmugglar propaganda till Spanien,” *Arbetet*, October 6, 1964.

organizing summer holidays in Spain for elderly party members.¹⁹⁰ This total inability to forge a united Left against the Franco regime meant that when a “wrong” Spanish political prisoner—for example in 1963, the famous communist leader Julian Grimau—was executed, the *SSU* Spanish Committee in Gothenburg did not even bother to participate in the protests.¹⁹¹ When *SSU* activists in Stockholm decided to show solidarity by joining the demonstrations, they were heavily criticized by the rest of the *SSU* and their actions labeled very “dangerous.” Even when the *SSU* Committee was considering inviting Spanish refugees to Sweden for educational courses, their political affiliation had to be controlled and vetted beforehand to ensure their “reliability.”¹⁹²

Grimau’s execution sparked an international outcry against the Franco regime. It coincided with a Spanish state-sponsored tourist campaign dubbed the “Spanish Week,” which was protested in all the Nordic capitals, except for Reykjavik where it was not held. In Sweden, the protest action was organized by a new organization bent on creating a broad political alliance against fascism and racism. Formed in 1963, it was called the Committee against Neo-fascism and Racial Prejudice (*Kommittén mot nynazism och rasfördomar* – CNR). CNR was quite successful, although it was often accused of being a communist front because its founder, Kjell E. Johanson, was a communist politician. It managed to unite both syndicalists and the *SSU* in Stockholm in demonstrations against Franco. CNR also spread information about racism in Sweden and campaigned for the rights of the Swedish Roma population. Although the organization managed to garner support from parts of the labor movement and to adopt a variety of anti-fascist issues, its activities were limited to Sweden. Johanson later played a role in the founding of the Swedish Committee for Democracy in Greece (*Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati*) and influenced its inclusive anti-fascist position.¹⁹³ He was also part of the New Left in Sweden and defined himself as working against both Stalinist dogma within his own party and against the dominant strain of Social Democracy, defined as being pro-capitalist and bureaucratic. The New Left propagated left-

¹⁹⁰ Newsletter, “Hyckleri med humanitet,” *Aktuellt från Spanienkommittén. Kontaktorgan för medlemsorganisationer och kontaktmän* [no date], NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0010, Den norske Spaniakomiteen.

¹⁹¹ Letter, Lennart Nyberg to Kåre Werner, April 27, 1963, NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0011, Den norske Spaniakomiteen.

¹⁹² Protocol, “Spanienkonferens i Göteborg,” October 3–4, 1964, NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0010, Den norske Spaniakomiteen.

¹⁹³ Pontus Järvstad, “The Committee against Neofascism and Racial Prejudice. Nordic Anti-Fascist Organizing and International Solidarity in the 1960s,” in *Anti-Fascism in European History. From the 1920s to Today* eds. Jože Pirjevec, Egon Pelikan, and Sabrina P. Ramet (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2023), 129–132; letter, Kjell E. Johanson to Hans Göran Franck, June 13, 1968, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-6, Hans Göran Franck.

wing unity among social democrats, communists, syndicalists, and unaffiliated leftists. What united them was a vision of socialism realized through economic democracy. Johanson was part of a young faction within the Swedish Communist Party, which identified itself with the New Left, and which worked towards reforming the party by “de-Stalinizing” it and ending its subservience to the Soviet Union. In Sweden, a compromise was reached between the New Left and the Stalinists, with the 1964 election of the new party chairman C.H. Hermansson.¹⁹⁴ Under his leadership, the party started a reform process geared toward distancing itself from Moscow. This corresponded to a trend all over Western Europe, reflecting the prevalent view that communism was in crisis after the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary. New parties emerged that saw themselves as neither communist nor social democratic. In Denmark, there was a split in the Communist Party in 1958, which led to the formation of the *Socialistisk Folkeparti* (Socialist People’s Party). In Norway, a splinter group from the Social Democratic Party established a similarly named party (*Sosialistisk Folkeparti*) in 1961. Both these parties wanted to see their countries leave NATO, propagate neutrality, and demilitarization. The founder of the Norwegian People’s Party, Finn Gustavsen, would later become involved in the struggle against the Greek Junta.¹⁹⁵ Thus, Johanson’s various contributions to the revitalization of anti-fascism should also be viewed within this ideological context. The New Left also espoused anti-colonial criticism of what it saw as the inertia of the social democratic premiership of Tage Erlander in an attempt to show active solidarity with national liberation struggles in Vietnam, the Portuguese colonies, and South Africa. In this criticism, anti-fascism coalesced with anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. It echoed W.E.B. Du Bois’s criticism of European Social Democratic welfare states, which had built their affluence on colonial exploitation.¹⁹⁶

In 1966—a year before the Greek coup—the CNR and Johanson described Spain and Portugal as fully fascist regimes. Because of the political repression in post-civil-war Greece, the country was seen as highly unstable swinging between fascism, reactionary conservatism, and democratic potentials. Although West Germany was not seen as fascist, Johanson argued that anti-democratic tendencies—together with the presence of old Nazis in the army, police, and judiciary—constituted a danger. Outside Europe, Apartheid South Africa was sometimes

¹⁹⁴ Ingemar Andersson, Anders Carlberg, Ulf Ellemark, Lennart Ingberg, Kjell E. Johanson and Klas-Göran Warginger, *Unga kommunister – aktuellt alternativ* (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers förlag, 1966), 9–16.

¹⁹⁵ Thomas Ekman Jørgensen, “The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 33, no. 4 (2008): 329; “Sosialistisk Folkeparti,” *Store norske leksikon*, accessed January 15, 2024, https://snl.no/Sosialistisk_Folkeparti.

¹⁹⁶ Andersson, et al. *Unga kommunister*, 18–23; “Vietnam och vårt personliga ansvar,” *Ny Dag*, September 24–30, 1965.

also labeled fascist because of its racial politics.¹⁹⁷ Johanson discouraged comparisons between such “fascist” states and the communist states in the Eastern Bloc or recent decolonialized countries. Pointing to Greece, Portugal, and Spain, he argued that fascism was conservative, for it preserved the old order by stifling social development. In addition, fascist regimes were capitalist because they did not question private ownership of the means of production. Their anti-democratic tendencies were directed primarily against the Left and the labor movement and, with less vigor, against liberals.¹⁹⁸

As for the question of racism, Johanson contended that the Nazis had instrumentalized latent antisemitic prejudices in German society by inciting the population against the Jews, resulting in the murder of six million in gas chambers and concentration camps. It was a case of the most extreme form of state-driven racism. And although Johanson did not see racism as essential to fascist ideology, but rather as an instrument, it was, to him, a fertile ground for fascism to take root. Just as antisemitism was paired with anti-communism in Nazi Germany, racism was paired with anti-communism in Southern Africa. Thus, struggles for the emancipation and liberation of Black Africans in Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa were rejected as a communist plot and racist policies and laws were justified as measures to counter communism.¹⁹⁹ Historian Heléne Lööw has shown how fascist movements of the 1960s, such as Nordic State Party (*Nordiska Rikspartiet*) and the New Swedish Movement (*Nysvenska Rörelsen*) looked up to and idealized Franco, Salazar, and the racial regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa.²⁰⁰ Yet Johanson argued that no real threat was posed by the small fascist organizations in Sweden,²⁰¹ although the situation could change if the population remained apathetic to the suffering of colonized peoples and to the proliferation of racial prejudices against the Roma and Sámi.²⁰²

CNR activities coincided with an upsurge in antisemitism and neo-Nazi activity in Sweden and internationally following the Swastika Epidemic in 1959–1960. Hence, questions of anti-racism became important to anti-fascists, as the CNR was initially formed to counter neo-Nazi activity in Swedish schools. The Swastika Epidemic was a series of instances of antisemitic and Nazi graffiti—which started on Christmas Eve 1959 in Cologne, and which spread to synagogues and Jewish gravesites worldwide. In Cologne, two members of the

¹⁹⁷ Kjell E. Johanson, *Fascism, Nazism, Rasism* (Malmö: Cavefors, 1966), 15–16, 56–58.

¹⁹⁸ Johanson, *Fascism*, 34–37.

¹⁹⁹ Johanson, *Fascism*, 24–26.

²⁰⁰ Heléne Lööw, *Nazismen i Sverige 1925–1979: Pionjärerna, Partierna, Propagandan* (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2016), 439–440.

²⁰¹ Johanson, *Fascism*, 48–49.

²⁰² Johanson, *Fascism*, 56–58.

West German neo-Nazi party *Deutsche Reichspartei* were arrested and confessed to the acts. They had painted large swastikas, and the words “Jews out” (“*Juden Raus*”) on the newly rebuilt and reopened Roonstrasse Synagogue, which had been badly damaged in the 1938 Nazi November pogroms. The antisemitic incidents caused an international outrage, resulting in sharp condemnations from West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower. As the attacks spread around the world, some of the perpetrators were Nazi sympathizers, but the majority were young attention seekers who did not seem to understand the severity of their actions.²⁰³ Thus, the issue highlighted what many saw as a lacuna in school textbooks with respect to the horrors of Nazism and fascism and as an unfinished project of denazification in West Germany.²⁰⁴

We now know that parts of the Swastika Epidemic originated as a KGB disinformation operation that sought to discredit West Germany as a fascist state and to disrupt relations between the West and West Germany. But the KGB campaign in Germany took on a life of its own. It was the first explosion of antisemitic hate on a global scale since the end of the Second World War.²⁰⁵ It is not entirely clear whether the Soviets started the campaign or whether they were just riding the wave of antisemitic vandalism and graffiti. Cases were reported in Oslo already months before they took place in Cologne. There were also incidents in Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland. Icelandic Social Democrats were horrified that the wave of antisemitism, fascism, and Nazism had spread to their country. Accusations were made against Swedish neo-Nazis and fascists, who were seen as the instigators in Sweden. The leader of the New Swedish Movement (*Nysvenska Rörelsen*), Per Engdahl initially claimed that it was a Jewish conspiracy before changing tack and blaming the competitors, the Nazi party *Nordiska Rikspartiet* (NRP) for the incidents. It led to an anti-fascist campaign by the Swedish printers’ union (*Typografförbundet*), which refused to print NRP propaganda. With many union members also belonging to the CNR, this campaign continued in the following years, resulting in more print shops rejecting NRP printing contracts.²⁰⁶

A representative of the Jewish World Congress had expressed deep concerns about NRP and its leader Göran Assar Oredsson. The Jewish community in Malmö where Oredsson

²⁰³ Järvstad, “The Committee against Neofascism,” 126–130.

²⁰⁴ “Generationen som inte minns,” *Dagens Nyheter*, February 3, 1960.

²⁰⁵ James Loeffler, *Rooted Cosmopolitans. Jews and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 230, 238–239.

²⁰⁶ Järvstad, “The Committee against Neofascism,” 127–28; “Hakakrossar í Reykjavík,” *Alþýðublaðið*, January 9, 1960: 1–3.

lived was fearful after the synagogue had been vandalized, but the local police chief claimed that antisemitism did not pose a threat. Oredsson idolized Hitler and Mussolini, blamed the Jews for societal ills, and denied the Holocaust. When the Norwegian journalist, Odd Bergfald, asked him pointedly about what he thought had happened in the concentration camps, he was more interested in knowing whether the interviewer was aware of any inmates. It was a question to which Bergfald responded that many Norwegians had been in the camps, including himself. Bergfald viewed the young Swedish neo-Nazis as a clear danger but only in domestic political terms. A bigger concern was the presence of Danish and Norwegian Waffen-SS veterans at NRP meetings, with Norwegian Nazis spreading their ideology in Sweden.²⁰⁷ In the immediate postwar years, Sweden became infamous as a source of antisemitic propaganda worldwide. Much of the material came from one person, the fanatic antisemite and Holocaust denier Einar Åberg. The Swedish state initiated legal proceedings against him in 1941. Its efforts culminated in the 1950s when he was sentenced to prison after a new law— informally dubbed Lex Åberg—had been passed against incitement of racial hatred (*Hets mot folkgrupp*).

After the Swedish Parliament established a legal framework to confront extreme antisemitism, NRP faced prosecution for incitement of racial hatred in the 1950s and 1960s.²⁰⁸ Nonetheless, while the state was able to confront antisemitism, it did not have the legal instruments to counter fascist manifestations in general. It outlawed the act of incitement to hatred against Jews but not the organizations that organized it. Thus, Swedish neo-Nazis were not prevented from distributing their antisemitic propaganda in Swedish schools in the early 1960s. On two occasions in 1961, thousands of young people shut down public meetings with Per Engdahl in Stockholm. In fact, it was the young generation that initiated the calls for more education on the Holocaust. In 1962, the Swedish School Board issued a recommendation for introducing additional reading material on the topic. These developments led to a broad societal engagement and eventually to the creation of CNR in 1963.²⁰⁹

In Norway, one of the most prominent individuals who spoke against antisemitism was the Social Democratic MP Aase Lionæs. In a 1960 parliamentary intervention, she urged

²⁰⁷ “Ung fanatiker i Malmö leder svensk naziparti,” *Aftenposten*, February 10, 1960.

²⁰⁸ Heléne Lööv and Lotta Nilsson, “Hets mot folkgrupp BRÅ-rapport 2001:7,” Brottsförebyggande rådet, accessed November 29, 2023, https://bra.se/download/18.cba82f7130f475a2f1800019149/1371914731775/2001_7_hets_mot_folkgrupp.pdf, 11–12.

²⁰⁹ Järvstad, “The Committee against Neofascism,” 128–129; “Avslöjande rapport till skolöverstyrelsen,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, September 9, 1961.

her own government to do more to confront the antisemitic attacks. She called for the enactment of new laws like those in Sweden that specifically targeted antisemitism and for education of the youth on the horrors of Nazism. Lionæs wanted the government to take antisemitism seriously and to remember that only 15 years had elapsed since Norwegian Jews had their families murdered in the gas chambers. Norway could not afford, she claimed, to forget the murder of 800 Norwegian Jews. The Minister of Justice, Jens Haugland, dismissed the concerns of his party colleague and saw the antisemitic incidents as an example of infantile mob action. If anyone was truly harmed, the existing legal framework was sufficient to deal with it.²¹⁰ A year later when the perpetrators of the antisemitic acts in Norway had still not been caught, Haugland changed his mind. With reference to the laws in Sweden and Denmark, the Norwegian legislation was amended, opening the way for prosecuting incitement of racial hatred.²¹¹

The most important international consequence of the Swastika Epidemic was the adoption of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1965. The work on such a convention had been initiated by Jewish NGOs in 1960, which put forward draft treaties designed to outlaw international antisemitism. It was the hope of these groups that there could finally be a global reckoning with the Holocaust. A year later, the Adolf Eichmann trial in Jerusalem received international attention. As it turned out, however, the convention that was adopted by the UN did not even mention antisemitism. The Eichmann trial was also put into question, with attempts being made to shift the focus from his role in the Holocaust to a discourse on whether his human rights had been violated or whether Zionists themselves were partly responsible for the Holocaust. Historian James Loeffler argues that the crime of the Holocaust was difficult to grasp because of the particularity of the genocide. The debate took place when the anti-colonial struggles worldwide reached a climax, with the spotlight on the universal evil of Apartheid and racism. Another contributing factor was the instrumentalization by the United States and Soviet Union of the issue in their global contest. The Americans sought to discredit the Soviet system by pointing to the ongoing persecutions of Jews. The Soviets were willing to mention antisemitism in the convention if it also included the outlawing of racist and fascist organizations—in effect, turning it into an anti-fascist document. What the Soviets wanted to do was to target West Germany as well as to criticize racial tensions in the United States. The

²¹⁰ “De anti-jødiske demonstrasjoner opp i Stortinget,” *Arbeiderbladet*, January 26, 1960.

²¹¹ Anette Sjøberg, “Rasediskriminering og hjemlig relevans? Norges rolle i FNs arbeid for avskaffelse av rasediskriminering, 1960-1970” (MA thesis, University of Oslo, 2016), 20.

Soviet delegates took this line of argument one step further in 1965 by suggesting that Zionism should be put on an equal footing with Nazism. It reflected the deteriorating state of Soviet-Israeli relations and increased geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. East bloc relations with Israel reached an all-time low after the Six Day War in 1967, and in 1975, the U.N. General Assembly ratified Resolution 3379, which branded Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination (it was revoked in 1991).²¹²

Antisemitism was also overlooked in the anti-racist articulations of the anti-fascist CNR, except for its call for educational reform in the schools. Instead, the focus turned on discrimination and prejudice faced by Roma people in Sweden and on opposing the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Although the CNR stated that it would not shy away from protesting the persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union, it was silent on the issue.²¹³ Nonetheless with the calls for expanded education in the Nordic countries on the horrors of fascism, anti-fascism was again expressed as part of a mnemonic practice—that of remembrance and premonition. It was argued that the revival of fascism was possible, if the young generation were not made to “remember.” In Norway, Aase Lionæs’ engagement with the Swastika Epidemic was also closely related to her concerns over the white supremacist government in South Africa. She put the issue within the context of racial persecution and the ongoing wars in the world, stressing the need for organizing against such ideological dangers, bearing in mind that it was only 15 years ago since the end of the Second World War. Lionæs called for more education on the evils of fascism as well as for a boycott against the South African regime. At the time, Lionæs gave speeches together with the black South African student Hans Beukes, who had managed to escape the oppressive Apartheid system that denied him an education.²¹⁴ In Norway, he was able to pursue an education, was granted a citizenship, and campaigned internationally against Apartheid.²¹⁵ Among the Nordic countries, the Norwegian student movement was the first to create a solidarity organization centering on South Africa in 1959. Although South Africa was sometimes dubbed fascist, a more prevalent view focused on a racial persecution organized by a brutal police state.²¹⁶ An argument could be made to see the entire anti-Apartheid movement as part of anti-fascism, as Johanson and perhaps Lionæs did. Nonetheless, the struggle against Apartheid was primarily

²¹² Loeffler, *Rooted Cosmopolitans*, 230–253.

²¹³ Järvstad, “The Committee against Neofascism,” 129–132.

²¹⁴ “Arbeiderkvinnene vil ha boikott av Sør-Afrika-varer,” *Arbeiderbladet*, January 21, 1960.

²¹⁵ ”Sør-Afrika må få samme løsning som Zimbabwe,” *Arbeiderbladet*, July 4, 1980.

²¹⁶ Tor Sellström, *Sweden and national liberation in Southern Africa. Vol. 1, Formation of a popular opinion (1950-1970)* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999), 60–61, 87–90.

characterized as anti-racist, anti-colonial, and anti-imperial. As for Lionæs's subsequent anti-fascist engagement, she became deeply involved in the work of the Nordic Committees against the Greek Junta in the late 1960s.

In Denmark, several initiatives were undertaken by the Communist Party in the 1960s to organize support for Spanish political prisoners, which was prompted by an upsurge in political repression in Spain. One such initiative was a petition signed by the resistance veteran Martin Evald Jensen, who had been active in the communist-lead BOPA group. It attracted the backing of many famous politicians and authors. Others, such as the Social Democrat Mogens Camre later became a central figure in the struggle against the Greek military regime, and authors like Halfdan Rasmussen and Erik Stinus also became prominent spokesmen on these issues.²¹⁷ In 1962, Stinus was behind a group of writers and artists that formed a new Spanish Committee called the Danish Committee for the Amnesty of Political Prisoners and Refugees (*Den danske Komité for amnesti til de spanske politiske fanger og flygtninge*).

The Danish initiative stemmed from an international campaign in Latin America and Europe, calling for an amnesty for Spanish political prisoners. It included a conference held in Paris, with cross-political support and participation of representatives from the British Liberal Party and Conservative Party.²¹⁸ The campaign had actually been launched by the exiled Spanish Communist Party, which caused controversy since the Spanish exile community was bitterly divided along political lines. Thus, the Spanish Socialists, the *PSOE*, and their union the *UGT* condemned the whole campaign, arguing that demands for amnesty represented concessions to the Franco regime. Political prisoners in Spain were unhappy about the infighting and protested it, but to no avail. Julián Gorkin, the former Trotskyist and socialist politician during the Spanish Civil War—who had turned into a hardline anti-communist in the 1950s—denounced the whole campaign in major American and European newspapers as a dangerous communist maneuver and rejected the idea of amnesty. Unsurprisingly, the Franco regime used the infighting among its opponents to its advantage and gleefully reproduced the anti-communist criticism. Nonetheless, such campaigns, centering on human rights issues, became increasingly popular, and they undoubtedly played

²¹⁷ Appeal: "Hjælp de spanske politiske fanger" [no date, 1963?], Spanien + Portugal 1960-1965, DK/ABA/921/472, Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti.

²¹⁸ *Jeg anklager*, booklet published by Den danske Komité for amnesti til de spanske politiske fanger og flygtninge (Copenhagen 1963), digitalized by Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv, restricted access (<https://abm.reindex.net/ABA/main/T.php?Ifm=Pz&zoomed=1108&qe=mta=8533>).

a role in softening the repressive activities of the Spanish state.²¹⁹ The Danish amnesty campaign that was started by Stinus became successful in raising money for the Spanish cause. It would later change its name to the Spanish Committee (*Spanienskomitéen*) and cooperated with the Danish Social Democrats as well.²²⁰ Although it was unclear whether it received the blessing of the Danish *LO* and whether it cooperated with other Nordic campaigns, the initiative was born out of frustration with the inaction of the Danish *LO* on the Spanish Question.²²¹

An approach focused on human rights became more prominent in the 1960s, with the founding of *Amnesty International* in 1961. In their seminal study on transnational advocacy networks, political scientists Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink argue that the rise of human rights NGOs, such as *Amnesty International*, were preceded by what they call proletarian internationalism, notably, the solidarity networks created during the Spanish Civil War in support of the republic. In their activities, these networks were preoccupied with democracy and freedom rather than human rights. Following the transition to human rights, the emphasis was on the victims of abuse rather than on future visions or the nature of the regimes. It enabled the NGOs to portray themselves as neutral actors without right-wing or left-wing biases, with *Amnesty*, for example, unmasking abuses on both sides of the Iron Curtain. During the post-war and Cold War eras, military coups and political repression in countries like Greece, Chile, Uruguay, Uganda, and Argentina increased global awareness of human rights violations.²²²

The human rights and amnesty agenda differed from proletarian internationalism—whose defining trait was anti-fascism—by its apolitical nature and character. The goal, after all, was not regime change but an alleviation of suffering and a propagation of human rights. This approach could not always bridge the political fault lines among the Spanish exiles who had gone through a civil war within the Spanish Civil War. Throughout the existence of the Spanish dictatorship, the unbridgeable divisions within the Spanish community abroad had a debilitating effect on the resistance against the regime. It was also often used as an excuse to maintain the status quo as it was argued that no viable alternative existed. A similar dynamic

²¹⁹ Olga Glondys, “Cold war controversies in the pro-amnesty campaigns of the Spanish political prisoners (1961) and the erosion of Spanish exiles’ leadership in the anti-Francoist policies,” *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies* 27, no. 1 (2021): 64–65, 67–69, 73–74.

²²⁰ Allan Christiansen, “Erik Stinus om Spanienskomitéen,” *Spanish Civil War and the Seafarers and Dockers*, accessed October 6, 2023, <https://spanishsky.dk/erik-stinus-om-spanienskomiteen/>.

²²¹ Report, “Rapport fra konference i Danmark,” August, 1964, NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0011, Den norske Spaniakomiteen.

²²² Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 82–90.

also existed within the Greek exiles opposing the Greek Junta in the early 1970s. Nordic anti-fascist activists sternly warned the Greeks against following the path of the Spaniards.

Opposing Fascism in Southern Europe and Africa

Another novelty of the 1960s was the changing culture of protest movements, with an increased focus on radicalism and direct action. The 1968 era also saw a process dubbed by historian Thomas Ekman Jørgensen as the individualization of politics. It meant that young activist people became less dependent on membership in organizations or parties when participating in political activities. This kind of culture epitomized the student movements at a time when the membership of political parties was declining, while general political engagement remained high. It also coincided with the growth of Maoist movements, especially in Sweden and Norway, which were radicalized by the Vietnam War. In Denmark, the change was less defined by Maoism and more inspired by the militant Marxist student movement in West Germany. Thus, the pragmatism, even pacifism, of the early New Left was challenged by ideas promulgating the necessity of revolution and violent liberation in the Third World.²²³

These developments had been preceded by what historian Kjell Östberg calls “the old social movements” of the late 1950s to the mid-1960s. Their work was more informed by consensus-oriented, social-liberal sensibilities, although it was also influenced by the rise of anti-colonialism. The CNR’s anti-fascism should be viewed within this political context; its defining ambition was to forge strong bonds with established organizations in the labor movement and civil society. Östberg argues that the transformation into “1968” started in 1965 with the New Left but also with the birth of the Vietnam demonstrations and Maoist movements in Sweden. Demands for the democratization of higher education were the driving force behind the student movement on the Continent. In contrast, in the Nordic countries, where such reforms were already being implemented, the main focus was on international solidarity. Thus, the Vietnam movement with the United FNL Groups became the most dynamic and visible in Sweden. Journals and bulletins espoused international solidarity with the various anti-colonial liberation struggles, but the resistance against Franco and, later the Greek Junta also figured prominently.

²²³ Jørgensen, “The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective,” 329–335.

The engagements with anti-colonialism and the Vietnam movement became dominated by small action groups, where informal decision-making often replaced the strict organizational practices of the old social movements. In the 1970s, the Left became far more fragmented, with the growth of competing groups of Trotskyists, Leninists, Maoists, and Stalinists. It signaled a clear reversion to dogmatism, which undermined the New Left and its ideas on economic democracy. Many New Left activists in Sweden ended up in the reformed Swedish Communist Party. Under the leadership of C.H. Hermansson, the party changed its name in 1967 to the Left Party – the Communists (*Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna*).²²⁴ In general, the Scandinavian region differed from continental Western Europe in that many of the demands of the protest movements became integrated into dominant political structures. Thus, radical protest was coopted into the polity and culture, a process that was initiated and facilitated in countries that were less conservative from the outset. While this inclusion might have made the movements seem less radical, it also gave the participants more influence over larger parts of their societies than was the case in continental Western Europe or the United States.²²⁵

Despite the focus on international solidarity and anti-colonialism, the left-wing action groups also engaged with issues of anti-fascism. In Denmark, a leftist “action-group” that called itself *Gruppe 61* became prominent in demonstrations against Franco. The group’s anti-fascist articulations went further by protesting Danish-German military cooperation on the grounds that West Germany had not been properly denazified. It also claimed that France was moving towards fascism and criticized Western support for the Portuguese dictatorship and its colonial wars.²²⁶ When the engagement of Princess Anne-Marie of Denmark and the future King of Greece Constantine II was announced publicly in 1963, the group protested political repression in Greece, highlighting the plight of political prisoners; it described the regime as a form of dictatorship and a fascist police state armed with NATO weapons. The protests took place during the festivities at the Danish royal residence, Amalienborg.²²⁷ Mogens Camre also participated in protests against the political repression in Greece during these years. In 1966, Camre—together with other Danish Social Democrats—boarded the

²²⁴ Kjell Östberg, “Sweden and the Long ‘1968’: Break or Continuity?” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 33, no. 4 (2008): 339–343, 347.

²²⁵ Tor Egil Førland, “Introduction to the Special Issue on 1968,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 33, no. 4 (2008): 320.

²²⁶ Flyer, “Hvad vil ‘Gruppe 61?,” Demos Gruppe 61, 1958-1965, DK/ABA/3281/84, Demos arkiv, Dokumentationsgruppen, Venstrefløjen I.

²²⁷ “Demonstrationer ved Amalienborg,” *Aktuelt*, January 27, 1963; “Mens der festes, pines grækere,” *Land og folk*, January 27, 1963.

Greek Royal yacht, which was cruising off the coast of Copenhagen, to protest the deterioration of democracy in Greece. King Constantine II, as it turned out, was not on board, but a letter was handed over to the captain.²²⁸ *Gruppe 61* also organized a series of other spectacular demonstrations in Denmark against Franco in 1963–1964. Protest signs calling Franco a “murderer” were often confiscated by the police on the grounds that it constituted a libel against a foreign head of state.²²⁹ This act famously entered the international mainstream in 1975 when the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme caused a stir by calling members of the Franco regime “damned murderers.”²³⁰ *Gruppe 61* also used human-sized dolls representing the dictator, and its actions ended, on numerous occasions, in confrontation with the police.²³¹ In one case, the made-up figure had a real pig head on it,²³² and often the dolls were hanged or burned in the process as part of macabre symbolic acts. In one case, three dolls were “hanged” in a park with the nametags: Franco, Salazar, and Verwoerd.²³³ These manifestations became so prominent in the press that the Swedish (*SSU*) and Danish (*DsU*) Young Social Democrats started imitating them, burning their own figures of Franco in Copenhagen.²³⁴ The Danish rage against the Franco dictatorship during these years culminated in bomb threats against Mallorca tourist flights²³⁵ and a real bomb attack and destruction of a Danish travel agency operated by the infamous businessman Simon Spies. No political group, however, took responsibility for these acts.²³⁶

The growing Nordic tourism to Spain deeply was a source of worry for the Norwegian Spanish Committee that was in regular contact with the Spanish socialist exiles and resistance groups within Spain. They had made sure that the travel agency of the Norwegian labor movement *Norske folkeferie* did not organize trips to the country and were outraged that the Swedish counterpart *RESO* offered them. Even the Norwegian *LO* protested directly to the Swedes who responded that *RESO* was a business enterprise, not a humanitarian one. This episode was a testimony to how important the issue was to the Norwegian Social Democrats in contrast to their Swedish comrades. A Swedish social democratic journalist even went as

²²⁸ Mogens Camre, *Knus tyrannerne*, 114–115.

²²⁹ “I handler efter ordre fra Franco,” *Land og Folk*, November 21, 1964; “Opgør i politiet efter Franco-demonstration,” *Ekstrabladet*, December 15, 1964.

²³⁰ “Svenskt beslut: ambassadören i Madrid hem,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, September 29, 1975; in the original Swedish: “satans mördare.”

²³¹ “Anti-spansk protest,” *Aktuelt*, October 21, 1965.

²³² “Ambassade-folk fra Spanien i byretten,” *Ekstrabladet*, November 25, 1964.

²³³ “Makaber demonstration,” *Information*, May 13, 1963; “‘Franco’ blev brændt,” *Ekstrabladet*, October 21, 1964.

²³⁴ “Ny afbrænding af Franco-dukke i gaar,” *Information*, November 9, 1964.

²³⁵ “Mallorca-fly stoppet af en telefonbombe,” *Land og Folk*, May 13, 1963.

²³⁶ “Flere om bombe-attentatet,” *Ekstrabladet*, February 20, 1965.

far as to suggest that a boycott would be “dictatorial.”²³⁷ In fact, it was only towards the end of the Franco regime, in 1975, that the Swedish *LO* encouraged a tourist boycott of Spain.²³⁸ That year *RESO* stopped flying to Spain, and only a year later, the travel agency was urged by its Spanish socialist labor colleagues to stop the boycott on the grounds that it was counterproductive since Spain was on the path of democratization.²³⁹

The Swedish interest in tourist boycott actions against Spain coincided with the 1975 executions of two Basque activists and three members of the communist guerilla movement *FRAP*. As it turned out, the executions were the last in Spain, but they caused an international outrage, prompting large demonstrations against the Spanish dictatorship.²⁴⁰ The event signaled a renewed interest in the Spanish cause in Sweden, and the Swedish Anti-Fascist Spanish Committee (*Svenska Antifascistiska Spanienkommittén*) was created to organize the support for *FRAP* in Spain. This group was made up of mostly younger anti-revisionist (Stalinist) communists from the small Swedish Communist Party *KMFL(r)*. It was active during the troubled Spanish transition to democracy, claiming that the dictatorship was only becoming more oppressive, despite opposition parties being able to assemble for the first time since the fall of the republic in 1939.²⁴¹

In contrast, the Secretary of the Norwegian Spanish Committee, Kåre B. Werner, never minced his words about Norwegian tourists that traveled to Spain. He told the Norwegian public that the Spanish resistance movement viewed them as Quislings because they provided the dictatorship with a steady cash flow. He had just returned from a clandestine trip to Spain to support the resistance when he uttered this statement.²⁴² In an earlier debate over Norwegian tourism in Spain, Werner engaged in a mnemonic practice by asking whether the Norwegians would have liked it if the same had happened to them during the Nazi occupation of Norway. Franco was, after all, the last leader of the “fascist triumvirate.” The journalist that Werner debated, Alf Biem, objected to Francoist Spain being portrayed as fascist. Biem viewed Spain simply as a conservative military dictatorship whose fascist supporters, the Falange, had been marginalized by the regime. To him, it was ridiculous to compare Spain to Norway under the Nazi occupation. For Werner, however, these mnemonic aspects were essential to the argument—to the legitimization of the cause.

²³⁷ “Strid om RESO vid spanienkommittékongressen,” *Arbetet*, February 15, 1965.

²³⁸ Folke Olsson, “Solidaritetsens soldater,” 201.

²³⁹ “Fritt fram för resorna till Spanien,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, November 30, 1976.

²⁴⁰ Klas Grinell, “Att sälja världen. Omvärldsbilder i svensk utlandsturism” (PhD diss., University of Gothenburg, 2004), 176.

²⁴¹ “Svenska Antifascistiska Spanienkommittén – nu riksorganisation,” *Spanien solidaritet* no. 3 (1976): 4, 22.

²⁴² “Spansk motstandsbevegelse ser på turistene som quislinger,” *Rjukan Arbeiderblad*, April 7, 1970.

Moreover, he defended the fascist categorization by referring to Resolution 39 of the UN General Assembly, which had established it. This official UN declaration—together with ongoing political repression and denial of basic democratic and human rights in Spain—should suffice. Werner hoped that democracy could come to Spain peacefully and believed that the answer was to be found in the lesson learned by the Norwegians after the Second World War. The opposition towards Franco had to be united under some form of Common Program (*fellesprogrammet*) and that progress was being made in that direction through cooperation between social democrats, Christian democrats and liberals in Spain.²⁴³ *Fellesprogrammet* was the 1945 multipartisan political platform of all the Norwegians political parties for the reconstruction of Norway after liberation. It was a continuation of the cooperation that had characterized the broad-based resistance movement against Nazi occupation and the home-grown fascists led by Vidkun Quisling.²⁴⁴ All these themes were later revived in the Norwegian—and, more generally, Scandinavian—debates over how to deal with the Greek Junta. When fighting fascism, one should be mindful of Norwegian anti-fascist experiences in resisting fascism, with the main lesson being the need to establish a unified opposition.

The pivotal role played by the Norwegians is especially interesting given the common view that Sweden was at the forefront of anti-fascist agitation against Spain. The historian Carl-Gustaf Scott even goes as far as to state that “after the Second World War the Swedish Social Democrats became one of the most forceful European critics of the Franco regime.”²⁴⁵ Yet, as discussed above, post-war Swedish Social Democracy had a very ambiguous approach towards Francoist Spain, often preferring to avoid the issue. The Swedish Aid Committee for Spain could easily have become as large as its Norwegian counterpart if it had received the same level of official support. Nevertheless, Scott is correct in asserting that the Spanish Civil War played a disproportionately large role in constructing a post-war Swedish anti-fascist identity when compared to Norway and Denmark, which could draw on their experience and collective memory of Nazi occupation. This did not mean the memory of the Spanish Civil War was unimportant in Norway and Denmark. Scott argues that Swedish leftist memory politics on the Spanish Civil War was constructed as a myth that overlooked

²⁴³ “Turist i Spania – støtte til Franco?,” *PAX. Spania i dag* 4, no. 4 (1965): 92–94.

²⁴⁴ “Fellesprogrammet,” *Store norske leksikon*, accessed January 15, 2024, <https://snl.no/Fellesprogrammet>.

²⁴⁵ Carl-Gustaf Scott, “The Swedish Left’s Memory of the International Brigades and the Creation of an Anti-Fascist Postwar Identity,” *European History Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (2009): 231.

the inaction of Nordic governments and catastrophic communist purges among the Republican forces.²⁴⁶

An example of how these myths were reproduced was the Swedish veteran organization Friendship Organization of Swedish Spain Volunteers (*Svenska Spanienfrivilligas kamratförening*). It managed to create a culture of memorialization based on the notion of a unified anti-fascist struggle with the famous memorial statue *La Mano* (1977) in Stockholm, which has since become a meeting point of May 1 demonstrators.²⁴⁷ The organization also succeeded—periodically—to unite the Swedish Left in demonstrations against Franco. One took place in February 1969 in Stockholm, where social democrats, syndicalists, and communists marched side by side. It also organized public meetings on Spain together with CNR.²⁴⁸ The Vietnam War was compared to the Spanish Civil by the organization to lend it anti-fascist legitimacy, although it was hardly needed due to the prominence of the issue in the media.²⁴⁹ Even though the veterans often encouraged left-wing unity, the organization was dominated by communists. This became especially clear when in 1980, it defended the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by characterizing it as proletarian internationalism in practice, just as had been the case with the Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War.²⁵⁰

The dictatorship in Portugal was seldomly mentioned in Nordic political actions in the 1940s and 1950s; the issue was not as prevalent as that of Spain. Yet, in the 1960s and 1970s, with the emergence of an organized anti-Apartheid movement in the Nordic countries, it received more attention. In Sweden, it was triggered by the formation of the Swedish South Africa Committee in 1961, which coincided with the beginning of the Angolan War of Independence, a war that would last for thirteen years, or until the fall of the Portuguese dictatorship. The anti-Apartheid movement brought attention to the Portuguese dictatorship and the South African regime, calling for the liberation of colonial peoples, for support for independence movements, and for agitation against racial inequality. In this context, Portugal and Rhodesia were often characterized as fascist states.²⁵¹ In 1968, the Davis Cup tennis match between Sweden and Rhodesia ended in riots when demonstrators tried to stop the

²⁴⁶ Scott, “The Swedish Left’s Memory of the International Brigades,” 217, 226, 231.

²⁴⁷ Olsson, “Solidaritetsens soldater,” 204.

²⁴⁸ ”Demonstration mot Franco-terrorn,” *För ett fritt Spanien*, no. 1 (1969), Trycksaker 1963–1992 SWE/ARAB/1237/3, Svenska Spanienfrivilligas kamratförening, 1–3.

²⁴⁹ Robert G. Colodny, *Spanien och Vietnam ett historiskt perspektiv* (Gävle: Ih grafik, 1968).

²⁵⁰ ”I den proletära internationalismens anda,” *För ett fritt Spanien* nr: 1 (1980). Trycksaker 1963–1992 SWE/ARAB/1237/3, Svenska Spanienfrivilligas kamratförening.

²⁵¹ Sellström, *Sweden and national liberation in Southern Africa*, 85, 113, 382–383, 401.

game. The event became known as the Båstad Riots, and although no one was seriously injured, the incident received much media attention. The protests were portrayed by the organizers in anti-fascist and anti-imperialist terms. In its call for backing the Zimbabwean national liberation struggle, the Swedish Liberal Youth Organization dubbed it a struggle against “white racial fascism” in Southern Africa.²⁵² Another controversy, which led to protests, was the proposed Swedish involvement in the Cahora Bassa Dam project in Portuguese Mozambique. The project—a joint enterprise by Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia—was meant to strengthen, strategically, the white minority regimes in the region. There were also plans for extensive Portuguese settlements in the area. In 1968, it was revealed that the Swedish industrial company *ASEA* was a contender for a contract to build power stations in Mozambique and South Africa for the dam. The affair became an embarrassment for the Social Democratic Government and highly divisive within the Social Democratic Party. But because the deal was so lucrative both the government and the Swedish *LO* supported it. What followed were large demonstrations against *ASEA* in Sweden. *ASEA* eventually withdrew from the project in 1969 because of popular mobilization against it and because of a law that prohibited economic relations with Rhodesia. The result was a huge victory for those organizations working in solidarity with the liberation movements of Southern Africa—in this case, the Mozambique *FRELIMO*. Later that year when Olof Palme became the new Social Democratic Prime Minister of Sweden, direct government support was extended to the movements. According to Sellström, Sweden became the first Western country to do so. There was much public and political support in Sweden for these anti-apartheid and anti-colonial movements, with the conservatives being the only party not willing to back them.²⁵³

Olof Palme’s government also supported—and provided economic aid to—the democratically elected Peoples Front (*Unidad Popular*) government of Salvador Allende in Chile. A special committee was formed in 1971 to organize this backing and to spread information about the right-wing backlash in Chile. Thus, when the Allende government was toppled in the 1973 military coup, there was already an established Nordic network of social democratic solidarity. This network was transformed into the Chile Committee (*Chilekommittén*), with independent local chapters all over Sweden, which combined in a broad political alliance against the Chilean Junta. The first watchword of the Chile

²⁵² Sellström, *Sweden and national liberation in Southern Africa*, 348–352.

²⁵³ Sellström, *Sweden and national liberation in Southern Africa*, 484–507.

Committee was to support the Chilean people's struggle against fascism and for socialism. The Nordic labor movement also became active in supporting its persecuted Chilean counterpart. Hans Göran Franck—together with Finnish social democratic colleagues—was deeply involved in the agitation against the Junta. But since their engagement was organized within the international Chile Commission, it was less of a social movement.²⁵⁴

By the end of 1975, it was clear that the dictatorships in Southern Europe were finished, even though the Spanish transition to democracy proved to be a protracted process. Surprisingly this year also symbolized a tactical shift in activist politics, with the reemergence of militant anti-fascism in the Nordic countries. As had been the case in the 1930s, this movement confronted domestic fascist organizations in the streets as well as in print. It first appeared in Norway in response to the establishment of the neo-Nazi party *Norsk-Front* (NF) with the help of old Norwegian Nazis who had been supporters of *Nasjonal Samling* and the traitor Vidkun Quisling. This organized anti-fascist reaction came from the Maoist Communist Party (*Arbeidernes Kommunistparti (AKP ml)*), which founded the organization *Anti-fascistisk Komite*. Its task was to coordinate anti-fascist activities and publish the magazine *Never again (Aldri mer)*. Curiously, the Maoists combined both legal and illegal methods in combating the neo-Nazis. While calling for the state to ban the party, they also used violence to break up NF meetings.²⁵⁵ This organizing was a precursor to anti-fascist movements that resisted neo-Nazis during the 1980s and 1990s in Sweden and Denmark.²⁵⁶ NF's activities came to a bloody end in 1979 when one of its member staged a bomb attack on a May 1 march in Oslo, leaving one person severely injured.²⁵⁷

The Norwegian Spanish Committee disbanded in 1979 after Spain had fully transitioned to democracy. The Committee received much praise from Spanish Socialist Party members, claiming that the Norwegians had been the only ones who had engaged in continuous activity since the early post-war years. They also believed that Norwegian solidarity activities had been valuable materially as well as morally. The humanitarian work

²⁵⁴ Lucy Viedma, “Hade vi bott i Chile hade det varit vi som spärrats in’ Chile i samlingarna,” *Arbetarhistoria* 134–135, no. 2–3 (2010): 50–57.

²⁵⁵ Protocol, “Anti-fascistisk Komite. Vedtak fra 1. Landsmøte.[1976],” NOR/AAB/ARK-2704/K/L0007, AKP(m-l), 3-7; “Antidemokrisk ungdom i slåsskamp på ‘lokalet’,” *Arbeiderbladet*, November 17, 1975; “Bloder fløt da ny-nazistene ble lempet ut,” *Nordlands framtid*, November 17, 1975.

²⁵⁶ Andrés Brink Pinto and Johan Pries, “Challenging fascist spatial claims. The struggle over the 30 November marches in southern Sweden,” in *Anti-fascism in the Nordic Countries: New Perspectives, Comparisons and Transnational Connections*, 254–255; see also René Karpantschhof, *Nynazismen og dens modstandere i Danmark- politiske bevægelser i internationale rammer 1980-1998* (Sydjysk Universitetsforlag, 1999), 5–10.

²⁵⁷ “Bombe mot faglig 1. mai-front,” *Arbeiderbladet*, May 2, 1979; “Nytt Naziparti erstatter Norsk Front,” *Arbeiderbladet*, July 28, 1979.

of the Norwegian Spanish Committee, which had collected several million Norwegian krone for the Spanish cause, was, indeed, impressive. Its anti-fascist stance influenced its contribution in a direct way. Thus, it abstained from doing humanitarian work inside Spain as it was seen as aiding the regime. Instead, having witnessed the horrendous conditions in the French refugee camps for Spaniards in the 1940s and 1950s, it organized, as mentioned, orphanages, elderly homes, and health clinics in France for those fleeing Francoist Spain. Together with Norwegian families, it provided for summer retreats for thousands of Spanish children in Norway.²⁵⁸ Swedish political activists wanted to do the same. But when Georg Branting made the request to the Swedish government in 1948, it was denied despite the Norwegian precedent. The Swedish government was extremely reluctant to receive refugees at that time, having denied requests to receive 2000 German orphans.²⁵⁹ The Norwegian Spanish Committee also offered stipends for Spanish students to study in Norway for short periods of time. Finally, the Committee worked as a go-between Spanish asylum seekers and the Norwegian immigration authorities, helping around one hundred Spaniards acquiring Norwegian citizenship. The key to its success was, no doubt, its close relations with the Norwegian *LO* and NGOs such as *Norsk folkehjelp* and *Norsk flyktingråd*, with most of those involved in the Committee coming from those organizations.²⁶⁰

The prominence of the Spanish Question in the history of Norwegian foreign policy was illustrated by the early scholarly research on the subject. In 1969, at the height of the controversies surrounding the Greek military regime, the Norwegian historian Edgeir Benun published a book about the subject, which attracted much scholarly and media attention. In his review, the famous conservative journalist Nils Morten Udgaard compared the Spanish Question with the ongoing controversies over Greece, especially the Scandinavian case against Greece in the Council of Europe. In his words:²⁶¹

For many, this idealistic crusade [of the Norwegian government] in the international community was a direct repercussion of the anti-fascist struggle during the war. But it was also an expression of a more constant aspect of the Norwegian relation to the world. There are many striking similarities between the Spanish Question back then and the Greek Question last year. It is, however, well known that the medieval crusaders were motivated as much to fight for their own soul's salvation as saving and

²⁵⁸ Werner, *Spania 1946–1979. Norsk støtte til Spanias frihetskamp*, 29–39, 43, 58, 28; “Viva la Espana Democracia,” *Helse Miljø Trivsel: Norsk Folkehjelp* 5 (1975): 2.

²⁵⁹ “Tyska barn släpps ej in – ‘soppa’ segrar över hem,” *Dagens Nyheter*, January 4, 1948.

²⁶⁰ Werner, *Spania 1946–1979. Norsk støtte til Spanias frihetskamp*, 29–39, 43, 58, 28; “Viva la Espana Democracia,” *Helse Miljø Trivsel: Norsk Folkehjelp* 5 (1975), 2.

²⁶¹ “Samarbeide på toppen: Spania-saken i Norge årene 1946-1947,” *Aftenposten*, January 30, 1969.

freeing others – whether the same motives were behind the Spanish Question and the action on Greece is something that one needs to figure out oneself.²⁶²

Even a conservative journalist acknowledged the influence of anti-fascism on both the Spanish and the Greek Questions. Udgaard did not approve of such an idealistic foreign policy, but its exceptionalism was clear. He showed that the Swedish government had declined Norwegian requests for a common action against Spain at the UN on the grounds that the pursuit of ethical foreign policy was ill-advised. In Gallup polls, there was a large difference in public support between Norway and Sweden for such policies.²⁶³ Yet, this did not mean that it was impossible to forge a common Scandinavian position based on idealism. When it came to the Greek issue within the Council of Europe, the Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish government were not only united but also instrumental in forcing the Greek Junta to withdraw from the organization before its imminent expulsion.

Ultimately, the post-war anti-fascist social movement that opposed Franco in the Nordic countries remained fractured and scarred by Cold War tensions. Resisting the Francoist dictatorship was frequently instrumentalized by different political groups for their own gain. No unified Nordic network of committees that opposed Franco was established. Nonetheless, the idea of a broad-based political committee that would organize anti-fascist activities through mnemonic practices lived on. It resurfaced and became surprisingly dynamic during the years of the Greek Junta from 1967 to 1974.

²⁶² “Samarbeide på toppen: Spania-saken i Norge årene 1946-1947,” *Aftenposten*, January 30, 1969. In the original Norwegian: “For en stor del var nok dette idealistiske korstog ut i det mellomfolkelige samfunn en dirkete efterdonning av krigsårenes anti-fascistiske kamp, men samtidig var det uttrykk for et mer bestandig element i nordmenns holdning til omverdenen – det er mange slående paraleller mellom Spania-saken dengang og Hellas-saken ifjor. Nå dro som bekjent middelalderens korstogfarere ut vel så meget for å vinne fred i egen sjel som for på en realistisk måte å skape andres frelse – hvoridt det er de samme motiver som har ligget bak Spania-saken og Hellas-aksjonen er noe hver enkelt får avgjøre med seg selv.”

²⁶³ “Samarbeide på toppen: Spania-saken i Norge årene 1946-1947,” *Aftenposten*, January 30, 1969.

Anti-Fascism as a Praxis: The Nordic Committees for Democracy in Greece

“Greece may not become a new Spain. How will the young generation in Europe be able to trust in democracy if a new dictatorship of fascistic type can consolidate its power without us mobilizing all democratic resources towards international resistance?”²⁶⁴

–Hans Göran Franck

“After World War II we had hoped that fascism had been definitely crushed and that it would not be able to make its appearance again, certainly not in Europe. And yet it did. It is our shame that its first appearance should have taken place in our country, Greece, the cradle of democracy.”²⁶⁵

–Georgios Papandreou

“... social movements are in fact agents of memory production but also consumers of memories. They are influenced by collective memories about their predecessors, as well as by politics and society in general.”²⁶⁶

–Donatella della Porta

The opposition to the Greek Junta exemplified the high-water mark of Nordic Cold War anti-fascism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It manifested itself in a transnational social movement that influenced international politics at the highest level—whether in NATO or at the Council of Europe. To fight for the restoration of democracy in Greece and to solidarize with the victims of the military regime, Committees for Democracy in Greece were established in Sweden (*Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati*), Norway (*Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas*), and Denmark (*Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland*). Less active Committees were also established in Finland (*Kreikan demokratian puolesta yhdistys*) and Iceland (*Grikklandshreyfingin*). The participants came from the entire political spectrum, even though the Scandinavian Committees were led by prominent social democrats who were preoccupied with preventing the communists from exerting dominant influence. Greek immigrants and refugees were also involved in—or cooperated with—the Committees. Norwegian and Danish activists viewed a unified Greek opposition as a prerequisite for actions against the Junta in international organizations. Yet, what hampered

²⁶⁴ Hans Göran Franck, “Våldsregimen i Grekland,” *Dagens Nyheter*, July 15, 1967. In the original Swedish: “Grekland får inte bli ett nytt Spanien. Hur skall den unga generationen i Europa kunna sätta sin lit till demokratin om en ny diktatur av fascistisk typ får befästa sin makt utan att vi uppådar alla demokratiska resurser till internationellt motstånd?”

²⁶⁵ “From George Papandreou’s message smuggled out of Greece on tape on the first anniversary of the military coup, April 21, 1968,” *PAK Newsletter* 3, no. 1 (1972): 1.

²⁶⁶ Donatella della Porta, et al., *Legacies and Memories in Movements*, 14.

their agitation was a deep split within the Greek opposition in exile on how to organize and conduct the opposition.

As a Nordic collaborative network, the Committees jointly sponsored protest meetings, public statements, and conferences. The transnational nature of the movement was reflected in political initiatives that enjoyed the direct or indirect backing of Nordic Social Democratic governments. It would be fitting to speak of the movement's "extra-diplomatic" efforts in the same sense as it was extra-parliamentary in nature. The climax of this Nordic cooperation was reached when Greece withdrew from the Council of Europe in 1969 after a decision had been made to expel it from the organization. It set a precedent for such proceedings in the future, exemplified by Russia's departure from the Council in 2022 just before its expulsion because of its invasion of Ukraine. The Nordic opposition movement against the Greek Junta also adopted a human rights agenda that contributed to the rise of international non-governmental movements (INGOS).²⁶⁷

Here the events leading up to the Greek coup and the formation of the Nordic anti-Junta committees, their practical work, and political narratives will be analyzed. Although the text will delve into the history of the committees, the main purpose is to examine the question of to what extent an anti-fascist collective identity informed their actions and ambitions. Traditionally, sociologists have used the concept of collective identity to understand why people come together for collective action at a certain time, to gauge what motivates them, and to interpret its cultural impact. Thus, the term collective identity is seen as a way to make sense of the connections between individuals and a broader community—whether it is an imagined identity or experienced directly.²⁶⁸ The Italian sociologist Donatella della Porta has supplemented this concept by emphasizing how the past is used as a symbolic resource of social movements. This aspect has often been overlooked in social movement studies. To della Porta, past events have become "memory building blocks on which collective identities are constructed."²⁶⁹ Among the examples she explores is how anti-fascist collective identities have been used to legitimize the struggles of social movements in Italy. The past becomes a well to draw lessons from—lessons of victories to emulate and disasters to avoid.²⁷⁰ Instead of centering exclusively on discourse analysis, it will be examined how the creation of such

²⁶⁷ Kim Christiaens, "'Communists Are No Beasts': European Solidarity Campaigns on Behalf of Democracy and Human Rights in Greece and East–West Détente in the 1960s and Early 1970s," *Contemporary European History* 26, no. 4 (2017): 621–46.

²⁶⁸ Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (2001): 284–285.

²⁶⁹ Della Porta, et al., *Legacies and Memories in Movements*, 13–14.

²⁷⁰ Della Porta, et al., *Legacies and Memories in Movements*, 115–118, x-xi.

an anti-fascist collective identity shaped a framework to pursue what was politically desirable and possible. This anti-fascism often competed for attention with other contemporary geopolitical developments, like the Vietnam War or the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Exiled Greek opposition politicians, like Andreas Papandreou, brought the instrumentalization of the Vietnam War to its logical extreme by propagating a war of national liberation in Greece. Such a narrative was not only meant to rid Greece of the Junta but also to challenge the legitimacy of liberal democracy and cater to Europe's radical Zeitgeist in the 1960s and early 1970s.²⁷¹

The focus will be on the transnational activities of the Nordic committees, not on the history of individual committees. The narrative builds on the connections between the different committees and how they influenced each other. They fought for a cause in a distant land, with the aim of creating a popular front against the Greek military regime. Whether the Greek Junta was “objectively” a fascist regime or not is beyond the scope of this project, although the text will engage with contemporary debates over the issue. This is also a story of the many roads not taken. In the end, it was not an internal Greek resistance movement or actions taken by NATO or the Council of Europe that brought down the Greek dictatorship. In November 1973, the student uprising at the Polytechnic University in Athens was brutally suppressed and led to a regime crisis. Another military coup followed, and a government under an even more anti-democratic leadership was formed. The new Junta tried to annex Cyprus by supporting a Junta-loyalist coup on the island. It resulted in a full-scale Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 to put an end to the coup and to partition the island, which, in turn, marked the end of the rule of the Greek military regime. The Turks, essentially, engineered a return to democracy in Greece by refusing to negotiate with the Junta. The exiled former Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis returned to Greece to lead an interim government and prepare for new elections.²⁷² Often neglected in European Cold War history, the Greek Junta lasted seven years, and its rule proved to be an acute embarrassment to the supposed “Free World.” Yet its legitimacy did not go unchallenged. In this account, it is shown how an influential Nordic cross-border movement was established to commit to the struggle for overthrowing a brutal military dictatorship.

²⁷¹ Kostis Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics, and the “Long 1960s” in Greece* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016), 47–48.

²⁷² James Edward Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 173, 195.

The Political Context: A Visit by a Danish Social Democrat in Athens

Just before the Greek coup, the Danish Social Democrat Mogens Camre had traveled to Greece on behalf of Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag to establish close cooperation between the Danish Social Democratic Party and a Greek opposition party, the Center Union, and the politician Andreas Papandreou, the son of the party's leader, Georgios Papandreou.²⁷³ At the time, Camre was a board member of the Social Democratic Party and working in the Ministry of Finance. To him, the problems facing Greece stemmed from the international isolation of the democratic forces in the country. To address them, Krag had suggested that the schools of the Danish labor movement be used to educate the Greeks about how to run a political party. It was an unconventional way to conduct foreign policy. Camre had already met with Andreas Papandreou, a Harvard-educated economist, in Denmark the year before when the latter had traveled to Sweden to receive the Wicksell Prize in honor of the Swedish economist Johan Gustaf Knut Wicksell. What was supposed to be an academic trip turned into a political scandal in Greece and a minor diplomatic crisis for Sweden and Denmark.²⁷⁴ Before flying back to Greece, Papandreou issued a statement in which he thanked the Swedish and Danish governments for supporting him and “the fight in Greece for democracy, social justice, and national pride.”²⁷⁵ When the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Ambassadors of Denmark and Sweden in Athens to explain the position of their respective countries, they responded that any support Papandreou had received was unofficial and did not imply any interference in the internal affairs of Greece.²⁷⁶

Papandreou was, in fact, supported by the Social Democratic Parties that were in power in both countries. In Sweden, he met with Pierre Schori, who was the Assistant International Secretary of the party.²⁷⁷ In Denmark, Camre had made Foreign Minister Per

²⁷³ “Noter fra Athen,” April 21, 1967, DK/RA/07680-13, Camre, Mogens, Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland, Papandreou 1963–1970 m.m. p. 1; letter, “Report on Greece by Mogens Camre,” May 4, 1967, DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens, 1963–2000, Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland, Grækenland 1967, 1. In this letter, Camre also discloses serious accusations against Andreas Papandreou. His assistant supposedly traveled to Egypt before the coup to procure armaments for an uprising.

²⁷⁴ Mogens Camre, *Knus tyrannerne, Erindringer og selvbiografi* (Odense: Trykkefrihedsselskabets Bibliotek, 2011), 118, 121, 116–117; “Ej officielt Papandreou-stöd,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, October 15, 1966.

²⁷⁵ Press statement, “From Professor Papandreou’s statements at airport, Wednesday night,” October 12, 1966,” DK/RA/07680-13, Camre, Mogens, Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland, Papandreou 1963–1970, m.m.

²⁷⁶ “Ej officielt Papandreou-stöd,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, October 15, 1966; [missing headline], *Information*, October 20, 1966: 1.

²⁷⁷ Pierre Schori, *Minnet och elden. En politisk memoar med samtida synpunkter* (Stockholm: Leopard förlag: 2014), 327, 372, 331; according to Schori, the International Office of the Swedish Social Democratic Party became the “unofficial” Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Hækkerup available for a semi-official dinner.²⁷⁸ Papandreou also visited Norway, but was not as cordially received there by the center-right coalition government.²⁷⁹ Thus, Danish and Swedish Social Democrats had a close working relationship with one of the future Greek politicians in exile. This relationship had much influence on the well-connected Nordic Committees that were formed after the coup and shaped policy decisions on Greece at the highest levels. A case in point was when Camre contacted Schori in October 1967, suggesting that the Swedish and Danish Social Democratic Parties support Papandreou and persuade him to establish his own social democratic party. Camre argued that this was especially important since the Greek Socialist Party, EDA, received support from the Eastern Bloc and was gaining popularity among Greek exiles in Europe.²⁸⁰

The fight for democracy in Greece, which Papandreou referred to, was about the ongoing political crisis that had erupted in 1965 when his father, Georgios Papandreou, had resigned as Prime Minister over disagreements with King Constantine II. The dispute centered on the political power over the Greek army. Since the end of the Greek Civil War, the army had remained deeply royalist and anti-democratic—and rumors of a military coup were circulating at the time. Fearing that the monarchy was in danger and acting against democratic institutions, the King tried everything to postpone parliamentary elections, which Georgios Papandreou's party was on course to win. The King aligned himself with the Conservative Party and sought to consolidate his power by appointing several short-lived minority and coalition governments. The last of these governments fell in April 1967, and new elections were scheduled take place the following month.²⁸¹

Arriving in Greece in mid-April 1967, Camre met with Papandreou to cement their political cooperation. While Camre slept at the Hotel Grande Bretagne, a luxury hotel in Athens, the fragile democracy in Greece was toppled in the early morning of April 21. In his personal notes from that day, Camre wrote about his experience after he woke up to a new reality: In a state radio broadcast, it was announced that the military had seized power. The coup-makers annulled the constitutional paragraphs dealing with civil liberties. Especially macabre was the removal of paragraph 18 on the ban of torture and capital punishment for

²⁷⁸ Camre, *Knus tyrannerne*, 116–117.

²⁷⁹ “Papandreou risikerer nå å miste sitt pass,” *Friheten*, October 14, 1966.

²⁸⁰ Letter, from Camre to Schori, October 19 [1967],” DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens, 1963–2000, Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland, Grækenland 1967.

²⁸¹ Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 122–124, 133; Tony Judt, *Postwar a History of Europe since 1945* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 505–507.

political crimes.²⁸² It was a foreboding act since the military regime became infamous for its use of torture.

Camre sensed much confusion and shock after the coup; no one seemed to know who was behind it. There were military vehicles and soldiers everywhere. Camre was almost snatched by plain-clothed policemen when taking photos of the military, but he managed to escape. Politicians from all parties were rounded up, thrown in jail, or put in house arrest. Later it was announced on the radio that Greece had been saved from a communist takeover. Camre viewed the announcement as utter nonsense, noting that none of the politicians from the Right or Left had warned of any such threat. What had preoccupied the whole political class were the May parliamentary elections. Camre had felt that the atmosphere was relaxed before the coup. Even the U.S. Ambassador in Athens, Philip Talbot, was taken by surprise. An old man in a cafe told Camre that although there had been political unrest before, this was unprecedented; it reminded him of the German occupation during the Second World War.²⁸³

Camre's reference to the confusion and shock was an accurate description of what took place in those early days after the Junta seized power. Nevertheless, many Greeks still believe in a powerful political myth that was built up around the events according to which the coup was engineered by the United States as part of its imperialistic policies. From the available documentation, it is clear that neither the U.S. Embassy nor the government knew that a coup was in the offing. American officials had informed the King that the United States opposed "extra-parliamentary solutions" to the political crisis and that it was against the overthrow of the democratic system. While Neovi M. Karakatsanis and Jonathan Swarts, who have written extensively on the coup, are aware of the widely-held Greek belief that future unclassified CIA documents might point to more direct US involvement, they find it highly unlikely.²⁸⁴ The Greek King, the Greek Military High Command, and even some conservative politicians did not see the military takeover coming either. The coup-makers were a group of colonels, middle-rank officers who did not inform the military chain of command or the King of their plans. In short, they took everyone by surprise. After the seizure of power, there were some hopes that the King might suppress the coup or, at least, influence it. But his initial

²⁸² Notes, "Noter fra Athen," April 21, 1967, DK/RA/07680-13, Camre, Mogens, Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland, 1–4.

²⁸³ Notes, "Noter fra Athen," April 21, 1967, DK/RA/07680-13, Camre, Mogens, Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland, 1–4.

²⁸⁴ Karakatsanis and Swarts, *American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels' Greece*, 1–3; Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 134.

indecisive opposition gave way to capitulation when he swore in the new military cabinet four days later and chaired its first meeting.

Despite the overthrow of a democratic regime, the United States was quick to recognize the new government. Both the Johnson and the Nixon Administrations cooperated with the Junta and supported it in the name of “political stability” and “broader military interests” until the very end. U.S. officials occasionally and gently suggested to the colonels that they return to constitutionalism to appease Western public opinion.²⁸⁵ Yet historian James Edward Miller argues that the U.S. Embassy was not forceful enough in its condemnation of the military regime and that it had failed to speak out against the prospect of a coup before it took place. The Johnson Administration may not have supported the military takeover or welcomed the Junta, but it became far too easy for the regime to hide behind NATO and to tell the world that Greece was allied with the United States.²⁸⁶

In his 2011 memoirs *Knus tyrannerne*, Mogens Camre writes that directly after the coup, he defied the curfew by visiting Andreas Papandreou’s wife, Margaret, to plan what to do next. Papandreou had been violently arrested that night in front of his wife and children—and his blood was still on the carpet in their house. It was Margaret, who informed Camre that her father-in-law, Georgios Papandreou, had also been arrested. Camre promised Margaret to do everything he could to make sure that the Danish government pressure the Junta to set both Papandreous free. Margaret came up with the idea to write letters to influential American academics whom Papandreou had befriended when he was a professor at various universities in the United States, such as Paul Samuelson, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Stephen W. Rousseas. They were well connected in U.S. academic circles and had direct access to President Johnson. With the help of Danish journalists, Camre was able to fly back to Copenhagen on April 23 and smuggled Margaret Papandreou’s letters out of the country. Danish Prime Minister Krag then arranged for the letters be sent to the United States via diplomatic mail.²⁸⁷

Camre had Krag’s ear on the events in Greece, for the latter immediately contacted the Colonels and demanded the release of the elderly Georgios Papandreou. The next day the Danish Social Democratic Party condemned the coup, calling for the restoration of democracy in Greece. On the very day he returned to Copenhagen from Athens, Camre also briefed Willy Brandt, the leader of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and

²⁸⁵ Karakatsanis and Swarts, *American Foreign Policy*, 42–54.

²⁸⁶ Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 135.

²⁸⁷ Camre, *Knus tyrannerne*, 126–135.

Foreign Minister—who was about to leave Denmark following an official visit—on the situation in Greece.²⁸⁸ Yet the meeting does not seem to have mattered much to Brandt, considering that he subsequently followed the U.S. lead on policies toward the Greek Junta. West Germany was the second largest exporter of military arms to Greece after the United States. While future West German military aid was put on hold, the existing level of support continued, and commercial sales of military equipment continued. Historian Mogen Pelt argues that the few arms-exports restrictions that the West German grand coalition government—made up of the conservative Christian Democratic Party and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, and the SPD—eventually adopted was solely due to external pressure: public outrage, opposition within SPD, and Danish and Norwegian criticisms of the Junta in NATO. As late as in 1973, Brandt spoke openly against challenging the Greek military regime, arguing that only a war could put an end to “fascist regimes”; no other type of outside intervention could topple the Junta. Therefore, NATO should continue its relations with the Greek government as before.²⁸⁹

One of the letters smuggled out by Camre was signed the “Center Union Party in Athens,” but the words “dictated by Margaret Papandreou” were scribbled in the margins. The letter was dated April 22 and addressed to all NATO governments (except for Portugal, with the authoritarian Salazar regime still in power), the North Atlantic Council (NAT), and the UN Secretary General. It condemned the coup, explained the absence of any organized resistance in Greece on the grounds that it had come as a complete surprise, and asked for the help of NATO to restore democracy in Greece. The Alliance was urged to act fast because the Greek people would rise against the Junta, adding to the risk that the communists would try to gain influence in such an uprising.²⁹⁰ This letter—together with other ones from Margaret—was sent to the American academics. Camre provided Galbraith with the direct phone number of Prime Minister Krag, adding that Krag was “informed of everything which I have been able to bring out of Greece.”²⁹¹ In response Galbraith contacted Krag and then

²⁸⁸ Camre, *Knus tyrannerne*, 126–135; Press statement, “Udtalelser fra Socialdemokratiets hovedbestyrelse,” April 24, 1967, DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens, 1963–2000, Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland, Grækenland 1967.

²⁸⁹ Mogens Pelt, “West Germany’s Policy toward Greece during the Junta Period in the Context of ‘Burden-Sharing,’” in *The Greek Military Dictatorship: Revisiting a Troubled Past, 1967–1974*, eds. Othon Anastasakis and Katerina Lagos (New York: Berghahn Books, 2021), 300–313.

²⁹⁰ Letter, from the leadership of the Greek Center Union to NATO governments, April 22, 1967, DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens, 1963–2000, Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland, Grækenland 1967.

²⁹¹ Letter, Camre to John Kenneth Galbraith, April 23, 1967,” DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens, 1963–2000, Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland, Grækenland 1967.

organized a letter-writing campaign in the U.S. academic community directed at the government of Greece to protest Papandreou's arrest. Moreover, Galbraith wrote that the "government is bringing such pressure as it can on the subject."²⁹² In the next eight months, Margaret Papandreou worked intensely with Camre and the American academics to prepare for the defense of her husband at a future trial in Greece and, simultaneously, push for his immediate release.²⁹³ Yet an uprising against the Junta, which many had hoped for—and Margaret had tried to organize—never came to fruition. A poorly planned and executed counter coup by the King in December also failed, forcing him into exile.

James Edward Miller argues that no Greeks were prepared to put their lives on the line in a fight against a well-equipped army to invest political power in Papandreou (father or son) or the King. Instead, he asserts—on the basis of contemporary accounts—that many expressed relief that the quarrelling politicians had been removed from power. Some hoped that former Prime Minister Konstantinos G. Karamanlis would become the democratic savior. Given the political passivity in Greece, the main efforts to free Papandreou were pursued abroad. The American academics put pressure on President Johnson, and even the U.S. Embassy in Athens worked for his release from prison. Papandreou was set free in December 1967 as part of a broad-based amnesty by the Junta that finally gave in to foreign entreaties. The decision was made when it became clear to the regime that opposition Greek politicians did not pose a risk to its survival. Since Papandreou feared being arrested again, he decided to organize the resistance against the Junta from abroad.²⁹⁴ While Papandreou felt betrayed by the Greeks for not instigating an uprising,²⁹⁵ there was a ray of hope because of the opposition to the Junta in many Western European countries.

²⁹² Letter, Galbraith to Camre, April 27, 1967," DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens, 1963–2000, Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland, Grækenland 1967.

²⁹³ Numerous letters between Camre and Margaret Papandreou, in the folder: "1967 Grækenland," DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens.

²⁹⁴ Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 138–140; Monteagle Stearns, *Gifted Greek: The Enigma of Andreas Papandreou* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2021), xvii, 85; Hoover Institution Library & Archives, "Firing Line with William F. Buckley Jr.: The Greek Dilemma," YouTube Video, 59:22, recorded April 20, 1972, accessed November 15, 2023, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nNQrrTKSYSA&t=2625s>. For the rest of his life Papandreou claimed that the coup was a CIA operation; he acknowledged, however, that American academics and President Johnson were to thank for his release from captivity.

²⁹⁵ Stearns, *Gifted Greek: The Enigma of Andreas Papandreou*, 85. The American diplomat, Monteagle Stearns, who knew Papandreou personally met with him after his release and witnessed him expressing this disappointment.

Nordic Reactions to the Greek Coup

The response in the Nordic countries to the coup in Greece was swift and categorical. From the very beginning, the Greek Junta was portrayed as fascist and those opposing it as anti-fascists. One of the first major Nordic demonstrations took place in Stockholm on April 23, in which about two thousand people participated. The march was organized by the large Greek expatriate community in Stockholm, which was often labelled “the Greek colony” in the Swedish press. The banners carried by the protesters contained anti-fascist slogans such as “Greece does not want to become Spain,” and “the sound of jackboots can be heard again.”²⁹⁶ In the coming years, the Greek communities in all the Nordic countries spearheaded many of the protests. On April 25, social democratic and non-communist socialist youth organizations all over Europe received a letter from their international umbrella organization, the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), encouraging them to protest the military regime in Greece and to collect petitions against the coup, which would then be handed over to Greek embassies. It also provided a specific date, when the demonstrations should take place,²⁹⁷ and included a statement by the Union of Austrian Socialist Students with the following exhortation:

From all democrats and antifascist people in Europe demonstrations will take place on MAY 4th, 1967 at 11.00 a.m. It must for ever be stated that all the European people have learned of the errors, which were made during the foregoing years of wars, causing so much unhappiness, political pressure and blood. It must clearly be stated that we, as democrats, will have nothing to do with the power-usurpers of Greece, who under the leadership of King Konstantin took over the political power in April 21st in Greece.²⁹⁸

Protests were organized in many European countries to oppose the military takeover, with references to the Second World War and to historical fascism. They contributed to the formation of a shared identity through collective memory and mnemonic practices. In Copenhagen, the Social Democratic Youth Movement organized a torchlight march,

²⁹⁶ “Grekprotest i Stockholm,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, April 24, 1967. Quotes in the original Swedish: “den grekiska kolonin,” “Grekland vill inte bli Spanien” and “stöveltrampet dånar åter”.

²⁹⁷ “International Union of Socialist Youth, European Circulat, no. 5/67 Vienna,” April 25, 1967, DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens.

²⁹⁸ Statement, “The Union of Socialist Students of Austria: To all democratic people in Europe,” DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens.

attracting around four thousand participants, together with youth organizations of other parties. Mogens Camre gave a speech which evoked themes and memories of the war:²⁹⁹

On this day 22 years ago we were freed from the trespasses of Nazism ... Those that propagated carefulness and non-intervention, those that thought our security could be protected if we abstained from provoking our enemy, were put to shame under the Second World War, with the Nazi German occupation ... 22 years ago after the victory over Nazism, 22 years ago some of us experienced our fathers returning home from concentration camps that Hitlers henchmen had dragged them into. 22 years ago after the victorious peoples of the world had promised each other that it will never happen again – after 22 years, we now experience a fascist military dictatorship has once again oppressed a people's freedom and democratic rights. A small ruling class with support from the army, and royal house, stood over a poor population whose democratic leaders demanded social reforms, even dared of speaking of the Danish welfare state as a role model ... It is frightening to hear the same talk about nonintervention as in the 1930s. It is frightening that Danish politician ... speak highly of non-interference in others states internal affairs ... **THOSE THAT NOT ACTIVELY OPPOSE DICTATORSHIP ARE WITH IT** ... We wish for intervention, just like other countries in 1945 intervened and liberated us. We give the Greek people our support. The enemies of Greece are our enemies, just like Denmark was liberated so should Greece be liberated.³⁰⁰

The speech illustrates how an anti-fascist collective identity was formulated in the early days after the coup. That the event was held on Denmark's Liberation Day created a symbolic link with the past. The collective memory of the Nazi occupation was evoked to explain what was happening in Greece as well as to legitimize the opposition to the regime. Camre cited the personal experience of his father being imprisoned by the Nazis. Challenging the Junta was

²⁹⁹ Letter, Camre to Professor George Lianis, May 4, 1967, DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens.

³⁰⁰ Notes, "4. Maj 1967," DK/RA/07680-13, Camre, Mogens. In the original Danish: "På denne aften for 22 år siden – vor befrielse fra nazismens overgreb ... Vi troede, vi kunne leve trygt i vor egen lille veren som "puslinglandet der hygger sig i smug mens hele verden brænder om dets vugge. ... De der manede til forsigtighed, til ikke-inblanding og til ikke-engagement, de der troede, at vores sikkerhed kunne beskyttes, hvis vi lod være at provokere vores fjender – de blev gjort til skamme i 2. verdenskrig, under nazitysklands besættelse. Vi blev så grundigt belært om at der ikke fandtes frihed for den lille nation, der stod alene, vi blev belært om at friheden og freden er udelelig. 22 år efter vores sejr sejren over nazismen, 22 år efter at nogle af os oplevede, at vore fædre kom tilbage fra de koncentrationslejre, som Hitlers håndlangere havde slået dem til, og 22 år efter at den sejrende verdens folk lovede hinanden at dette ikke skulle ske igen – ja, 22 år efter dette, har vi igen oplevet, at et fascistisk militærdiktatur har undertrykt et folk frihed og demokratiske rettigheder. ... En fåtallig herskerklasse med støtte i hæren og kongehuset stod overfor en fattig befolkning hvis demokratiske ledere krævede sociale reformer – ja endog dristede sig til at tale om den dansk velfærdsstat som et forbillede. ... Det er skræmmende igen i dag at høre de samme toner om ikke-inblanding som i 1930erne. Det er skræmmende, at danske politikere, som i fine ord erklærer sig imod diktaturet, samtidig advarer mod danske protester mod det der er sket i Grækenland og tale højt om ikke-indblanding i andre stater affærer. ... **DE DER IKKE ER AKTIVT MOD DIKTATURET ER MED DET.** ... Grækenland vil komme til at opleve sin rigdagsbrandproces: den hedder ASPIDA og den hovedanklagede hedder Andreas Papandreou. Hans forbrydelse er, at han vil demokrati og social retfærdighed. ... Vi ønsker indblanding, ligesom andre lande i 1945 blandede sig og befriede os. Vi tilsiger det græske folk vor støtte. Grækenlands fjender er vore fjender som Danmark blev frit skal Grækenland blive frit."

portrayed in similar terms as the resistance against the Nazis. The past brought significance to the present, a calling, and lessons of what had to be avoided this time around. The most explicit of these lessons was to reject all forms of non-intervention or appeasement. These were powerful mnemonic articulations, considering that Camre had experienced both events. Thus, the Greek coup was not a distant event, for Denmark had undergone a similar experience during World War II. After the march, Camre wrote to Greek Professor George Lianis, who was among the academics residing in the United States, about the protests, expressing his admiration for the high turnout of his countrymen and adding that as “you may know we are not a “demonstrating people!””³⁰¹ Afterwards, Margaret, who was still in Greece, thanked Camre for the “youth procession,” emphasizing that the only way forward now was to put pressure on the Junta in NATO.³⁰²

In Iceland—which was governed by a coalition government between the right-wing Independence Party and the Social Democratic Party—Young Social Democrats organized a protest meeting against the coup, which prompted a patronizing and an overly optimistic compliment from their hard-left Socialist adversaries. The Socialists pointed out that the pro-NATO Icelandic Social Democrats had often been quiet over Western foreign policy actions. Yet they hoped that with this “historical event,” the Greek coup, it would be possible to work together on issues without having to check whether their “political compass showed West or East.” The Socialists naively suggested that the Cold War was subsiding “even in Iceland.”³⁰³

Such skirmishes between socialists and communists, on the one hand, and social democrats, on the other, were to characterize anti-Junta oppositional activities in the Nordic countries. The former made much of NATO’s alleged role in the coup to underpin their own critical attitudes toward the Alliance. Thus, far-left articulations were integrated into an already existing anti-American and anti-imperialist discourse adopted by these movements, with Greece being described as a “Vietnam in Europe.”³⁰⁴ Nonetheless, the willingness of the social democrats to see the Greek regime as fascist and the opposition to it as anti-fascist, partly defused factional infighting within the Left. The dominant anti-totalitarian Cold War paradigm of the period was also challenged by the events in Greece; instead of seeing all

³⁰¹ Camre, *Knus tyrannerne*, 138–139; letter, Camre to Giorgios Lianis, May 4, 1967,” DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens.

³⁰² Letter, Margaret Papandreou to Camre, May 5, 1967, DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens.

³⁰³ “Frá degi til dags. Samhengið,” *Þjóðviljinn*, May 6, 1967. Quotes in the original Icelandic: “sögulegur atburður,” “hvort nál skoðanaáttavítans visar í austur eða vestur,” and “sönnun þess að kalda stríðinu er nú loks einnig að slota á Íslandi.”

³⁰⁴ Thomas Ekman Jørgensen, *Transformations and Crises: The Left and the Nation in Denmark and Sweden, 1956–1980* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 104.

dictatorships as equally bad, there was a tendency to favor particular action against Greece because democracy had been usurped. This anti-fascist collective identity formation had a unifying potential. At the protest meeting of the Icelandic Social Democratic Youth, they made it clear that the demonstration was part of a broader social democratic initiative all over Europe. A statement was issued that demanded that the Icelandic government use its influence internationally to work for a return of democracy to Greece and to condemn the coup that the “fascists and Greek army committed in Greece...”³⁰⁵ Many attended the protests, and among those speaking was Sigurður A. Magnússon, a journalist and a Hellenophile, who a year later established the Icelandic Committee against the Greek Junta with Swedish assistance.³⁰⁶

What started out as an issue largely dominated by social democrats in the Nordic countries soon took on a different political character. In Sweden, the Social Democratic Youth participated in a quiet torchlight procession, which attracted around 300 people, half of them Greek expatriates. They marched together with members of the local youth peace movement and the Swedish chapter of Amnesty International, which was chaired by the lawyer Hans Göran Franck. In his address at the protest meeting, Franck called for international action against the Greek Junta at the UN and for measures to stop arms shipments to Greece from all countries, especially the United States. He also encouraged Swedish Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson to act against Greece in the Council of Europe and at the UN General Assembly to ensure that Greece abide by the European Convention on Human Rights.³⁰⁷ Most importantly, Franck argued that “Greek Committees should be established all over the country, just like the Spanish Committees in the past, to collect money to the resistance movement that is now growing in Greece.”³⁰⁸

Franck did not think that it was enough to use Amnesty International in the fight to help Greek political prisoners or to limit the protest action to a single political party. This fact cannot be stressed enough; these people could have pursued a campaign solely within Amnesty International but chose not to do so. As mentioned above, there was a clear difference between the new human rights agenda and the international proletarianism and

³⁰⁵ “Valdaráninu mótmælt,” *Alþýðublaðið*, May 6, 1967. Quote from the original Icelandic: “Almennur fundur í Iðnó hinn 4. Maí 1967 fordæmir harðlega valdarán það, er fasistar og gríski herinn frömu í Grikklandi hinn 21. apríl sl.”

³⁰⁶ Sigurður A. Magnússon, *Á hnífsins egg. Átakasaga*, 32–34.

³⁰⁷ “Tyst demonstration mot regimen i Grekland,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 3, 1967.

³⁰⁸ “Tyst demonstration mot regimen i Grekland,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 3, 1967. In the original Swedish: “Greklandskommittéer borde bildas över hela landet så som det en gång bildades Spanienkommittéer för att samla pengar till den motståndsrörelse som håller på att växa fram i Grekland.”

anti-fascism that preceded it. He envisioned a broad-based solidarity organization, with a strong anti-fascist identity. It is also highly likely that the above-mentioned scandals within Amnesty, with reports of infiltration by British intelligence and its anti-communist vetting of staff played a role here. Since he received his inspiration from the Spanish Committees in Sweden during the Spanish Civil War, it was logical for him to opt for a broad political coalition. By this time, Franck was a high-profile lawyer in Sweden, taking part in public debates over various social issues. He was known for his left-wing social democratic leanings and was a party member. It turned out later that the Swedish secret police had classified him as a communist. His mother was of Jewish descent, and during World War II, his parents had been active in the struggle against Nazism; they had also opened their home to Jewish, Norwegian, and Finnish refugees. This experience, no doubt, influenced his political engagement and humanitarian work throughout his life.³⁰⁹ The idea of combining forces and building on a tradition of anti-fascism was also promoted in other Nordic countries. In Norway, for example, members and representatives of the Social Democratic Party in the Ski and Nesodden areas maintained that the “Norwegian Labor movement, must be faithful to its tradition, to prepare itself for struggle against fascism wherever and in whatever form it might appear....”³¹⁰

The first two Nordic Committees for the restoration of democracy in Greece were established in May 1967, one in Sweden (*Svenska Kommittén för Greklands Demokrati*) and the other in Norway (*Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas*). At the Swedish press conference marking the event, members stated that the Committee would not be party-affiliated. It invited all political parties, yet without mentioning the communists, to organize a parliamentary fact-finding mission to Greece and follow in the footsteps of French parliamentarians who had already arrived there. Expatriate Greeks also participated in the founding of the Swedish Committee, such as Emmanuel Poniridis, who later became the Ambassador of Greece to Sweden.³¹¹ At a protest meeting in late May in Uppsala, the first Swedish Professor of Sociology, Torgny T. Segerstedt, spoke to a crowd of almost one thousand people. He was the son of one of Sweden’s most famous anti-fascists during the

³⁰⁹ “Dödsfall: Hans Göran Franck,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, March 21, 1998; “Kända svenskar i säkerhetsarkiv,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, December 4, 1998.

³¹⁰ “Skarp fordømmelse av kuppet i Hellas,” *Arbeiderbladet*, May 3, 1967. In the original Norwegian: “Den norske arbeiderbevegelsen må, tradisjonen tro, samle seg til kamp mot fascismen hvor og i hvilken forklledning den opptrer ...og yte all mulig støtte til de krefter som kjemper for at demokratie gjeninnføres.”

³¹¹ Report, “Rapport från Kommittén för Greklands Demokrati,” October 3, 1967, NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Komité for demokrati i Hellas, Lionæs, Aase, 1; “Svenskar för kontroll i Grekland aktionskrav,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 11, 1967: 3, 14.

war, the liberal journalist Torgny Karl Segerstedt. Like Franck, Segerstedt believed that it was necessary to go beyond demands to free political prisoners, for it was not just a question of amnesty. He stressed that the Committee had to fight for a return to democracy in Greece. The famous author—and subsequent Nobel Prize laureate—Eyvind Johnson also spoke at the meeting, repeating the theme of the Spanish tragedy. Referring to how powerful democratic states had refrained from acting when it was still a possibility to do so, he claimed that “Spain could have been saved.” Yet he also stressed that powerful democracies had often supported military regimes. What was happening in Greece reminded him of other democracies that had been betrayed in the past. Solidarity was important, and he expressed his hope for an organized resistance on the grounds that if “democracy is to be preserved, it needs to be defended.”³¹² These calls for remembrance clearly illustrate the mnemonic aspects of anti-fascism; the participants used collective memory to forge a shared identity, to mobilize for the political struggle, and to legitimize it. In Sweden, the transnational memory of the Spanish Civil War was the dominating factor.

The formation of the Swedish Committee influenced the decision to establish a Norwegian Committee only a few days later. Swedish members, such as Poniridis, participated in the first press conference of their Norwegian counterparts. Just like the Swedes, the Norwegians wanted to invite civil society groups, including the labor movement and the women’s movement, to participate in Committee activities. Both Committees started with an interim board until one could be elected by a constituent meeting. The Norwegian Committee, however, was quite small at the beginning, with only a few members. The driving force behind it was the Greek author Elias Theophilakis, who had been in contact with people in Denmark and Sweden before it was established.³¹³ In contrast, the Swedish Committee had by October an impressive list of followers. A large board of 30 individuals included famous actors, authors, academics, politicians, union leaders, and exiled Greeks. Among them were the economist Gunnar Myrdal; the prominent young Social Democrat and future Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson; the writer and actor Tage Danielsson; the writer Vilhelm Moberg; the Social Democratic MP Nancy Eriksson; and the Liberal MP and later Prime Minister Ola Ullsten to name a few. Over four thousand people signed the Committee’s first petition.

³¹² “Uppsalamöte om Grekland,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 25, 1967: 7.

³¹³ “Våken internasjonal opinion viktigste våpen i striden,” *Arbeiderbladet*, May 20, 1967; “Komité dannet for demokrati i Hellas,” *Arbeiderbladet*, May 13, 1967; “Norsk komité for demokrati I Hellas konstitueres fredag,” *Arbeiderbladet*, May 11, 1967.

Around 15 national organizations were part of the organization and another 30 local unions.³¹⁴

Confronting the Junta: A Nordic Parliamentary Fact-Finding Mission to Greece

The reach and influence of the Swedish Committee were shown when it took the initiative to organize the first official Nordic parliamentary fact-finding mission to Greece in August 1967. A total of fourteen Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, and Finnish MPs participated. The Swedish Committee also invited Icelandic MPs, but it is unclear why they did not participate. It was a broad-based delegation, spanning the whole political spectrum from left socialists to conservatives. Still, no Swedish Conservatives joined the mission and only one Finnish Communist did so. The project was a joint undertaking between the Swedish and Norwegian Committees and the Amnesty chapters in the Nordic countries. The trip received much media attention and, according to the Swedish Committee, it strengthened public opinion against the military regime in Greece.³¹⁵ Mogens Camre also took part in the planning of the mission; after conferring with the American academics and Margaret Papandreou, he asked the delegation to try to meet with Andreas Papandreou in his prison cell and to extract promises from the Junta to allow the presence of foreign observers and legal representation at his upcoming trial.³¹⁶ Such a wide political backing from four different countries was impressive, considering that the last delegation had been a group of British Labor MPs.

The Nordic initiative was very much in the spirit of the interwar popular front: What was happening in Greece was considered serious enough to justify a broad political alliance. The trip was also followed with interest by the foreign ministries of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, and the issue of the Greek Junta was brought up at a Nordic foreign ministers' meeting in late August. The three Nordic governments also contemplated actions against the Greek regime internationally.³¹⁷ In Norway, the Committee member and journalist Arne

³¹⁴ Report, "Rapport från Kommittén för Greklands Demokrati," October 3, 1967, NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Komité for demokrati i Hellas, Lionæs, Aase, 1.

³¹⁵ Report, "Rapport från Kommittén för Greklands Demokrati," October 3, 1967, NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Komité for demokrati Hellas, Lionæs, Aase, 2; List of participants, "Den nordiske parlamentarikerdelegasjon ... Adressliste," NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Parlamentarikerdelegasjonen til Hellas, Lionæs, Aase; Hanne Hagtvedt Vik and Skage Alexander Østberg, "Sweden, Amnesty International and Legal Entrepreneurs in Global Anti-Torture Politics, 1967–1977," *The International History Review* 44, no. 3 (2022): 637; Protocol "Svenska Kommittén för Greklands Demokrati," August 9, 1967," Protokoll mm 67–70, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-2, Hans Göran Franck, 2.

³¹⁶ Information, "Oplysninger til Parlamentarikerdelegationen til Grækenland," August 13, 1967, DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens.

³¹⁷ "Nordiska parlamentariker skall resa till Grekland," *Dagens Nyheter*, July 28, 1967.

Treholt organized the trip with Social Democrat Aase Lionæs, who became the leader of the delegation. He also accompanied the delegation on its week-long journey to Greece from August 14 to 21. Treholt became a prominent member of the Norwegian Committee, but he is mostly known for his subsequent conviction of treason and espionage for the Soviet Union and Iraq in 1983.³¹⁸

Aase Lionæs was a well-known Social Democrat and a women's advocate. She had worked at the UN after the war on issues such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights together with Eleanor Roosevelt.³¹⁹ She was the leader of the delegation and would later become the chairwoman of the Norwegian Committee. In her notes from the trip, Lionæs wrote that the delegation was the first to be allowed to visit some of the imprisoned Greek politicians. Previous delegations from Italy and England had tried but failed to get such a permission. Of the six thousand political prisoners, around 40 were members of the Greek parliament. Before the prison visits, the delegation managed to meet with the "Prime Minister" Constantine Kollias, who sported a pinstripe moustache, and several other high-ranking ministers in the military government. He had been a collaborator during the Nazi occupation of Greece, and as Minister of Justice, he had persecuted resistance members. Yet he was never brought to justice for his actions. The Nordic delegation members did not hold back; they asked about the status of political prisoners and whether a return to democracy in Greece could be expected.³²⁰ When Kollias asked them if they understood the necessity of the coup—having argued that there was still democracy in Greece, even though there were no free elections or free press—Aase Lionæs responded in the following manner:³²¹

As a veteran of the UN General Assembly, I would like to answer these questions with quoting Article 30 in the Declaration of Human Rights. Both Greece and the Scandinavian countries voted in its favor. I quote: "Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any

³¹⁸ Letter, from Arne Treholt to Aase Lionæs, July 28, 1967, NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, *Parlamentarikerdelegasjonen til Hellas*, Lionæs, Aase; notes Lionæs, "Parlamentarikerdelegasjonen til Hellas 1967," NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, *Parlamentarikerdelegasjonen til Hellas*, Lionæs, Aase, 1–3; Arne Treholt (1942–2023) was convicted of espionage and high treason in 1983; he committed the crimes during the period of 1974–1983 or mainly after the fall of the Greek Junta; NRK Radio, "Spionen Treholt," accessed December 6, 2023, https://radio.nrk.no/podkast/hele_historien/sesong/spionen-treholt/1_663d8c75-d5bd-44e0-bd8c-75d5bd94e092.

³¹⁹ "Nekrolog Aase Lionæs," *Dagsavisen*, January 4, 1999.

³²⁰ Notes Lionæs, "Parlamentarikerdelegasjonen til Hellas 1967," NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, *Parlamentarikerdelegasjonen til Hellas*, Lionæs, Aase, 1–3; Dimitris Kousouris, "From Revolution to Restoration. Transnational Implications of the Greek Purge of Wartime Collaborators," in *Dealing with Wars and Dictatorships: Legal Concepts and Categories in Action*, eds Liora Israël and Guillaume Mouralis (The Hague: Asser Press, 2014), 155.

³²¹ Report, "Rapport fra den nordiske parlamentarikerdelegasjons reise til Hellas i tiden 14.–21. august 1967," NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Lionæs, Aase, 3–4.

activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.” This is my reaction towards what happened on the 21st of April.³²²

This confrontational intervention angered Kollias, who claimed that it represented a direct interference in the internal affairs of Greece. If the delegation continued like this, it would be seen as an act of hostility on the part of the Nordic governments towards Greece. Lionæs answered, calmly, that this was not so; she was simply quoting the Declaration of Human Rights. Then she explained to Kollias what really constituted an interference in internal affairs. This incident was widely covered in the Nordic press.³²³ The Swedish delegate Ullsten, however, did not tell the Swedish press that it was Lionæs that had made Kollias so angry. Instead, Ullsten himself took partial credit for the intervention, asserting that the Scandinavian delegates had jointly recited the Declaration of Human Rights.³²⁴ In another interview, he claimed that it was a Norwegian male delegate who had made the reference.³²⁵ This shows how easily women could be erased from the historical record. Another incident took place when the Norwegian Conservative Otto Lyng was physically thrown out of the office of the Junta leader Stylianos Pattakos. When the delegation finally met with Pattakos, he strangely accused the group of engaging in an “inquisition” for wanting to find out whether torture was practiced in Greek prisons. Just like the other Junta officials, Pattakos was aware of Scandinavian intentions to move against Greece in NATO and the Council of Europe, which he interpreted as an example of ill will towards Greece. Moreover, he erroneously claimed that the Nordic countries had never fought against Nazism or communism. When delegation members tried to correct him, Pattakos told them that the Nordics had surrendered immediately to the Nazis. Amnesty official Bent Knudsen ended the meeting by saying he was looking forward to a return to parliamentarism in Greece.³²⁶ Later,

³²² Report, “Rapport fra den nordiske parlamentarikerdelegasjons reise til Hellas,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Lionæs, Aase, 4. In the original Norwegian: “Som en veteran i FN’s hovedforsamling vil jeg besvare disse spørsmålene med å sitere artikkel 30 i Deklarasjonen om menneskerettighetene. Denne har bade Hellas og de skandinaviske statene stem for. Jeg siterer: “Intet i denne erklæring skal tolkes slik at det gir noen stat, gruppe eller person rett til å treffe noe tiltak, utove noen virksomhet eller utføre noen handling som tar sikte på å ødelegge noen av de rettigheter og friheter som erklæringen gjelder.” Dette er min reaksjon på det som skjedde de 21. april.”

³²³ Report, “Rapport fra den nordiske parlamentarikerdelegasjons reise til Hellas,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Lionæs, Aase, 4–6; “Kollias irritert over uttalelse fra Aase Lionæs,” *Dagbladet*, August 19, 1967.

³²⁴ “Riksdagsmän på ministervisit utskällda i Aten,” *Dagens Nyheter*, August 19, 1967; “Riksdagsmännen fick “tillrättavisning” av premiärministern,” *Aftonbladet*, August 19, 1967.

³²⁵ “Vi vill veta vad som sker,” *Expressen*, August 19, 1967.

³²⁶ “Otto Lyng kastet lodrett ut hos Patakos,” *Dagbladet*, August 17, 1967; Report, “Rapport fra den nordiske parlamentarikerdelegasjons reise til Hellas,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Lionæs, Aase, 10–13.

Aase Lionæs expressed admiration for her Conservative colleague Otto Lyng during the trip; she wrote in her notes:

... the delegation made use of an old-fashioned revolutionary approach, the direct action. To lead this revolutionary charge the delegation brought with it a secret weapon made in Trondheim, a bulldozer (dark blue) Otto Lyng. Thanks to the bulldozer the colonels had to capitulate, and the delegation could march into all these government offices.³²⁷

This quote encapsulates the non-partisan character of the delegation as well as the radical approach adopted by some of its members; they felt like they were fighting fascism. Given the delegation's confrontational approach, it was a bit surprising that it was allowed to meet with political prisoners. Aase Lionæs was shaken by the experience, recounting that in a two-roomed cell, 12 ghost-like prisoners greeted the delegation. They had not received outside visitors, except for family members since April 21. They did not know why they were imprisoned; they had no legal counsel and did not know for how long they would be kept in jail. Natural light was blocked out from the cell and an electric light was always kept on. Of the prisoners, seven were former MPs or ministers—all from the Center Union. In an interview with a newspaper, Lionæs remarked that it was not strange that Greece was so quiet; all opposition members had been incarcerated, and it was in jail where one could find free Greece.³²⁸ Otto Lyng and Danish Conservative Hans Jørgen Lembourn also managed to meet with Andreas Papandreou. They buoyed his spirit by telling him of the promises the delegation had received from Kollias about the right to call witnesses and to have a legal counsel at the trial against him for high treason.³²⁹ As it turned out, the legal proceedings were cancelled before he was released from prison.

Shortly after the trip, three Nordic publishing houses cooperated in putting out a book about the fact-finding mission. It included contributions from the famous Greek actress-singer-activist Melina Mercouri and delegation members such as the Danish Conservative Hans Jørgen Lembourn, the Norwegian Left Socialist Finn Gustavsen, the Swedish Liberal

³²⁷ Notes Lionæs, "Möter med greske ministre," September 9, 1967, NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, *Parlamentarikerdelegasjonen til Hellas*, Lionæs, Aase, 2. In the original Norwegian: "...delegasjonen benyttet seg av en god gammel revolusjonær fremgangsmåte, den direkte aksjon. Til å føre an i dette revolusjonære framstöt hadde delegasjonen medbragt et hemmelig våpen produsert i Trondhjem en bulldozer (mørkeblå) Otto Lyng. Takket være bulldozeren måtte oberstjuntaen strekke våpen og delegasjonen marsjerte opp i alle disse regjeringskontorer."

³²⁸ Notes Lionæs, "Parlamentarikerdelegasjonen til Hellas 1967," NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, *Parlamentarikerdelegasjonen til Hellas*, Lionæs, Aase, 4; "I fengslet møtte jeg det FRIE Hellas," *Arbeiderbladet*, August 21, 1967.

³²⁹ Report, "Rapport fra den nordiske parlamentarikerdelegasjons reise til Hellas," NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Lionæs, Aase, 7–8.

Ola Ullsten, and the Finnish Social Democrat Pekka Korvinheimo. The afterword was written by Hans Göran Franck.³³⁰ All of the contributors, except for one (Ullsten), evoked the collective memory of the historical fight against fascism, when they wrote about the Greek Junta.³³¹ As Franck put it:

A new dictatorship of the fascist type has spawned in Europe. We can observe how neo-Nazi tendencies spreads in other countries too. In Italy people speak openly about the danger of a fascist coup. Spain and Portugal are keeping their fascist-dictatorships after more than 20 years after the fall of the Hitler regime. The Spanish tragedy was a prelude to the Second World War. Few thought in 1936 that Franco's coming of power would have such dire consequences. Greece must not become a new Spain. A success for democracy can have international repercussions. Today's militant supporters of dictatorship must suffer a defeat in Greece. Our struggle demands not only will and commitment but also concentration and persistence.³³²

Franck not only saw himself as an international observer, but as an active participant in the fight against fascism, expressing it through mnemonic practices. For him, the stakes could not be higher. In a similar vein, Finn Gustavsen made extensive references to the Spanish Civil War in his chapter. He added another layer by mentioning to the famous Norwegian anti-fascist poet and war correspondent Nordahl Grieg, who had been killed when reporting from a bombing raid over Berlin in 1943. Grieg had written a book on the Spanish Civil War entitled *Spanish Summer*. Gustavsen, fittingly, named his contribution "Greek Summer" and quoted Grieg from a section where republican volunteers from Scandinavia mourn their fallen comrade and ask the journalist to deliver an appeal back home.

This appeal, which was released in the summer of 1937, demanded that the Nordic democracies do everything in their power to support Spain. Gustavsen then quoted Greek writer Vassilis Vassilikos, who in the summer of 1967 stated that only the Nordic countries showed any real concern for what was happening in Greece. The Scandinavian republican volunteers' appeal is compared to Vassilikos's call to the Nordic peoples to unite and fight the misfortune that had befallen Greece. Gustavsen contended that in 1937, the larger democratic

³³⁰ Report, "Rapport från Kommitten för Greklands Demokrati," October 3, 1967," NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Komité for demokrati i Hellas, Lionæs, Aase, 2.

³³¹ Finn Gustavsen, Peka J. Korvenheimo, Hans Jørgen Lembourn, and Ola Ullsten, *Rapport fra Athen: Nordiske politikere i Hellas* (Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S, 1967).

³³² Gustavsen et al., *Rapport fra Athen*, 156. In the original Swedish: "En ny diktatur av fascistisk typ har vuxit fram i Europa. Vi kan iaktta hur nynazistiska strömningar gör sig breda även i andra länder. Det talas öppet i Italien om faran för en fascistisk statskupp. Spanien och Portugal behåller sina fascist-diktaturer nu mer än 20 år efter Hitlerrikets fall. Den spanska tragedin hörde till andra världskrigets förspel. Det var inte många i 1936 som trodde att Francos maktövertagande skulle få så förödande konsekvenser. Grekland får inte bli ett nytt Spanien. En framgång för demokratin i Grekland kan få internationella återverkningar. Dagens militanta diktaturanhängare måste lida ett nederlag i Grekland. Vår kamp kräver inte bara vilja och engagemang utan också koncentration och ihärdighet."

states as well as the Nordic ones had betrayed Spain. Back then “barbarity” had been met with the passive politics of nonintervention. He argued that another betrayal was now taking place with respect to Greece, except for a failed Danish protest in NATO. Gustavsen lamented the Norwegian government’s lack of action, stating that it could have prevented a torpedo boat deal with Greece. His comparisons were not limited to the Spanish Civil War, for Vietnam was to him another important lesson. Greece and Vietnam were two sides of the same coin, he claimed—a consequence of American imperialism. All complaints should be made both to the master and his servants, both to U.S. President Johnson and the Greek Colonels. Although Gustavsen struggled to choose a slogan—whether Greece should be seen as a “New Spain” or a “Vietnam in Europe”—the former seemed to have been more on his mind when he finished his chapter with these words:³³³ “People must assert themselves if they are to understand this time that ‘it can happen here’—that one fascism can be threatening enough, just like it was a Spanish summer for 20 [30] years ago.”³³⁴ Others were uneasy about putting the blame on the United States for the Greek coup. Ola Ullsten argued, for example, that Greece had its own history and not every misfortune in it could be traced to imperialism. He wanted to moderate the language used to describe the coup and to assign guilt, emphasizing that the available evidence did not point to an American involvement. Instead of making references to historical betrayals and struggles against fascism, Ullsten concentrated on analyzing the political landscape in Greece and its problematic relationship with democracy prior to the coup. His narrative was devoid of any reference to collective memory. A key aspect were the traditional anti-democratic tendencies among Greek monarchs and their conflicts with the parliament and democratically elected leaders such as Georgios Papandreou.³³⁵ It seems that Ullsten wished to avoid oversimplification and instrumentalization of the coup for anti-American purposes. As he put it:

A particular large interest has been directed towards the position of USA towards the April-coup and later political developments. Considering the strong influence of the USA over Greece ever since the end of the Second World War such questions are understandable. But the answers should be sought after in Greece, not in Vietnam or the Dominican Republic.³³⁶

³³³ Gustavsen et al., *Rapport fra Athen*, 60–61, 94–96.

³³⁴ Gustavsen et al., *Rapport fra Athen*, 96. In the original Norwegian: “En vanskelig erkjennelse må til hos mange om de denne gang vil begripe at det << kan hende her >> – at en fascism kan true som den gjorde det en spansk sommer for 20 år siden.”

³³⁵ Gustavsen et al., *Rapport fra Athen*, 97–99, 122.

³³⁶ Gustavsen et al., *Rapport fra Athen*, 122. In the original Swedish: “Särskilt stort intresse har koncentrerats kring USA:s hållning till aprilkuppen och den senare politiska utvecklingen. Med tanke på USA:s starka inflytande över Grekland ända sedan andra världskrigets slut är frågor om USA:s ställning naturligtvis motiverade. Men svaren skall sökas i Grekland, inte i Vietnam eller Dominikanska Republiken.”

Hans Jørgen Lembourn was also keen on placing the coup within the context of Greek history. He blamed the King's failure to act on his young age and because he was surrounded by reactionary advisors who saw communists lurking everywhere. He hoped that the monarchy could be saved if the King took action to restore democracy. What explained the absence of an insurrection, he believed, was that people feared the outbreak of a new civil war. As a journalist, Lembourn had reported from the Greek Civil War, where he witnessed the aftermath of a massacre of civilians committed by communists in a mountain village. This experience led him to reassess his political outlook. He had hoped that resistance movements, such as those in Denmark—where communists and conservatives had cooperated—could pave the way for a neutral Europe between West and East. It was the Greek Civil War that had crushed such postwar aspirations. For him, it was not possible to be neutral when faced with barbarity. The communist commander, “general Markos” [Markos Vafeiadis], whom Lembourn interviewed, did not deny that the massacre had taken place, adding that “to achieve 100% power, it might be necessary to apply 100% terror.” From then on, Lembourn did not believe in neutrality. He became hostile toward political ideologies in general, especially those that accepted the dictum that the end justified the means. Instead, humans had a responsibility for both means and ends. Yet, identifying himself politically as a social liberal or a liberal conservative—or occupying a middle ground—he failed to consider his own position as ideologically motivated. Interestingly, while the massacre made him antagonistic towards communism, it still brought back collective memory in the form of “lessons learned” from the Second World War.³³⁷ As he observed:

Because of this, the struggle we had fought against Nazism was not over. It was necessary once again to become engaged. Neutrality was not possible anymore. It also meant standing together with people and political ideas one did not sympathize with, to be ascribed political ideas that one did not share and be attacked because of them.³³⁸

Lembourn compared this transgression of the communists in Greece with the military coup. Once again, neutrality was not an option because it was impossible to compromise with the

³³⁷ Gustavsen et al., *Rapport fra Athen*, 24–26, 55–58, 9–15.

³³⁸ Gustavsen et al., *Rapport fra Athen*, 14. In the original Danish: “Den kamp, vi havde ført mod nazismen, var dermed ikke forbi. Det blev nødvendigt at engagere sig endnu engang. Ingen neutralitet var længer mulig. Uanset at man vidste, at det ville betide, at man kom til at stå sammen med mennesker og politiske ideer, man ingen sympati havde or, og at man ville få tillagt meninger, man ikke havde – og angrebet for dem.”

Junta. This position required allying with people one might disagree with on other issues as was the case during Nazi occupation and the Greek Civil War.³³⁹ The wartime tradition of forging broad alliances had to be revived to fight the Junta. He wrote: “Whatever happens, how big or small the final results might be, this has been accomplished: four democratic countries and all the political parties were able to cooperate to put democratic consciousness into praxis.”³⁴⁰

Whereas Lembourn emphasized broad alliances for democracy and the experience of the Danish resistance movement as a model for resisting the Greek military dictatorship, Pekka J. Korvenheimo made an insightful historical comparison between Finland in the 1920s and 1930s and the post-1945 period in Greece. He pointed out that both countries experienced a merciless civil war where the losing party was utterly suppressed. In both countries, the communists were forced underground, while the far right operated freely and openly. Eventually, this paved the way for the fascist Lapua Movement and the Mäntsälä Rebellion in Finland and to the coup in Greece. Korvenheimo argued that the only difference was that what had failed in Finland during the 1930s had succeeded in Greece during the 1960s. The resort to such historical analogies was also meant to answer the question of why it was necessary to care for Greece in the present. Citing the importance not only of ancient Greece but also of the Greek independence movement and the European national movements in the 19th century, Korvenheimo emphasized the “Europeanness” of Greece.³⁴¹ In his words:

We in the delegation asked ourselves many times, why we in the Nordic countries care so deeply about the recent developments in Greece, even though there are many other dictatorships in the world. I would say that our stance is informed by compassion that depends on the historical significance of Greece. The old ruins in Athens only strengthen this emotional factor. Nevertheless, ever since the world war, Greece has been, despite of it all, considered a European democracy, even though the fact is that political and societal conditions have been lagging developmentally.³⁴²

³³⁹ Gustavsen et al., *Rapport fra Athen*, 14–15.

³⁴⁰ Gustavsen et al., *Rapport fra Athen*, 59. In the original Danish: “Hvad der end sker, hvor store eller hvor små de endelige resultater blir, så meget skete: fire demokratiske lande og samtlige partier kunne samarbejde om at omsætte demokratiets samvittighed i praksis.”

³⁴¹ Gustavsen et al., *Rapport fra Athen*, 130–132.

³⁴² Gustavsen et al., *Rapport fra Athen*, 136–137. In the original Swedish: “Vi frågade oss själva i delegationen många gånger varför vi i Norden är så djupt bekymrade just för den senaste utvecklingen i Grekland, trots att det finns en hel rad andra diktaturer i världen. Jag skulle säga att det i vårt ställningstagande ingår en stor del medkänsla, vilket beror på Greklands utomordentligt stora historiska betydelse. De gamla ruinerna i Aten bara förstärker detta känslö-element. Däremot har Grekland efter världskriget trots allt ansetts vara en europeisk demokrati, låt vara att man inte får blunda för det faktum att landets politiska och samhällsliga förhållanden stått på ett lågt utvecklingsstadium.”

Korvenheimo also pointed to similarities between the Junta, on the one hand, and the Mussolini and Hitler regimes, on the other. Although he did not explicitly call the Junta fascist, he tried to explain why Greece was important. He defended the Finnish government's response to the Greek military regime, which had been criticized for not being as direct as that of the other Nordic countries. Finland's recent history did not allow for purely moralistic considerations in foreign policy and was restricted by Realpolitik. The country was neither a member of Council of Europe nor NATO, which left it with no options in these bodies, but it had encouraged the other Nordic countries to take action against Greece.³⁴³

The book perfectly illustrates how a sense of urgency to act was created around the case of the Greek Junta through collective memory of resistance against fascism and through the embrace of an anti-fascist collective identity. But the language of the contributors was not identical. Gustavsen and Franck emphasized that a repetition of the betrayal of Spain needed to be avoided. Lembourn evoked the memory of the Danish resistance against Nazi occupation. Neutrality was not an option when facing barbarity, making broad alliances all-important. Korvenheimo highlighted the significance of the Greek coup by evoking Finland's own close call with domestic fascism. Thus, he expressed a distinctly Finnish collective memory of fascism that differed greatly from the other Nordic countries. For all the other authors, with the exception of Ullsten, it was not enough to describe the tragedy. Instead, they saw the event as a critical transition that triggered collective memories of anti-fascist narratives of betrayal, loss, and triumph. Opposing the Junta was portrayed in mnemonic anti-fascist terms—as part of a clarion call to arms against a recurring threat.

After the parliamentary delegation returned from Greece, the right-wing Norwegian press indulged in Cold War rhetoric to belittle the cause. It questioned the motive behind going to Greece since the delegation could have visited communist dictatorships in Eastern Bloc countries. The journalist Willy Møller went further by asking why the parliamentarians had not visited “anti-white” dictatorships in Africa or, even more far-fetched, the oppressed Germans in South Tyrol. Criticism of previous political actions such as economic boycotts against South Africa and Spain were part of this ridicule. Møller sarcastically noted that Greece was so special because the Norwegians were dealing with resurrected fascists and Nazis.³⁴⁴ The response to such attacks usually centered on the need for singling out Greece because a democratic regime had been toppled. A social democratic editorial argued that

³⁴³ Gustavsen et al., *Rapport fra Athen*, 137–139.

³⁴⁴ “Hellas, demokratiet og vi,” *Norges Handels og Sjøfartstidende*, September [?], 1967.

because Norway's own democratic system had been trampled on during five years of occupation, it reacted strongly when a democracy in Europe was destroyed and replaced by a reactionary dictatorship.³⁴⁵

The trip to Greece also reminded Otto Lyng of Norway's wartime occupation. It was clear to him that the Greek people did not support the regime, but were unwilling to speak up about it, as was the case with Norwegians under Nazi occupation. Together with Lionæs, he stressed the importance of international actions against the Greek military regime.³⁴⁶

Although Lionæs claimed to be determined to act on the Greek issue in the Norwegian press, she had expressed uneasiness, in her notes, about such interventions before the trip. In a legalistic and formalistic fashion, she argued that it was not the role of MPs to place demands on other governments. It was only one's own government that could do so.³⁴⁷ But she also speculated about whether such fact-finding missions by MPs to pressure dictatorships to live up to international commitments—for the sake of the plight of political prisoners and refugees—might be used more frequently in the future.³⁴⁸

Her ambiguity over the Greek issue arose again later, leading to a split in the Norwegian Committee. Nonetheless, Lionæs made the case publicly that the work of the delegation should be continued, first in NATO, then, at the Council of Europe, and finally at the UN. Lionæs even argued that the Greek situation could, from a long-term perspective, endanger freedom and peace in Norway. She also encouraged a tourist boycott of Greece.³⁴⁹ In September 1967, Lionæs was elected chair of the Norwegian Committee being the first woman to hold such a position among the Nordic Committees. Otto Lyng was also elected to the board.³⁵⁰ After the delegation trip to Greece, the Nordic Committees started coordinating and cooperating more closely together in meetings held in Scandinavian capitals. Yet the idea of a unified effort against a fascist threat, it turned out, came into conflict with the general fault lines of the European Left during the Cold War.

³⁴⁵ "Hellas-besøk," *Arbeiderbladet*, August 23, 1967.

³⁴⁶ "Hard dom over regimet i Hellas," *Verdens Gang*, August 22, 1967.

³⁴⁷ Notes Lionæs, "Möter med greske ministre," September 4, 1967," NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, *Parlamentarikerdelegasjonen til Hellas*, Lionæs, Aase, 1.

³⁴⁸ Notes Lionæs, "Parlamentarikerdelegasjonen til Hellas 1967," NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, *Parlamentarikerdelegasjonen til Hellas*, Lionæs, Aase, 7–8.

³⁴⁹ "Politisk jordskjelv kan komme om ingen reagerer," *Arbeiderbladet*, August 22, 1967.

³⁵⁰ "Aase Lionæs ble formann i den norske Hellas-komiteen," *Arbeiderbladet*, September 18, 1967.

Scandinavian Party Politics and the Nordic Committees

To continue the successful Nordic cooperation in fighting the Greek Junta, the Swedish Committee held a meeting with the Norwegians and Finns in January 1968 to plan the future work of the Nordic Committees and a larger Nordic conference in April. At this time, there was no Danish Committee, but Franck reported that the Danes were acting through members of the Social Democratic Party, especially Camre. At the meeting the Finns, Norwegians, and Swedes reported on their activities so far. The Finnish Committee had organized a petition for the release of the world-known composer Mikis Theodorakis and held a demonstration on the Greek National Day of October 28. The Finnish Socialist MP Backlund claimed that the Finnish Committee was represented by all parties but that it lacked financial backing.³⁵¹ The Norwegian Committee reported similar progress and challenges.³⁵² The Swedish Committee was the most active one; it had organized an extensive tourist boycott campaign, which sought to “undermine the Junta economically and contribute to its toppling.”³⁵³ The Swedes seemed to have heeded the call, for the Committee reported that twelve thousand fewer tourists had visited Greece in 1967 compared to the previous year. A boycott of Swedish trade with Greece was not seen as relevant because the trade balance was in Sweden’s favor. Ignoring this question of trade would come to haunt the Swedes later. The Swedes were also hopeful for the support from the International Federation of Transportation Workers for a 24-hour boycott against ships sailing under a Greek flag. The strangest boycott idea was targeted at Greek immigrants who were advised to stop sending money home to their relatives. Emmanuel Poniridis acknowledged that it would be hard to estimate the decline in remittances, but still claimed there was a 30–35 percent decrease.³⁵⁴

These actions were consistent with a long tradition of anti-fascist boycott campaigns against Francoist Spain and Nazi Germany. In the meeting, the Swedes, Norwegians, and Finns had discussed actions on the international stage, but efforts to bring up the Greek issue

³⁵¹ Report, “Rapport fra internordisk konferanse i Stockholm” (Arne Treholt), January 28, 1968, NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Komité for demokrati i Hellas 1967–68, Lionæs, Aase, 1; there are two different “protocols” on the meeting: an official protocol written by the Swedes and a report by Arne Treholt. I refer to both as they complement each other.

³⁵² Protocol, “Svenska Komitteen för Greklands Demokrati och representanter för den norska och finska kommitteen,” January 28, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens, 1

³⁵³ Protocol, “Svenska Komitteen ... den norska och finska kommitteen,” January 28, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens, 3–4. In the original Swedish: “underminera ekonomin och medverka till juntans fall.”

³⁵⁴ Protocol, “Svenska Komitteen ... den norska och finska kommitteen,” January 28, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens, 4–5.

at the United Nations stranded at an early point. No one seemed willing to raise it in the UN Commission for Human Rights or to seek to bring it on the agenda of the Security Council. Sweden had demanded that the location of a trade fair for developing countries be moved from Greece to another country. But only the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia supported the proposal. When it came to political prisoners and refugees, the Swedish Committee delegated those tasks to the Swedish chapter of Amnesty International.³⁵⁵

In the January meeting, Ola Ullsten argued that the Committees should be closely tied to the political parties in the Nordic countries. He was the only participant from a right-wing party there. The others disagreed; they wanted the Committees to be totally independent in their work.³⁵⁶ Being in a minority, Ullsten's wish for more party influence was not surprising. The issue was a good example of the tensions that arose when trying to revive a popular front approach to resist the Junta. Unlike the Swedish Liberals, members of the Swedish Conservative Party (*Högerpartiet*) were not part of the Committee. The Secretary of the Conservative Youth Organization (*Högerns ungdomsförbund*), Anders Arfwedson, claimed that such committees would always end up being dominated by the Left. Work aimed at humanitarianism and democratic values always deteriorated into anti-Americanism as was the case, Arfwedson claimed, when young conservatives participated in the anti-Apartheid committees.³⁵⁷ The Greek Committees did not manage to keep their distance from political parties. Conflicting views on the Greek issue and tensions arising from them shaped much of their work. This became increasingly clear during the preparations for Papandreou's visit to the Nordic countries after his release from prison.

When Andreas Papandreou was released from prison in late December 1967, it was not known where he would settle. He already had a standing offer from Gunnar Myrdal for a university position in Stockholm. Camre tried getting him a similar offer from Danish universities. He also tried to influence Papandreou in general, urging him to forge closer ties with Western European politicians and social democratic parties, create his own party, and be wary of Greek exile groups in Europe.³⁵⁸ Camre was one of the main organizers of Papandreou's visits to Denmark, Sweden, and Norway on behalf of the three Social Democratic Parties, which financed them. Although a "bourgeois government" had replaced a

³⁵⁵ Protocol, "Svenska Komitteen ... den norska och finska komitteen," January 28, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens, 6–10.

³⁵⁶ Report, "Rapport fra internordisk konferanse i Stockholm" (Arne Treholt), January 28, 1968, NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Komité for demokrati i Hellas 1967–68, Lionæs, Aase, 2.

³⁵⁷ "Under kommittéernas täckmantel," *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 2, 1968.

³⁵⁸ Letter, Camre to Andreas Papandreou, December 26, 1967, DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens.

Social Democratic one in Denmark, Camre saw to it that the leader of the opposition, former Prime Minister Krag, welcomed Papandreou at the airport. To prepare Papandreou for the meeting with the new Danish Foreign Minister, Camre had this to say:

Mr. Poul Hartling will be foreign minister. This man is a complete fool. He was very hostile towards you and the Greek democrats at the beginning, but today nobody in Denmark dares to speak against you or the Center Union. As I have told you you have become the hero of our people.³⁵⁹

Camre told Papandreou to rely mainly on the Swedish Social Democratic Government on the Greek issue.³⁶⁰ Papandreou seems to have put much trust in Camre's advice, promising not to make any arrangements with Franck about his visit to Sweden before consulting him first.³⁶¹ It was clear that Franck and Camre viewed the solidarity with the Greek resistance differently. Franck saw himself primarily as the chairman of the Swedish Committee and his main motivating factor was his commitment to anti-fascism. He told Papandreou that he saw the Greek cause as part of "duties which every democrat and anti-fascist must shoulder these days."³⁶² He conveyed a sense of urgency when facing a fascist foe. In contrast, Camre seemed more concerned with political scheming and party politics now that his friend was in safety. Although Camre evoked the memory of the Danish resistance in World War II on several occasions, he worked through his party and had at this time not yet founded the Danish Committee.

By now, the Committees in Sweden and Norway saw themselves as the principle go-to-organizations for matters dealing with the Greek Junta. Franck wanted the Danish Committee to organize Papandreou's Nordic trip, but the Swedish Social Democrats were keen on taking the credit. In the end, Pierre Schori, the International Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party and a member of the Swedish Committee was put in charge of planning Papandreou's journey.³⁶³ For Camre, party politics was what mattered: Papandreou and the Greek issue were a matter of prestige. He even conditioned his support for Papandreou by demanding loyalty to the Danish Social Democrats. Papandreou was supposed to allow them to decide on which party interlocutors he met to make sure that he would not be

³⁵⁹ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, February 1, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens.

³⁶⁰ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, February 1, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens, 2.

³⁶¹ Letter, Papandreou to Camre, February 3, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens.

³⁶² Letter, Hans Göran Franck to Papandreou, Februar 16, 1967[1968], SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-2, Hans Göran Franck, 1-2.

³⁶³ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, February 17, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens; see also letter from Lionæs to Franck, February 14, 1968, NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Komité for demokrati i Hellas, Lionæs, Aase.

“misused” by Conservatives or Liberals.³⁶⁴ In short, specific party interests trumped anti-fascist unity. A press statement released by the Danish Social Democratic Party in February stated that Papandreou was invited to Denmark, Sweden, and Norway on behalf of the Nordic Social Democratic Parties.³⁶⁵ Political criticism of Camre for seeking a Danish Social Democratic “monopoly” on the Greek question played no small part in the establishment of a cross-political Danish Committee in May 1968. Indeed, in his autobiography, Camre argues that this criticism was the main motivating factor.³⁶⁶

Papandreou was welcomed with open arms in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, with the press mostly crediting the Committees for organizing the trip. In Denmark, Papandreou was honored with a torchlight ceremony. He also met with—and was interviewed by—Hans Jørgen Lembourn for the Danish newspaper *B.T.*; the last time they had met was when the Scandinavian parliamentary delegation visited Papandreou in prison. Papandreou praised the Scandinavians for their actions on behalf of Greece, claiming that a resistance movement was now growing in Greece against the Junta. The readers of *B.T.* were informed about the torture methods used on prisoners in Greece. Danish resistance veterans were also interviewed about their own experience of enduring torment in Nazi concentration camps. The fact that this comparison was made so easily in a conservative tabloid is indicative of the sway of an anti-fascist collective memory, which viewed the Greek Junta as fascist.³⁶⁷ In a meeting with Foreign Minister Poul Hartling, Papandreou did not spare his criticism of the Greek King and of renewed arms shipments from the United States to Greece.³⁶⁸ In Stockholm, Franck and the Social Democrat Sven Mobert—together with over two hundred Greeks—greeted Papandreou at the airport under heavy police presence because of death threats against him. At a press conference the same day, Papandreou revealed the name of the new resistance organization, the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK), and predicted that the Junta would not survive longer than a couple of months. He also claimed to be the leader of the

³⁶⁴ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, February 17, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens. 2. Interestingly, Camre thought that he should create a party and try to push the Junta towards a more democratic constitution. Any ideas of armed resistance against the Junta were unrealistic to him. This was before Papandreou’s visit to Stockholm where he announced the establishment of his resistance organization PAK.

³⁶⁵ Press release, “SNT. 21. Februar 1968. Presse-meddelelse. Andreas Papandreou besøger København,” DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens.

³⁶⁶ Camre, *Knus tyrannerne*, 155. In a letter to Papandreou on May 8, 1968, Camre also argues that a Danish Committee will make it easier to collect money for the PAK; furthermore, in his opening speech in the Committee on May 16, 1968, (“Tale ved stiftelsen af Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland”) Camre emphasized the formalization and continuation of the cooperation with the other Nordic Committees. DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens.

³⁶⁷ “Græske modstandsgrupper klar til sabotage i byerne,” *B.T.*, February 24, 1968.

³⁶⁸ “Skarp Papandreoukritik av kung Konstantin,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, February 24, 1968.

Center Union in exile. The Swedish Committee used the occasion for creating extra publicity for its campaign by putting up large posters as a press conference backdrop together with the following poem by Mikis Theodorakis:³⁶⁹

Dictatorship, fascism
Texas Americans
The people will sweep you away.
Near is the day of the big feast.³⁷⁰

The poem was a telling example of the level of anti-Americanism, which was tolerated within the Swedish Committee; the Norwegian and Danish Committees, in contrast, had to be far more careful with respect to any criticism of the United States due to the NATO membership of both countries. It was also a testament to the blatant nationalism that characterized the Greek anti-Junta movement, which sought to delegitimize the Colonels by denying their nationality. The next day Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander invited Papandreou to speak in the Swedish Parliament; he was promised that Sweden would not recognize the Greek military regime, that the Swedish Social Democratic Party would support PAK financially, and that there would be closer cooperation between the party and the Center Union.

Papandreou was the first foreigner and non-MP to address the Swedish Parliament. His speech was met with a standing ovation. Later, the Swedish Committee organized a large public meeting in Stockholm with Papandreou, where he recounted the promises he had received from Erlander and criticized West Germany and the United States for their continued support for the regime. In his address, Franck repeated that the Greek Junta was a threat to democracy and peace and that he hoped that the Swedish Committee had “been able to some extent to carry out the duties which every democrat and antifascist must shoulder these days.” This work had to continue until Greece was free again.³⁷¹ At the end of the meeting, he read out a declaration, demanding Greece’s immediate expulsion from the Council of Europe.³⁷²

In Norway, Papandreou met with the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Trygve Bratteli who promised to collaborate with the Danes and Swedes on the question of providing direct aid to the Greek resistance. Both Papandreou and Aase Lionæs spoke, in the evening,

³⁶⁹ “Jubel och hot om mord mötte Andreas Papandreou,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, February 27, 1968: 3, 26.

³⁷⁰ “Juntan får vapenleveranser för 200 miljoner dollar i år,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, February 27, 1968. In the Swedish translation “Diktatur, fascism. Texas amerikaner folket skall sopa undan er. Nära är den stora festens dag.”

³⁷¹ Speech, “Inledningsanförande på konserthuset,” [February 27, 1968] Del II Svenska Kommitten, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-6, Hans Göran Franck, 1–3.

³⁷² “Grekiskt inbördeskrig oundvikligt om inte kuppregiemen faller snart,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, February 28, 1968: 15.

to a large crowd at a special event, which was organized by the Norwegian Committee and held at the Oslo City Hall. Lionæs made references to the Norwegians' own experience of oppression during the wartime occupation and stated that the Greek cause was also the Norwegian cause.³⁷³ In addition, Papandreou met with representatives of the Norwegian Labor Union Federation and with Foreign Minister John Lyng.³⁷⁴ Yet his visit to Norway did not get the same official reception as in Sweden, since he did not meet with Norwegian Prime Minister Per Borten.³⁷⁵

Papandreou's visit to the three Scandinavian countries proved to be an enormous success, especially in Sweden. The government's commitment to the Greek resistance and official promises of support led some commentators to question Sweden's non-alignment policy. Unsurprisingly, the harshest criticism came from the Greek Junta, accusing the Swedish government of doing the Soviet Union's bidding. Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson responded that the support for the PAK came from the Social Democratic Party, not the government. The same excuse that had been used earlier. Sweden's neutrality applied to a wartime situation (non-alignment); it was not about ideological neutrality. He made the point that throughout recent history, many exiled politicians had been allowed to work in Sweden, for example German refugees fleeing Nazism or Hungarian refugees after the 1956 Revolution. Nilsson argued that a line was drawn when it came to training and organizing military units, referring to the Swedish government's decision to step in to hinder recruitment campaigns by Spaniards in Sweden during the Spanish Civil War.³⁷⁶ The active opposition of the Erlander government to the Greek Junta differed from the passiveness of the previous government of Per Albin Hansson on the Spanish Question. Nonetheless, both governments remained committed to the policy of wartime neutrality.

The official state reception and support for Papandreou in Sweden could be contrasted with his otherwise lackluster success in garnering support from other Western heads of state. In West Germany, Willy Brandt chose to meet with Papandreou in his position as the head of the Social Democratic Party rather than as Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the United Kingdom, Papandreou was denied any high-level meetings with government officials. After his Scandinavian tour, he traveled to the United States, where only Assistant Secretaries in the Johnson Administration met with him. Although Papandreou had connections within the

³⁷³ "Vi må gjøre vårt for å gi Hellas demokrati," *Arbeiderbladet*, March 1, 1968.

³⁷⁴ "Dere har i praktisk handling vist at dere forstår vår kamp," *Arbeiderbladet*, March 2, 1968.

³⁷⁵ "Norge positivt till Pak-stöd," *Svenska Dagbladet*, March 1, 1968.

³⁷⁶ "Aten-protest mot svenskt befrielsestöd," *Svenska Dagbladet*, March 1, 1968: 3, 13.

Democratic Party, these persons were not in good standing with the President. A case in point was John Kenneth Galbraith, who was a vocal critic of the Vietnam War, supporting competing Democratic presidential candidates against Johnson.³⁷⁷ It was Scandinavia that was leading the international opposition against the Greek Junta.

Yet the Swedish government's support for the Greek opposition was mired in ambiguity. Camre informed Papandreou, for example, that the latter's proposed financial plan for Swedish support for the PAK was unrealistic—and the idea put forward by some Greek opposition members for military training camps in Sweden had no chance of being accepted.³⁷⁸ PAK was eventually provided with its own offices in Stockholm and with substantial financial support from the Swedish Social Democratic Party. Emmanuel Poniridis became involved in PAK in addition to his membership in the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Swedish Committee. The PAK offices were tapped by the Swedish Secret Police (*Säpo*) for the whole time the organization operated in Sweden. In his biography, Pierre Schori asked himself why this was done, since Papandreou had been the guest of the government and had been the first foreigner to address the Swedish Parliament.³⁷⁹

Undoubtedly, many Scandinavian social democrats preferred supporting figures such as Papandreou rather than more radical socialist or communist-aligned personalities. The limitations that such Cold War considerations put on imagined anti-fascist unity took on many forms. To Camre, for example, Melina Mercouri was being used by EDA. He even dissuaded Papandreou from sharing a stage with her.³⁸⁰ Camre also suggested to Krag that the Social Democratic Party not invite Mercouri, who was a popular and a powerful symbol of the Greek resistance all over the world, to Denmark. Camre had his male-chauvinist explanation for her political appeal, telling Papandreou that “the invitation to her from Stockholm as merely given to use the fine publicity it is to have a smart girl who takes a stand in politics. There is no real political thinking behind [it].”³⁸¹ He thought that the Swedes, especially Franck, were “more or less on EDA's side”³⁸² and that they were splitting the Greek resistance by giving Mercouri such a high-profile role. Camre even asked Papandreou to write to Prime Minister Erlander to ask him not to share the stage with her

³⁷⁷ Stan Draenos, “Andreas Papandreou's Exile Politics: The First Phase (1968–1970),” *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique* 11, (2014): 41–46.

³⁷⁸ Letter, Camre to Andreas and Margaret Papandreou, April 17, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens, 1–2.

³⁷⁹ Pierre Schori, *Minnet och elden*, 373.

³⁸⁰ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, April 18, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens.

³⁸¹ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, April 18, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens.

³⁸² Letter, Camre to Papandreou, April 18, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens.

during the May 1 marches.³⁸³ It is unclear whether Papandreou heeded Camre's advice, but Mercouri did not share the same stage as Erlander. Instead, she spoke together with Olof Palme, who at that time was the Minister of Education, in Stockholm.³⁸⁴ Papandreou also wanted a PAK representative to give a speech at this demonstration,³⁸⁵ but this did not materialize.

Mercouri's speech on May 1 in Stockholm was powerful. She evoked the call from Papandreou that the resistance needed to be united, listing the three prominent organizations at the time: PAK, Democratic Defense, and the Patriotic Front. She deconstructed metaphorically the Junta's own rhetoric about saving Greece through an operation removing sick parts of the body by asking whether the coup-makers intended to remove the heart where the Greek love for freedom lies or the brain where the concept of democracy was first developed. Mercouri argued that the final aim of the Junta with their scalpel was the "emasculat[i]on" of Greece, that their role was never that of a surgeon, but of a butcher whose savagery Greece had experienced before. The Junta ruled with torture and terror, with the aim of killing off democratic institutions and freedom as well as the labor movement. The Greek school system was being "completely revised, the textbooks... being rewritten, teachers who believe in democracy are thrown out of the schools. The Junta's intention is to create a generation of fascists."³⁸⁶ She was surprised how a faraway country like Sweden could be so committed to Greek democracy and how the Swedish people must be fearless and free of misery. She quoted Demosthenes: "if you had equal material strength to your moral strength, no tyrant would ever rule Greece."³⁸⁷ To explain this solidarity, she continued:

What has become clear in this twentieth century is that the outcome will be decided in the choice we make between honor and dishonor. We will be saved only by the best in us. The policies of practical politics of expedience, of temporizing are not only obsolete, they are dangerous. Indeed, the only practical politics that is workable today is morality. And the moral man knows that when a Greek is tortured on a far away barren island, it diminishes him in Stockholm. A moral man knows that the weapon that murdered Martin Luther King in Memphis, Tennessee is the same weapon that is held against the head of a Greek democrat. Hatred is contagious. Tyranny is not a local matter.³⁸⁸

³⁸³ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, April 18, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens.

³⁸⁴ "Beska medicinen för ekonomin har gjort åsyftad verkan," *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 2, 1968.

"Ge hr. Holmberg en vaktkur på Arlanda...", *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 2 1968.

³⁸⁵ Letter, Papandreou to Franck, April 19, 1968, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-6, Hans Göran Franck.

³⁸⁶ Speech (Melina Mercouri), SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-27, Hans Göran Franck, 2-3.

³⁸⁷ Speech (Melina Mercouri), SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-27, Hans Göran Franck, 1.

³⁸⁸ Speech (Melina Mercouri), SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-27, Hans Göran Franck. 1.

Her speech could be characterized as the pinnacle of an anti-fascist ethos. “Practical politics” meant appeasement of tyranny and an abandonment of morality. It was a Sartrean existentialist call to action. These were the lessons from the twentieth century: that tyranny had to be resisted and that an injury to one is an injury to all. It was a message against appeasement and for solidarity. It is also noteworthy how she incorporated a gendered language by viewing the Junta as emasculating Greece.

When the time finally came for the large Nordic Conference on Greece in Stockholm in April 1968, Mercouri was there to speak and give two performances³⁸⁹ before appearing at a concert—together with the major Swedish celebrities and musicians—as part of a family spring festival in the amusement park Gröna Lund. The artists volunteered, with all the proceeds going to the Swedish Committee’s fund for the Greek cause.³⁹⁰ It was an impressive event where families enjoyed music and performance by members of the Swedish cultural establishment, such as Povel Ramel, a musician and entertainer, and the jazz singer Monica Zetterlund. Attendees could also pay for throwing pies in the faces of the famous comedians Hans Alfredson and Hans Furuhausen.³⁹¹ Much attention was given to Mercouri in the press; in interviews, her dress and looks were especially highlighted, while predictably no comments were made of Franck’s choice of attire. Despite her powerful performances, she seemed to attempt to attract “the male gaze” when describing herself as not being very political. Yet she claimed that she would not act in movies that spread “propaganda for Nazism or fascism” and never go to Spain to shoot a film, adding that she had recently declined an acting role where she was supposed to play a “fascist woman,” even though the character died in the end.³⁹²

At the Nordic Conference on Greece, two Social Democratic ministers without portfolio—the world-famous sociologist Alva Myrdal and the politician Sven Moberg—predicted a quick return to democracy, stressing that Sweden had not risked its neutrality with its support for Papandreou. Papandreou had to cancel his appearance because of sickness, but a recording of his speech was played at the gathering, in which he thanked Sweden and the

³⁸⁹ “Program for the Scandinavian Conference about Greece April 27–28, 1968,” and “Program för Greklandsafton i konserthuset 27 april,” Nordiska konferensen, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-6, Hans Göran Franck.

³⁹⁰ Press release, “Pressmeddelande från Svenska Kommittén för Greklands demokrati,” April 18, 1968, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-6, Hans Göran Franck.

³⁹¹ “Mosebacke matchade Melina på Grönan – söndag för Grekland,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, April 29, 1968. These names represented much of the cultural establishment in Sweden at the time. Povel Ramel (1922–2007) was an entertainer and musician; Monica Zetterlund (1937–2005) was a jazz singer; and Hans Alfredson (1931–2017) and Hans Furuhagfen (1930–2021) were comedians.

³⁹² “Melina Mercouri: Res inte till Grekland,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, April 27, 1968.

Nordic countries for leading the international condemnations of the Junta.³⁹³ It was decided on the same occasion to organize further protest action in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway in front of travel agencies doing business with Greece, with the aim of closing them down. Norway and Finland were encouraged to withdraw their ambassadors from Greece just as Sweden and Denmark had done.³⁹⁴ Kjell E Johanson from CNR was one of the representatives from the Swedish Committee in the conference. Although there were delegates from all the Nordic countries, except for Iceland, and many international observers at the conference,³⁹⁵ it did not get as much attention as Mercouri's performances. Nonetheless, Camre was there presenting a report on how international institutions had reacted to the military coup. He emphasized the inaction of NATO and its failure to condemn the coup. There were also reports on the ongoing tourist boycott, the condition of political prisoners, and the resistance movement.³⁹⁶ The conference and the fundraising event managed to collect around 96 thousand Swedish kronor, which at that time was a considerable sum of money. The Patriotic Front and Democratic Defence were each given twenty thousand kronor, while PAK received ten thousand. Smaller amounts were divided amongst different organizations dealing with political prisoners and refugees, and a Greek sailor union.³⁹⁷

In a statement approved at the conference, the Junta's political "reform" plans and constitutional changes were condemned; it was also stressed that appeasing the regime was not an option and that new elections had to be called immediately. West Germany and the United States were singled out for criticism for their continued military and financial aid to the regime. NATO countries were also targeted— "above all the most influential powers" (thereby somewhat exonerating Denmark and Norway)—for breaking the North Atlantic Treaty and its commitment to democracy and freedom. Economic sanctions were touted as a tool to put pressure on the regime. In addition, the conference participants encouraged support for the Greek resistance movement, expressing the hope that Papandreou's and PAK's intention to unite the resistance would succeed. They called for action in the Council of

³⁹³ "Manifestation för Grekland," *Svenska Dagbladet*, April 28, 1968: 3, 11.

³⁹⁴ "Demonstrationer tills resebyrå stängs," *Svenska Dagbladet*, April 29, 1968: 3, 16.

³⁹⁵ Letter, from the Swedish Committee to its members, March 22, 1968, "Ang.Nordisk konferans om Grekland,;" List of attendees, "Från Norge kommer," Nordiska konferensen, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-6, Hans Göran Franck; List of attendees, "Deltagarförteckning Nordisk Konferens om Grekland 27–28 april 1968," DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens.

³⁹⁶ "Report from the Nordic conference on Greece. April 27th – 28th held in Stockholm," Uttalanden, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-27, Hans Göran Franck, 1–15.

³⁹⁷ Protocol, "Svenska Kommittén för Greklands Demokrati," May 14, 1968, Protokoll mm 67–70, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-2, Hans Göran Franck, 3, bilaga 1.

Europe and the UN to free political prisoners and urged the labor movement to enforce a ban on Greek imports.³⁹⁸ Evoking a sense of urgency, the regime was, again, labeled as fascist:

Greece must today be counted as a fascist dictatorship. It poses a danger to peace, progress, and democracy. It is especially serious that this fascist dictatorship arrived in Europe more than 20 years after the Second World War, with its aims of obliterating fascism and Nazism. This is even more disconcerting since Spain and Portugal have not yet been freed from their fascist dictatorships and new fascist movements are arising in other European countries.³⁹⁹

This wording echoed attempts at the conference to cement an anti-fascist collective identity, which had been promoted since the coup took place and would be pursued by the Nordic Committees until the Junta fell. It was cemented through the collective memory of historical fascism and through the mnemonic practices of anti-fascism. The Committees were not only concerned with helping victims of a brutal regime but also with doing away with a fascist dictatorship in Greece as well as in Spain and Portugal.

These aspects are perhaps best illustrated by Kjell E. Johanson, who argued that it was to Franck's credit that the conference had broad backing of the entire political spectrum as well as the labor movement. To him, the situation in Greece called for the creation of an anti-fascist social movement. Fascism could only be defeated if the labor movement was united with democrats and liberals in the struggle against it. He conceded that it would be difficult to achieve this goal because of the alliance between American imperialism and European fascism. Yet, he was hopeful that the Nordic Conference had established the foundation for a social movement with a wide political appeal to face this challenge.⁴⁰⁰

At an international conference on Greece, which was held in Geneva in June the same year, the Norwegian and Swedish Committees tried hard to have it adopt the statement from the Nordic Conference. But to their great disappointment, the Geneva resolution was far less forceful than the Nordic one. The conference, which was attended by members of Greek Committees from all over the world, called for action at the UN against Greece, the expulsion of Greece from the Council of Europe, and the suspension of aid to Greece from the

³⁹⁸ Press statement, "Uttalande från Nordiska konferensen för Greklands demokrati," DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens, 1–3. Quote from the original Swedish: "och framför allt dess tongivande makter."

³⁹⁹ "Uttalande från Nordiska konferensen för Greklands demokrati," DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens, 1. In the original Swedish: "3. Grekland måste idag räknas till de diktaturer av fascistisk typ, som utgör en fara för fred, framsteg och demokrati. Det är särskilt allvarligt att denna fascistiska diktatur kunnat tillkomma i Europa mer än 20 år efter det andra världskriget där målsättningen var att utplåna fascism och nazism. Detta är så mycket mer oroande som Spanien och Portugal ännu inte befriats från sina fascistdiktaturer och nya fascistiska strömningar gör sig breda i andra europeiska länder."

⁴⁰⁰ "Summering av Greklandskonferensen," *Norrskensflaman*, May 6, 1967.

European Economic Community (EEC). But the conference did not agree with the Scandinavians on seeing “fascist” Greece as a burden on NATO or that it should not be offered any assignments within international institutions until further notice. The Norwegian Liberal and Committee member Bjørn Johannessen advised against further participation in such international conferences due to their limited impact, high cost, and what he termed their failure to read the political situation in Greece correctly. The international Committees that participated were too different from each other in their positions. Due to the limited funds the Norwegian Committee had at its disposal, he argued that the resources should be put to better use elsewhere.⁴⁰¹ It took four years until another large international conference was held. In short, the placing of the Greek Junta within a fascist framework did not go uncontested.

Conflicting Interpretations of Fascism

The political message of the Nordic Committees about the nature of the Greek Junta was clear: it was fascist. Because of this classification, collective memory of past fascist regimes could be evoked in the fight against the present one. In her work on social movements in Italy Spain, Greece, and Portugal, Donatella della Porta engages with this kind of memory politics. She shows how social movements in Southern Europe have made use of memories of events that occurred before their time to make sense of events “that are perceived as critical junctures, unsettling the then existing order and becoming the basis for a new one.”⁴⁰² This interpretation also applies to the movements that forged an anti-fascist collective identity; they saw the military coup in Greece as a critical or traumatic juncture. Collective memory and identity were, similarly, articulated to define an “us-versus-them” binary, encompassing anti-fascists against fascists. Thus, the fight against the Junta was part of a historical legacy and a larger fight. Della Porta argues that memory offers a “cultural program” that helps shaping moods, intentions, and actions. This becomes especially important for social movements in their attempts to create solidarities and identities. Complex events that seem chaotic are made into a narrative with heroes and villains. At the same time, the past becomes a reservoir of examples of successes to imitate and mistakes to avoid. In this way, social movements can create knowledge, or counter visions, to persuade the public to reinterpret the meaning of events.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰¹ Report, “Beretningsrapport for tidsrommet 20/5 – 26/11 – 68,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/A/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 3-4.

⁴⁰² della Porta, et al, *Legacies and Memories in Movements*, ix.

⁴⁰³ della Porta, et al., *Legacies and Memories in Movements*, ix-xii.

The Spanish Civil War was one such reservoir of success to imitate for European solidarity movements. The solidarity movement with Spain had to compensate for the betrayal of liberal democracies in their non-interventionist stance vis-à-vis the Spanish Republic. Thus, the volunteers that aided the Republic with their lives were heroes and their sacrifice should be remembered. It was necessary to fight fascism before it was too late and not to appease it. At the same time, the mistakes to avoid in the Spanish Civil War were also spelled out in this narrative. It was important to maintain the unity of democratic forces resisting fascism. The resistance against the Nazi occupation of Denmark and Norway was another political engagement worthy of imitation. It was presented as a success story, with Denmark and Norway eventually managing to bring together political forces—from conservatives to communists—in the anti-fascist struggle. This historical narrative, coupled with lived experiences, shaped what was seen as desirable and possible. To allow for the use of this interpretation—to account for the past and present—it was essential to characterize the Greek military regime as fascist. If the Junta were merely a conventional military dictatorship, it would have been impossible to use these narratives of a past heroic struggle, failure, betrayal, and victory in the mobilization against it. And if the Junta was not fascist, opposition towards it would neither be anti-fascist nor mnemonic.

Instead of striving for an objective political classification of the regime, it was considered more important to forge a shared anti-fascist identity based on collective memory. While it is debatable whether it was a conscious choice or not, these ideas did not go unopposed; the skepticism of viewing the Junta as fascist was widespread, even among Greek intellectuals. The Greek sociologist, Constantine Tsoucalas, who was among the first to write about the Junta from a Marxist perspective, argued in 1969 that the Colonels represented the “petit bourgeoisie” of the Greek officer corps and their sentiments. To him, the Junta had come to power to guard the interests of “big bourgeoisie linked to monopolies.” At the same time, it had disagreed with traditional political and economic elites, demonstrating its own agency. Thus, after the coup, the military was purged not only of liberal elements but also of monarchists.⁴⁰⁴ Of the ideology of the regime, Tsoucalas had this to say:

Although the petit-bourgeois class origin of the new leaders (who, unlike the generals at the top of the army, integrated into the big bourgeoisie, remain impregnated with the authoritarian nationalism of the petit-bourgeoisie) is not sufficient for an exhaustive analysis of the régime, it does at least, as a start, furnish an explanation of

⁴⁰⁴ Constantine Tsoucalas, “Class Struggle and Dictatorship in Greece,” *New Left Review* 56 (1969): 9. The article was found in Hans Göran Franck’s archive, indicating that it had been read by him and seen as significant.

the “ideological” characteristics which it has manifested from the first day of its rule. “Strong and national” State, racism (“Greece—pure and sublime race”), virulent anti-communism, religious obscurantism, intransigent moralism, populism, such are the dominant slogans of the régime, and they clearly emanate from the frustrated petit-bourgeois ideology which characterizes the Greek officer corps.⁴⁰⁵

One could think that this class characterization of the Junta and its ideology would lead to a fascist interpretation, even within a Marxist framework. Nonetheless, Tsoucalas claimed that the material conditions were not right; the Junta had not come to power in the midst of economic and social crises in contrast to what happened in Italy and Germany. Thus, the fascist regimes of the past had certain traits that the Greek Junta did not fulfill. It was an indigenous petit-bourgeois movement—in the Marxist sense—which big capital used for its own benefits to reconsolidate its political power in an economic impasse. Thus, the regime served capital interests and organized itself within a political party through authoritarian means; what was more, its nationalist-racist ideology was simply a reflection of its class character. Thus, according to Tsoucalas, the Greek Junta could not be seen as fascist. He pointed out, even if he did not dwell on it, that the Junta had no popular basis in contrast to the fascist and Nazi movements in Italy and Germany. For him, U.S. agents played a large part in the coup, but he does not characterize the regime as being a neo-colonial one, which would have required “archaic” societal characteristics such as the lack of defined class structures. This was not the case with Greece, with the Junta displaying clear class characteristics. In the end, Tsoucalas, views the Junta as representing the Greek bourgeoisie as part of the latter’s response to “social and economic contradictions which were undermining its own interest.”⁴⁰⁶

Another important exiled Greek Marxist sociologist, Nicos Poulantzas, also argued in 1969 that the Junta should not be confused with fascism.⁴⁰⁷ In his *The Crisis of Dictatorships*, Poulantzas defined the Southern European autocratic regimes—all of which had fallen when the book came out in 1976—as being part of the family of “exceptional capitalist regimes (fascism, Bonapartism, military dictatorship).”⁴⁰⁸ At the same time, they belonged to a developed European arena in contrast to underdeveloped dictatorships in South America. To Poulantzas, the military dictatorships were “not in the strict sense fascist” and were “located

⁴⁰⁵ Tsoucalas, “Class Struggle and Dictatorship in Greece,” 9.

⁴⁰⁶ Tsoucalas, “Class Struggle and Dictatorship in Greece,” 13–15.

⁴⁰⁷ Eleni Kouki and Dimitris Antoniou, “Making the Junta Fascist: Antidictatorial Struggle, the Colonels, and the Statues of Ioannis Metaxas,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 35, no. 2 (2017): 454.

⁴⁰⁸ Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain* (London: Humanities Press, 1976), 7.

in a different historical period from that of the inter-war years.”⁴⁰⁹ The dominance of the military was the main distinguishing factor. He wrote:

The dominant role of the military, which is thus not only expressed in the visible institutional apparatus, also distinguishes these regimes from the fascist regimes proper, and this has a very particular result: the internal contradictions of these regimes are expressed above all in the military apparatus, the apparatus which above all others actually wields armed force (and not in the party and the bureaucracy, the dominant apparatuses of the fascist regimes).⁴¹⁰

This is, indeed, an important distinction to make. Poulantzas argued that this military system had more internal contradictions than a fascist one. When the bourgeoisie could not instrumentalize a political party, they turned to the military for power. As a result, a struggle and competition within the military arises. The Greek Junta managed, for example, to alienate some of its most conservative and reactionary supporters within the universities by appointing military officers to all leading positions in society. In the absence of a unifying fascist party with its own ideology, there were instead different institutions with competing cultures.⁴¹¹ Nonetheless, in the book, one can detect a certain ambiguity about the fragile democratization of Portugal, with Poulantzas dismissing the chances of a “... return to fascism ...”⁴¹² When dealing with a “critical development” or event, he used the concept of fascism to spell out the significance or seriousness of the situation. In an earlier book that engaged specifically with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, he wrote about the specter of fascism.⁴¹³ As he observed:

1. It is quite true that the spectre of fascism or dictatorship is often raised, and not only by the self-confessed Right, in order to hold back the revolutionary fervour of the working class and the masses. This fascist bogey takes many familiar forms, and it can make fascism into a pure justification, even for the Left. Sometimes, however, the phenomenon can have another side. How many sincere militants are there who have experienced and fought against the nightmare of fascism, and become so obsessed by it that their automatic reflex is to see the spectre on every side?⁴¹⁴

Considering that he wrote this text in 1970 this is a striking remark. Poulantzas contemplated the danger of the rebirth of fascism, but he did not even mention the Greek military regime—

⁴⁰⁹ Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships*, 9.

⁴¹⁰ Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships*, 105.

⁴¹¹ Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships*, 105–106, 124–126.

⁴¹² Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships*, 136.

⁴¹³ Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism* (London: Verso, 1979), 358.

⁴¹⁴ Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship*, 358.

irrespective of whether he considered it fascist or not. It raises the question of whether he believed that the opposition to the Junta had raised this specter of fascism. In his mind, a collective identity based on anti-fascism might as well be theorized as the specter of fascism.

Like a good theoretician, he guarded himself from future criticism when writing that the “book has shown that increased repression alone is not enough to define the rise of fascism. According to the forms it takes, however, and in relation to the whole range of characteristics in which it is situated, such increased repression can be significant.”⁴¹⁵

Perhaps Poulantzas thought it was justifiable to call a regime “fascist” if the violence from the state was severe enough. To him, history served the function of being a lesson for the present—not to predict the future rise of fascism would be unforgivable.⁴¹⁶

It was not only Marxist intellectuals who questioned the classification of the Junta regime as fascist. In a series of articles reporting on the Junta in Greece, the journalist Agne Hamrin emphasized the mundaneness and quietness of the Greek police state, even though dissidents were sent to horrible prison camps on the islands of Jaros and Leros; he made the point that tourists still enjoyed carefree holidays on the island of Rhodos. And even though the Greeks had become silent just like those who had lived under the yoke of Nazism or fascism, he believed that there was a significant difference between the Junta and those regimes.⁴¹⁷ As he put it:

The dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini were built on modern organized massive factories whose militant forces were dressed in picturesque and sensational uniforms. Wherever one went there was a police officer. The Nazi and fascist dictatorships also had their “bible” – Mussolini’s “Dottrina fascista” could be called the Old Testament, while Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” could be called the New Testament. The Greek colonels do not possess such “holy scripture.” Their “revolution” is no such thing, in the sense of ideas and organization it is a sterile permanent military coup. In less than six months after the fact there reigns a total deficit in constructive ideas – unless one should not consider the closing of brothels in Pireus as “ideas” ...⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁵ Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship*, 359.

⁴¹⁶ Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship*, 358.

⁴¹⁷ “Camouflerad diktatur Revolution utan idéer,” *Dagens Nyheter*, October 4, 1967.

⁴¹⁸ “Camouflerad diktatur Revolution utan idéer,” *Dagens Nyheter*, October 4, 1967: 8. In the original Swedish: “Hitlers och Mussolinis diktaturer bars upp av modernt organiserade massfabriker, vilkas militanta element kläddes i pittoreska och därför uppseendeväckande uniformer. Man såg poliskonstapeln var man stod och gick. De nazistiska och fascistiska diktaturerna hade ju dessutom sin “bible” – Mussolini “Dottrina fascista” kan man kalla Gamla testamentet, Hitlers “Mein Kampf” Nya testamentet. De grekiska överstarna har ingen sådan “helig skrift”. Deras “revolution” är ingen sådan, den är idémässig och organisatorisk, en steril permanent militärkupp. Ett knappt halvår efter denna kan man konstatera dess totala brist på konstruktiva idéer – för så vitt man inte skall beteckna stängandet av Pireus bordeller som “idéer” ...”

To him, the Greek Junta lacked fascist ideology and did not embrace the aesthetics of fascism. Such an interpretation differs from that of the Marxist intellectuals who considered the question of ideology secondary to that of structural considerations of class and economic interests. It is fascinating that Aase Lionæs saved these series of articles from Agne Hamrin in her documents about her engagement with the Greek issue. Although there is no indication that she questioned the act of classifying the Junta as fascist, Lionæs underlined the part in the article where it is pointed out that the Junta leaders have not created a political party or built a popular movement. Thus, according to Hamrin, visually Greece under the Junta was as “civil” as it was under democracy: “Behind the colonels there are no marching SA-regiments, no hordes of black shirts singing Greek equivalents of Horst Wessel or Gionezza songs....”⁴¹⁹ Hamrin did not shy away from highlighting the brutality of the regime and its durability. Yet, even though the Junta described its regime in revolutionary terms, he saw it as vacuous and aimless.⁴²⁰ In his third article from Athens, Hamrin spoke directly to those opposing the Junta: It was wrong of them to characterize the regime as fascist because it was wholly devoid of revolutionary ambition. Its economic policies could be compared to that of West Germany and could just as well be pursued by a democratic government. Moreover, he claimed that the boycott actions against the regime had been unsuccessful. Greece had even showed signs of economic recovery as it tried to encourage foreign capital investment.⁴²¹

The ambiguity that could be detected specifically within the Nordic Committees and, more generally, in the movement, on the question of whether the Greek Junta could be considered fascist is perhaps best illustrated by the Greek-born Swedish activist and author Theodor Kallifatides. In a recent interview, he stated that he had not viewed the Greek Junta as fascist at the time. To him, the military leaders did not know what fascism really was; they were first and foremost instruments of the NATO readiness plan Prometheus, which called for a military intervention if the Left came to power. The Colonels did not even decide for themselves to take power; they were not the “head” but rather the “hands” that performed this work. Nonetheless, he argues that there was a fascist “personality trait” in Greece as well as the Latin world as expressed in essentialized views about women and the poor as being inferior. It is unclear whether this cultural or personality trait echoed the authoritarian personality theorized by Theodore Adorno. Nevertheless, for Kallifatides, calling himself an

⁴¹⁹ “Camouflerad diktatur Revolution utan idéer.” In the original Swedish: “Bakom översterna marscherar inga SA-regementen, inga svart-skjortehorter, hänfört sjungande någon grekisk Horst Wessel-sång eller Gionezza....”

⁴²⁰ “Camouflerad diktatur Revolution utan idéer.”

⁴²¹ “Ekonomisk bojkott utan verkan,” *Dagens Nyheter*, October 6, 1967.

anti-fascist would be an exaggeration. And by hurriedly characterizing the Junta as fascist, he would have given the enemy too much credit. When interpreting the opponent, he claimed, there is a risk of overestimation and underestimation when acting in haste. He expressed this as a factor of “dressing the enemy in too big clothes.” Nevertheless, he stated that at the time he would often call the Greeks disguised fascists and for that he was criticized in the Greek newspapers. In essence, fascism is according to Kallifatides not only a political question but an ethical one, when viewing other human beings: It expresses contempt for weakness. Hence, he does not like to define himself in terms of a negation, or as an anti-fascist, but, instead, wants to declare his humanism as a democrat or as a democratic socialist.⁴²²

These remarks are in marked contrast to those he made in a 1969 political text published in an anthology edited by Kjell E. Johanson, entitled *Solidaritet Antifascistisk Årsbok 1968–69*, which can be seen as a rebuttal to Agne Hamrin’s articles. Kallifatides argued here that the Swedish and international press were wrong in claiming that the Junta was devoid of ideology except for anti-communism. Nor was it correct to say that the Junta did not have a political program comparable to that of Hitler and Mussolini. Like the historical fascist regimes, the Junta had a destructive program that sought to sow mistrust in parliamentarianism and eliminate all resistance, with the aim of sharpening class divisions and achieving total political control over education in the name of “true democracy.”⁴²³

Kallifatides wrote:

Bearing this in mind I would personally never hesitate in calling the dictatorship in Greece fascistic, and the ideology of the Junta fascism. The fanaticism of the Colonels, their anticommunism, the establishment of a system of informants, concentration camps, the creation of a faction within universities and other colleges, are some of the other characteristics that substantiate my claim.⁴²⁴

It is, thus, unclear whether Kallifatides simply changed his mind about the nature of the Junta, remembered incorrectly his earlier views, or published his earlier analysis purely for political reasons to put forward the idea of an anti-fascist collective identity or the evocation of the “specter of fascism.” This dynamic can also be explained as *memories of movements*,

⁴²² Interview with Theodor Kallifatides, September 19, 2022.

⁴²³ Theodor Kallifatides, “Grekland,” in *Solidaritet: antifascistisk årsbok. 1968–69*, ed. Kjell E. Johanson (Uddevalla: Cavefors, 1968), 69–70.

⁴²⁴ Kallifatides, “Grekland,” 70. In the original Swedish: “Med tanke på allt detta skulle jag personligen inte tveka att kalla diktaturen i Grekland för fascistisk och fascismen för den militära juntans ideologi. Överstarnas fanatism, antikommunism, upprättandet av angiverisystem, koncentrationsläger, skapande av en falang inom universiteten och andra högskolor är några av de många kännetecken som ytterligare bekräftar mitt påstående.”

in the sense that the memory of participants often differs from articulations made at the time. They could also be infused with newer expressions of public memory.⁴²⁵ Finally, such inconsistencies show the inherent limitations of oral sources in historical research.

What also makes Kallifatides's work interesting is that it was published by the CNR, which, as noted, was active from 1963 to 1970 and dealt with a host of different political issues linked to ideas of anti-fascism—with a domestic political focus on racism and neo-Nazism in Sweden as well with a broader and more explicit one on the opposition to the dictatorships in Southern Europe. In response to the military coup in Greece, the CNR published two anthologies of political texts, in which it attempted to unify different political struggles as part of an anti-fascist project. Its chairperson at that time was the Swedish Social Democrat Sten Cederqvist, who had been active during the 1930s in anti-fascist work and solidarity organizations. In the introduction to *Solidaritet Antifascistisk Årsbok 1968–69*, Cederqvist wrote that the anthology followed the tradition of anti-fascist texts written in the 1930s. The goal was to educate the public about reactionary forces and encourage them to fight against them. Cederqvist referred to the famous case of two Swedish sailors Knut Mineur and Erik Jansson, who were interned in Nazi concentration camps. As a response the Swedish labor movement created Jansson-Mineur Committees to fight for their release, which, in the end, was successful. Another example he named were the Spanish Committees—formed in Sweden in solidarity with Republican Spain under the leadership of Georg Branting—and the many Swedish volunteers who traveled to Spain, fighting, and dying in defense of democracy. Cederqvist wrote that back then, it was only human solidarity that stood up against fascism. In his words:⁴²⁶

Fascism is not dead – it lives on in the even more powerful military dictatorships established all over the world. Modern fascism, neo-Nazism is another name, has the same objectives as its predecessors from the 1930s. It seeks to divide humanity between slaves and the master race. These power grabbers will stop at nothing reaching their goal—political persecution, imprisonment, torture, concentration camps, yes, the suppression of all human rights. There is no free and independent labor movement, no artistic freedom for artists and authors, no freedom for social movements. We have discovered that on top of all these crimes that the Junta has inflicted the Greek people they have added a ban on performing the theatres of Euripides and Aristophanes.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁵ Daphi and Zamponi, “Exploring the Movement-Memory Nexus,” *Mobilization*, 24, no. 4 (2019): 399, 404–406; Accornero, *The Revolution before the Revolution: Late Authoritarianism and Student Protest in Portugal*, 1–15.

⁴²⁶ Kjell E. Johanson, *Solidaritet: antifascistisk årsbok 1968–69*, 7–9, 192.

⁴²⁷ Johanson, *Solidaritet: antifascistisk årsbok 1968–69*, 9. In the original Swedish: “Fascismen är inte död – den lever i de av ännu mäktigare finansintressen upprättade militärdiktaturerna världen över. Den moderna

Hans Göran Franck was also involved in the publication of the books, with the statement from the 1968 Stockholm Nordic Conference on Greece republished in one of them. A founding member of the CNR, the Communist (VPK) Kjell E. Johanson—who initially was on the executive committee of the Swedish Committee on Greece together with Franck—advocated a popular front against fascism and imperialism. The Greek coup had shown the world that there were new possibilities for a fascist revival in Europe. The book’s many contributors, who included activists, journalists, and writers, covered a very wide array of subjects apart from anti-fascism, including the Vietnam War, Apartheid, Neo Nazism in West Germany, the political genocide in Indonesia, and the civil rights movement in the United States.⁴²⁸ The work of CNR was one of the clearest examples of how collective memory was used in a movement based on anti-fascist collective identity, mnemonic practices, and a desire to emulate the legacy of anti-fascism.

Pierre Schori was another significant member of the Swedish Committee for Democracy in Greece, who viewed the struggle against the Greek Junta in anti-fascist terms. In his autobiography, he wrote about the solidarity work of the Socialist International (SI), and how Sweden’s ambitious foreign policy stances were often curtailed by other European Social Democrats who had to dilute critical attitudes not to anger their partners in NATO, such as the “honorable,” “anti-fascist” Willy Brandt. Given Sweden’s non-aligned position, Schori argued that it did not have to deal with such constraints. Hence, the Swedish Social Democrats were regarded highly within the SI because of their support for, in his own words, “anti-fascist and anti-colonial resistance.”⁴²⁹

As part of his work for the Swedish Committee, Schori also published together with the journalist Bengt Holmqvist the pamphlet *Förräderiet mot Grekland* (1971),⁴³⁰ which, among other aspects, dealt with the question of whether the Junta should be considered fascist. It recognized that in a strict sense the Junta had no fascist ideology. The coup represented a national revolution, with emphasis on religion, traditional values, duty, and personal hygiene. Books that were seen as jeopardizing these values were banned, among

fascismen, nynazismen är ett annat namn, har samma målsättning som sina föregångare på 30-talet. Nämligen den att uppdelna människorna i slavar och herrefolk. För att nå detta mål ryggas dessa makterövrare inte för något – förföljelse, rättsförtryck, fängelse, tortyr, koncentrationsläger, ja undertryckandet av alla mänskliga rättigheter. Ingen frihet för fackföreningarna att verka, ingen frihet för konstnärligt eller litterärt skapande, ingen frihet för folkrörelserna. Vi har erfarit att diktaturregimen i Grekland till alla sina brott mot det plågade grekiska folket fogat förbud att uppföra Euripides’ och Aristofanes’ skådespel.”

⁴²⁸ Johanson, *Solidaritet: antifascistisk årsbok 1968–69*, 5–6, 11, 74, 193.

⁴²⁹ Schori, *Minnet och elden*, 380–381.

⁴³⁰ Schori, *Minnet och elden*, 371–372.

them some of the classics from Greek antiquity. Even though there was no fascist social movement behind the regime, the authors argued that it would be meaningless since the regime already possessed power. Similarly, there would be no need to create an “antiquated” party. Popular support could just as well come later through intensive indoctrination of the younger generations. The text argued that in this aspect “the new fascism differs most clearly from the ‘classical,’”⁴³¹ adding that this “thought, the gradual indoctrination of fascist way of thinking amongst children and youngsters, was borrowed directly from the Portuguese dictator Salazar.”⁴³² The line of argument was undoubtedly a response to critics like Hamrin. Thus, the Greek Junta was seen as a new form of fascism more adapted to the current epoch. A purely epochal interpretation of fascism could be discarded by arguing that contemporary fascism had to find ways to reinvent itself. In this reading, the Junta remained fascist, and mnemonic practices of anti-fascism could be applied despite the objective differences between the Greek regime and historical fascism.

As mentioned, comparisons between the military regime in Greece and the dictatorships in Portugal and Spain were common; they accentuated the belief that the Greek Junta was comparable to these dictatorships, which had direct or indirect fascist roots. In a column for *Arbeiderbladet* in 1967, the Norwegian author Bjarte Kaldhol argued that it would be a small reassurance to claim that the Junta only consisted of typical reactionaries or conservatives rather than fascists. One should not forget that the Junta indoctrinated the youth to hate and inform on friends and family just like in Mao’s China. It was a part of an agenda to create a new *Übermensch*—to save eternal Greece from socialism and communism. Thus, the Greek regime was, in its nationalism, anti-communism, moralism, and anti-liberalism, a dictatorship like those of Spain and Portugal. It combined Prussian militarism with the methods of Nazism against dissidents. There was no solace in claiming that the Junta was not fascist because the regime was working towards resurrecting fascism and fanatical nationalism. It was regrettable that the Scandinavians had been so concerned with conditions in far-away countries [Vietnam] rather than with their own allies and their crimes. It raised the question of how one should react when a fellow NATO member state established concentration camps in Europe.⁴³³

⁴³¹ [Pierre Schori and Bengt Holmqvist], *Förräderiet mot Grekland Svenska Kommittén för Greklands demokrati* (Borås: Sjuhäradsbygdens Tryckeri, 1971), 12.

⁴³² *Förräderiet mot Grekland*, 13.

⁴³³ “Det nye Hellas,” *Arbeiderbladet*, July 6, 1967.

This linking of Greece with Spain and Portugal happened long before the military coup. Already back in 1963, the famous Danish authors and poets Halfdan Rasmussen, Ivan Malinovski, and Erik Stinus wrote a book, which sold well, to discourage Danish tourism and counter romanticized travel accounts about the three Mediterranean countries. Its title, *Med solen i ryggen*, suggested that the tourists did not see the suffering in these countries because they were blinded by the sun, while the authors had the sun in their back.⁴³⁴ Rasmussen and Malinovski had been active in the resistance movement during World War II.⁴³⁵ They engaged with political repression in Greece that had been intense since the end of the Civil War. They pointed out that neo-Nazi organizations were allowed to operate publicly to spread antisemitism and anti-communism, to desecrate Jewish synagogues with swastika graffiti, whereas left-wing organizations, in contrast, were persecuted. Children were forced to denounce, publicly, their left-leaning parents to be allowed to attend school. They also alluded to the famous peace activist Grigoris Lambrakis, who was assassinated by a Greek “fascist” and Nazi collaborator. The authors even attended the funeral of Lambrakis in Athens.⁴³⁶

The dictatorship in Spain, and to a lesser degree the Portuguese dictatorship, are described in the book as being more brutal than in Greece. Rasmussen, Malinovski, and Stinus visited Asturias in Spain where a strike had been brutally suppressed with arrests, deportations, and torture. They felt monitored and likened the atmosphere with that of Denmark under Nazi occupation, when people had lived in fear and in hiding, with no one wanting to talk to outsiders. And they pleaded with the public not to spend their vacations in these countries, building on their own experience of living under an occupation.⁴³⁷ After the Greek coup, the book was republished as *Mørke over Akropolis* with an addendum describing the latest political developments in Greece. Rasmussen, Malinovski, and Stinus hoped that the book would keep the interest alive about the situation in Greece and about the developments that had led to the death of democracy.⁴³⁸ Although they did not deal explicitly with the question of whether the three regimes were fascist, their anti-fascist ethos is perhaps

⁴³⁴ Halfdan Rasmussen, Ivan Malinovski, and Erik Stinus, *Med solen i ryggen* (Copenhagen: Forlaget Rhodos, 1963), 7–9.

⁴³⁵ Lene Bredsdorff, *Halfdan En biografi om Halfdan Rasmussen* (Viborg: Aschehoug Dansk Forlag, 2005), 93–94.

⁴³⁶ Rasmussen, et al., *Med solen i ryggen*, 22–23, 70–71, 76–82.

⁴³⁷ Rasmussen, et al. *Med solen i ryggen*, 118–127, 203–208.

⁴³⁸ Halfdan Rasmussen, Ivan Malinovski and Erik Stinus, *Mørke over Akropolis* (Copenhagen: Forlaget Rhodos 1967), 7.

best captured in a powerful poem by a veteran of the resistance, Rasmussen, entitled *Dit ansvar* [Your responsibility]:

Everything that you don't do the blind judge
will use against you. Everything that you do he will
use to prove your guilt. You can never say:
I just followed orders. I did not act.
Say: I did as my consciousness commanded.
No one forced me to do something I did not want.
If I undertook a responsibility, small or large,
then it was eternally mine and mine alone
like my life was mine
my death my death.⁴³⁹

Consistent with the plea for taking responsibility, Rasmussen went on to become a board member of the Danish Committee on Greece⁴⁴⁰ and was in contact with EDA. Stinus was also involved in the Danish Committee on Spain called *Den danske Komité for amnesti til de spanske politiske fanger og flygtninge*.⁴⁴¹ This beautiful poem, again, conveyed a sense of anti-fascist collective identity—or even a Sartrean existentialist ethos—which seemed to have been widespread. As Mercouri had stressed in her speech in Stockholm 1968, the conceived “lesson” of the 20th century was that one had to take a stand against tyranny, to live up to one’s morals, and never to accept appeasement.

Most scholars of fascism today would agree with contemporary observations—made by scholars such as Nicos Poulantzas—that the Junta was primarily a military dictatorship, not a fascist regime. Prominent historians of fascism, such as Robert O. Paxton, or political theorists, such as Roger Griffin, would extend the same interpretation to Franco Spain and Salazar Portugal.⁴⁴² Paxton argued that while fascism is always militaristic, not all military

⁴³⁹ Rasmussen et al. *Med solen i ryggen*, 10.

In the original Danish:

Alt hvad du ikke gør vil den blinde dommer
bruge imod dig. Alt hvad du gør vil han bruge
for at bevise din skyld. Du kan aldri sige:
Jag handlede efter ordre. Jag handlede ikke.
Sig: Jeg gjorde som min samvittighed bød.
Ingen tvang mig til noget jeg ikke ville.
Tog jeg et ansvar på mig, stort eller lille,
da var det evigt mit og kun mit alene
som mit liv var mit
min død min død.

⁴⁴⁰ List of boardmembers for the Danish Committee [1969], “medlemmer af Bestyrelsen,” Grækenlandskomite 1968–1973, DK/RA/07680-14, Camre, Mogens.

⁴⁴¹ Bredsdorff, *Halfdan*, 218–220, 224.

⁴⁴² Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 81; Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning Under Mussolini and Hitler* (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 6, 267, 355–

dictatorships are fascist. They have existed for as long as there have been warriors, and there is no necessary connection with a failure of a democratic system. Most dictators of such regimes are content with being simple tyrants and do not venture into the uncertainty of mobilizing a popular excitement for fascism. Although most right-wing authoritarian regimes in Europe during the 1930s (including Spain and Portugal) adopted fascist aesthetics, they differed because the main agencies of social control were not a fascist party but resided in other institutions, such as the church, family, military, and economy. Thus, these regimes were more conservative than fascist, relying on the status quo rather than on revolutionary ideas. The dictators usually strove for a strong but limited state and were hesitant to use the state to intervene too extensively in the economy. This was the case with both Spain and Portugal, more so in the case of the latter.⁴⁴³ Another way of making the distinction would be to classify the military dictatorships as non-totalitarian in contrast to the fascist regimes. Yet Paxton is doubtful about the usefulness of the theory of totalitarianism due to its obsession with comparing communism with fascism.

Other historians, such as Richard Griffiths, however, argue that these clear distinctions are, to some extent, teleological: that the word fascism did not have the same pejorative connotation in the interwar years on the Right as it did after World War II. The clearest example is how Mussolini was regarded with much respect by large part of the European Right as a potential ally against Hitler in the early and mid-1930s. Griffiths also cites a 1938 interview with Franco where he clearly saw his movement, although different than that of Hitler, as the Spanish manifestation of fascism. Salazar, too, had fascist origins, taking much inspiration from what is often viewed as the major inspiration of the fascist ideology, the French far-right political movement Action Française. Salazar suppressed the more radical elements in his regime, the national syndicalists. Yet Griffiths argues that this was due to differences in tactics rather than doctrine. To be sure, he does not want to exchange one simplism of a categorization of conservatism with that of fascism. But he argues that Salazar had to conform to Portugal's neutral position in world politics, which he had adopted. And although the Portuguese dictator neutralized the national syndicalists, he created a clearly fascist-inspired youth movement. To him and his contemporary admirers, it was clear what intellectual tradition he had most in common with.⁴⁴⁴

356; see also Paxton, "I've Hesitated to Call Donald Trump a Fascist. Until Now," *Newsweek*, January 11, 2021, accessed November 19, 2023, <https://www.newsweek.com/robert-paxton-trump-fascist-1560652>.

⁴⁴³ Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, 216–218.

⁴⁴⁴ Richard Griffiths, "Fascist or Conservative? Portugal, Spain and the French Connection," *Portuguese Studies* 14, no. 1 (1998): 140, 146–150.

Historians Eleni Kouki and Dimitris Antoniou have emphasized that the Junta leader Georgios Papadopoulos excluded the more radical elements of his regime in 1971. Papadopoulos stressed that Greece had not become a one-party state and that it had no youth organizations or a totalitarian constitution. His political vision was a “semi-democratic regime”—and he pursued a policy of what he termed “controlled liberalization.” There were, however, competing views within the Junta, with some contesting Papadopoulos’s course. The most prominent critic was the anti-democratic hardliner Dimitrios Ioannidis, who overthrew Papadopoulos in 1973. Nevertheless, Kouki and Antoniou also recognize how important it was for political movements to depict the Junta as fascist when building support internationally against it. They argue this was done by comparing the Junta with the interwar Greek Metaxas dictatorship. In this way, the two regimes were characterized as fascist, while “objectively,” they might have been something else. As an example, they take Ioannis Metaxas’s personality cult, which did not increase under the Junta. The two historians argue that calling the Junta fascist was not done to encourage a theoretical discussion of the nature of fascism but rather to articulate the point that the West was not a space of freedom in contrast to the common belief.⁴⁴⁵ Using the Metaxas regime as a comparison to classify the Junta as fascist might have been important for some Greek groups resisting it. But it was rarely mentioned in the Scandinavian texts on the military regime, which saw the dictatorships in Spain and Portugal as being far more important and prominent as fascist models for comparison. The transnational collective memory of the Spanish Civil War for the Left cannot be overstated in this regard. In short, there are no indications that there were disagreements within the Nordic Committees about whether the Junta should be classified as fascist, for it was seen as a fact. Questioning this assumption would have denied them the mobilizing and legitimizing power of mnemonic anti-fascism.

Anti-Imperialism or Anti-Fascism? The Norwegian Split and Greek Refugees

In February 1968, the secretary of the Norwegian Committee, Elias Theophilakis—who had been one of its founding members—complained to the chairwoman Aase Lionæs about its lack of activity.⁴⁴⁶ Theophilakis was also the chairman of the Greek Anti-dictatorial Committee (*Grekerne komité mot diktatur*). Such committees had been established all over

⁴⁴⁵ Kouki and Antoniou, “Making the Junta Fascist,” 469, 471–473.

⁴⁴⁶ Letter, Elias Theophilakis to Aase Lionæs, February 10, 1968, NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Komité for demokrati i Hellas, Lionæs, Aase.

Europe, consisting of exiled and immigrant Greeks who were connected to the communist-aligned EDA party and the Patriotic Front. For Theophilakis and other committee members, NATO and the United States were primarily to blame for the Junta.⁴⁴⁷ This point was his main criticism against Lionæs: that the Norwegian Committee was silent about NATO's support for the military regime. Being part of the Alliance's security policy in the Middle East, the Americans and even the West German Social Democrats—he claimed—assisted the Junta and had a role in the coup. Theophilakis argued, further, that the Committee was obstructing the true will of the Norwegian people to help Greece and that it had hardly accomplished anything since its establishment.⁴⁴⁸

Some of Theophilakis claims were unsubstantiated and probably provocative in the eyes of Lionæs, a pro-NATO Social Democrat. But it was true that under her leadership, the Committee had not become an organization that was willing to take to the streets. When in March 1968, around five hundred people demonstrated against the Junta in Oslo, the event was organized by Theophilakis with his group together with the Norwegian Student Association without the participation of Lionæs or the Norwegian Committee. One speaker, Torkel Opsahl, who was a Professor of Law at the University of Oslo, asked whether NATO should now be seen as obsolete because it could not be seen as a guarantee against a coup. Opsahl claimed that the United States could have stopped the military takeover. Theodor Kallifatides traveled from Sweden to speak at the gathering,⁴⁴⁹ illustrating both the importance of Greek activists in the movement and its transnational nature.

The anti-U.S. theme did not sit well with the conservative students who had taken part in planning the action; they threatened to end it if protest signs blaming the United States for the Junta were not removed on the grounds that the police had not given permission for their use.⁴⁵⁰ Neither did the Norwegian Committee participate in demonstrations organized by Theophilakis and Norwegian students, which took place on the one-year anniversary of the coup. Again, protest signs were on ample display, stating that the Junta would not have been possible without NATO. A few days later Melina Mercouri, who had arrived in Oslo on the invitation of the Norwegian Committee and the Anti-dictatorial Committee, echoed this line in interviews, in which she emphasized the need to expel Greece from NATO.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁷ "Mot juntaen av Pentagons nåde," *Friheten*, no. 12, 1968, 7.

⁴⁴⁸ Letter, Theophilakis to Lionæs, February 10, 1968. NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Lionæs, Aase.

⁴⁴⁹ "Forlang ikke en ny borgerkrig av oss!" *Arbeiderbladet*, March 26, 1968.

⁴⁵⁰ "Demonstrasjonsmøtet på Universitetsplassen," *Arbeiderbladet*, March 27, 1968.

⁴⁵¹ "Jeg vil ikke være i Konstatins båt," *Roglands Avis*, April 24, 1968.

In Sweden, Hans Göran Franck was informed of the brewing tensions in the Norwegian Committee by the Norwegian Socialist MP Finn Gustavsen (*Sosialistisk Folkeparti*)—who, as noted, had been part of the parliamentary delegation to Athens. Gustavsen had kept himself out of the Norwegian Committee “on tactical grounds,” but had advised Theophilakis that he could either have a wide Committee with a broad appeal, if limited activity, or a smaller more radical one that could be more active but enjoy less support. He viewed the current situation as critical because the question of Norway’s NATO membership was up for debate; in 1969—or twenty years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty—members could withdraw from the Alliance with a one-year notice period. His party was, as noted, was part of the “old” New Left that worked actively for a Norwegian exit from NATO. In the 1969 parliamentary election, it lost its seats in parliament after a younger faction of Maoists split from the party. These Maoists would go on to form the Maoist Communist Party (*Arbeidernes Kommunistparti (AKP ml)*). Gustavsen considered Lionæs a right-wing Social Democrat, who, together with Otto Lyng, did everything in her power to avoid a debate that could do damage to NATO or the United States. Gustavsen had been asked by Theophilakis and other Greeks from Sweden to help push the Norwegian Committee in a radical direction on the premise that the case for a broad committee did not exist anymore.⁴⁵² Gustavsen wrote: “I can make sure that radical people participate in a general meeting and assume control over the board. But this would be very serious.”⁴⁵³ In the end, it was decided that a coup could wait until after the Nordic Conference on Greece in Stockholm. In the meantime, pressure should be put on the Norwegian Committee to include more radicals.⁴⁵⁴

Having gotten winds of their plans, Lionæs was instrumental in forming a decision—made by the majority of the Committee’s board—to suspend Theophilakis for denying the chairwoman access to the Committee’s mailbox and the treasurer to its payment system.⁴⁵⁵ A motion to restructure the Committee was subsequently passed with a narrow majority. This act meant that the large political parties—apart from the socialists and communists—assumed complete control of the Committee. Yet the reason Lionæs gave for the restructuring was to

⁴⁵² Letter, Finn Gustavsen to Franck, 27 March, 1968, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-6, Hans Göran Franck, 1–2; “Sosialistisk Folkeparti,” *Store norske leksikon*, accessed January 15, 2024, https://snl.no/Sosialistisk_Folkeparti.

⁴⁵³ Letter Gustavsen to Franck, March 27, 1968; in the original Norwegian: “Jeg kan godt sørge for at radikale mennesker møter fram i et representantskapsmøte og “overtar” ledelsen. Men det er meget betenkelig.”

⁴⁵⁴ Letter, Gustavsen, March 27, 1968.

⁴⁵⁵ Protocol, “Styremøte i Den norske komite for Demokrati i Hellas,” May 8, 1968,” SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-6, Hans Göran Franck.

broaden the Committee to include more civil society groups in the organization and to bolster its financial position. It was not explained how excluding socialists and communists would contribute to inclusiveness. Instead, the decision was justified in terms of strengthening efforts to help prisoners and their families.

The members of the minority, who included the treasurer of the Committee, Arne Treholt, protested, seeing the decision as not legally binding because it was made in a board meeting.⁴⁵⁶ It was to no avail, however; the majority saw themselves as responding to an attempted takeover. As it was put in the Committee's board meeting minutes: "Aase Lionæs answered that she was not interested in using the Norwegian Committee for a political struggle in Norway; she referred to the recent massive membership increase of SF [the Socialist Party] districts within the Committee."⁴⁵⁷ The whole affair attracted much media attention. Theophilakis claimed that Lionæs and Otto Lyng had instigated a coup and that they were no better than the Greek Colonels. They wanted to avoid asking the question of whether Norway should leave NATO.⁴⁵⁸ Lionæs received criticism from her own party as well. The youth organization AUF in Oslo saw it as unacceptable to exclude other socialist parties and only to work with right-wing forces. The Committee should not be reduced to humanitarian work but rather continue to support the Greek resistance, spread information, and propagate international action against Greece.⁴⁵⁹ In its words, the "work for democracy in Greece has its natural origin within the labor movement. It is a mission for a united labor movement to support morally and financially the forces that are preparing for an uprising against the fascist regime."⁴⁶⁰ Ultimately, the Lionæs faction lost, and the attempt to restructure the committee failed. The minority organized an open general meeting where a new interim board was elected. Surprisingly, it had many representatives from the labor movement, such as Harriet Andreassen, the president of the large union *Norsk Arbeidsmandsforbund*. Finn Gustavsen was also elected, but there were no communists on

⁴⁵⁶ "Styremøte i Den norske komite for Demokrati i Hellas," May 8, 1968, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-6, Hans Göran Franck.

⁴⁵⁷ "Styremøte i Den norske komite for Demokrati i Hellas," May 8, 1968. In the original Norwegian: "Aase Lionæs svarte at hun ikke var interessert i at Hellas-komiteen skulle bli brukt til en politisk kamp i Norge, og viste til den masseinnmelding av SF-lag som har funnet sted den siste tida." The "Hellas-komiteen" is translated as the "Norwegian Committee" because it is another word for it.

⁴⁵⁸ "Det greske og det norske NATO-kupp," *Friheten*, no. 20 (1968).

⁴⁵⁹ "AUF i Oslo om Hellas-komiteen," *Arbeiderbladet*, May 10, 1968.

⁴⁶⁰ "AUF i Oslo om Hellas-komiteen," *Arbeiderbladet*, May 10, 1968. In the original Norwegian: "Arbeidet for demokrati i Hellas har sitt naturlige utspring i arbeiderbevegelsen. Det er en oppgave for hele den samlede arbeiderbevegelse å yte så vel moralsk som økonomisk støtte til de krefter som nå forbereder oppstand mot fascistregimet."

the board.⁴⁶¹ Gustavsen denied the accusations that his party had planned a coup. The Social Democrat Inge Staalesen had her doubts because of a similar coup in the Solidarity Committee for Vietnam (*Solidaritetskomiteen for Vietnam*).⁴⁶² Treholt even invited Franck to the meeting, who attended to show him support.⁴⁶³

A year later representatives from the Swedish Committee traveled to Oslo to participate in a Nordic meeting of the Committees. The Norwegians were glad that the fight over the split was over and that they could resume their work. They still had limited funds, apart from a substantial donation from the Oslo municipality, and were hoping that their relationship with the Norwegian *LO* would be strengthened.⁴⁶⁴ Union leader Harriet Andreassen had this to say about the developments:

Harriet Andreassen accounted for the attempts by *LO* to establish their own committee on Greece. These had been unsuccessful. Her own union, Norsk Arbeidsmandsforbund, was a contributing factor for why they had failed. Currently the *LO* is working on setting up a labor movement aid fund that is meant to be used in support in concrete cases. Greece had been mentioned in the setup for the fund.⁴⁶⁵

This shows the competing visions among Norwegian Social Democrats and even the labor movement on the issue, with Andreassen being a party member herself. Left of the social democrats was Elias Theophilakis, who had become a member of the board. He was highly critical of pro-NATO members:⁴⁶⁶

Theophilakis said that the work of the Norwegian committee was hampered by individual committee members' relations with NATO. The radical, anti-imperial youth was not willing to support a committee where there were members that supported a Norwegian membership in NATO. [Opposing this,] Poniridis, Ericsson, Andreassen and Treholt emphasized the desirability of aiming for a political breadth.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶¹ "Hellas-komiteen reorganisert," *Friheten*, no. 21 (1968).

⁴⁶² "Hellas-komiteen får et interimstyre på 12," *Arbeiderbladet*, May 22, 1968.

⁴⁶³ Letter, Arne Treholt to Frank, May 20, 1968," SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-6, Hans Göran Franck.

⁴⁶⁴ Protocol, "Protokoll fra koordineringsmøtet mellom de nordiske hellaskomiteene," March 23, 1969, Protokoll mm 67-70, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-2, Hans Göran Franck, 1–3.

⁴⁶⁵ "Protokoll fra koordineringsmøtet mellom de nordiske hellaskomiteene," March 23, 1969, 4. In the original Norwegian: "Harriet Andreassen redegjorde for forsøk fra LOs side på å opprette en egen Hellaskomite. Disse hadde ikke ført fram. Hennes eget forbund, Norsk Arbeidsmandsforbund, var en medvirkende årsak til at dette ikke hadde lyktes. LO arbeidet for tiden med opprettelse av et Arbeiderbevegelsens Hjelpesfond som var tenkt anvent til understøttelse i konkrete tilfelle. Hellas var her nevnt i opplegget for fondet."

⁴⁶⁶ "Protokoll fra koordineringsmøtet mellom de nordiske hellaskomiteene," March 23, 1969, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-2, Hans Göran Franck.

⁴⁶⁷ "Protokoll fra koordineringsmøtet mellom de nordiske hellaskomiteene," March 23, 1969. In the original Norwegian: "Theophilakis sa at den norske komiteens arbeid var hemmet av enkelte komite-medlemmers forhold til NATO. Den radikale – anti-imperialistiske ungdom var ikke villig til å støtte en komite hvor det satt folk som var tilhengere av norsk medlemskap i NATO. Fra Poniridis, Ericsson, Andreassen og Treholt ble ønskeligheten av et tverrpolitisk sikte understrekket."

Thus, an activist-centered, radical, anti-imperialist vision—espoused by exiled Greeks—was, thus, juxtaposed against that of a broad political, anti-fascism, collective identity favored by the Norwegian Social Democrats and the Swedish Committee members. Finn Gustavsen, who also attended the meeting, most likely agreed with Theophilakis. It shows that parts of the New Left, Maoists and Stalinists prioritized the NATO question. Defending the popular anti-fascism, Swedish Social Democrat Arne Ericsson claimed that the Greek Question attracted a larger, more diverse (not only the young) support from the Swedish people than the Vietnam Question. As evidence, he cited the backing of the White-Collar Workers' Central Organization (*Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation, TCO*). For the first time in its history, it officially condemned another country's actions and directly informed its members of this decision. Another example was the financial support for the cause from the Federation of Consumer Co-Operatives in Sweden (*Kooperativa Förbundet, KF*). Ericsson deplored the ongoing splits within the exiled Greek Left, which he claimed had negatively affected the work of the Swedish Committee. The meeting pleaded with the Greeks not to involve the Nordic Committees in these conflicts.⁴⁶⁸ Nonetheless, the ideological split, between anti-imperialism and anti-fascism continued to affect the work of the Committees, with Theophilakis eventually leaving the Norwegian Committee because of it.⁴⁶⁹ Theophilakis's passionate activism and contribution to the Greek cause was best illustrated by his own efforts to aid Greek refugees who came to Oslo in 1967, after having been threatened with deportation back to Greece from West Germany. He put them up in his home and helped them out with money. Theophilakis coordinated this together with the Greek Anti-dictatorial Committees in West Germany. Treholt implored Lionæs to arrange for a more organized form of assistance since Theophilakis's Norwegian wife was the only income to their household.⁴⁷⁰

Several curious political episodes surrounded the issue of Greek refugees in the Nordic countries. In 1967, the Greek Junta had stated that “willing countries” could receive the 2500 “communists” who were political prisoners in Greece. Having initially responded positively to the offer, the Dutch Labor Government soon realized that it might be a too big undertaking to grant all of them asylum in the Netherlands. Therefore, it secretly approached the Scandinavian Social Democratic parties about sharing the burden. In the end, nothing

⁴⁶⁸ “Protokoll fra koordineringsmøtet mellom de nordiske hellaskomiteene,” March 23, 1969, 1–7.

⁴⁶⁹ Report, “Beretning for tidsrommet 27/11-1968 til 20/1-1970,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/A/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 2.

⁴⁷⁰ Letter, Arne Treholt to Aase Lionæs, November 8, 1967, NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Komité for demokrati i Hellas, Lionæs, Aase.

came of the whole episode; it was the Junta playing a trick on those Western European states who were critical of the Greek regime.⁴⁷¹

The Nordic Committees played a key role in assisting Greek refugees who arrived in the Nordic countries; yet the Greek communities in these countries did much of the practical work. One of the more dramatic cases that the Norwegian Committee dealt with involved two Greeks, Konstantin Meletis and Panelis Marketakis, who had fled from Strasbourg, where they were scheduled to testify—at the Council of Europe—against torture allegations put forward against the Greek military regime. Instead, they escaped from the Junta guards, accompanying them. With the assistance of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and the Norwegian Committee, they were granted asylum in Norway, where they were received with open arms and cared for. Yet, after a couple of days, Marketakis was showing signs of mental strain and went missing. Subsequently, it was revealed that he was being held in the Greek embassy in Stockholm. From there, he was escorted by embassy personnel to the airport and flown back to Greece.⁴⁷² Before reaching Athens, the plane was grounded in London after a bomb threat. Back in Greece, Marketakis gave distressing interviews, claiming that he had been kidnapped in Strasbourg by “bolshevists” and that he was almost killed at the airport in Stockholm. Nothing of this was true. The most plausible explanation was that the Junta kidnapped him in Stockholm and pressured him to go back to Greece by threatening his family’s safety.⁴⁷³ The affair received much attention in the press. It even led to a popular Norwegian theatre play called *Pantheos* written by the playwright Per Hansson.⁴⁷⁴ The other Greek witness Konstantin Meletis continued to live in Norway, where he became the chairman of the Greek Anti-dictatorship Committee and continued to assist political prisoners and torture victims.⁴⁷⁵

Another refugee case that received media attention involved Paul Kotzikos. The Swedish authorities had decided not to deport him to West Germany, where he had a residence permit, but, instead, to send him directly back to Greece where he awaited a two-

⁴⁷¹ Letter, Pieter Danker to Trygve Bratteli, December 12, 1967; letter, Lionæs to Bratteli, December 13, 1967, NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Lionæs, Aase.

⁴⁷² Report, “...Pantelis Marketakis og Konstantin Meletis opphold i Oslo,” “Beretning for tidsrommet 27/11-1968 til 20/1-1970,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/A/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas. Bilag 3. 5, 14–18; “Nå gjelder det å redde de to familiene” *Arbeiderbladet*, December 2, 1968; “De to grekerne reiser til Norge,” *Arbeiderbladet*, November 28, 1968.

⁴⁷³ “Avhoppat Atenvittne kørd till ambassaden i Stockholm i taxi,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, December 18, 1968; “Marketakis hämtad av grekiskt flygplan” *Svenska Dagbladet*, December 19, 1968; “Grek vittnar: Marketakis flydde frivilligt.” *Svenska Dagbladet*, December 20, 1968; “Marketakis: “Mordhotad i Stockholm”,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, December 21, 1968.

⁴⁷⁴ “Tredobbelt premiere,” *Arbeiderbladet*, April 4, 1970.

⁴⁷⁵ “Redd den syke og mishandlede Baras!” *Arbeiderbladet*, September 17, 1969.

year prison sentence because of his political convictions. Kotzikos had given political reasons for fleeing Greece, but when the Swedish police had asked the offices of PAK in Stockholm to confirm his account, Emanuel Poniridis's secretary stated that Kotzikos was lying. Poniridis claimed to have no knowledge of the action of his secretary who was subsequently fired. In this case, political infighting in the Greek exile community was not even put on hold when a man needed refuge. The episode proved embarrassing, not only for PAK but for the Swedish government as well, which faced fierce criticism in parliament.⁴⁷⁶ Because of the affair the Swedish Committee decided reach out to Greeks to inform them on how to apply for residence and political asylum and on how to appeal decisions. The Swedish Committee also reported the case to the ombudsman of justice.⁴⁷⁷ In general, it could be argued that anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism dominated the collective identity of the Greek exiles in the Nordic countries. It was unsurprising considering the support the Junta received from the United States. Nonetheless, without an anti-fascist identity, the unity in the struggle against the regime was lost. And, in the Nordic countries, the internal conflicts among the Greeks—and the strong opposition to NATO—were incomprehensible to key segments of the public.

Committees on the Margins: Iceland and Finland

In the early spring of 1968, an Icelandic communist activist, Ragnar Stefánsson, who was a member of the Socialist Party's Youth Organization (*Æskulýðsfylkingin*), traveled to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden to establish contacts with fellow activists. His mission was to gauge Nordic interest—in radical left-wing circles—in taking part in protests meetings against the upcoming June NATO Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik.⁴⁷⁸ One of Stefánsson's interlocutors was Hans Göran Franck, whom he had met after receiving a tip from young Swedish communists. With Franck's help, Stefánsson and his Swedish colleagues arranged for the trip of ten Greeks—living in Sweden—to Iceland. One possible explanation why Stefánsson did not meet any members of the Danish or Norwegian Committees was that they were less keen on taking on NATO than the Swedish Committee,⁴⁷⁹ which financed, in part,

⁴⁷⁶ "Utvisningen," *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 28, 1969; "Avvisningen av greken Reglerna ses över" *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 29 1969; "Skarp kritik mot regeringen för avvisningen av Kotzikos" *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 31, 1969, "Språkligt missförstånd möjlig avvisningsorsak," *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 31, 1969.

⁴⁷⁷ Protocol, "Svenska Kommitten för Greklands Demokrati," May 27, 1969, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-2, Hans Göran Franck.

⁴⁷⁸ Meeting protocol, May 15, 1968, Félags og Aðalfundagerðarbók Æskulýðsfylkingar Kópavogs 1968–1972, *Þjóðskjalasafn Íslands – ÞÍ* [The Icelandic National Archives], ICE/ÞÍ/E.51.12; Ragnar Stefánsson, *Það skelfur. Endurminningar*, 229.

⁴⁷⁹ Interview with Ragnar Stefánsson, September 26, 2022.

the travel costs of the Greeks. This did not mean, however, that the Swedish Committee members were enthusiastic about the anti-NATO protest action. Preferring the more sheltered environment of an international conference in Geneva on the Greek issue to that of an activist adventure in Reykjavik, none of them bothered to accompany the Greeks to Iceland.⁴⁸⁰ The conference in Geneva, mentioned above, turned out to be a disappointment.

Theodor Kallifatides, however, was among those who took part in the protests in Iceland. Later, he remembered his visit with fondness—and the same applied to his meetings with young people in Iceland—even if he had not forgotten how brutally the Icelandic police had dealt with the demonstrators.⁴⁸¹ The protests lasted several days. On the first day, a long protest march was organized from the U.S. military base at Keflavik to Reykjavik—a 50-kilometer walk. On the next day, there were demonstrations outside the building where the NATO Ministerial Meeting took place. Finally, on the third and fourth days, a “Youth Conference on NATO” was organized, with a special focus on the Greek issue.⁴⁸² In addition to the ten Greeks, 14 young people came from Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland to participate in the protests. The Swedes belonged to the extra-parliamentarian socialist organizations like Clarté; and the Norwegians were members of the organization Norway out of NATO (*Norge ut av NATO*).⁴⁸³ The Finns only sent one young communist member of the Finnish Democratic Youth Organizations; like many other Scandinavians from Soviet-aligned communist groups, they prioritized the upcoming 9th World Festival of Youth and Students in Sofia.⁴⁸⁴

While the focus of the Reykjavik protests was on opposing NATO in general, the Greek coup also figured prominently on the agenda. The disdain toward the Junta was visible on many protest signs. Ragnar Stefánsson together with the Greeks organized a direct-action disruption of the arrival of the Greek Foreign Minister Panagiotis Pipinelis at the airport.⁴⁸⁵ There were some scuffles with the police during the days of protests—between right-wing counter-protesters who attacked the Icelandic Youth Socialist headquarters and the police

⁴⁸⁰ Protocol, “Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati,” June 19, 1968, Protokoll mm 67-70, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-2, Hans Göran Franck, 3–4.

⁴⁸¹ Interview with Theodor Kallifatides, September 19, 2022.

⁴⁸² Letter, Samband ungra sósíalista Æskulýðsfylkingin to the Swedish Committee, May 30, 1968, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-27, Hans Göran Franck.

⁴⁸³ “Svenskar demonstrerar på Island,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, June 23, 1968, 8; handwritten note about the Greek protesters from “Jón” [surname unknown] to “Franz” [Gíslason?]; and telegram, the Swedish Committee to Æskulýðsfylkingin, June 9, 1968, Æskulýðsfylkingin – bréf o. fl. 1960–1968, ICE/ÞÍ/E.51.8.

⁴⁸⁴ Letter, Seppo Kanerva (Finlands Demokratiska Ungdomsförbund) to Æskulýðsfylkingin, March 20, 1968, bréf o. fl. 1960–1968, ICE/ÞÍ/E.51.8.

⁴⁸⁵ Stefánsson, *Það skelfur*, 231.

after the “long march” from Keflavik. Comically, the youthful right-wing disrupters shouted slogans such as “Long live NATO – NATO – More bubble gum.”⁴⁸⁶ Kallifatides remembers how he fled the scene—after the police charged forward—and hid in a cemetery.⁴⁸⁷ The next day, a large group of protestors sat down by the entrance of the University of Iceland’s main building where the NATO ministers met; they were, however, roughly treated and arrested by the police.⁴⁸⁸

Most of the speakers at the “Youth Conference on NATO” dwelled on topics connected to imperialism, the Vietnam War, and Iceland’s security policy. Unlike the conference in Geneva, the Reykjavik conference was held outdoors in a park.⁴⁸⁹ Kallifatides gave a speech on the Greek Junta, arguing that Iceland and Greece were united in their struggle against NATO. After the event, a small group of protestors walked the streets of Reykjavik shouting paroles such as “Ho HO ho Chi Min, exit NATO, Iceland for Icelanders, free Greece.”⁴⁹⁰ The agitational focus was on anti-imperialism and nationalism rather than anti-fascism. The Norwegian activist Lars Alldén argued that NATO was not a defensive alliance but rather an instrument of American imperialism. The struggle was about pushing NATO out of the Nordic countries in an act of solidarity with the “Third World,” with the aim of resisting American cultural imperialism and of constructing a future socialist society. In addition, he blamed NATO for the Vietnam War and U.S.-backed military coups in South America. Finally, he pointed to the fact that Portugal, with the help of military aid from NATO, pursued a brutal colonial war in Africa, which stood in the way of the independence of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea.⁴⁹¹ One of the older foreign protestors that came to Iceland was the charismatic Babis Kalantzis; he was the leader of the Greek group and a veteran of the resistance movement against the Nazi occupation and of the Greek Civil War. He had been imprisoned for a long time, severely beaten and tortured. Like Kallifatides, he had come to Sweden before the Greek coup in search of a better life.⁴⁹²

⁴⁸⁶ “Óður skráll réðst að Tjarnargötu 20 og lögreglustöðinni,” *Þjóðviljinn*, June 25, 1968; in the original Icelandic: “Upp með Nató – Nató – Meira tyggjó.”

⁴⁸⁷ Interview with Theodor Kallifatides, September 19, 2022.

⁴⁸⁸ Stefánsson, *Það skelfur*, 231–233.

⁴⁸⁹ “Ráðstefna ungs fólks um Nató,” *Þjóðviljinn*, June 27, 1968.

⁴⁹⁰ “Mótmælafundurinn í hjómskálagarði,” *Alþýðublaðið*, June 26, 1968.

In the original Icelandic: “Ho HO ho Chi Min, burt úr Nato, Ísland fyrir Íslendinga, frjálst Grikkland.”

⁴⁹¹ “NATÓ og heimsvaldastefnan,” *Þjóðviljinn*, June 27, 1968.

⁴⁹² Interview with Theodor Kallifatides, September 19, 2022; obituary, “Till minne: Charalampos ‘Babis’ Kalantzis,” accessed November 15, 2023, <http://www.grekiskarikisforbundet.se/index.php/el/epikairotita-menu/deltia-typou-menu/672-till-minne-babis-kalantzis-20210226>.

For Kalantzis, the creation of an Icelandic Committee on Greece was a priority since Iceland was the only Nordic country without one. He argued that the Greek Junta was the shared responsibility of NATO members: “Thus we find that all NATO states are complicit, because they all pay for the cost of the dictatorship, directly contradicting the founding treaty of NATO.” For him, the United States was responsible for the coup, and the form of fascism, which was taking place was closely connected to NATO’s readiness plans, notably Prometheus.⁴⁹³ He stated:

We regard April 21 last year as the beginning of an offensive of fascist government practices, not only in Greece but in all of Europe. We regard Greek fascism not as an isolated phenomenon, but rather as connected with international circumstances. Under similar circumstances fascism will try to clear the way again. We regard the plans that were used to establish fascism in Greece, Prometheus plan, to be available in all NATO states – because of this we regard it as our duty to inform people everywhere of what happened in our country and to warn them of the dangers that might be ahead.⁴⁹⁴

Thus, the emphasis was not on expelling Greece from NATO on the grounds that the Alliance should not be represented by a fascist regime. Instead, he blamed NATO for creating the Junta; hence, it was necessary to fight both. Kalantzis was preoccupied with Greece’s road to fascism, which was the main threat, and with the need to support the resistance movement. In contrast, Lars Allén was more concerned with national liberation and anti-imperialism.

The protests in Reykjavik were a clear expression of the youthful protest cultures at the time. There was no real involvement of political parties—and most of the protesters were young. They were activist-centered and engaging, with attempts made to obstruct the proceedings of the NATO Ministerial Meeting. Reykjavik provided an interesting counterpoint to the more established forms of protests sponsored by the Swedish and Norwegian Committees, which were about demonstrating “peacefully” and attending more settled conferences. Kallifatides and his fellow Greeks met many prominent Icelanders at the victory celebrations for the left-wing presidential candidate Kristján Eldjárn, who had won

⁴⁹³ “Natóríkin greiða upphaldskostnað af einræði herforingja í Grikklandi,” *Þjóðviljinn*, June 28, 1968. In the original Icelandic: “Því finnst okkur að öll Natóríki séu samábyrg, því öll borga þau upphaldskostnað einræðisins í Grikklandi, þvert ofan í yfirlýst stefnumið Nató.”

⁴⁹⁴ “Natóríkin greiða upphaldskostnað af einræði herforingja í Grikklandi,” *Þjóðviljinn*, June 28, 1968. In the original Icelandic: “Við teljum að 21. apríl í fyrra hafi byrjað sókn fasískra stjórnarháttá, ekki aðeins í Grikklandi heldur og í allri Evrópu, við teljum ekki grískan fasisma einangrað fyrirbæri heldur í tengslum við alþjóðlegar aðstæður og að við svipaðar aðstæður muni fasismi reyna að brjóta sér leið. Við teljum að áætlanir eins og Próméþeusáætlunin, sem notuð var til að koma á fasisma í Grikklandi, séu til í öðrum Natóríkjum – því teljum við okkur skylt að segja frá tíðindum í okkar landi sem víðast og vara við þeim hættum sem yfir geta vofað.”

the elections shortly after the NATO meeting. There they were introduced to Sigurður A. Magnússon, an author, journalist, and Hellenophile, who had been involved in protest meetings against the Greek Junta in Iceland.

After the Greeks informed him about the Committees and resistance groups, he contacted the Swedish Committee, which assisted him in establishing an Icelandic Committee.⁴⁹⁵ The bylaws of the Icelandic Committee were a direct translation of those of the Swedish Committee, with Magnússon wanting to create a broad-based committee open to all.⁴⁹⁶ A large founding meeting of the Committee—in September 1968—put his aspiration to the test because the proposal to copy the Swedish structure was contested. It was suggested that a more selective membership of individuals was preferable to avoid political infighting, which had plagued the Vietnam movement in Iceland. Magnússon argued that there should be no veto power for organizations taking part in the activities of the Committee. That meant equal representation, with organizations only having one vote each. Yet, since the conservatives present at the meeting sensed that they would be in a minority, they expressed concerns about sharing a platform with “left-wing extremists.” They complained about the inconsistency of condemning and boycotting Greece, while trading with the Soviet Union after its recent invasion of Czechoslovakia. Despite being a disorderly meeting, a board was elected and the statement from the Nordic Conference on Greece in Stockholm was adopted.⁴⁹⁷ Conservatives were elected to the board, but, as it turned out, they did not take an active role in the Icelandic Committee.⁴⁹⁸

Questions about the ideological orientation of the Committee were also raised by the Left. In an interview with the youth communist magazine *Neisti*, Magnússon was asked about whether he thought it not ridiculous that those who supported Iceland’s NATO membership were part of the Committee since the Alliance was responsible for the Junta. Although Magnússon did not want to comment on individual members, he stated that NATO had to speak up against the Junta and that it should not accept a fascist government in a member state. Nonetheless, the Icelandic Committee was not formed to oppose NATO or military bases in Iceland. The goal was to bring public attention to the Greek issue. Magnússon believed that it was a sign of strength that the whole political spectrum was part of an effort

⁴⁹⁵ Sigurður A. Magnússon, *Á hnífsins egg*, 32–34.

⁴⁹⁶ Icelandic bylaws, “Stofnskrá Grikklandshreyfingarinnar – stuðningsmanna lýðræðis í Grikklandi,” stofnfundur Grikklandshreyfingar, [1968] ICE/LBS/710-NF, Sigurður A. Magnússon; Swedish bylaws “Stadgar för Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati,” [1968] CE/LBS/710-NF Sigurður A. Magnússon.

⁴⁹⁷ “Stofnfundur Grikklandshreyfingarinnar haldinn í Tjarnarbúð,” September 12, 1968, stofnfundur Grikklandshreyfingar, ICE/LBS/710-NF, Sigurður A. Magnússon, 1-8.

⁴⁹⁸ Sigurður A. Magnússon, *Á hnífsins egg*, 35.

to counter the spread of fascism. For him, the end goal was a more active Icelandic foreign policy in lieu of those in the neighboring Nordic countries. As he observed:⁴⁹⁹

Furthermore, we feel it is time that Iceland takes up a more realistic and active foreign policy so that we can be in solidarity with the Nordic countries. They have been very active on this issue, even Denmark and Norway, they are both members of NATO and they both currently have right-wing governments. Both these governments have been severe in their opposition against the fascists in Greece, and I think that it is strange that we have been so weak. Our struggle is intertwined with this ambition to drag Iceland into this international resistance, that Iceland follows the example of our Nordic relatives, and that Iceland adopts an assertive and firm stance on this issue as with other foreign policy issues.⁵⁰⁰

In comparison to the other Nordic Committees, the Icelandic Committee did not manage to garner as much support for its activities. Magnússon requested the support from the Icelandic Federation of Labor (*Alþýðusamband Ísland – ASÍ*), referring to the fact that the Nordic labor movement supported the other Nordic Committees. But the request was not even answered.⁵⁰¹ Since the Icelandic committee did not attract much financial support in the form of donations, it was unable to do much.⁵⁰²

Only once did an Icelander attend a Nordic Committee meeting; it was a friend of Magnússon, who happened to live in Stockholm. He complained bitterly about the whole ordeal, seeing it as a failed movement of old bureaucrats as compared to the lively and youthful movement against the Vietnam War.⁵⁰³ For several years, Magnússon doggedly tried to get Andreas Papandreou to come to Iceland, but without success. At one time, even as he was assisted by Arne Treholt, Papandreou backed out at the last minute, arguing that the airplane ticket was not allowed to be in his name for security reasons, even though he had

⁴⁹⁹ “Viðtal við Sigurð A. Magnússon formann Grikklandshreyfingarinnar,” *Neisti* 6, no. 4 (1968): 29–30.

⁵⁰⁰ “Viðtal við Sigurð A. Magnússon formann Grikklandshreyfingarinnar,” 30. In the original Icelandic: “Einnig þótti okkur tími til kominn að Ísland tæki upp raunhæfa og virka stefnu í utanríkismálum þannig að við getum haft samstöðu með Norðurlöndum þau hafa beitt sér mjög gegn þessari þróun, meira að segja Danmörk og Noregur sem bæði eru aðildarríki að NATO og bæði hafa borgarlegar ríkisstjórnir sem stendur. Báðar þessar stjórnir hafa verið mjög harðar í andstöðunni gegn fasístanum í Grikklandi og mér finnst furðulegt að við skulum hafa verið eins aumir og raun ber vitni. Inn í baráttu okkar fléttast því sú viðleitni að draga Ísland inn í þessa alþjóðlegu andstöðu, og einnig að Ísland fari að dæmi frænda okkar á Norðurlöndum og taki ákveðna og harða afstöðu í þessu máli og öðrum utanríkismálum.”

⁵⁰¹ Letter, Sigurður A. Magnússon to the board of ASÍ, September 4, 1968, ICE/LBS/710-NF, Sigurður A. Magnússon.

⁵⁰² Letter, Sigurður A. Magnússon to Stensture Wikström secretary of the Swedish Committee. February 3, 1969, in which he explained why the Icelanders could not participate in the Nordic meetings and asked for material assistance and help with arranging for the invitation of Greek speakers to Iceland, ICE/LBS/710-NF Sigurður A. Magnússon.

⁵⁰³ Letter, Vésteinn Lúðvíksson to Sigurður A. Magnússon, November 12, 1970, ICE/LBS/710-NF Sigurður A. Magnússon.

never mentioned it beforehand to the Icelanders.⁵⁰⁴ Given its lack of resources, the Icelandic Committee was not integrated into the work of the other Nordic Committees. This was a handicap since it could have been beneficial for the Danish and Norwegian Committees to work with Icelandic one to push for putting the Greek issue on the agenda in NATO. In contrast to the leading members of the Scandinavian Committees, Magnússon was not an influential social democratic operator with direct government access. Ragnar Stefánsson recalls how the anti-fascist agenda of the Icelandic Committee—which together with Greece was also used against Spain and Portugal—was quickly overshadowed by that of anti-imperialism espoused by the movement against the Vietnam War. It dominated protest activities in Iceland as was the case in the other Nordic countries.⁵⁰⁵ No less than the Spanish Question, the Greek Question could not be dealt with through a reference to a collective memory of fascism, which made sense to the Icelandic public. What concerned the Icelandic Left was opposing the continued U.S. military presence on the island within a transnational context. Abandoning a purely nationalist narrative, it was linked to a world-wide anti-imperialist struggle symbolized by the opposition to the Vietnam War. In this context, the idea of Nordic cooperation in opposing a fascist regime in Greece was less attractive than that of supporting Third World national liberation movements.

Like the Icelandic Committee, the Finnish Committee took only a limited part in the transnational activities of the Nordic committees. Apart from the first Nordic conference in Stockholm, the leader of the Finnish Committee, Georg Backlund, participated in two other Nordic meetings, one in 1968 and the other in 1970.⁵⁰⁶ In 1971, the other Nordic Committees were informed by the Finns that they were having problems with their Committee, which was undergoing a reorganization. A new future committee would entirely be made up of representatives from the different Finnish youth organizations. Yet, no further Finnish involvement in the Nordic cooperation of the Committees seems to have taken place.⁵⁰⁷ Before the reorganization, the largest undertaking of the Finnish Committee was the hosting

⁵⁰⁴ Letter, Andreas Papandreou to Sigurður A. Magnússon, May 16, 1972, ICE/LBS/710-NF Sigurður A. Magnússon.

⁵⁰⁵ Interview with Ragnar Stefánsson, September 26, 2022.

⁵⁰⁶ Report, “Rapport fra internordisk konferanse i Stockholm søndag 28/1 1968,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Komité for demokrati i Hellas 1967–68, Lionæs, Aase, 1; “Referat fra møte mellom de nordiske komiteer for demokrati i Hellas [November 1970],” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 3; at the 1970 meeting, the Finnish representative had even less to report than the stand-in representative for Iceland.

⁵⁰⁷ Report, “Beretning for perioden 28.1.1970 – 28.1.1971,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/A/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 2.

of the First World Congress of Greek Anti-dictatorship Committees in July 1969.⁵⁰⁸ These Committees were particularly close to the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries where many exiled Greeks had lived since the end of the Greek Civil War, although they had chapters in the West as well. The Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Greek Democrats seemed to have played a significant role at the First World Congress. It goes without saying that it defined the Junta as fascist and the opposition to it as anti-fascist.⁵⁰⁹

Except for the Finnish Committee, the only other Nordic Committee that participated in the Congress was the Swedish one, with Hans Göran Franck representing it. Franck had also been involved—in a similar capacity—in another Soviet-led event in Berlin organized by the World Peace Council. The Congress in Finland, however, was primarily organized for exiled Greeks; Franck and the Finnish Committee members only had an observer status.⁵¹⁰ The Greek Anti-Dictatorial Committees stated at the Congress that they wished to unify all Greek resistance groups abroad under their umbrella organization, regardless of political affinity;⁵¹¹ it was an aspiration which proved to be unsuccessful. It was widely reported in the Nordic press that participants in the Congress were ready to take up an “armed struggle” and use “violence” against the Junta to topple it.⁵¹² Such statements did not ease the work of the Nordic Committees. The adversity the Finnish Committee faced in its work can be traced to a related political issue—and the Congress probably aggravated it. In an article about Finnish-Greek relations, written by former Finnish Ambassador to Greece and social democrat Ralf Friberg, he claimed that the Finnish Committee was being monitored by the Finnish Foreign Ministry on the grounds that it wanted to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece. The Foreign Ministry, he claimed, also found the goals of the Committee incompatible with the Finnish law on associations because it sought to change the policies of another country. This kind of government pressure and scrutiny contributed, undoubtedly, to the decline of the Finnish Committee. When the government was pressed by Finnish Communist Party and Social Democratic Party members to clarify its stance vis-à-vis the Junta, the Foreign

⁵⁰⁸ Letter, Antti Perheentupa and Georg Backlund (Finnish Committee) to Hans Göran Franck, July 7, 1969, Korrespondens 1966-1970, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-5, Hans Göran Franck.

⁵⁰⁹ “Congress of fighters against dictatorship in Greece,” *Information Bulletin of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Greek Democrats*, 6 (1969): 2–3.

⁵¹⁰ Report, “Verksamhetsberättelse för 1969,” SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-1, Hans Göran Franck, 6.

⁵¹¹ Document, “The first congress of the Greek anti-dictatorship committees,” July 13–15, 1969, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens.

⁵¹² “Grekkommittéer beredda till våld mot juntan,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, July 16, 1969; “Væpnet oppgjør,” *Arbeiderbladet*, July 16, 1969.

Ministry stated that it was Finnish policy to have diplomatic relations with all countries regardless of whether they agreed with their policies or not.⁵¹³

The second Finnish Committee was called “Action group for free Greece,” and among its members was the future President of Finland Tarja Halonen. It was more successful in bringing together representatives from the larger political parties—and managed to persuade Mikis Theodorakis to visit Finland. Nevertheless, Friberg argues that overall, the Greek Junta received minimal attention in Finnish domestic politics and public life; compared to the other Nordic countries, the Finns were seen as being “reserved” in their attitudes towards the Junta. Friberg also points to the fact that Finland did not have a Greek immigrant and refugee community like Sweden.⁵¹⁴ Thus, like its Icelandic counterpart, the Finnish Committee played a marginal role in the transnational activities of the Nordic Committees. In addition, Finland was neither a member of the Council of Europe nor NATO, which excluded it from the two most effective avenues to confront the Greek Junta. It could be argued that the Finnish Committee faced a unique set of challenges when compared to its Nordic counterparts. One effect of “Finlandization” seems to have been the limitation of popular engagement with foreign policy issues. More research, however, is needed to answer the question of whether the collective memory of fascism played a role in limiting or enabling mobilization of public opinion against the Greek Junta in Finland.

The Nordic Committees usually responded with unease when there were public calls for violence. In 1967, the chairman of the Greek Anti-dictatorship Committee in Denmark, Stathis Rigas, stated in the Danish press that all the Committees in Europe had decided, in a meeting in Paris, to acquire weapons and bombs for the resistance struggle.⁵¹⁵ Since members of the Norwegian Committee had attended the Paris meeting, Treholt and Lionæs were uncomfortable about the statement.⁵¹⁶ It is unclear to what extent the Committees participated in illegal activities; if they did, they probably did not want it advertised. Nonetheless, in the 1980s, a Swedish Social Democratic member of the Swedish Committee, Arne Eriksson, admitted to having participated, personally, in sabotage actions inside Greece. Eriksson even

⁵¹³ Ralf Friberg, “Suomi ja junta,” *Helikon*, 2 (2010): 15–20, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://www.yumpu.com/fi/document/read/42577259/2-2010-irtonumero-3a-suomen-ateenan-instituutti>. The text was translated by Tarmo Tähtinen and Google translate.

⁵¹⁴ Friberg, “Suomi ja junta,” 15–21.

⁵¹⁵ “Våben til græsk modstand,” *Politiken*, November 11, 1967.

⁵¹⁶ Notes, “Referat fra møtet i den greske seksjonen av komiteene som arbeider for demokrati i Hellas 4. og 5. november 1967 i Paris,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Komité for demokrati i Hellas 1967-68, Lionæs, Aase, 1–2.

claimed responsibility for the bombing of a statue of U.S. President Truman in Athens,⁵¹⁷ which, if true, was an act of unexpected boldness on the part of a Scandinavian Social Democrat. In 1970, the journalist Bengt Holmquist, who together with Schori had been involved in writing the book *Förräderiet mot Grekland*, was also accused of smuggling explosives to Greece at a trial held there against resistance members.⁵¹⁸ The recurring accounts of Swedish Social Democrats handling explosives might suggest a more direct Swedish participation in the Greek resistance. Indeed, historian Stan Draenos claims that Andreas Papandreou used a farm in Sweden owned by Schori to experiment with explosive devices.⁵¹⁹ To determine the true extent of these activities requires further research, but they illustrate how a militant potentiality within an anti-fascist collective identity challenged the legalism of Scandinavian Social Democrats.

Debating Nordic Participation in the European Athletic Championship in Athens

Hans Göran Franck used the time at the 1969 First World Congress of Greek Anti-dictatorship Committees in Finland to publish a collective statement on behalf of the participants, urging for the boycott of the upcoming European Athletics Championships in Athens. The games should be boycotted because they would be used as a propaganda tool for the military regime like the “Olympic games held in Berlin 1936.”⁵²⁰ Already in 1968, the Norwegian and Swedish Committees had started to propagate against participation in the Athens Championships. In Norway, the new chairman of the Committee, the Social Democrat Jens Haugland, urged Norway’s Athletic Association (*Norges Fri-idrettsforbund*) to call for a change of venue or for staying away from Athens, using the 1936 Berlin Olympics analogy. At a joint Swedish-Norwegian Committee meeting, a statement was issued calling for a Nordic boycott of the championships.⁵²¹ It put pressure on the athletes themselves: “... the Committees find it morally reprehensible that the athletic associations hold a position that will force active athletes to perform as propagandists for Greek neo-fascism.”⁵²² The Swedish

⁵¹⁷ “För tio år sedan Kommittén för Greklands demokrati var en unik rörelse,” *Stockholms Tidningen*, November 14, 1983.

⁵¹⁸ “Svensk åter utpekad av åtalad i Aten,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, April 8, 1970.

⁵¹⁹ Draenos, “Andreas Papandreou’s Exile Politics,” 55.

⁵²⁰ Report, “Verksamhetsberättelse för 1969,” SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-1, Hans Göran Franck, Bil. 9.

⁵²¹ Iceland was not mentioned specifically in the appeal.

⁵²² Letter, Jens Haugland (Norwegian Committee) to Per Sonerud (Norwegian Athletics Association), November 30, 1968; press release, March, 25 1969, “Beretning for tidsrommet 27/11-1968 til 20/1-1970,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/A/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, Bilag 8, p.7, Bilag 9. Translated from the original Norwegian: “På denne bakgrunn finner komiteene det moralsk forkastelig at fri-

Committee was successful in influencing the umbrella organization *Sveriges Riksidrottsförbund*, whose role was to advise and issue recommendations to various sports associations. In an extra-annual meeting, the *Riksidrottsförbund* came to three far-reaching conclusions. Sports exchange, competition, or exhibitions should not happen if the country in question was guilty of discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or political conviction; if it was under U.N. sanctions; or if it did not have diplomatic relations with Sweden. Thus, it recommended that the track and field association of Sweden should not participate in Athens.⁵²³ The day before the official decision Andreas Papandreou spoke to a crowd in Stockholm where he asked the following questions: “—Is it the will of the athletes in the championship in Athens to become the moral co-conspirators of the Junta and to applaud the dictator of Greece when he enters the stadium?”⁵²⁴

The Track and Field Association (*Svenska friidrottsförbundet*), however, went against the recommendation of the *Riksidrottsförbund*, deciding, unanimously, to participate in the championships. It claimed that opinion polls showed that the public shared the view that politics should be kept out of sports. The decision was protested outside the meeting venue, but the demonstrators were prevented by the police from delivering their demands to the board members.⁵²⁵ Papandreou did not mince his words, when lamenting the decision as “a black day for the Greek resistance movement.” He pleaded with Swedish athletes not to go, and if they did, at least protest the Junta during their stay. The Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander stated that the sports movement is democratic and had every right to make its own independent decisions.⁵²⁶ The chairman of the track and field association argued that if there had been UN or Council of Europe sanctions in place against the regime, things might have been different.⁵²⁷

As part of a coordinated Nordic effort, the Swedish Committee lobbied the Swedish state broadcasting agency *Sveriges Radio* (SR) to boycott the games to forestall a repeat of

idrottsförbundene inntar en holdning som tvinger de aktive fri-idrettsfolkene til å opptre som propagandister for gresk nyfascisme.”

⁵²³ Letter, Wolf Lyberg (Swedish Sports Confederation) to the Swedish Committee, January 24, 1969. Svenska Kommittén för Greklands demokrati, “Verksamhetsberättelse för 1969,” SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-1, Hans Göran Franck, Bil. 3.

⁵²⁴ “Tusentals protesterade mot EM och Kotzikos-fallet,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 31, 1969. In the original Swedish: “—Vill de idrottsmän som deltar i EM i Aten moraliskt bli juntans sammansvurna och applådera Greklands diktator när han kommer in på stadion.”

⁵²⁵ “Sverige startar i friidrotts-EM,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, June 1, 1969.

⁵²⁶ “Demonstrera när ni är i Grekland,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, June 1, 1969. In the original Swedish: “svart dag för den grekiska motståndsrörelsen.”

⁵²⁷ “Idrotten lever i en inkonsekvens,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, June 1, 1969.

the 1936 Olympics.⁵²⁸ The board of the broadcaster heeded the plea, which caused an uproar. Olof Rydbeck, the chief of SR, feared that it would set a precedent and limit free flow of information. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, *Norsk Rikskringkasting* (NRK) also decided against broadcasting the games. *Danmarks Radio* (DR) did not go as far, deciding to broadcast recordings from the “Eurovision” broadcaster. The Finnish Public Broadcasting Company (YLE), however, went against the grain and stuck to its decision to offer broad coverage of the games.⁵²⁹ The success of a partial Nordic media boycott of the championship illustrated the power of mnemonic anti-fascism. If the Junta was fascist, a sport championship in Greece could readily be compared to the 1936 Berlin Olympics. And this historical analogy has been a recurring theme whenever authoritarian regimes organize sport events.

An intense debate followed in the Nordic countries over journalistic freedom and government pressure. The Swedish Minister of Education, Olof Palme, who was responsible for the relations between the public broadcaster and the Swedish state, argued that SR had not deferred to the Swedish government’s foreign policy but was echoing public opinion about the Junta.⁵³⁰ Franck became the public face for the campaign in Sweden, enjoying ample access to radio and TV shows. In a curious episode, a sports journalist in *Sydsvenska Dagbladet* targeted him personally, accusing him of spreading lies: “he [Franck] travels back and forth repeatedly to communist dictatorships to get so-called democratic allies in the struggle for the blockade against Athens (it is like driving out the Devil with Beelzebub, “but worse”).”⁵³¹ This was too much for the respectable lawyer Franck, who threatened the editor with a libel suit, if the paper did not apologize and donate 3000 SEK to the Swedish Committee.⁵³² Although the editor believed that the demand for restitution would not be upheld by a court, he agreed to it since he was sympathetic to the cause.⁵³³ In its apology, *Sydsvenska Dagbladet* argued that their journalist had not told any lies, even if he been too hard on Franck. What particularly offended Franck was the charge about his travels to the Eastern Bloc, which he did not view as problematic. He claimed that he had embarked on his trips to East Berlin and Moscow to gather support for the boycott. He even asserted without

⁵²⁸ Letter, Hans Göran Franck and Arne Eriksson to the board of ”Sveriges Radio,” August 12, 1969, ”Verksamhetsberättelse för 1969,” SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-1, Hans Göran Franck, Bil. 10.

⁵²⁹ “Radiochefen kritisk mot EM-bojkotten,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, August 29, 1969: 3,14.

⁵³⁰ “Två läger i radiohuset Blixtmöten,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, August 30, 1969.

⁵³¹ “Lögnen som argument,” *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, August 31, 1969. In the original Swedish: “han reser i skytteltrafik till de kommunistiska diktaturländerna för att skaffa sig s k demokratiska bundsförvanter i kampen för blockaden mot Aten (det är som att söka driva ut Djävulen med Belsebub, “fast värre”).”

⁵³² Letter, Hans Göran Franck to Nils Ivar Ivarson (*Sydsvenska Dagbladet*), September 9, 1969, Grekländskommittén, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-31, Hans Göran Franck.

⁵³³ Letter, Ivarson to Franck, September 15, 1969, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-31, Hans Göran Franck.

providing evidence that he had criticized the Soviets, vocally, for their sports relations with Greece.⁵³⁴ The whole episode might be characterized as a curiosum. Yet it was indicative of Franck's social standing (and that of the Committee) that he was able to squeeze out a hefty compensation and an apology from a newspaper that had offended his sensibilities.

Norwegian and Danish Committee members also had some misgivings about Franck's willingness to cooperate with the Soviets against the Greek Junta. The Norwegian Social Democrat Ole Wiig questioned the inclusion of representatives from state-controlled Eastern European Committees at international conferences. Ole Wahl Olsen, a Danish Committee member, argued that boycotts in the West were useless because the Soviet Union and its Eastern European partner states had increased their trade and cultural exchange with the Junta. Unlike the Swedes, the Danes and the Norwegians had doubts about the effectiveness of the boycott. Eastern Bloc Committees sent heaps of printed material to the Danes without responding to a single letter from the Danish Committee. Doubts were also cast on Franck's participation in the Finnish Congress and on his excuses for involving Committees from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Although he admitted that the communist committees had failed to aid Western-based resistance organizations because of currency restrictions, he made the point that their donations had been delivered to the International Red Cross. To him, it was important that the Nordic Committees put pressure both on both Western and Eastern Bloc governments.⁵³⁵

The chairman of the Soviet Committee, Sergey Smirnov, who participated in some of the conferences sponsored by the Nordic Committees, dismissed all criticism of his country's policies towards Greece, blaming it on anti-Soviet political circles. He justified the extensive commercial relations that had been forged between the Soviet Union and Greece by saying that they were part of long-term trade agreements. Moreover, he denied that state-sponsored Soviet cruises to Greece undermined the anti-Junta tourist boycott. On the other hand, he stressed that any support the Greek regime received from the United States and NATO had to be exposed. Finally, he asserted that the Soviet Committee had organized several "thousand public meetings"—in the previous three years—where Soviet citizens had protested the Junta

⁵³⁴ "Om lögnen som argument," *Sydsvenska Dagbladet* [?] September 1969; The right-wing extremist Christopher Jolin also accused Franck and the Swedish Committee of being controlled by the Soviets; see "Greklandskommittén och Världsfredsrådet," *Göteborgsposten*, July 6, 1971; "Greklandskommittén en fri organisation," *Göteborgsposten*, July 18, 1971.

⁵³⁵ Protocol, "Nordisk konferanse i Stockholm," March 14, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 2–3, 6, 8; in the Swedish notes from the same meeting, the discussion about the Eastern bloc Committees was omitted.

and demanded a return to freedom and democracy.⁵³⁶ It was a dubious claim since it must have meant that public protests had been held almost daily during this period. Smirnov's sincerity in his support for freedom and democracy could also be questioned. In 1958, he had personally spearheaded the campaign against Nobel Prize winner Boris Pasternak, which led to the writer's ostracization and loss of citizenship.⁵³⁷ Franck's willingness to cooperate with the Soviets became a reoccurring liability for the Swedish Committee and probably limited its public appeal. Nonetheless, it was consistent with the commitment of some segments of the Left to détente and undoubtedly reflected an anti-fascist ideal internationally. Cooperation with committees in Eastern Europe was also understandable considering the large, exiled communities of Greeks living there. This cooperation, however, should also be critically evaluated since it was clear that the Eastern bloc committees were controlled by authoritarian states, which failed to take concrete actions to oppose or put pressure on the Greek Junta.

Although the Swedish-Danish-Norwegian broadcasting boycott was heeded at home, it meant nothing to the outside world. The European Athens championships were an enormous success from which the Greek Junta benefitted. Attendance of European athletes was seen as a sign of support for the regime. The Norwegian labor movement sponsored an unofficial Norwegian delegation—made up of Otto Lyng, Einar Førde, and Arne Treholt—that visited Athens during the event. The trio was struck by how smoothly the games had proceeded without any demonstrations or bombings. What shocked them, however, was the attendance of a uniformed and armed “fascist” paramilitary youth organization, *Neolaia Alkimon*, at the closing ceremony. Before the games, there had been a wave of arrests of suspected resistance members. Nonetheless, the Greek resistance movement was considered extremely weak and without deep popular roots. And its bomb attacks against predominantly U.S. targets had not enhanced its domestic standing prior to the big event. Those Greeks that opposed the regime were disappointed by the Nordic athletes, arguing that their participation was not consistent with the tough stance adopted by Nordic governments against the Junta. In their eyes, the Junta, which was controlled by the United States and NATO, was a neo-fascist threat to the rest of Europe. If it could not be successfully countered internationally, the Greeks themselves had to act.⁵³⁸ As he had done on preceding visit to Athens, Lyng insisted

⁵³⁶ “Solidaritetsrörelsen för det demokratiska Grekland,” *Ny Dag Arbetar-Tidningen*, December 9–10, 1970. In the original Swedish: “flera tusen offentliga möten, där sovjetmedborgare gett uttryck åt sin indignation över juntans handlingar och krävt frihet och demokrati skall återupprättas i Grekland.”

⁵³⁷ Olga Ivinskaya, *A Captive of Time: My Years with Pasternak* (New York: Doubleday, 1978), 251–261.

⁵³⁸ Report, “Uoffisiell delegasjonsreise til Hellas i dagene 16. – 25. september 1969,” DK/RA/07680-13, Camre, Mogens, 1–2, 11–12.

on seeing the Interior and Vice Prime Minister Stylianos Pattakos, a request that was granted. In the company of Treholt and Førde, Lyng engaged, again, in a heated debate with Pattakos, who had no qualms about associating his regime with Jesus, and who made the case for closer Norwegian ties with Greece. Lyng pressed Pattakos—unsuccessfully it turned out—for the release of political prisoners who could join him on his return flight from Greece. Lyng lamented that Norway had to be in an alliance with Greece.⁵³⁹ The Norwegian delegation also met with an unnamed “chief of the political section” at the U.S. Embassy in Athens who revealed that the American position on the Junta would not change unless it became clear that the Greek population really opposed the regime. At that time, there were no such indications, only signs of increased support in the countryside and a general apathy among the Greeks who, like the Spaniards, were tired of the prospects of war and political conflict. The diplomat, who was stupefied by the Scandinavian outrage over the Junta, reiterated that the Americans were against isolating the regime internationally as well as against any political actions that might threaten the status quo in NATO.⁵⁴⁰

Nordic Actions against Greece in NATO and the Council of Europe

After the Greek coup, the Danes had been one step ahead of the Swedes and Norwegians when it came to organizing a political campaign against the Junta. Mogens Camre did not immediately establish a Greek committee in Denmark. Instead, he continued his covert activism in governmental circles and his practice of sending letters about the Greek situation to the American academics who had been enlisted in the Greek cause. It prompted a critical intervention by Liberal opposition leader Poul Hartling, who asked Prime Minister Krag—in parliament—about the influential activist, claiming that Camre was dictating Danish foreign policy toward Greece. In a television interview, Camre had already called for the abdication of the Greek King. In his memoirs, Camre recounts that in May 1967, the Foreign Policy Committee of the Danish Parliament had decided to bring up the Greek coup in NATO.⁵⁴¹ Yet, when Denmark’s NATO Permanent Representative, Henning Hjort-Nielsen, tried to do so a day later at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris, his Greek counterpart protested, stating he would leave the session if the Danish statement addressed the situation in Greece.

⁵³⁹ Report, “Uoffisiell delegasjonsreise til Hellas i dagene 16. – 25. september 1969,” DK/RA/07680-13, Camre, Mogens, 13–17.

⁵⁴⁰ Report, “Uoffisiell delegasjonsreise til Hellas i dagene 16. – 25. september 1969,” DK/RA/07680-13, Camre, Mogens, 5–8.

⁵⁴¹ Danish records of parliament, “1/6 67: 3. beh. Af f. t. l. om tillægsbevilling for 1966-67,” DK/RA/07680-13, Camre, Mogens, 5211-5212; Mogens Camre, *Knus tyrannerne*, 137–138.

The Italian Secretary General of NATO, Manlio Brosio, reacted to this exchange by suspending the meeting for two days.⁵⁴² The Danes did not, however, give up; they calculated that if they were not allowed to speak on Greece, they could, at least, write about it, distributing a statement to all NATO Council members.⁵⁴³ Norway's Permanent Representative to NATO, Georg Kristiansen, did the same on behalf of the Norwegian Foreign Minister, John Lyng. The Greek delegation responded by complaining to the NATO delegations that this was an interference in the internal affairs of Greece.

In the Danish and Norwegian letters concerns were not only raised about the abrogation of democracy and condition of political prisoners. It was asserted that the Greek coup had the potential of delegitimizing the democratic credibility of the Alliance as a whole.⁵⁴⁴ Throughout the reign of the Greek Junta, Denmark and Norway were the only NATO members that expressed unambiguous opposition to the regime. Already in the 1950s, the two Nordic states had opposed the NATO membership of Greece and Turkey on the grounds that they lacked democratic credibility and that their inclusion might be interpreted as an attempt to encircle the Soviet Union.⁵⁴⁵ In contrast, their Nordic neighbor, Iceland, never joined them in their protests within NATO. Historian Valur Ingimundarson has shown that this was due to a direct request from the Americans to the Icelandic government, which the government heeded.⁵⁴⁶ Conservative officials within the Icelandic Foreign Ministry also advised against it, arguing that joining the Danish and Norwegian protests would jeopardize Icelandic fish exports and the cordial diplomatic relationship with Greece,⁵⁴⁷ which had not encountered any problems due to the coup.

Historian Effie Pedaliu argues that both Denmark and Norway pursued “a foreign policy based on principled humanitarianism.” Thus, violations of human rights were seen as especially problematic; besides, the Norwegians and the Danes had few economic interests in Greece. Like other scholars, Pedaliu also stresses that the royal ties between the Danish and Greek dynasties—the marriage between King Constantine and Princess Anne-Marie—

⁵⁴² Letter, “Report on Greece by Mogens Camre,” May 4, 1967, DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens, 3; “Kuppledare lovar släppa fångar,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 5, 1967: 17. There is a confusion over the date in both Pedaliu's and Swarts's accounts; they think it is May 9.

⁵⁴³ Statement, “Afleveret skriftligt til NATO-rådsmedlemmerne 5. maj 1967,” DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens.

⁵⁴⁴ “Danmark-Norge fördömer Atenkuppen i Nato,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 6, 1967.

⁵⁴⁵ Effie G. H. Pedaliu, “‘A Discordant Note’: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974,” 102.

⁵⁴⁶ Valur Ingimundarson, *Uppgjör við unheiminn: Samskipti Íslands, Bandaríkjanna og NATO 1960-1974. Íslensk þjóðernishygga, vestrænt samstarf og landhelgisdeilan* (Reykjavík: Vaka-Helgafell, 2001), 95–96.

⁵⁴⁷ Memorandum, “Frásögn” (Niels P. Sigurðsson), May 11, 1967, utanríkisráðuneytið, stjórnarbyltingin í Grikklandi í apríl 1967, P. I, ICE/ÞÍ/B/324.

influenced Denmark's hostility toward the military regime.⁵⁴⁸ Brosio's response to the Danish and Norwegian letters at the NATO meeting in May became the norm for dealing with Greece until the Junta was toppled. The Alliance, he claimed, was not the right place to bring up the situation in Greece. The Secretary General collaborated closely with the U.S. Permanent Representative, Harlan Cleveland, on how to contain any adverse developments stemming from the Greek coup. Through their efforts, it was kept out of official communiques. Both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations worked behind the scenes to silence formal criticism of the Junta. Historians Karakatsanis and Swarts argue that in this way the question of democracy in the Alliance became a secondary issue for the United States and other NATO members, such as West Germany, which, as noted, followed U.S. lead. In short, raw military interests trumped talk about human rights or democracy.⁵⁴⁹

The Scandinavian "offensive" on the Greek issue at the Council of Europe proved to be more successful. On May 10—the same day that the Swedish Committee's inaugurating press conference took place—Krag took the initiative to bring up the situation in Greece at a Nordic Prime Ministers meeting in Oslo. He pressed his Swedish and Norwegian counterparts, Tage Erlander and Per Borten, for action against Greece in the Council of Europe. They responded positively with the caveat that they had to consult with their governments and foreign policy committees.⁵⁵⁰ Nonetheless, historian Kristine Kjærsgaard argues that the Danes pursued, a "wait and see policy" until September and that they did not bring up the Greek question in NATO. As is clear from the discussion above, the Danish were not passive. It is, however, true that the Danes did not want to go ahead alone in making the complaint against Greece in the Council. They feared that it would have minimal impact and could be written off as a "Royal drama" because of the dynastic relations between the Danish and Greek royal families. To Kjærsgaard, the only motivation for the Danes to pursue the issue was this royal connection. She argues that the comparatively small interest Denmark took in the 1960 military coup in Turkey strengthen this interpretation. The royal connection was discussed by the Foreign Policy Committee, and there were demonstrations outside the Danish Royal Palace protesting the Greek King's involvement.⁵⁵¹ However, what should be stressed is that the Danish Social Democrats and Andreas Papandreou had already forged

⁵⁴⁸ Pedaliu, "'A Discordant Note': NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974," 102, 109.

⁵⁴⁹ Karakatsanis and Swarts, *American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels*, 6, 148, 152.

⁵⁵⁰ "Nordisk action: Europarådet bör dryfta grekkuppen," *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 11, 1967; "Grekregimen behandlas vid Oslomöte," *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 10, 1967.

⁵⁵¹ Kristine Kjærsgaard, "Confronting the Greek Military Junta Scandinavian Joint Action under the European Commission on Human Rights, 1967–70," in *The 'Long 1970s': Human Rights, East-West Détente and Transnational Relations*, 55–56.

political ties before the coup. The references to the memory of the Nazi occupation, in particular, and to fascism, in general, were also all-important. It is hard to discard the idea that seeing the Junta as a return to fascism heightened the sense of urgency. Meanwhile, public pressure was clearly a significant factor in the decision of the Nordic governments to support the Greek opposition.

The Swedish Committee also played its part in the events that followed. In June, it urged the Swedish Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson to raise the Greek question in the Council of Europe and at the UN.⁵⁵² In mid-July, Hans Göran Franck wrote an article, which was published in the newspaper *Dagens Nyheter*, demanding action in the Council of Europe. He argued that since Portugal and Spain had been denied membership in the Council due to their lack of democratic credentials, the same should apply to Greece because it had violated Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, banning torture. As for the formal procedure, he pointed out that what was needed was that a member state brings the case forward within the Council—and he asked the Swedish government to do so. He also wanted it to discuss Greece at the UN. With literature and poetry from antiquity being banned and women being separated from their babies as political prisoners, he maintained that it was important to act. Greece should not be allowed to become a new Spain. The youth of Europe would not be able to have faith in democracy if a fascist dictatorship was allowed to flourish.⁵⁵³

Thus, the argument for opposing the Junta was made on the basis of human rights, but more importantly through mnemonic anti-fascism. Again, the public was urged to remember the past—or what happened in Spain—to avoid a similar tragedy happening in the present. A week later, in an article in *Dagens Nyheter*, the Vice President of the Council of Europe, the Swedish Liberal MP Sven Gustafson, seconded Franck's pleas by encouraging the Swedish government to move on Greek issue within the Council. Yet, he also corrected Franck on two points: that the situation in Greece had already been brought up in the Council and that the coup had been condemned by the Assembly. This had happened back in April, and in June, when the Council's Permanent Committee expressed a wish that member governments, either separately or collectively, refer the question of human rights violations in Greece to the Commission of Human Rights.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁵² Report, "Rapport från Kommitten för Greklands Demokrati," October 13, 1967, NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030, Komité for demokrati i Hellas, Lionæs, Aase, 1.

⁵⁵³ "Våldsregimen i Grekland," *Dagens Nyheter*, July 15, 1967.

⁵⁵⁴ "Grekland och Europarådet," *Dagens Nyheter*, July 23, 1967.

Mogens Camre was also eager to see Nordic action in the Council. In early August, he suggested that Franck put pressure on the Swedish government before the Nordic Foreign Ministers meeting in Helsinki scheduled for later that month. He exhorted Franck to use his position as chairman of the Swedish Committee and his personal contacts within the Social Democratic Party. Camre informed Franck—based on information he had received from Krag—that the Danish government was willing to act in the Council if it could be presented as a concerted effort by several governments. All available pressure should be put on the foreign ministers to bring forward a case against Greece.⁵⁵⁵ Camre also encouraged the IUSY General Secretary Jan Hækkerup⁵⁵⁶ and his American academic contacts to use their influence in the matter. The American scholars and activists were mobilized through detailed and confidential “Coordination Reports,” in which Camre informed them on the Council of Europe, NATO, and other international avenues of action against the Greek Junta. Among others, these reports were sent to professors John Buttrick, George Loanis, Frank Newman, Stephen Rousseas and to the famous activist Stanley Sheinbaum. Camre provided the recipients with the names of all the Nordic foreign ministers (except for the Icelandic one), requesting that they write to them and that the letters be simultaneously published in the Scandinavian press. The different Committees could also be used to this end. In addition, he claimed that the Danish government was involved in secret diplomacy to try to influence other NATO members on the Greek issue. Thus, Krag had discussed it with President Johnson during the “Middle East crisis,” making the Danish position clear.⁵⁵⁷ All this shows, how the Greek issue was pursued by covert political action and public pressure as well as through transnational cooperation and coordination.

This campaign proved to be successful. It confirms what historians like Pedaliu have assumed that the public pressure was essential, and that the Scandinavian governments were especially receptive to it.⁵⁵⁸ In late August, the Swedish Foreign Minister Nilsson stated that the Greek issue should be referred to the European Commission on Human Rights. He claimed that it was not only Sweden and Denmark that supported this course of action but all the Nordic countries. Because Finland was not a Council member, a Nordic decision to act against Greece had to be made without it.⁵⁵⁹ Undoubtedly, the Nordic Parliamentary delegation to Greece, which had, as mentioned, returned home a day before also influenced

⁵⁵⁵ Letter, Camre to Hans Göran Franck, August 2, 1967, DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens.

⁵⁵⁶ Letter, Camre to Jan Hækkerup, August 1, 1967, DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens.

⁵⁵⁷ Letter, Camre “Coordination – Report No. 1,” August 3, 1967, DK/RA/07680-10, Camre, Mogens, 5–6.

⁵⁵⁸ Pedaliu, “A clash of cultures?” 97–99.

⁵⁵⁹ “‘Nordisk grekaktion bör tas upp i Europarådet,’” *Dagens Nyheter*, August 23, 1967.

the willingness to act. Historians Hanne Hagtvedt Vik and Skage Alexander Østberg claim that at the Foreign Ministers meeting in Helsinki, Torsten Nilsson stated that the Swedes were prepared to put forward the application for the expulsion of Greece from the Council alone if no one would join them. This threat had forced the Danes and Norwegians to side with the Swedes because they did not want to be left out.⁵⁶⁰ This seems a bit contradictory considering the previous involvement of Krag as shown by his media statements. The motivation for acting at this point was that there had been no movement toward restoring democracy in Greece. Sweden was ready to act, and Norway was likely to follow; since the Council itself had recommended action, the Netherlands and Belgium were likely to follow a Scandinavian initiative.

Kjærsgaard argues that in Denmark and Norway, the action in the Council against the Junta was used to stave off criticism against their NATO membership, which had increased after the Greek coup. In the case of Norway, the government hoped if it moved within the Council of Europe on Greece, it would improve its foreign policy reputation among its population. This was after the completion of a controversial sale of torpedo boats to the Junta, which had been sarcastically dubbed the “Nasty affair” since the class of boats were named Nasty. Kjærsgaard interprets public pressure as the driving force behind the Danish government’s position on the Greek issue. For her, this was most apparent when the Minister of Trade, Tyge Dahlgaard, was forced to resign over his media statements about Denmark’s trade with Greece, which he thought should take precedence over concerns over democracy and human rights.⁵⁶¹ However, the calls for Dahlgaard’s resignation came from within the Social Democratic Party. More precisely, they were orchestrated by Mogens Camre together with the Social Democratic Youth organization (D.s.U.). They argued that the intervention by Dahlgaard, who was a career diplomat without party affiliation, constituted an unprecedented attack on Krag and on Denmark’s new ethical foreign policy.⁵⁶² This episode illustrated how important the Greek issue was for Danish Social Democracy and suggested how influential Mogens Camre had become. The legal departments of the foreign ministries of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway cooperated in making a case against Greece in the Council of Europe, which focused on violations of democratic and human rights. On September 20,

⁵⁶⁰ Vik and Østberg, “Sweden, Amnesty International and Legal Entrepreneurs in Global Anti-Torture Politics, 1967–1977,” 637.

⁵⁶¹ Kristine Kjærsgaard, “Confronting the Greek Military Junta,” 56–57.

⁵⁶² Press statement, “Danmarks socialdemokratiske Ungdom Frit Forum’s landsforbund,” September 28, 1967, ”DK/RA/07680-13, Camre, Mogens, Den danske komite for demokrati i Grækenland, Papandreu 1963–1970 m.m; Mogens Camre, *Knus tyrannerne*, 142–144.

1967, the three countries filed their applications for the expulsion of Greece from the Council to the European Commission on Human Rights. Shortly thereafter, the Netherlands followed suit.

Iceland had been informed of the planned actions and participated in the Nordic Foreign Ministers meeting in Helsinki. The Icelandic government, however, wanted to avoid the Greek issue as much as possible, partly because it did not want to jeopardize its fish exports to Greece.⁵⁶³ After the application had been filed, the Social Democratic Foreign Minister Emil Jónsson claimed that Iceland had only been informed later by “one of the Nordic ambassadors” and that the three Nordic nations had forgotten to send the Icelandic government the application. As he put it: “... the application never came and because of this we fell off the train for the moment, but we have now decided to participate nonetheless.”⁵⁶⁴ As it turned out, Iceland never filed its own application. Instead, the government wrote to the General Secretary of the Council, stating that it was sympathetic to the case against Greece. Belgium and Luxembourg did the same.⁵⁶⁵ This “excuse” did not satisfy the opposition Icelandic Socialist newspaper *Þjóðviljinn*. It had followed the issue closely and frequently asked why Iceland had not taken a more direct part in the Nordic initiative. It pointed out that Emil Jónsson had been in Helsinki where the Swedes, Danes, and Norwegians publicly stated that they would pursue the Greek case in the Council. The claim that Jónsson had not known about the application by then made no sense.⁵⁶⁶

Four days before the Scandinavian countries filed their applications, the Icelandic government had, in fact, still not decided on a course of action. The Icelandic Permanent Representative had access to the Scandinavian applications at least a couple of days before they were filed. Nonetheless, the Icelandic Foreign Ministry hoped that it would suffice to issue a verbal statement in support of the applications. After the Icelanders were told that such a declaration had no validity, they were forced to make it in writing. Yet, as a sign of their lukewarm support, they chose to do it the day after the Scandinavians had filed their complaint.⁵⁶⁷ This ambiguous Icelandic stance continued when the Icelandic Permanent Representative on the Committee of Ministers failed on two occasions—in March and April

⁵⁶³ Hanne Hagtvedt Vik and Skage Alexander Østberg, “Sweden, Amnesty International and Legal Entrepreneurs,” 637.

⁵⁶⁴ “Norðurlönd bera fram kærú gegn grísku herstjórninni,” *Morgunblaðið*, September 21, 1967. In the original Icelandic: “... kærán kom ekki og þess vegna heltumst við þá úr lestinni í bili, en við höfum nú ákveðið að vera með eigi að síður.”

⁵⁶⁵ Kjærsgaard, “Confronting the Greek Military Junta,” 58.

⁵⁶⁶ “Frá degi til dags. Með ólíkindum,” *Þjóðviljinn*, September 22, 1967.

⁵⁶⁷ Letter, Pétur Eggerz to Emil Jónsson, October 5 1967,” *utanríkisráðuneytið, stjórnarbyltingin í Grikklandi í apríl 1967*, P. I, ICE/ÞÍ/B/324.

1968—to support a resolution put forward by their Nordic partners, which threatened to expel Greece from the Council of Europe if democracy was not restored. The Icelandic official was even complimented by the Greek Permanent Representative for his inaction. This lack of solidarity with the other Nordic states was subsequently suppressed in a foreign ministry report and hidden from the Icelandic parliament’s Foreign Policy Committee.⁵⁶⁸

The Norwegian press reported that the Scandinavian action was well received in Strasbourg, noting that it had received official praise from the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Several West German members of the Council of Europe asked in the chamber why there had not been a similar Scandinavian initiative during the 1930s, when German Social Democrats had been persecuted by Hitler. Since it was well known that the application process in the Council of Europe would take many years, the Norwegian Social Democratic press reported that its significance was mostly “psychological.”⁵⁶⁹ There was also criticism of the Scandinavian action for being hypocritical and for reflecting a “foreign policy of pointing fingers” because it did not deal with similar transgression in the Eastern Bloc countries. Krag responded to this criticism by arguing that a cautious policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries contributed to détente and peace. Yet he claimed that the Greek case was different; it was a duty to protest because a democratic government had been replaced with a dictatorship.⁵⁷⁰

The different Nordic Committees would do their best to follow up on the Scandinavian action by putting pressure on the Council of Europe. In Stockholm, the Swedish Committee organized a big torchlight protest on the National Day of Greece at the end of October. Around one thousand people participated in it—Greeks as well as Swedes. Slogans such as “smash fascism” were prominent. Hans Göran Franck spoke at the event, urging the Swedish government to work for a freeze in international relations with Greece and for its immediate expulsion from the Council of Europe. In his speech, the Social Democratic Minister (without a portfolio) Lennart Geijer pointed to the public outrage in the West against the Junta. He encouraged extra-parliamentary action, such as tourist boycotts, and asked the public to support the Committee. The protest turned into scuffles with the police when they failed to prevent some demonstrators from reaching the Greek and

⁵⁶⁸ Memorandum, “Frásögn” (Ólafur Egilsson), April 3, 1968; memorandum “Frásögn” (Ólafur Egilsson), March 27, 1968, utanríkisráðuneytið, stjórnarbyltingin í Grikklandi í apríl 1967, P. I, ICE/DÍ/B/324; “Kunningjabréf,” *Alþýðublaðið*, March 20, 1968.

⁵⁶⁹ “Skarp norsk note i Strasbourg,” *Arbeiderbladet*, September 21, 1967.

⁵⁷⁰ Vik and Østberg, “Sweden, Amnesty International and Legal Entrepreneurs,” 637.

American embassies. A smaller group also smashed a window in the Greek Tourist Bureau.⁵⁷¹ The liberal newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* called the march anti-American because it put the blame on the Americans.⁵⁷² But as a sign of the popular traction of the Greek issue, demonstrations even took place in Swedish towns, such as Kalmar where “Smålands-Greeks” protested the activities of the Junta’s secret police in Sweden, accusing it of illegally monitoring and harassing dissidents.⁵⁷³

In Norway, the Committee established close contact with Jens Evensen, who oversaw the case against Greece in the Council of Europe. Committee members supplied information about torture testimonies and political prisoners in Greece. The Norwegian Committee included some MPs who followed up on the case in the Norwegian Parliament. In late March 1969, the Swedish and Norwegian Committees exhorted the Nordic governments not to wait for the result of the European Commission of Human Rights and push, instead, for the expulsion of Greece on the grounds that it had already violated its human rights commitments.⁵⁷⁴ In Denmark, Committee members, especially Camre, also made available important witnesses and testimonies to the Danish legal team. A case in point is the fascinating story of Maria Becket, who worked clandestinely to help witnesses of human rights abuses to leave Greece. According to Camre, Krag would even call her their own “Mata Hari” because of her covert skills. She was Greek herself, but her husband was an American jurist working for United High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Due to her access to vast resources, Camre suspected that she was connected to a larger intelligence service; it was later revealed that she was working secretly for anti-Junta elements in the Greek-Orthodox Church. Becket’s clandestine activities against the Junta put her at great risk. Since Camre was worried about her, he asked Frode Jakobsen, the legendary veteran of the Danish resistance movement, to give her personal advice. Frode told her to avoid all resistance figures that either talk too much, drink too much, or are womanizers. Becket jokingly replied that in that case, she had to avoid all Greeks. Another important witness whom the Danes accessed through Camre was the naval officer Konstantine Marotis, who had a Danish wife and who had settled in Denmark.⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷¹ “1000 i tåg för Grekland,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, October 29, 1967.

⁵⁷² “Facklor för Grekland,” *Dagens Nyheter*, October 29, 1967.

⁵⁷³ “Smålandsgreker fruktas närvaro av säkerhetspolis,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, October 29, 1967.

⁵⁷⁴ Report, “Den norske komite for Demokrati I Hellas, Oslo 1. Beretning for tidsrommet 27/11-1968 til 20/1-1970,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/A/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 9, bilag 13.

⁵⁷⁵ Mogens Camre, *Knus tyrannerne*, 148–150, 154.

The Icelandic Committee was also mobilized in the struggle. In 1969, the activist Betty Ambatielos, who had visited Iceland, encouraged the Icelanders to collect signatures from Icelandic MPs for an appeal to the Council of Europe. In the appeal, the imprisonment of their parliamentary colleagues in Greece was protested. The document was very modestly worded, yet many Icelandic parliamentarians refrained from signing it. One was the Social Democratic Foreign Minister Emil Jónsson and more than half of the Conservative MPs.⁵⁷⁶ While in other Nordic countries, Committee members had meetings with foreign ministers, or even had ministers speaking at their protest meetings, this was not the case in Iceland. In fact, Emil Jónsson did not even respond to letters from the Icelandic Committee.⁵⁷⁷ This passivity was unsurprising, considering that at a government meeting in January the same year, Jónsson had ordered his government to work against Greece's expulsion from the Council of Europe. Officially it was to wait for the report from European Commission on Human Rights.⁵⁷⁸ The Greek representatives themselves hoped that with the human rights report they could bring the case before the European Court of Human Rights, thus postponing an expulsion.⁵⁷⁹ Either way the stalling actions by Iceland in the Council of Europe was noticed and greatly appreciated by the Greeks who expressed their gratitude.⁵⁸⁰ This pertained to a vote in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe where a large majority argued that Greece had already violated conditions for membership and was, hence, liable for expulsion.⁵⁸¹ In this vote, Iceland abstained.⁵⁸²

The three Scandinavian legal teams continued to cooperate closely in preparing the case against Greece in the Council of Europe. They also received evidence from Amnesty International about torture perpetrated by the Junta. Historians Vik and Østberg, however,

⁵⁷⁶ “Hugur alþingismanna til grískra starfsbræðra kannaður,” *Þjóðviljinn*, June 27, 1969; Sigurður A. Magnússon, *Á hnífsins egg*, 32, 38–39. Betty Ambatielos (1917–2011) was the husband of the famous communist union organizer Tony Ambatielos (1914–1995). He had already been sentenced to death during the Greek Civil War, but after an international campaign his sentence was commuted. After the coup, the couple were imprisoned once again; Betty witnessed first-hand the brutality and violence of the Junta, when mothers who were still breastfeeding their babies were separated from them and thrown into jail. Even the conservative press in Iceland reported on the couple's fate with sympathy; see “Norðurlöndin hafa sýnt grísku þjóðinni ómetanlegan stuðning,” *Morgunblaðið*, May 8, 1969.

⁵⁷⁷ Report, “Skýrsla formanns Grikklandshreyfingarinnar 1969,” ICE/LBS/710-NF, Sigurður A. Magnússon, Grikkland, 2.

⁵⁷⁸ Report, Ólafur Egilsson (Icelandic Council of Europe representative) “Nr. 161 Grikklandsmálið” January 23, 1969, utanríkisráðuneytið, stjórnarbyltingin í Grikklandi í apríl 1967, P. II, ICE/ÞÍ/B/325; “Kunningjafbréf” *Alþýðublaðið*, March 20, 1968.

⁵⁷⁹ “Verður Grikkland rekið í desember?” *Alþýðublaðið*, November 24, 1969.

⁵⁸⁰ Letter, Royal Greek Embassy (London) to the Icelandic Foreign Ministry, March 8, 1969, utanríkisráðuneytið, stjórnarbyltingin í Grikklandi í apríl 1967, P. II, ICE/ÞÍ/B/325.

⁵⁸¹ Kristine Kjærsgaard, “Confronting the Greek Military Junta,” 61.

⁵⁸² Letter, Þorvaldur Garðar Kristjánsson to Emil Jónsson, February 6, 1969, “Ráðgjafarþing Evrópuráðsins 27.–31. janúar 1969,” utanríkisráðuneytið, stjórnarbyltingin í Grikklandi í apríl 1967, P. II, ICE/ÞÍ/B/325.

contest the claim by some scholars that a specific 1969 Amnesty report on this issue was instrumental in the decision to add the charge of torture to the list of the Scandinavian complaints. The foreign ministries of the countries were already aware of torture cases. Indeed, the influence of the Nordic Committees on public opinion is often neglected in the scholarship, with Amnesty International given a disproportionately important role.⁵⁸³ After a lengthy period of collecting documents, summoning witnesses, and arguing the case in Strasbourg, the European Commission on Human Rights, finally, issued its opinion in November 1969, agreeing, in most points, with the arguments of the claimants. Its report, which detailed 213 cases of torture, was not made available to the public, but was leaked a month later.⁵⁸⁴ Historian Barbara Keys claims that up until then, the official Amnesty reports on Greece had been criticized for lacking credibility, with all accusations of torture having been denied by the Junta. The Commission, however, confirmed such allegations. Where there had previously been doubts, there were none now. The media began to report on torture cases as facts instead of mere allegations.⁵⁸⁵ Mogens Camre was likely involved in the leak. On November 30, Camre informed Margaret and Andreas Papandreou about the upcoming December 12 vote on the suspension of Greece in the European Council of Ministers. He calculated that seven countries were in favor—Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the Benelux countries and Britain—but he was unsure about whether West Germany, Italy, and Austria would join them. In the case of failure, Camre wanted the Scandinavian Social Democrats to leave the Council. Indicating that he was behind the leak, Camre wrote: “I have an illegal copy of the report of the Commission for Human Rights (which is only sent to the Governments on this side [of the Atlantic] of December 12th) given to J.O. Krag and have seen to it that important newspapers in W. Europe gets it too. Nobody knows how.”⁵⁸⁶

The same day, the content of the report was revealed in the *New York Times* and *Sunday Times*.⁵⁸⁷ The Swedish press reported on it as being the “most thorough international legal investigation since the Nuremberg trial....” Thus, the significance of it was that it was seen through the prism of memory rather simply as a victory for human rights.⁵⁸⁸ Finally on December 12, the Junta learned that there was a majority in the Council for the suspension of

⁵⁸³ Vik and Østberg, “Sweden, Amnesty International and Legal Entrepreneurs,” 638.

⁵⁸⁴ Vik and Østberg, “Sweden, Amnesty International and Legal Entrepreneurs,” 638.

⁵⁸⁵ Barbara Keys, “Anti-Torture Politics: Amnesty International, the Greek Junta, and the Origins of the Human Rights ‘Boom’ in the United States,” 202–203.

⁵⁸⁶ Letter, Camre to Margaret and Andreas Papandreou, November 30, 1969, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens.

⁵⁸⁷ “Rapport klar: Tortyr praxis i Aten,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, November 29, 1969; “‘London för terrorkampanj mot Grekland’,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, December 2, 1969.

⁵⁸⁸ “Inget kommunisthot vid överstarnas kupp,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, November 29, 1969.

Greece. To save face, Greece immediately withdrew from the Council, putting an end to a protracted process that had taken more than two years. Throughout it, the West Germans and the French had tried to persuade the Scandinavians to compromise on the issue to, but to no avail.⁵⁸⁹ Until the very end, the Icelandic government also opposed Greece's expulsion from the Council of Europe; it wanted to wait for the report to be officially considered by the Council, a process that would have enabled the Greeks to postpone their exclusion for a couple of years. The Icelanders finally gave in eleven days before the vote, deciding to side with their Nordic partners. The Swedes had assured them that Iceland's trade with Greece would not be affected, pointing to an increase in the Swedish trade with the country.⁵⁹⁰ Nonetheless, before the vote, Emil Jónsson traveled to Brussels to meet personally with the Greek Foreign Minister Panagiotis Pipinelis. The content of their talks is not known.⁵⁹¹ But throughout the process in the Council of Europe, the ambiguous stance of the Icelandic government was influenced by conservative foreign ministry officials. Jónsson belonged to the more right-wing faction of the Social Democratic Party, which, apart from being less left-wing than its Nordic counterparts, was part of a coalition government with the far larger conservative Independence Party.

At bottom, the Icelandic government was not fully committed to Nordic solidarity on the Greek issue and did not subscribe to the view that the Junta regime posed a threat to democracy. Ultimately, the leaking of the European Commission on Human Rights report was probably a big contributing factor to the outcome. Another important reason was that the United Kingdom changed sides in response to public pressure at home and to the hope that the same result might be averted in NATO.⁵⁹² The U.S. government, however, feared the opposite:⁵⁹³ that it would jeopardize Greece's place in the Alliance. In his Christmas greetings to Camre, the American academic Stephen Rousseas wrote: "The results of the Council of Europe were excellent – and you deserve so much of the credit for it. Now if pressure could be made within NATO...!"⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁸⁹ Kjærsgaard, "Confronting the Greek Military Junta," 63–65.

⁵⁹⁰ Report, Icelandic Council of Europe representative to Foreign Minister Jónsson, November 25, 1969 "Grikklandsmálið í Evrópuráðinu"; report from meeting with Scandinavian ambassadors, Pétur Thorsteinsson, "Frásögn", December 1, 1969, utanríkisráðuneytið, stjórnarbyltingin í Grikklandi í apríl 1967, P. III, ICE/ÞÍ/B/325.

⁵⁹¹ Letter, Pétur Thorsteinsson to Consul Marios G. Pipinelis (cousin to Panagiotis Pipinelis), December 1, 1969, utanríkisráðuneytið, stjórnarbyltingin í Grikklandi í apríl 1967, P. III, ICE/ÞÍ/B/325.

⁵⁹² Kristine Kjærsgaard, "Confronting the Greek Military Junta," 63–65.

⁵⁹³ "Inget kommunisthot vid överstarnas kupp," *Svenska Dagbladet*, November 29, 1969.

⁵⁹⁴ Letter, Stephen Rousseas to Mogens Camre [undated, Christmas card], DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens. The letter is interesting for its description of the political climate in the United States. Rousseas wrote about political repression, assassinations of Black Panthers, "the Chicago 7," concluding that the country was in deep

Yet, putting pressure on Greece in NATO was a much more complicated and difficult thing to do. According to historian Effie G.H. Pedaliu, Greece managed to stay out of trouble in NATO, partly because the spotlight was on the ongoing process in the Council of Europe, but more importantly because there were more pressing security concerns, such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Muammar Gaddafi's coup in Libya in 1969. At a NATO meeting in April 1969, the Danes, Norwegians, and the Italians managed to add to the official communique that the Alliance was "founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." But in practice, it did not mean much. During Richard Nixon's first presidential term from 1969 to 1973, relations between the United States and Greece improved considerably. Nixon even stated that he was the best friend the Junta had. Vice President Spiro Agnew had Greek ancestry, and the pro-Junta Greek businessman Thomas Pappas was a big donor to the Republican Party. Heavy weapons shipments would eventually be resumed after having been momentarily halted under the Johnson Administration. The Junta became self-assertive and even more unwilling to prepare for a return to democracy.⁵⁹⁵

Reports of U.S. military aid to the Junta were met with opposition from the Danes and the Norwegians. Social-liberal Danish Prime Minister Hilmar Baunsgaard voiced his displeasure publicly on a U.S. visit in April 1970.⁵⁹⁶ Before the trip, Krag had sent a letter with recommendations to Baunsgaard on how to deal with the Greek issue in talks with the U.S. President.⁵⁹⁷ This Social Democratic pressure on the Prime Minister was also discussed in a *Washington Post* article on his visit. Baunsgaard argued against the resumption of military aid to Greece because it could threaten the unity of Europe and NATO. Denmark's vanguard role in resisting the Junta both in the European Council and now in NATO was explained away as being motivated by the dynastic connection between the two monarchies.⁵⁹⁸ In the run up to the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Rome, in May 1970, the Norwegians and the Danes were contacted by the British, Belgians, and the Americans, who pleaded with them not to raise the Greek issue. U.S. Secretary of State, William Rogers asked Baunsgaard to think, instead, of the security interests and unity of the Alliance. In turn, Baunsgaard told Rogers, that the Danish public—across the political spectrum—was deeply

trouble. He also lamented the lack of communication with Andreas Papandreu ("our mutual friend in Toronto").

⁵⁹⁵ Pedaliu, "'A Discordant Note': NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974," 206–108.

⁵⁹⁶ Karakatsanis and Swarts, *American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels*, 163–164.

⁵⁹⁷ Letter, Jens Otto Krag to Prime Minister Hilmar Baunsgaard, April 10, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens, Grækenland 1970–1974.

⁵⁹⁸ "Danes Urge Nixon to Curb Aid to Greece," *The Washington Post*, April 15, 1970.

troubled by the military dictatorship in Greece, considering it one of the biggest problems facing Western Europe. Baunsgaard also made it clear that Greece was particularly important for the Social Democrats. Something had to be done; otherwise, the Danish public would demand that the matter be raised in NATO. He argued that this held true for Norway as well. The Americans tried many times, but failed to get assurances that the Danes would refrain from demanding that NATO become involved in the situation of Greece.⁵⁹⁹

The Danish attitude reflected the fragmentation of the party system and the domestic political changes, which had taken place in Denmark and Norway during the 1960s, when parties on the Left gained momentum. Foreign policy concerns went from being exclusively decided and formulated by political elites to being concerns for public discussion. The Vietnam War, nuclear weapons, and NATO's tolerance for Greece, Portugal, and Turkey were all issues that disturbed large segments of the electorate. Increased dissatisfaction with the inaction of NATO also made it impossible for prime ministers—whether on the Left or Right—in Denmark and Norway to ignore what was happening in Greece. Moreover, the far left used the Greek issue to push for debates and referendums on leaving the Alliance, which greatly worried the Danish and Norwegian Social Democrats. This was clearly illustrated by the split within the Norwegian Committee. Sweden also influenced Denmark and Norway on the issue. While not a member of the Alliance, it had offered Andreas Papandreou political asylum and direct support for his “resistance organization”—PAK.

When Olof Palme became Prime Minister in 1969, Sweden's activist foreign policy was cemented.⁶⁰⁰ Nonetheless, the Swedish government later abandoned this activism for the sake of economic interests in Greece. As noted, social movements working transnationally to “democratize“ Danish and Norwegian foreign policies—through an anti-fascist collective identity and conflict repertoire—had been galvanized in the post-war period to engage with the Spanish Question. Their success in the Council of Europe was not matched within NATO. Denmark and Norway were not going to put their NATO membership on the line to protest the Alliance's inaction vis-à-vis Greece. Thus, the fight to take measures against the Junta in NATO failed. Having secured the backing of the majority of NATO members, the United States did everything to oppose attempts to sideline the Greek regime. It even went out of its way to ensure Greece of its support to avoid the kind of campaign that had resulted in the Council of Europe's Greek walkout.

⁵⁹⁹ Karakatsanis and Swarts, *American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels*, 153–157.

⁶⁰⁰ Pedaliu, “‘A Discordant Note’: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974,” 109.

The U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Henry Tasca, even visited Junta leader Georgios Papadopoulos at his beach house to give him assurances before the NATO Rome meeting, which was one of the more egregious examples of the subservience the Americans were willing to stoop to. Tasca stated that NATO was not the Council of Europe and that the strongest member states as well as the General Secretary Manlio Brosio were firmly against raising issues that concerned the internal affairs of member states. If the Greeks staged a walkout, it would represent a victory for their enemies, and, for this reason, they should stay calm.⁶⁰¹ When the Danes and Norwegians eventually brought up the political situation in Greece issue in Rome, the Greeks followed U.S. advice, stating that it was an internal affair.⁶⁰² As had been the case in the Council of Europe, the Danes and Norwegian could not count on the support from Iceland. The Icelandic ambassador to Norway, Agnar Klemens Jónsson, made fun of Norwegian concerns as expressed in parliamentary debates. He thought it curious that it had not been “enough” for the Norwegians to “scare away” Greece from the Council of Europe.⁶⁰³ Emil Jónsson ignored a telegram from Andreas Papandreou, asking for Icelandic support.⁶⁰⁴

Either way, the diplomatic maneuvering by the United States was followed up by resuming arms shipments to Greece in September 1970. Tasca even opposed suggestions from the State Department that the United States encourage the Junta to release prisoners for the sake of creating goodwill within the Alliance. He thought that this would only encourage the “communists” to push for the isolation of Greece and threaten the unity of the Alliance. Some high-level State Department officials, such as Joseph Sisco, wanted to use military support for the Junta as a leverage to encourage the democratization of the regime. Nixon, however, sided with Tasca.⁶⁰⁵ Another controversy arose at the same time when the Nixon Administration asked for a NATO report, recommending further military aid to Greece. Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands were against the initiative, but meekly accepted the report after having managed to insert a footnote in the minutes where their opposition was stated. The so-called footnote solution subsequently became the preferred mode of successive Danish governments to deal with controversial issues in NATO as a way to address foreign

⁶⁰¹ Karakatsanis and Swarts, *American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels*, 159.

⁶⁰² Pedaliu, “‘A Discordant Note’: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974,” 110–111.

⁶⁰³ Letter, Agnar Kl. Jónsson (Icelandic Ambassador in Oslo) to the Icelandic Foreign Ministry, 25 May, 1970, Utanríkisráðuneytið, Stjórnarbyltingin í Grikklandi í apríl 1967. P. IV, ICE/ÞÍ/B/325. In the original Icelandic: “... það væri ekki nægilegt að hafa unnið að því að Grikkland flæmdist úr Evrópuráðinu, heldur þyrfti að vinna að því, að Grikkland yrði látið fara úr NATO.”

⁶⁰⁴ Telegram, Andreas Papandreou to Emil Jónsson, May 23, 1970, utanríkisráðuneytið, stjórnarbyltingin í Grikklandi í apríl 1967, P. IV, ICE/ÞÍ/B/325.

⁶⁰⁵ Karakatsanis and Swarts, *American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels*, 159–162.

political divisions within the government and parliament. The success of the Junta supporters within the Alliance was absolute. Denmark and Norway did not threaten to stop taking part in NATO maneuvers, or, more drastically, to withdraw from the Alliance. They did not even try to apply the consensus or unanimity rule in NATO to oppose the Junta, reflecting the preponderance of the United States in the Alliance.⁶⁰⁶

Meanwhile, Camre was trying to get Andreas Papandreou to visit the Nordic countries to meet with foreign ministers and to figure out ways to put pressure on the Americans. He was especially keen on seeing Papandreou uniting with some other political figure from the other Greek political parties to create a roadmap to democracy and to stick to NATO agreements.⁶⁰⁷ Instead of a response, Camre received one of the usual PAK press releases where Papandreou was preoccupied with squabbling with other members of the “resistance movement.” This time, it was Mikis Theodorakis and his Patriotic Front, with PAK insisting on endless preconditions for their cooperation.⁶⁰⁸ Later in September, Margaret Papandreou answered Camre on behalf of her husband, as she often did. She asked Camre if he could arrange for a meeting between Papandreou and Krag and other Danish politicians who wanted to push the Greek issue in NATO.⁶⁰⁹ The reply she received was astounding considering it was from a Social Democratic MP. It illustrated the extent to which an anti-fascist ethos or a collective memory informed Camre and others in the Committees when confronted with the question of what had to be done before a breakthrough on Greece could be achieved. Camre feared that the United States was descending into fascism and that time was running out to act against the Junta. He promised to arrange the meeting Margaret asked for, but lamented the waning interest in the Greek question among the public.⁶¹⁰ In his words:

There are so many ugly things happening in the world and it is not so easy to attract the attention of the population and of the politicians as nothing happens on the surface of quiet Greece. If there were a real underground and members of the junta were liquidated things would look different, but it is hard for us to prove the opposition of the people. The Danes are concerned primarily with Vietnam, South America and Jordan. We have had enormous demonstrations – the biggest ever – against the International Bank for Development and Reconstruction which held its annual meeting in Copenhagen. City looked as after a bomb raid during World War II. So you will understand that we need some clear manifestations in Greece to make our government act in the Nato-council again. I am also eagerly expecting proposals for activities outside Greece to bring that poor country

⁶⁰⁶ Karakatsanis and Swarts, *American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels*, 165–167.

⁶⁰⁷ Letter, Camre to Andreas and Margaret Papandreou, March 16, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁰⁸ Press release. “PAK – Stockholm – Sweden” May 15, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁰⁹ Letter, Margaret Papandreou to Camre, September 17, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶¹⁰ Letter, Camre to Margaret Papandreou, October 6, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

back on the political scene.⁶¹¹

This shows not only how the opposition against the Greek Junta competed with other protest movements over international issues but also how difficult it was for Camre and others in the Committees to bring attention to it, especially, since there was no unified front against the Junta in Greece or among the Greeks in exile. The fact that Camre suggested liquidations of Junta members—and that such an act could change the playing field—illustrates the point. In this context, it is important to remember that during the Nazi occupation of Denmark, liquidations of collaborators were a preferred, if controversial, tactic of a large segment of the Danish resistance movement. This collective memory of the Danish resistance movement undoubtedly played a role in his suggestion: It justified more drastic measures in resisting the Greek Junta. The calls for a militant resistance and a united front clearly illustrated how much Camre viewed the Greek issue through memory. Camre then continued to bemoan the resumption by the United States of heavy arms shipments to Greece, which the Danish Committee protested. Yet he considered it futile to “send shipments of paper [letters] without the slightest importance or effect.”⁶¹² His desperation was apparent when he finished his letter:

I just found that the Nato-meeting takes place 2nd to 4th December. We must somehow prepare for the activity. Why can't somebody kill some junta-members? Could Andreas send an open letter to the Norwegian and Danish governments informing them of the real background of the American statements on Greece of these days and asking them to protest. He could stress that the alternative of the colonels is certainly not a communist Greece, so there is no reason whatsoever to protect those gangsters – except that they protect the illegal interests of the present U.S. government.⁶¹³

Again, it is worth considering the level of militancy propagated by a Social Democrat. Nonetheless, there was no overt or covert campaign for killing Junta members. Instead, Papandreou sent letters to the prime and foreign ministers—as well as to the major political parties—of Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Holland, Iceland, Norway, and West Germany, with the hope that they would bring up the Greek question at the NATO Brussels meeting in December 1970. Papandreou—rather ineffectively—tried to assure the recipients that the majority of Greeks opposed the military regime, as exemplified by their “strong, quiet,

⁶¹¹ Letter, Camre to Margaret Papandreou, October 6, 1970. The same letter is quoted by Karakatsanis and Swarts (167), but the sentence where Camre suggests liquidation is redacted. Karakatsanis and Swarts refer the source to “Mogens Camre (private archive),” not to the National Archives of Denmark where I accessed it.

⁶¹² Letter, Camre to Margaret Papandreou, October 6, 1970. DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶¹³ Letter, Camre to Margaret Papandreou, October 6, 1970. DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

passive resistance.”⁶¹⁴ Without giving any concrete suggestions for action, he stated that Greeks did not beg for action; they demanded it.⁶¹⁵ Yet the situation in Greece was not discussed in Brussels.⁶¹⁶ Papandreou, it turned out, preferred, in fact, the shipments of paper to an active and unified resistance effort.

The total marginalization of the Danish-Norwegian position on Greece in NATO became clear at the Ministerial Meeting in June 1971. Despite objections from Denmark and Norway, it was held in dictatorial Portugal.⁶¹⁷ Leading up to the meeting, the clandestine activist Maria Becket corresponded with Camre on how best to proceed with the Greek issue. She hoped that the Scandinavians would criticize Portugal for its brutal colonial war in Africa. She also sent him and Krag a report on the sorry state of the Greek resistance movement.⁶¹⁸ Very tellingly Camre responded that there could be no progress in NATO without overt resistance activities taking place in Greece. The only member likely to act in the Alliance was Norway due to its Social Democratic government, but since it was a minority government, there were limits to what it could do. He informed Becket that together with other colleagues, he was lobbying the Danish government not to go to Portugal. But the pressure from the Americans was huge⁶¹⁹ He claimed that he had “reports both from the Norwegian government and from the Danish government that the U.S. have pressed them to withdraw from the Greek scene. That gives very little hope that the U.S. is going to move.”⁶²⁰

Maria Becket shared Camre’s assessment of the situation, Moreover, she informed him, in detail, of the difficulties facing the opponents of the Junta in Greece:

I certainly never expected that any nation would put enough pressure on NATO in order to cause trouble to the Colonels, but only this possibility would be a decisive enough step. We all realize that nothing can happen when the situation is so calm. The standstill of the present is very strange as it has come to a point where Papandreou and Theodorakis as well as democratic resistance say they have money for resistance but no people to make this resistance in the country. Other groups like the EMA (Greek Military Resistance) or a AAA have many people and not a single penny to help them. Financial help from Parties, Governments and Committees seem to still go to Andreas for resistance when in four years he has proved he can’t make one single act of resistance in the country. These new groups

⁶¹⁴ Letter, Andreas Papandreou to Prime Ministers of NATO members, November 16, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶¹⁵ Letter, Andreas Papandreou to Prime Ministers of NATO members, November 16, 1970. DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶¹⁶ “Papandreou skrifaði Jóhanni [Hafstein],” *Alþýðublaðið*, December 4, 1970.

⁶¹⁷ Pedaliu, “‘A Discordant Note’: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974,” 112–113.

⁶¹⁸ Letter, Maria Becket to Camre, March 24, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶¹⁹ Letter, Camre to Maria Becket, April 13, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶²⁰ Letter, Camre to Maria Becket, April 13, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

demand more and more material and they produce more and more cells but refuse to cooperate with the organizations that had sent up to now, practically all their members to jail.⁶²¹

Becket knew what she was talking about; she was deeply involved in the resistance against the Junta. Among other feats, she had organized the spectacular escape of the Center Union politician Georgios Mylonas from his imprisonment on the Greek island of Amorgos.⁶²² Not only was the Greek resistance movement fragmented and passive; the favorite son of the Scandinavian Social Democrats, Andreas Papandreou, had not accomplished anything with PAK. Nonetheless, in June 1971, the Norwegian Social Democratic Foreign Minister Andreas Cappelen criticized the lack of democratic accountability in Greece and Portugal at the NATO gathering in Lisbon. The Greek Junta representative countered that the military regime was just a different kind of democracy. The Danish Foreign Minister Poul Hartling was pressured by Brosio to be less direct in his criticism. In the end, no other member state was willing to support the Scandinavians; hence, Greece escaped censure yet again. Later that year the Dutch conservative Joseph Luns succeeded Brosio as General Secretary of NATO. Luns continued defending the Greek Junta against all criticism, and he even traveled to Greece to compliment—publicly—its military.⁶²³ Among the Nordic Committees, mnemonic anti-fascism shaped their expectations on the Greek opposition vis-à-vis the Junta. If the regime was, indeed, fascist, a unified front against it was called for, as had been the case in Nazi-occupied Denmark and Norway. At the very least, an active resistance movement was long overdue.

Collective Memory and Political Practice: Norwegian Attempts to Unify the Greek Opposition

When visiting his Norwegian colleagues in September 1970, Hans Göran Franck complained that it was hard to sustain the activities of the Swedish Committee because nothing was really happening in Greece itself. The situation seemed as locked in place as that of Spain; in Portugal, however, the situation seemed more fluid and dynamic. He hoped that Norway and Denmark would continue to highlight the Greek issue in NATO, but for Sweden as a non-

⁶²¹ Letter, Maria Becket to Camre, April 21, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶²² Mogens Camre, *Knus tyrannerne*, 150.

⁶²³ Pedaliu, “‘A Discordant Note’: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974,” 112–113.

aligned country, there was not much it could do, except for adhering to the tourist boycott.⁶²⁴ Little did Franck know that the Norwegians were working on a very ambitious plan to break the deadlock. Journalist Berit Ruud Retzer claims that Jens Evensen, a high-ranking diplomat, was its author. As noted, Evensen played a key role—on behalf of the Norwegian government—in the case against Greece in the Council of Europe. He suggested to the Norwegian Committee that attempts should be made to unify the Greek opposition.

Evensen drew his inspiration from his own experience during the Second World War. What he was thinking of was the Norwegian National Unity Program (*fellesprogrammet*) that brought together all political parties against fascism and for a post-war reconstruction. Evensen assisted the Norwegian Committee in gaining access to the major figures of the Greek opposition.⁶²⁵ In a meeting with Treholt, Evensen drafted a ten-point plan aimed at restoring democracy in Greece by unifying all anti-Junta forces—ranging from the communists to the King.⁶²⁶ In late August 1970, the Committee contacted leaders of the resistance movement, suggesting that a summit be held in Scandinavia with opposition leaders. The purpose was to coordinate resistance against the Junta and to create a minimalist program that all participants could adhere to. To organize this summit, Einar Førde and Arne Treholt traveled to Geneva, Rome, Copenhagen, Paris, Stockholm, London, and Athens to meet with all elements of the Greek opposition. Later Pierre Schori also took part in these meetings. The Norwegian Committee created a separate planning committee, made up of political elite figures, such as Otto Lyng, Jens Evensen, Professor Christian Norberg-Schultz, and the International Secretary of LO, Thorvald Stoltenberg. Førde and Treholt wrote detailed reports of every meeting with the opposition figures they met. Yet, much of their time was used to resolve or ease the conflicts and splits within the Greek opposition.⁶²⁷

The Norwegian Committee claimed that the initial reactions from Mikis Theodorakis, and Andreas Papandreou had been positive. Subsequently, it informed the Danish and Swedish Committees of the initiative, with the goal of expanding it into a Scandinavian one. The leading personalities of the Danish and Swedish Committees, Mogens Camre and Hans-Göran Franck, gave the Norwegians their full support. The first round of trips undertaken by

⁶²⁴ Meeting notes, “Notat av samtale med formannen ... Hans Gøran Franck i Oslo,” September 26, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0002, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas.

⁶²⁵ Berit Ruud Retzer, *Jens Evensen: Mannen som gjorde Norge større* (Trondheim: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2017), 113-114.

⁶²⁶ Meeting notes, “Notat for samtale med ekspedisjonsjef Jens Evensen – ko-ordinering av gresk motstand,” September 19, 1970,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas.

⁶²⁷ Report, “Konfidensielt: Rapport av samtaler med greske motstandsledere og opposisjonspolitikere,” November 10, 1970, and “Rapport fra reise til Aten og Geneve ...” February 5, 1971, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas.

Førde and Treholt took place in the period of October 29–November 7, 1970. They met with over 20 different leaders and activists from the exiled opposition—from PAK, PAM, Democratic Defense, Center Union, the left socialist EDA and the communist KKE—in various European cities. In these initial meetings, most of the top leaders were sympathetic towards the initiative, not least because they realized that a united effort was needed to have any effect on the Junta.

Yet, there were elements among the rank and file in PAK and Democratic Defense that were more skeptical, seeing the old political establishment in the opposition movement—the party leaders and the King—as wholly untrustworthy on the grounds that they had not been able to prevent the coup.⁶²⁸ Perhaps the most controversial figure was the King, whom Førde and Treholt met in his Rome residence. He expressed his support for the initiative, although he remained doubtful about its feasibility. He was weary of Papandreou’s constant criticisms and attacks against him, but he believed that all the opposition forces should be included in the plan. He was especially positive towards Mikis Theodorakis. He also recognized the importance of the move for the Norwegians and the Danes in their efforts to bring up the Greek issue in NATO. To him, it made little sense to continue hitting at the Junta; the criticism should be directed at the right address: the Americans. He referred to the action by Poul Hartling and Signe Marie Stray Ryssdal in Rome the same year, and how easily Pipinellis had disarmed them, rhetorically.⁶²⁹

The need for a unified Greek opposition for the sake of action in NATO—to be able to present a political alternative—was emphasized by the Norwegians in all their meetings with the opposition. What was more, they believed that the last chance to discuss the situation in Greece in NATO—as a follow up on the successful action in the Council of Europe—was in May 1971. The Greek opposition leaders had expressed gratitude towards the Scandinavian action in the Council, singling out Jens Evensen’s contribution. The future Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis told the Norwegians that their initiative would not have been taken seriously if it had come from a country outside Scandinavia. The biggest challenge was the question of political representation. The opposition was split between those in exile and those in Greece. Moreover, since the party apparatuses were not working properly, it was difficult to determine who should attend the summit and who should not. Thus, the old Communist

⁶²⁸ “Konfidensielt: Rapport av samtaler med greske motstandsledere og opposisjonspolitikere,” November 10, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 1–3.

⁶²⁹ Report, “Samtale med kong Konstantin i hans bolig i via Porta Latina i Roma,” November 1, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas.

Party (KKE), which had been in exile since the civil war, refused to cooperate with the newer Greek left party EDA, which placed a heavy burden on the Left.

It was not either clear who would represent the Conservative Party ERE at the summit. The official leader Kanellopoulos still resided in Greece, and it would not be possible to invite him; the unofficial leader, Karamanlis, was in exile in Paris, but he was biding his time for a comeback. As it turned out, he did not even go to the Council of Europe during the proceedings against the Junta. Therefore, an alternative representative of the Greek Right had to be found. Even bigger was the problem of representation within the Center Union, which, according to the Norwegians, was split into no fewer than four different fractions. For one thing, the party did not have an authorized representative; the older Papandreou had named his son as his successor, but the party had never accepted the move. After years of infectious infighting, various Greek opposition figures would not give the Norwegians straight answers and were not honest about whom they favored to attend the summit. In a drastic move, the Norwegians concluded that they should decide which politicians to invite. It was a risky idea—which was further compounded by the insistence that all political fractions should be included—and it caused trouble later.⁶³⁰

In the first series of trips, the Norwegians did not manage to meet with anyone from ERE or with Papandreou.⁶³¹ Since Papandreou lived in Canada, the Norwegians set up a meeting between him and Evensen in New York, but the former cancelled.⁶³² Everyone they met thought that the biggest challenge would be to get Papandreou on board. While he had initially been positive, he now claimed that he would not attend the summit if Mitsotakis or the communist in exile, Kollijannis, were invited. The Norwegians also deplored Papandreou's continued attacks against the King. Perhaps they were influenced by their own perception—and their collective memory—of the unifying role of the King during the Nazi occupation of Norway. Much of the cadre of PAK was also skeptical toward the Scandinavian initiative, but Papandreou's secretary, Angela Kokkola, had promised the Norwegians that she would do her best to convince him to participate. It all depended on what names they could get; if Karamanlis showed up, Papandreou could not afford—politically—to be absent. Apart from ideological divisions, there was a gap between those in exile and those in Greece, and

⁶³⁰ "Konfidensielt: Rapport av samtaler med greske motstandsledere og opposisjonspolitikere," November 10, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 4–7.

⁶³¹ "Konfidensielt: Rapport av samtaler med greske motstandsledere og opposisjonspolitikere," November 10, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 4–7.

⁶³² Report Arne Treholt, "Samtale med Andreas G. Papandreou på Hotel International i London," December 8, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 5.

between the older and younger generations. The Norwegians dubbed it the “home and exile-front,” a clear reference to their own participation in the Norwegian resistance movement during the war. Building on this experience or identity, they argued that the main obstruction stemmed from the disunity of the Greek opposition.⁶³³ To resist fascism, unity was needed, not only for the sake of the struggle itself but also for attracting solidarity in other countries:

Many shared our opinion. If we cannot get a coalition now and an initiative at the latest before the NATO ministerial meeting in May 1971, then it is probably too late. This initiative would be very significant for the public opinion in Scandinavian countries. The disunity inhibits the work of the solidarity committee. The Greek organizations can first count on our full solidarity when they find a collective platform to fight the fascism on. We also believe that this kind of initiative will have a positive effect on the Greeks themselves. We consider it of utmost importance that all those resisting the current fascist regime come together on a broad basis and deliberate towards a united action plan.⁶³⁴

This admirable, if rather self-centered Scandinavian framework of anti-fascist collective identity collided with Papandreou’s own interpretation of the Greek situation. When Mogens Camre finally managed to get through to Papandreou to inform him about the Norwegian initiative, he correctly claimed that it was supported at the highest level. In Norway, it had already received the support of Centre Party Prime Minister Per Borten and the Social Democratic members of his coalition government.⁶³⁵ The same applied to the leadership of the Norwegian Social Democrats.⁶³⁶ The Norwegians were trying to get a temporary leave of absence for Jens Evensen from the Foreign Ministry to enable him to work full-time on the plan and on arranging meetings between the King and Karamanlis. Moreover, Camre stated that Danish Prime Minister Hilmar Baunsgaard had welcomed the idea of holding a summit, adding that he had organized a meeting between him and Theodorakis when the latter visited

⁶³³ “Konfidensielt: Rapport av samtaler med greske motstandsledere og oppposisjonspolitikere,” November 10, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 7–9. In the original Norwegian: “hjemme og utefront.”

⁶³⁴ “Konfidensielt: Rapport av samtaler med greske motstandsledere og oppposisjonspolitikere,” 9. In the original Norwegian: ”Flere av de forespurte delte vår mening. Får man ikke til en samling nå og et initiativ senest på NATOs ministerrådsmøte i mai 1971, er det trolig for sent. For den politiske opinionen i de skandinaviske landene vil et slikt initiativ ha stor betydning. Splittelsen hemmer solidaritetskomiteens arbeid. De greske organisasjonene kan først regne med vår fulle solidaritet i det øyeblikk de finner en felles platform å bekjempe fascismen på. Vi tror også at et initiativ som dette vill ha en positive virkning på grekerne selv. Vi anser det som svært verdifullt at alle motstandere av det sittende fascistiske styret kommer sammen og på bredt grunnlag diskuterer seg fram til en felles handlingslinje.”

⁶³⁵ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, November 20, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶³⁶ Letter, Arne Treholt to Camre, November 18, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens; see also Letter, Treholt to Pierre Schori, November 17, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0002, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas.

Copenhagen. All this illustrated how deeply involved the Norwegian and Danish governments were in the initiative, even if it was denied later. Camre pleaded with Papandreou to stop, temporarily, the attacks on the King. After all, even the communists were ready to work with Constantine II, and Camre pointed out that he was popular in the Anglo-Saxon world.⁶³⁷ Camre was on the same page as the Norwegians about the need to show a unified front against the Junta:

The world is forgetting Greece, there is no real resistance activity that can threaten the junta and it is very difficult to make the Scandinavian governments act in Nato, because there is no alternative to the junta to make the U.S. policy difficult. We need a united Greek exile front as a platform for a strong policy in Nato. On the other hand: if we get this kind of “exile government,” we are prepared – and our government is prepared to take very strong new steps. We have already decided how to act in Nato, if the council becomes a reality. Official pressure on the U.S. government from our governments is also within reach.⁶³⁸

Evoking the Danish and Norwegian wartime experience, he emphasized the importance of a forging an alliance against fascism in the present:

But there will be no understanding among Danish and Norwegian politicians if you will not accept having the other more or less doubtful figures with you. Here we had no internal political struggles during the German occupation and our resistance included everything from communists to ultra-conservatives.⁶³⁹

Camre desperately pleaded with Papandreou to respond positively to the initiative, warning that he risked his “power in Scandinavia” if he “refused to participate.”⁶⁴⁰ Papandreou’s answer illustrates how differently he viewed the political situation than the Norwegians and Danes. While he expressed his gratitude for what Scandinavia had done for the Greek cause so far, he did not trust the Norwegian initiative or even the Norwegians themselves.⁶⁴¹ In a ferociously nationalistic tone he wrote: “If a group of foreigners (that is to say, non-greeks [sic]) were to determine arbitrarily (that is to say, without reference to the expressed will of the Greek people) who is to participate in such a “unity” meeting, then the Greeks abdicate their sovereign rights at the very time that they are struggling for their restoration.”⁶⁴²

⁶³⁷ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, November 20, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶³⁸ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, November 20, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶³⁹ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, November 20, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁴⁰ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, November 20, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁴¹ Letter, Andreas Papandreou to Camre, November 25, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens, 1.

⁶⁴² Letter, Papandreou to Camre, November 25, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens, 2.

Papandreou stated that it was too unclear who was behind the initiative and that he should be given assurances that the Danes and Norwegians would confront the Americans in NATO; that they should label the United States as an occupying power in Greece; and that they should withdraw from the Alliance if the “occupation of Greece” was not terminated. To him, the political situation in Greece was not primarily about the rule of a fascist Junta, but rather about another Czechoslovakia in Europe. The Americans were playing the role of the Soviets, and NATO was the equivalent to the Warsaw Pact. Papandreou even went as far as to claim that the Norwegian initiative and the idea of unity representation were doing “direct and serious damage to our struggle.” Instead, it should either be a summit of the three large pre-1964-election parties (excluding the communists), or a summit of the “well known resistance organizations.” Inviting people on an individual basis “undermines the organizational framework of the liberation struggle.” Thus, Papandreou was clearly inspired by the ongoing war in Vietnam; he favored a national liberation struggle rather than an anti-fascist popular front.⁶⁴³ He wrote:

That cost [for the U.S. occupation] will become high only when a truly robust liberation movement develops in Greece, only when the European allies find the courage to resist the transformation of NATO into an oppressive instrumentality bent upon Latino-americanizing the European continent. But if this is true, then it is very important, indeed critical for the Greeks to prepare for a great struggle. And a great liberation struggle calls for a VISION. And visions are seldom incorporated in minimum programmes---especially if such a programme is to include the KING. For the King draws his salary from the junta. Can you imagine King HAAKON receiving a monthly cheque from Quisling?⁶⁴⁴

In other words, Papandreou wanted to have nothing to do with either the communists or the King. It was ironic that he wrote his letter to a Dane, perhaps confusing Denmark with Norway. The Danish King had received his salary from a country under military occupation. Camre tried to convince Papandreou of the sincerity of the initiative, but “they cannot openly involve the governments in the plan itself.” He agreed with the idea that Greece could be seen as a Czechoslovakia, but he did not think it was realistic to wait for a final showdown in a liberation struggle or guerilla war in Greece. He doubted if they would experience such a showdown in their lifetime. The situation was critical because the Junta had full power, and

⁶⁴³ Letter, Papandreou to Camre, November 25, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens, 1-2.

⁶⁴⁴ Letter, Papandreou to Camre, November 25, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens, 3.

there seemed to be “a Spanish development” underway,⁶⁴⁵ suggesting that Greece was being turned into another Spain. Camre wrote:

As for the value of resistance I agree. But do not forget: no country is at war with Greece (Germany 1939-45) and no European country can give you the necessary financial support to form a Greek resistance. You need radio stations, illegal newspapers, arms, munition and explosives, and organization. You must remember that to us resistance meant a mass movement and you have an elite movement. If however a reasonable number of junta members were killed, this might work. But how should we do that? Could we – as a minimum – kidnap 5 important CIA-people in Athens?⁶⁴⁶

It is noteworthy that a Danish Social Democratic MP continued to try to get the Greek opposition leader to order the killing of individual Greek Junta members. This time Camre even suggested kidnapping U.S. government officials. What is also striking is the two different conflicting understandings of the Junta and resistance against it. After this exchange, Angela Kokkola informed Camre that his private correspondence with Papandreou had been made public. To be precise, the letter from Papandreou where he practically denounced the Norwegian initiative, had been “mimeographed” and distributed to “a number of friends in Scandinavia by the Secretariat of PAK, as it was thought that it would interest them to have Mr. Papandreou’s views on the Greek matter.”⁶⁴⁷

Unsurprisingly, the Scandinavians were not happy—to put it mildly. The following week Arne Treholt was finally able to meet Papandreou in a London hotel. Treholt claimed that he did not want to make a fuss over the matter, but could not hide his disappointment with the Papandreou’s handling of it:⁶⁴⁸

We had always seen him as one of our closest friends. We had expected his support and advice in this work. Because of this we were very astonished that he had answered Camre’s letter – a personal – confidentially formulated letter – that under our understanding had demanded a confidential – personal formulated answer – more or less publicly. Papandreou said that he had not sent the letter to the press. This I thanked him for on behalf of everyone: It would have been very bad if he had done that! I made it clear that we had found this course of action entirely unacceptable. We had expected and demanded more from him than this.⁶⁴⁹

⁶⁴⁵ Letter, Camre to Andreas Papandreou, December 3, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens, 1.

⁶⁴⁶ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, December 3, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens, 2.

⁶⁴⁷ Letter, Angela Kokkola (PAK Secretary) to Mogens Camre, December 2, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁴⁸ Report Arne Treholt, “Samtale med Andreas G. Papandreou på Hotel International i London,” December 8, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 1-2

⁶⁴⁹ Report Arne Treholt, “Samtale med Andreas G. Papandreou,” December 8, 1970, 1–2. In the original Norwegian: “Vi hadde alltid betraktet ham som en av våre nærmeste venner. Vi hadde regnet med hans støtte og

Papandreou reacted with fury, saying that he had no choice but to make his position on the Scandinavian initiative known. He was afraid of being betrayed because he was on the other side of the Atlantic. Furthermore, he believed that Camre's letter had been designed to pressure him into participating in the summit; he could have lost his Scandinavian influence without speaking out. Papandreou also felt that his standing was threatened because of Theodorakis's actions and repeated his complaints about "foreigners" choosing Greek political representatives. The West Germans—through Horst Emhke, the head of the West German Chancellery—had already asked for a guarantee of Greece's continued NATO membership and of a unified Greek opposition as a prerequisite for their support. Such ideas were deemed unacceptable by Papandreou, who claimed that he was not interested in a "Quisling-game." For him, the United States was an occupational force, and he was against making any concessions to it. By bringing up Quisling, Papandreou also referred to a collective memory in his efforts to receive Norwegian understanding for his position. Treholt tried to explain to Papandreou that the Norwegians made no conditions with respect to the content of the Greek opposition's political program. He also entertained the possibility that the Greeks themselves could decide on a group that would be representative of the whole political spectrum, as the Norwegians preferred. Yet, he received no clear answer on this point from Papandreou.⁶⁵⁰

Maria Becket was extremely frustrated with Papandreou's behavior. In previous conversations with the Norwegians, she had argued that if he tried to obstruct the initiative, he should be excluded. If he used such tactics, he would be playing the role CIA had wished him to do.⁶⁵¹ Becket thought it "rather ridiculous to attack the initiative that Scandinavians have taken and not to attack the fact that Greeks have not taken this initiative themselves few months after the Junta was installed in Greece."⁶⁵² Becket had been briefed by Jens Evensen who had been "very upset" about the leak and the whole affair.⁶⁵³ The Norwegians did not

hans råd i dette arbeidet. Derfor hadde det forbauset oss meget at han hadde besvart brevet til Camre – et personlig – fortrolig formet brev – som etter vårt skjønn også krevde et fortrolig – personlig formet svar – offentlig mer eller mindre. Papandreou sa at han ikke hadde latt det gå til pressen. Hvilket jeg betakket på vegne av alle: Det ville ha vært for ille om du også skulle ha gjort det! Jeg gjorde klart at vi hadde funnet denne framgangsmåten helt utillatelig. Vi hadde venet og stilt atskillig høyere krav til ham enn dette."

⁶⁵⁰ Report Arne Treholt, "Samtale med Andreas G. Papandreou," December 8, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 2-6.

⁶⁵¹ Report [Arne Treholt], "7. Samtale med Maria Becket i København," 4 November, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas. In the original Norwegian: "Han [Papandreou] spiller nå nøyaktig den rolle som CIA hadde ønsket at han skulle spille!"

⁶⁵² Letter, Maria Becket to Camre, December 16, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁵³ Letter, Maria Becket to Camre, December 16, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

give up, however; through a Greek intermediary, they were informed that Papandreou would be interested in a summit on one condition: that it be exclusively made up of representatives of political parties that had been elected to parliament in the last democratic elections. This meant the exclusion of the communists.⁶⁵⁴

At this moment, Treholt was informed by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry that unification talks between the different Greek resistance organizations in London had broken down according to the Greek Newspaper *Apogevmatini*. The main reason was that Papandreou had not been offered a leading role in a unified resistance council. The Greek newspaper also reported that the Norwegians were attempting to unify the old parties.⁶⁵⁵ That this sort of information had become common knowledge was problematic for the Norwegians. They had emphasized from the beginning that the meetings should be confidential, and they had hoped to keep the media out until later.⁶⁵⁶ It is noteworthy that the Norwegian Committee had this kind of high-level contacts to the Foreign Ministry. Evensen had personally met with some opposition figures⁶⁵⁷ and was present in some meetings, for example with representatives from the central committee of the Communist Party KKE, Basil Efremdis and Theodoros Stingos. Obviously, they resented Papandreou's suggestions to include all parties except for their own. To them, this would mean upholding anti-democratic legislation that had made KKE illegal to begin with. The question of leadership and representation was acute since there was no clear leader of either the Center Union or EDA. Thus, the Greek communists preferred the invitation on a personal basis, just as the Norwegians had suggested.⁶⁵⁸

Camre met with Papandreou on December 22 in Copenhagen and organized a meeting with Prime Minister Baunsgaard. Papandreou suggested that he himself should be made the chief negotiator. The reason was the possibility that EDA and ERE would not want to meet with each other. In such a case, there could be two separate summits, with Papandreou acting as the intermediary. Camre commented that such a situation would mean that a summit was

⁶⁵⁴ Report [Arne Treholt], "Samtale med George Yannopoulos [PAK]," December 10, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, Saksarkiv diverse, Rapportert og samtaler.

⁶⁵⁵ Letter, Chargé d'affaires in Greece, Per Gulowsen to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, December 15, 1970. NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, Saksarkiv diverse, Rapportert og samtaler. The letter was given to Treholt, handwritten in the corner: "Til Arne Treholt".

⁶⁵⁶ Notes Arne Treholt, "Notat for samtale med ekspedisjonsjef Jens Evensen – ko-ordinering av gresk motstand," September 19, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas.

⁶⁵⁷ Letter, Arne Treholt to Pierre Schori, November 17, 1970. NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0002, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas.

⁶⁵⁸ Notes, Arne Treholt, Einar Førde and Jens Evensen, "Samtaler med Basil Efremdis og Leonidas Stingos fra sentralkomiteen i KKE," Desember 14-15, 1970, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, Saksarkiv diverse, Rapportert og samtaler.

not feasible. It was clear that Papandreou wanted to lead the initiative himself.⁶⁵⁹ Baunsgaard used the opportunity to tell Papandreou that while he supported the Scandinavian initiative, the possibilities for Denmark and Norway to act in NATO were exhausted. Surprisingly, Papandreou answered that if the United States put too much pressure on the Junta, it would pursue a Nasserite course and cozy up to the Soviets.⁶⁶⁰

Irrespective of Papandreou's obstructionist attitude, the Norwegians soon found out that the conservative politicians left in Greece were not forthcoming either. Einar Førde and Pierre Schori traveled to Athens on two different days to minimize the likelihood that they would both be denied entry. While repression, torture, and surveillance had increased in the country, their visit was not blocked. Several of those they had wished to meet were imprisoned. They had a meeting with the last Prime Minister before the coup, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos from ERE. He made it clear that he was generally positive toward the Norwegian initiative, but that he would not cooperate with the communists in the KKE or Theodorakis in EDA. He explained that because of the Greek Civil War, there was a general dislike and fear of communism among the Greek population. If the communists were included in talks, the Junta would instrumentalize these anxieties against the opposition.

As they viewed the world through a Norwegian anti-fascist collective memory, the activists were seemingly oblivious to the legacy of the Greek Civil War. Another conservative, Georg Rallis, even went further, stating that it was a question of principle not to cooperate with communists, even if the goal was to bring back democracy to Greece. Førde and Schori still hoped that the Greek Right could be swayed if public statements of support for the initiative came from other leaders.⁶⁶¹ They stressed that this unity platform on behalf of the Scandinavians was their last major effort on the Greek issue. If there was no progress after the 1971 spring NATO Ministerial Meeting, "Greece would become a third rank problem in line with that of Portugal and Spain." Kanellopoulos reacted fiercely to such reasoning; for him, it was incomprehensible why a unified Greek opposition was needed to put pressure on the United States.⁶⁶²

⁶⁵⁹ Report, "Strictly confidential ... meeting between Andreas G. Papandreou ... Ole Espersen and Mogens Camre," December 22, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁶⁰ Report, "Referat av samtale mellom Mogens Camre og Ole Espersen fra dansk side og Andreas G. Papandreou," December 22, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁶¹ Report, "Rapport fra reise til Aten og Geneve I dagene 27. november–2. desember 1970," NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, Saksarkiv diverse, Rapporter og samtaler. 1-7.

⁶⁶² Report, Einar Førde and Pierre Schori, "Samtale med Panasjotis Kanellopoulos," November 29, 1970, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens. In the original Norwegian: "Hellas være degradert til et tredje rangs problem på linje med Portugal og Spania."

Until January 1971, members of the Swedish and Norwegian Committees—especially Franck, Førde, and Treholt—continued to talk about plans for an interim government in Greece. They speculated what was needed to prepare for new elections and how long the interim government had to stay in power to ensure a smooth transition back to democracy. To them, the wording “joint program” was too strong, suggesting, instead, that of a “minimum program.”⁶⁶³ The following week, details about the initiative was leaked to the British socialist newspaper *Tribune*, which published a story on how the Norwegian negotiations on uniting the Greek opposition had resulted in a dead end. The conservatives did not want to cooperate with the communists. Andreas Papandreou also refused unconditional cooperation with all groups and demanded assurances from the governments of Denmark and Norway.⁶⁶⁴

When Norwegian Prime Minister Per Borten was asked about the initiative—and about whether he had claimed that actions in NATO were preconditioned on making the Americans believe there was an alternative to the Junta—he denied any involvement, adding that the “statement [in the *Tribune*], which is attributed to me, is fabrication and pure nonsense.” Førde confirmed to the media that the Committee had met with all major opposition figures, but he denied having contacted the prime minister about the initiative. In a resigned fashion, he had this to say about the future:⁶⁶⁵ “We see it as important that a unification of these groups comes into being, our committee as well as other Greek committees have worked towards this goal. Since this goal has not been realized, one might as well give up the work for democracy in Greece.”⁶⁶⁶ This fatalism corresponded with the sense of unworthiness of the Greek cause since it did not correspond with the lessons learned from anti-fascist collective memory. This memory should have enabled unity; instead, it constrained the political work because it faced a split memory—one of anti-fascism and the other of the Greek Civil War.

Stephen Rousseas, one of the American academics with whom Camre had worked closely, averred that Andreas Papandreou was suspected of having leaked the plan of the Norwegian initiative to kill it in its tracks. The Norwegian Ambassador in London had been

⁶⁶³ Meeting protocol, “Kommentarer til fellesprogram – møte mellom Hans Gøran Franck, Einar Førde og Arne Treholt” January 3, 1971, NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, Saksarkiv diverse, Rapporter og samtaler.

⁶⁶⁴ “Norsk initiative for juntamotstanderne,” *Dagbladet*, January 9, 1971.

⁶⁶⁵ “Norsk initiative for juntamotstanderne,” *Dagbladet*, January 9, 1971. In the original Norwegian: “Den uttalelsen som er tilagt meg, er oppspinn og det rene nonsense. Jeg har aldri hevdet noe slikt.”

⁶⁶⁶ “Norsk initiative for juntamotstanderne,” *Dagbladet*, January 9, 1971. In the original Norwegian: “- Vi ser det som viktig at det kommer i stand en samling av disse gruppene, og så vel vår komité som andre Hellas-komiteer har arbeidet med dette som mål. Dersom man ikke får realisert dette mål, kan man like godt oppgi å arbeide for demokrati i Hellas.”

confronted by the Greek Ambassador, who had showed him the mimeographed letter and put the question of what the Norwegian government was up to. This explains why Papandreou had unnecessarily repeated so much of Camre's original letter in his answer. Nevertheless, Rousseas understood why Papandreou had rejected the overtures. He argued that Papandreou had, in fact, been asked to commit political suicide for the sake of unity. The likelihood that Papandreou would cooperate closely with politicians like Kannelopoulos and Mitsotakis was always slim. According to Rousseas, Kannelopoulos had, before the coup, tried to throw Papandreou in jail, and Mitsotakis had betrayed both the Center Union and his father when siding with the King. Thus a "1944 Norwegian coalition" was not a good blueprint for Greece, or, at least, not for Papandreou.⁶⁶⁷ Evensen's Norwegian anti-fascist collective memory and identity collided with the political ambitions of Greece's highly divided pre-Junta political elite. There was a collision of split European memories between the Norwegians who remembered a unified anti-fascist victory and the Greeks preoccupied with their own bloody civil war.

In Norway, Einar Førde went quite far in denying Norwegian governmental involvement. He lied when he claimed that the idea behind the initiative had not come from the Norwegians at all but from the Swedish Committee. The Norwegian Committee had always emphasized the need for a united front in Greece against fascism, and there was nothing new to report here. Both Thorvald Stoltenberg⁶⁶⁸ and Camre⁶⁶⁹ denied that the Social Democratic Parties of Norway and Denmark were part of the initiative, with the latter stating that it was a covert action.⁶⁷⁰ The chairwoman of the Danish Committee, the Social Democrat MP Bodil Koch, who knew nothing about the Norwegian initiative, was deeply disappointed in Camre for not informing her.⁶⁷¹ It was perfectly consistent with Camre's preference for "secret diplomacy" over social movement engagement. Previously, he had lamented the inactivity of the Danish Committee, blaming "liberal and conservative circles" for it⁶⁷²

⁶⁶⁷ Stephen W. Rousseas, "Memoire on the 'Second Solution'," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 2, no. 1 (1975): 34.

⁶⁶⁸ "Ønskelig at grekerne forener sine krefter," *Arbeiderbladet*, January 9, 1971.

⁶⁶⁹ "Gæteri om Grækenland," *Information*, January 28, 1971.

⁶⁷⁰ "Nordiske politikere hemmeligt i Athen," *Information*, January 16–17, 1971.

⁶⁷¹ "Mystik om hemmeligt besøg i Grækenland," *Aktuellt*, January 18, 1971.

⁶⁷² Letter, Camre to Claude Serge Aronstein (Belgian Committee, "Association Belge Pour La Democratie En Grece"), March 26, 1969, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens. Camre was tasked by Bodil Koch to answer questions of the Belgian Committee on the activities in Denmark. He obliged, but also took the chance to bemoan the behavior of the liberals and conservatives on the Committee.

On the occasion of the four-year anniversary of the Greek coup in 1971, Førde was interviewed again—this time by Treholt in *Arbeiderbladet*, who was, of course, deeply involved in the Norwegian initiative himself. That the Committees had journalists as members allowed them to interview themselves. Førde argued that Norway should continue to put pressure on the United States about Greece within NATO. He regretted the disunity of the Greek opposition, while making it clear that Norwegian Committee would continue its work on a humanitarian basis. An anti-fascist collective identity is clearly expressed in the article. Førde stated, for example, that Europe now had a permanent fascist dictatorship: that Greece was becoming a new Spain. The development represented “... a bitter defeat for all those who believed that it was impossible for fascism to once again take root in a European country.”⁶⁷³

Despite the failure of the unity initiative, Treholt traveled, again, to London in February to meet with Greek opposition members; subsequently, he expressed serious doubts about a united Greek front and about whether Norwegians could be taken seriously as intermediators. Greek Conservatives and some Center Union people seemed more willing to cooperate with the Junta and hope for a liberalization of the regime than to unite with the Communist Party for the goal of reinstating democracy. Thus, again, the Nordic anti-fascist collective identity collided with Greek political realities. On the part of the Greeks, there was also growing antipathy toward “foreigners” who were seen as intervening in Greek affairs. From the criticism, Treholt concluded that there was still hope if a Norwegian delegation of older, more experienced politicians visited Greece.⁶⁷⁴ As a result, Einar Gerhardsen,⁶⁷⁵ the former Norwegian Prime Minister and a veteran of the resistance movement, who had been imprisoned in the Grini and Sachsenhausen concentration camps, was chosen to head it. A year earlier, Gerhardsen had published his memoirs of the war years. In it, he wrote about the planning that went into setting up the unified program of cooperation (*fellesprogrammet*) between all parties that opposed fascism, which set the norms and expectations for Norway’s reconstruction after liberation.⁶⁷⁶

⁶⁷³ “Europa har fått et nytt permanent fascist-diktatur,” *Arbeiderbladet*, April 22, 1971. In the original Norwegian: “... et bitter nederlag for alle som trodde det var umulig at fascismen igjen skulle slå rot i et europeisk land.”

⁶⁷⁴ Report Treholt, “Konfidentielt. Rapport fra reise til London i dagene 2. – 4. februar 1971,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 1–3.

⁶⁷⁵ Report, “Beretning for perioden 28/1 – 1971 – 17/2-1972,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/A/L0001, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 2.

⁶⁷⁶ “Motståndsman – Statsminister,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, February 17, 1971.

Gerhardsen traveled on behalf of the Committee to Athens in April and sought to influence Kanellopoulos and the Center Union leader Georgi Mavros. The Norwegian Foreign Minister was informed of the trip, and the Chargé d'affaires in Athens assisted Gerhardsen in his meetings during the visit. Gerhardsen appealed to Greek leaders to reconsider the Norwegian initiative. It was based on his own wartime experience under the German occupation in Norway: the united front of all the Norwegian parties, the cooperation between the home-front and those in exile, and the work with the national unity program. The Greek response to Gerhardsen's entreaties proved less than enthusiastic and skepticism persisted. Gerhardsen got the impression that the divisions between those in exile and those who stayed in Greece were huge. While there was much respect for Karamanlis, Papandreou was distrusted.⁶⁷⁷ In press conferences after the trip, Gerhardsen hid his disappointment. Refraining from mentioning the disunity of the opposition, he drew attention to the Greek disbelief in the U.S. decision to support the Junta. Norway should continue to pressure the Americans to change their position; otherwise, the situation would weaken the legitimacy of NATO and buttress those who opposed the Alliance.⁶⁷⁸ Nonetheless, Gerhardsen thought that the solution was not to be found in NATO; instead, bilateral contacts with responsible American politicians should be used.⁶⁷⁹

There was widespread disappointment that Gerhardsen was not able to accomplish more. Amongst the Danes, Camre desperately asked Papandreou for direction and some kind of strategy for the continued work of the Danish Committee. There was frustration that Papandreou lived on the other side of the Atlantic and did not show leadership in the solidarity work. Camre wrote:⁶⁸⁰

Andreas and Margaret, we need a strategy. How shall we change the situation in Greece? Violently or wait for elections? What can we do today, apart from keeping Greece known to the international opinion?⁶⁸¹

That summer Krag asked for Camre's opinion on an initiative undertaken by the Dutch social democrat Max van der Stoel to pursue the Greek issue in the United States through the *Socialist International*.⁶⁸² Camre supported the idea but highlighted the impasse on the Greek issue: how the Norwegians had tried so hard to unite the opposition and how let down

⁶⁷⁷ Einar Gerhardsen, *Mennesker og politikk. Erindringer 1965-78* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1978), 189–192.

⁶⁷⁸ "Ønsker USA Hellas som demokrati?" *Arbeiderbladet* April 30, 1971: 1, 16.

⁶⁷⁹ "Gerhardsen advarer mot å kaste Hellas ut av NATO," *Moss Avis*, April 30, 1971.

⁶⁸⁰ Letter, Camre to Margaret and Andreas Papandreou, May 25, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁸¹ Letter, Camre to Margaret and Andreas Papandreou, May 25, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁸² Letter, Jens Otto Krag to Camre, June 4, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

Gerhardsen had felt. The Greek Right had expressed willingness to cooperate with the Junta, and Papandreou had zero interest in cooperation unless he would be the leader. Camre felt that a change in leadership among the democratic politicians was needed, but since it was unlikely to happen soon, it was perhaps better for the Danes to have a policy of wait-and-see on Greece.⁶⁸³

The Norwegian Committee organized two more trips to Greece that year, but they were more of a fact-finding nature.⁶⁸⁴ In August, the criminologist Hans Beniksby observed trials of political prisoners in Athens and received information of the continued use of torture in the country.⁶⁸⁵ In November 1971, a promising young lawyer, Nils Kristian Sundby, traveled to Athens to investigate judicial conditions under the Junta and the treatment of political prisoners. He, too, received ample support from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry through the Norwegian Chargé d'affaires in Athens. Sundby noted that public backing for the Junta was growing despite the political trials. There was stability, economic growth, and improvements in living standards. Having drawn up this rosy picture, Sundby felt the need to qualify it by pointing out that he was not a supporter of the military regime. He thought that the only possibility for change was if there were rifts within the government or if the United States forced the holding of elections through sanctions. He recommended that the Norwegian Committee continue to push for actions within NATO; if not, it might as well disband, at least in a political sense. It could continue to operate on a humanitarian basis by helping Greek refugees or political prisoners in Greece. Sundby described the Greek opposition as hopelessly divided—both the domestic and exiled opposition groups. When a new leader was elected in the Center Union, the outcome was disputed by high-ranking politicians within the party.

At the same time, Andreas Papandreou issued statements in which he seemed to denounce parliamentary democracy.⁶⁸⁶ In October 1971, he stated that all political activities of parties should be subordinated to a “military movement” against the American occupation and its agents in Greece. There was a need for a “military and national liberation movement in the classic style and framework of the Third World.” Papandreou recognized that this would mean “tremendous sacrifices” for the Greek people, and for this reason, there had to be

⁶⁸³ Letter, Camre to Krag, July 2, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁸⁴ Report “Beretning for perioden 28/1 – 1971 – 17/2-1972,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/A/L0001, 2.

⁶⁸⁵ “Gresk sikkerhetspoliti fortsetter å torturere,” *Arbeiderbladet*, August 9, 1971.

⁶⁸⁶ Report, “Rapport til den norske komitéen for demokrati i Hellas. November 1971 – Nils Kristian Sundby,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0002, Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas, 1–3, 13–15.

a clear vision of the future for which they could fight.⁶⁸⁷ As he put it: “after the overthrow of the Junta Greece will be a neutral country viz á viz the blocs of the Cold War: socialist and not simply social democratic, and democratic (democracy in the framework of a socialist society overtakes the static parliamentary form and proceeds towards lively forms of participation by the people in all decisions which concerns them).”⁶⁸⁸ Thus, again, Papandreou saw himself fighting American imperialism rather than, like the Scandinavians wished, a fascist regime by uniting all political forces under the banner of anti-fascism. The statement caused great concern among social democrats who had seen Papandreou as their leader against the military regime. In particular, his remarks about “overtaking the static parliamentary form” did not sit well with the Danish Social Democrats.

The Party Secretary Ejner Hovgård Christiansen sought answers from Camre,⁶⁸⁹ who wrote to Papandreou about the need to clarify his position. Camre suggested that what Papandreou perhaps meant to say was that Greece should strive for a sort of expansion of democracy—an idea that was also part of a Scandinavian Social Democratic vision of the future. He wished to clear up a potential misunderstanding. The phrase “socialist and not simply social democratic” would be interpreted in the West as meaning communist. He deplored that he had not heard from Papandreou in a long time and emphasized this communication should be considered confidential. After four and a half years of no real progress,⁶⁹⁰ Camre told Papandreou that he hated “to see you and other brave Greek democrats turn onto the road of the Spanish resistance leaders after 1936. You are too much of the right solution for Greece to lose your way.”⁶⁹¹ There is no indication that Papandreou responded to Camre. It is not entirely clear what Camre really meant or what lessons he drew from the Spanish Civil War. Yet he probably feared that Papandreou was turning into a communist. The social democratic instrumentalization of the memory of the Spanish Civil War was not wholly convincing. The Nordic Social Democracies failed to assist Republican Spain in the 1930s, leaving it to the Soviet Union to be the only foreign country to take part in the military struggle against Franco.

In the latter half of 1971, when it became clear that the Norwegian initiative had failed, the Nordic solidarity work with Greece began to wane. What had seemed so obvious

⁶⁸⁷ Copy of a letter, Andreas Papandreou to Stavros Kaikis, October 10, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens. This statement was written in a letter Papandreou sent to the General Secretary of the Center Union’s youth organization abroad, Stavros Kaikis, who was to make it public at its upcoming congress.

⁶⁸⁸ Copy of letter, Papandreou to Kaikis, October 10, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁸⁹ Letter, Ejner Hovgård Christiansen to Camre, December 3, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁹⁰ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, December 7, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁹¹ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, December 7, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

for the Norwegians was met with a high level of suspicion and aversion among key elements of the Greek opposition. In the spring, Maria Becket had visited Sweden, Denmark, and Norway to meet with both high-ranking politicians and Greek exiles there. Her experience was negative—and it made her sad that material support for the Greek resistance seemed to be declining. The Scandinavians insisted on Greek unity for continued assistance. She wrote:⁶⁹² “One of the Greeks from Athens to whom I said this argument of unity with the other resistance organization (argument which I got in Sweden) said to me: why should we join for example the Democratic Defense: they have set 24 bombs in 4 years and they have 73 members of their organization in jail! I suppose all this is pretty difficult to explain, etc., etc.”⁶⁹³

In 1972, there was yet another attempt by the Nordic and international Committees to unify the Greek resistance by organizing a large international conference on Greece in Paris. Hans Göran Franck was the chair and promised a renewed boycott campaign against Greek merchant shipping. Einar Førde was satisfied with the event because representatives from “almost all” resistance organizations had sat at the same table to coordinate their humanitarian work. To him, this was an accomplishment that the Scandinavian Committees had worked towards since 1967. He hoped that it might be the beginning of real cooperation among those political forces resisting the Junta; this did not materialize, however.⁶⁹⁴ The Swedish Committee also saw the conference as a success, although it was never spelled out in what way.⁶⁹⁵ Perhaps another reason for Førde’s optimism was the sizable donation—in the amount of 50.000 NOK—that the Norwegian Committee had received from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Although much of this sum went to aiding Greek resistance organizations, the Committee’s improved financial situation allowed more travel for its members.⁶⁹⁶ It raises the question of whether conference junkets had become more important than the political work itself. The Danish Committee turned down an invitation to the conference because of its lack of faith in such gatherings. As Mogens Camre put it in a letter to Franck:⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹² Letter, Maria Becket to Camre, June 13, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁹³ Letter, Maria Becket to Camre, June 13, 1971, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁶⁹⁴ “Boikott av greske skip,” *Arbeiderbladet*, March 20, 1972.

⁶⁹⁵ Meeting protocol, “Svenska Kommittén för Greklands demokratis styrelsemöte,” April 10, 1972, SWE/ARAB/1093-1, Föreningshandlingar, Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati, 3; report, “Conférence internationale pour l’abolition de la dictature en Grèce. Paris 17-18-19 Mars 1972”; report, Möte i Paris, mars 1972,” SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-11, Hans Göran Franck. The previous year or in 1971, there had been two minor conferences in Vienna and Modena. It is unclear whether they accomplished anything other than making plans for the big international conference in Paris the following year.

⁶⁹⁶ Report, “Beretning for perioden 28.1.1971 – 17.2.1972,” NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/A/L0001 Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas. 4.

⁶⁹⁷ Letter, Camre to Franck, February 17, 1972, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-11, Hans Göran Franck.

We are of the opinion that Greece is not one step closer to democracy because of these public meetings with well-intending West Europeans. We do not believe that the old politicians – including the divided exiles – are any future for Greece. Besides, we have no confidence in conferences that are surveilled by at least three nations' intelligence services. Greece will never be delivered freedom from the outside, only through internal organizing, that properly deal with the old political structures. NATO together with a new U.S. President is perhaps capable through the pressure of Denmark and Norway to bring back Greece to the time before the Junta, but the Greeks today do not want that.⁶⁹⁸

Camre asked that the Danish position be presented to the conference,⁶⁹⁹ but it is not known whether it was done—and the Norwegians and the Swedes were baffled by it.⁷⁰⁰ One thing was clear, however: There was a huge divide between what the Scandinavians envisioned concerning their work with Greece and the political reality the Greeks had to deal with, reflecting split collective memories of the past.

The Decline of the Nordic Committees

One of the best indicators of the declining public support for the Greek cause was the massive increase in tourism to Greece in 1971. The tourist boycott had been the pride of the Swedish Committee, which had been highly successful in the first years following the coup. Four years later, things were different; seven Swedish travel agencies advertised trips to Greece, mainly to Rhodes, which proved to be popular among tourists. When Franck discussed the issue with the editor of *Aftonbladet*, Allan Fagerström, the latter argued that the boycott had been a failure because it had not been replicated elsewhere—in countries such as Britain, Germany, and France. He argued that tourism could actually be a positive force for change, as was the case in Portugal and Spain. The journalist asked Franck, in turn, whether undemocratic regimes should not be targeted by boycotts, such as Spain, Portugal, and Eastern Bloc countries. Franck thought that it was impossible to boycott all these countries. Greece was a special case because the Greek resistance organizations had insisted on the

⁶⁹⁸ Letter, Camre to Franck, February 17, 1972, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-11, Hans Göran Franck. In the original Danish: "Vi er af den opfattelse, at Grækenland ikke kommer et skridt nærmere til demokrati gennem disse offentlige møder for velmenede folk i Vesteuropa. Vi har ingen tro på, at de gamle politikere – inklusive de indbyrdes uenige eksilfolk – er nogen fremtid for Grækenland. Herunder tror vi ikke på konferencer, der overvåges af mindst tre landes efterretningstjenester.

Grækenland kan ikke få frihed leveret udefra, men kun gennem indre organisation, der gør op med det gamle samfundssystem. Nato og en ny præsident i U.S.A. kan måske ved et stort pres fra Danmark og Norge skaffe Grækenland tilbage til tiden før juntaen, men det er der intet behov for hos grækerne i dag."

⁶⁹⁹ Letter, Camre to Franck, February 17, 1972, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-11, Hans Göran Franck.

⁷⁰⁰ Letter, Franck to Camre, March 6, 1972, SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-11, Hans Göran Franck.

boycott and because the Nordic governments had condemned the regime. Even though the Swedish boycott was failing, Franck didn't see how it could be revitalized other than continuing asking people not to travel to Greece.⁷⁰¹

Later that year, it was reported that there was a substantial increase in Nordic tourism to Greece, except from Norway. The Greek Junta gleefully published the new figures through their tourist agency in Sweden. The Swedish Committee complained that it lacked financial resources to continue with the boycott campaign.⁷⁰² The Swedish travel agencies claimed that the Swedes themselves had asked for more trips to Greece.⁷⁰³ Instead of finding new ways to relaunch the boycott action, the Swedish Committee capitulated. In a board meeting, Franck argued that the tourist statistics for 1971 showed that a continuation of an organized campaign would be impossible. What was more, there was no longer a consensus on the usefulness of the boycott among the Greek resistance organizations. Franck averred that a large part of those travelling to Greece from Sweden were of Greek descent. While offering no evidence for this assertion, Franck seemed to have wanted to put the blame of the boycott failure on the Greeks. The board recommended that a continued boycott should be an act of individual consciousness of everyone,⁷⁰⁴ a position that was hardly consistent with the term.

The Swedish Committee began to question its own purpose and whether the movement could attain its goal of achieving freedom in Greece. It organized a large public meeting on the matter, which resulted in a far less ambitious program: to limit its activities to spreading information about the situation in Greece and to helping political prisoners, although that task had already been delegated to Amnesty International. The messaging was not entirely clear, however. The Committee was against stopping the boycott but stated that it did not have enough money to fund the campaign given the financial resources of travel agencies. The Social Democratic MP and Committee member Nancy Eriksson argued that those travelling to Greece should not be stigmatized as “fascist sympathizers”—pointing out that some of them might think that they could have a positive effect on the Greek people—even though she was against visiting the country. She also criticized efforts of the far left to tie the Greek issue to Sweden's future membership in the EEC or NATO since no Swedish political party was in favor of joining these organizations.

⁷⁰¹ “Ska vi resa till Grekland?,” *Veckojournalen*, May 18, 1971: 26–27.

⁷⁰² “Grek-bojkott utan effekt?,” *Arbetet*, September 14, 1971.

⁷⁰³ “Svenska turister struntar i bojkotten mot Grekland,” *Aftonbladet*, October 6, 1971.

⁷⁰⁴ Board meeting protocol, October 4, 1971, SWE/ARAB/1093-1, Föreningshandlingar, Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati, 1–2.

Members of the Norwegian Committee, who participated in the meeting, were coming to similar conclusions. Its chairman, Førde, argued that the liberation of Greece could not come from Stockholm or London but only from the Greek people themselves.⁷⁰⁵ He also accounted for the disappointment felt by the Norwegian and Swedish Committees over of the weak support for the liberation movement among political circles in Greece. If the Greeks themselves could not unite against the Junta, this limited what outside actors could do.⁷⁰⁶ Gone were the days of endless optimism—of the belief that through international action, the Greek Junta could be pressured into returning the country to democracy. Gone was the optimism about the idea of a unified anti-fascist effort to rid Europe of another fascist regime. These collective memories, identities, expectations, and beliefs went against political developments in Greece and its history. Yet the capitulation of both the Norwegian and Swedish Committees had unforeseeable and unwelcome consequences.

In early 1972, rumors circulated that Swedish government might reinstate its ambassador to Greece. When hearing them even Melina Mercouri, who was in Sweden at the invitation of the Swedish Committee, became dejected. She pointed out that they came on top of increased Nordic tourism to Greece, whose trade relations with the Eastern Bloc was also growing.⁷⁰⁷ Franck pleaded with the Swedish Foreign Minister Krister Wickman not to follow through with the plan of resuming normal diplomatic relations with Greece, citing the many political prisoners and the continued practice of torture.⁷⁰⁸ The catalyst for the policy change had been the decreasing share of exports from Sweden to Greece. Even Finland was overtaking Sweden in some areas, such as timber—and the same applied to Eastern European countries. A year earlier, the Swedish lobbying organization Export Association (*Exportföreningen*) had invited a Greek trade delegation for talks in Sweden to do something about its substantial decline in profits.⁷⁰⁹ All the biggest Swedish industrial companies traded with Greece, including Volvo, ASEA, LM Ericson, and SKF.⁷¹⁰

⁷⁰⁵ “Turistbojkotten mot grekjuntan ej längre effektiv,” *Dagens Nyheter*, December 5, 1971.

⁷⁰⁶ “Turistbojkotten mot grekjuntan ej längre effektiv.” In the original Swedish: “Storingsman Førde tolkade den besvikelse som man inom Greklandsrörelsen i både Norge och Sverige känt över det mycket svaga stöd och gensvar som man fått för frihetskampen från de politiska kretsarna i Grekland. – Faktum är att grekerna inte själva lyckats samla frihetens krafter, konstaterade Einar Førde resignerat. Det måste råda ett nära samspel mellan vad vi kan göra utanför Grekland och vad grekerna själva kan göra i sitt eget land för att uppnå en friare regim.”

⁷⁰⁷ “Kampen fortsätter trots bojkotten,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, March 4, 1972.

⁷⁰⁸ Letter, Hans Göran Franck to Foreign Minister Krister Wickman, January 24, 1972, Uttalanden 1971-73, SWE/ARAB/1093-1, Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati.

⁷⁰⁹ “Exporten starkt ned Grekdelegation hit,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, March 27, 1971.

⁷¹⁰ “Svenskt export-ras bakom ambassadors-utnämningen?” *Arbetet*, June 27, 1972.

The Swedish Committee had, as noted, never made the trade to Greece a political issue because it had argued that the trade relationship was only beneficial for Sweden. Now this decision came back to haunt it. The Committee protested the visit of the Greek trade delegation, seeing it as a break with the policy of isolating the Junta. Prime Minister Olof Palme and other representatives of the Swedish government also expressed unease with it.⁷¹¹ In the spring of 1972, the Swedish Committee had been informed by both Palme and Wickman that the diplomatic status quo would be maintained in Greece. In June, however, the government had seemingly changed its mind and appointed a new ambassador to Greece. The representative of the Swedish Social Democratic Party on the Swedish Committee, Arne Eriksson reacted with fury and resigned. He claimed that he could not in good conscience represent the Social Democratic Party on the Committee any longer.⁷¹² As he put it:

- For the last five years all social movements in Sweden have shown their support in this question and we still receive money daily from many organizations.
- Against this enormous engagement a single organization – Export Association – comes and demands that an ambassador is reinstated. Then all the sudden the government does not give a damn about all the social movements, says Arne Eriksson agitatedly. – It is also ugly political tactics that the government takes this decision in the middle of summer when most social movements are not active, and people are on holiday.⁷¹³

The news caused quite a domestic political stir. The Social Democratic Women's Organization (*Sveriges socialdemokratiska kvinnoförbund*) condemned the decision, adding that it could only mean that the Swedish government accepted the "fascist regime in Athens."⁷¹⁴ Wickman was booed when he addressed the congress of the Young Social Democrats (*SSU*). In contrast, the Conservative Party and the Export Association (*Exportföreningen*) were happy with the decision, seeing it as a step towards protecting Swedish economic interests in Greece.⁷¹⁵ A brazenly written editorial in the Social Democrat newspaper *Arbetet* defended the decision of the government. Claiming that the Junta was

⁷¹¹ Press statement, Hans Göran Franck, May 28, 1971, Uttalanden 1971-73, SWE/ARAB/1093-1, Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati.

⁷¹² "Öppen strid inom socialdemokratin om Grekland," *Aftonbladet*, June 27, 1972.

⁷¹³ "Öppen strid inom socialdemokratin om Grekland." In the original Swedish: "– Hela folkrörelse-Sverige har i fem år slutit upp helt fantastisk i den här frågan och vi får fortfarande dagligen pengar från många organisationer.

– Men mot hela denna enorma uppslutning kommer en enda organisation

– Exportföreningen – och kräver att en ambassadör tillsätts. Då struntar regeringen i alla folkrörelser, säger Arne Eriksson upprört.

– Att regeringen gör detta utspel mitt i sommaren när alla folkrörelser är ur funktion och man gått på semester kan bara betecknas som ful politisk taktik."

⁷¹⁴ "S-kvinnor besvikna på 'grekbeslut'," *Dagens Nyheter*, June 29, 1972.

⁷¹⁵ "Krister Wickman utbuades av SSU," *Aftonbladet*, June 27, 1972.

there to stay, it could be resisted in other ways. Another contributing factor, it was argued, was the failure of the Swedish Committee in its boycott campaign: “The Swedish tourist boycott has become a fiasco, and this has regrettably led to that there is a national interest in having competent diplomatic representation in Greece.”⁷¹⁶ What he meant was the presence of Swedish officials who could assist Swedish tourists in trouble. Wickman was also quick to point out that the boycott had failed.⁷¹⁷

The fact of the matter was that it was under the Junta that Greece really took off as a tourist destination, with 2.5 million tourists visiting the country in 1972.⁷¹⁸ The social democratic editorialist argued that communists should not have to complain either, because the Eastern Bloc had continuous and expansive relations with the Colonels; even Maoist China recognized the regime. The only thing to do now was to continue the support of the resistance, which was, in the eyes of the journalist, personified in Andreas Papandreou.⁷¹⁹

According to reports from Athens, the Junta had been jubilant when it learned of the Swedish capitulation after five years of a “cold war.” The government press made the point that this solved all the diplomatic difficulties with the three Scandinavian countries because the regime only needed one ambassador. Greek opposition figures, in contrast, lamented the Swedish decision. In the words of one of them:

The English appeased and they managed to free lady Flemming. The Germans appeased and they managed to free Professor Mangakis. The Swedes appeased and they managed to free export licenses ...⁷²⁰

To soften the blow, the Swedish government tried to appease the Swedish Committee. The Party Secretary claimed that the ambassadorial appointment did not mean that the government would cease its support for the Greek resistances and that the Swedish labor movement was leading the effort on the international stage. The Social Democratic Party issued a statement, promising to consult with the Swedish Committee and Andreas

⁷¹⁶ “Front mot juntan,” *Arbetet*, June 28, 1972. In the original Swedish: “Den svenska turistbojkotten har blivit ett fiasco, och bland annat detta leder tyvärr till, att vi har ett nationellt intresse av att ha en kompetent diplomatisk representation i Grekland.”

⁷¹⁷ “Vi sviker inte grekerna,” *Dagens Nyheter*, June 28, 1972.

⁷¹⁸ Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship*, 12.

⁷¹⁹ “Front mot juntan,” *Arbetet*, June 28, 1972.

⁷²⁰ “Juntan jublar,” *Expressen*, June 28, 1972. In the original Swedish: “– Engelsmännen gjorde eftergifter. De fick ut lady Fleming. tyskarna gjorde eftergifter. De fick ut professor Mangakis. Svenskarna gjorde eftergifter – de får ut en massa exportlicenser ...”

Papandreou on how to continue this backing.⁷²¹ Palme and Wickman subsequently met with the Swedish Committee to drive home the point. The Swedish chapter of Amnesty International, *Amnestyfonden*, received a substantial donation of 200,000 Swedish kronor to assist Greek political prisoners and their families. The Swedish Committee also asked the government for a sum of 150.000 kronor to finance its information outreach, but whether it received the money is unclear. Most importantly the Committee demanded that the Swedish government continue its pressure on the Junta internationally.⁷²² Wickman complied, criticizing the lack of democracy, and expressing concerns about human rights in Greece and Czechoslovakia in the U.N. General Assembly that year (for which he received a lengthy rebuttal from the Greek representative).⁷²³ The Committee characterized the Foreign Minister's intervention as a victory.⁷²⁴

In Norway, the trade with Greece also increased significantly, especially in shipbuilding. The Norwegian Department of Industry supported the newly established trade relations. One of the business owners argued that shipping was the ultimate free trade; there could be no political consideration, especially not with a NATO ally. Arne Treholt regretted the decision, whereas State Secretary Thorvald Stoltenberg did not want to comment on it.⁷²⁵ Mogens Camre did not have to worry that something similar might happen in Denmark. He complained to Papandreou about the pressure the U.S. and U.K. governments were putting on his country to stop bringing up the Greece in NATO. Compared to Norway and Sweden, Camre thought that Denmark was in the best position to act. He hoped that Papandreou could help him by keeping up the pressure on Danish politicians and by maintaining an interest in the Greek issue.⁷²⁶ As he wrote:

Greek affairs here are at a standstill. The Danish Committee for Democracy in Greece has just protested against the Swedish decision to appoint an ambassador in Athens and we warned the Danish government against doing the same. I think we can avoid a Danish appointment. We do not sell any Volvos to Greece.⁷²⁷

⁷²¹ Press statement, Sten Andersson party secretary of the social democrats, June 28, 1972, Uttalanden 1971–73, SWE/ARAB/1093-1, Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati.

⁷²² Report, Thomas Hammarberg, "Uppföljning av uppvaktningen hos Olof Palme och Krister Wickman den 30 juni 1972," Uttalanden 1971-73, SWE/ARAB/1093-1, Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati.

⁷²³ UN General Assembly, "27th session: 2062nd plenary meeting, Wednesday, 11 October 1972, New York," accessed November 15, 2023, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/753751?ln=en>.

⁷²⁴ Report, "Verksamhetsberättelse för år 1972," SWE/ARAB/1093-1, Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati.

⁷²⁵ "Statsstøtte til Norsk etablering i Hellas," *Arbeiderbladet*, Mars 22, 1972.

⁷²⁶ Letter, Camre to Andreas Papandreou, July 18, 1972, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

⁷²⁷ Letter, Camre to Papandreou, July 18, 1972, DK/RA/07680-12, Camre, Mogens.

Nevertheless, Camre was criticized in the Danish press for the standstill and for not keeping the public updated about the dealings of the Danish Committee, especially the perceived unnecessary secrecy surrounding the Norwegian initiative. Camre rationalized his behavior by saying that nothing much had happened with respect to Greece because of the stance of the U.S. Administration. Yet the leader of the Anti-dictatorial Committee in Denmark, Stathis Rigas, took it upon himself to attack Camre on behalf of “us Greeks.” He asserted that the Danish-Norwegian Committees were obsessed with negotiating with right-wing Greek politicians who lived a good life under the Junta. Rigas thought that Camre was illusioned to think that the Greek people wanted to have anything to do with NATO in the future.⁷²⁸ As he put it:

It is an illusion to believe that while suffering through such a tragedy the Greek people will ever forget the role the NATO machinery played in its oppression and that it would be ready to accept a puppet regime orchestrated by the State Department. It is regrettable that a committee that was founded to support the struggle of the Greek people does not take into consideration the fundamental demand of the Greek resistance movement but instead goes in the opposite direction and misleads public opinion in Denmark and create confusion regarding the real conditions in Greece.⁷²⁹

Rigas argued that the Danish Committee should stop its futile negotiation attempts and, instead, start collaborating with the Greek Anti-dictatorial Committee in Denmark. He claimed that their previous calls for cooperation had gone unanswered.⁷³⁰ It is true that Camre and the Danish Committee were preoccupied with responding to critics on the Right who feared a Greek exit from NATO, or a communist takeover if the Junta was removed. In their pamphlet from 1969, Camre ensured those critics that the Greeks were, in fact, fiercely anti-communist and would stick to Greece’s NATO membership. Thus, the United States was encouraged to withdraw its support for the Junta because it had no good reason to back it.⁷³¹

It was a political message that suited diplomacy more than a social movement. Camre tried to reassure the political Right against the threat of communist takeover instead of

⁷²⁸ “Camre, Grækenland – og vi grækere,” *Information*, March 2, 1971.

⁷²⁹ “Camre, Grækenland – og vi grækere.” In the original Danish: “Det er en illusion at tro, at det græske folk, der gennemlever en sådan tragedie, nogensinde vil glemme, hvilken rolle NATO-apparatet har spillet for dets undertrykkelse, og at det vil være parat til at acceptere en marionetregering fabrikeret i State Departments kulisser. Det er beklageligt, at en komite, der er blevet oprettet for at støtte det græske folks kamp. Ikke tager hensyn til den græske modstandskamps elementære krav men går den stik modsatte vej og vildleder opinionen i Danmark ved at skabe forvirring om de faktiske forhold i Grækenland.”

⁷³⁰ “Camre, Grækenland – og vi grækere”.

⁷³¹ Pamphlet, Mogens Camre, “Grækenland,” *Den danske komite i Grækenland* [April 21, 1969], DK/RA/07680-13, Camre, Mogens.

emphasizing the suffering of the Greek people or their loss of democracy. These anti-communist reassurances of the Danish Committee did not sit well with Rigas or other young radical people on the Left in Denmark. Among them were the Left Socialist MP Hanne Reintoft, who claimed that those who opposed NATO were systematically excluded from the Danish Committee. In her mind, this behavior was hypocritical because NATO was behind the coup. The Greek people should be able to decide their own fate—and they might not prefer a future NATO membership or even a Western-style democracy.⁷³² Still, Reintoft could not avoid controversies of her own making; she had left her political party because, among other things, it had condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.⁷³³ She also participated—perhaps unknowingly—in a Soviet disinformation campaign, which leaked American stay-behind operation plans for Denmark, claiming that they described, instead, a Danish version of a Greek-style colonels' coup.⁷³⁴ The NATO question continuously created tension among those opposing the Greek Junta, which was also instrumentalized by the Soviet Union. It contributed to the fact that many young radical people—who normally constituted the most dynamic segment of social movements—did not feel at home in the Nordic Committees. The NATO question strained aspects of the anti-fascist collective identity. If the Junta was merely the puppet of NATO and American imperialism, there was no need to classify it as fascist, since it, ultimately, had no agency of its own. And more importantly there would be no reason to unite with democratic forces that were not anti-American.

Even though the Swedish Committee did not shy away from criticizing NATO, it was not immune to the criticism of the Greek exile community. It was directed specifically at Hans Göran Franck, who was seen as too domineering and authoritarian, and who had prevented Greek exiles from speaking out at a public meeting. Franck thought nothing of it and complained, instead, about the endless infighting among the Greek Anti-dictatorial Committees. The exchange was published in a magazine launched by the famous Maoist Jan Myrdal.⁷³⁵ Still, Theodor Kallifatides does not recall any severe disagreements with the Swedish Committee, even if there were occasional tensions with Swedish Social Democrats

⁷³² Hanne Reintoft, "Morgendagens Grækenland," *Information*, June 5, 1969.

⁷³³ Regin Schmid, *Pet's overvågning af politiske partier 1945-1989: PET, Folketingets partier og østlig efterretningsaktivitet PET-Kommissionens beretning Bind 7*, accessed May 23, 2023, https://www.leksikon.org/images/pet_bind7.pdf. 262–263.

⁷³⁴ Morten Heiberg, *KGB's kontakt- og agentnet i Danmark: Sagerna i PET's arkiv vedrørende Arne Herløv Petersen og Jørgen Dragsdahl PET-Kommissionens beretning Bind 13*, accessed December 2, 2023, https://www.leksikon.org/images/pet_bind13.pdf. 30–31.

⁷³⁵ "Svar på öppet brev om grekmötet i Kalmar," *Folket i bild/Kulturfront* 2, no. 8 (1973): 13.

in general. This was because of the Greek experience with anti-communist repression. As he remembered it: “At that time, Swedish Social Democracy was more anti-communist than it was social democratic.”⁷³⁶

In addition to tensions between the Nordic Committees and the Greek exiles, there were generational differences and political culture divides between the Committees and the many young protest movements. An episode involving a young Icelandic radical is a case in point. In 1970, the chairman of the Icelandic Committee, Sigurður A. Magnússon asked a friend, Vésteinn Lúðvíksson, who later became a famous Icelandic writer, to participate on his behalf in a Nordic Committee meeting in Stockholm. Afterwards Lúðvíksson wrote to Magnússon in detail about his experience. He argued that the Nordic Committees were organized on the false premise of being member organizations. In reality, the Committees had other huge organizations, such as political parties and labor unions attached to them, but only through the leadership of these organizations. The Swedish Committee bragged about a large membership; yet, in reality, its level of activity was very low. Most of the members did not even know they were supporting these Committees or that they even existed. The leadership of the Committees were in the eyes of Lúðvíksson “passive paper-bureaucrats” who wanted most of all to kiss Melina Mercouri. In his eyes, Franck was primarily a Social Democrat protecting the Swedish Committee from more active radical people; while he was less critical of the leaders of the Danish and Norwegian Committees, he believed that the Committees were not well run.⁷³⁷

What especially irritated him was that no one seemed to have considered that scant public interest in the Greek issue could be blamed on the organizational structure. For him, it was a simple fact that the Committees did not mobilize and engage people in political actions. The only activity suggested at the meeting he attended was to lobby different organizations on diverse political issues. Lúðvíksson believed that the Greek cause would be better served with smaller activist groups that were not immobilized because of allegiances to NATO. Lúðvíksson also complained about the presence of Soviet representatives who were there mostly to cover up their increased trade with Greece. He was bewildered by how suspicious and impatient the Nordic Committees were towards the Greek exile-movement. He wondered

⁷³⁶ Interview with Theodor Kallifatides, September 19, 2022. In the original Swedish: “den svenska socialdemokratin på den tiden var ju mer antikommunistisk än socialdemokratisk.”

⁷³⁷ Letter, Vésteinn Lúðvíksson to Magnússon, November 12, 1970, ICE/LBS/710-NF Sigurður A. Magnússon.

what the purpose of the Committees was, if not serving them, and the Greek people.⁷³⁸ The beginning of his letter captures his whole experience:

I have never before, in such a short time, received such a high dose of bourgeoisie cackle and snobbishness. If I had been a theoretical Marxist when I arrived, I would have left as a revolutionary communist. It was like riding from Hólar to Hákot [a downgrade] first to attend a meeting with the FNL groups on Friday and then to attend this meeting the day after.⁷³⁹

The FNL groups led the Swedish Vietnam movement were, as noted, characterized by their strong Maoism but also by their factionalism. Irrespective of the highly pejorative content of the letter, the analysis of the structure of the committees as well as the differences that existed in political cultures was convincing. It was also an indication of how bureaucratized the Committees were. The failure of the Swedish Committee to mobilize and engage with its members is corroborated by several letters from members. Complaints range from not receiving information about activities to the organizations being too centralized.⁷⁴⁰ The activity level of the Nordic Committees declined steadily from 1972 to 1974, resulting in a marked decrease in meetings and demonstrations until the fall of the Greek Junta. In a January 1974 meeting, the passivity of the Swedish Committee was explained by referring to increased attention devoted to the Chilean military coup and to geopolitical developments in the Middle East. One Swedish Committee member suggested that a more active recruitment campaign should be initiated. Another member, Hertha Fischer, wanted the board and other members to go out on the streets once a month to sell the Committee's magazine and collect money for the Greek cause. What seemed like two excellent ideas to encourage interaction with the public were swiftly quashed by Franck, who argued that such work should be done by the member organizations—the parties and unions—not the board members of the Committee.⁷⁴¹

Such a passive attitude was in sharp contrast to the extremely active student movement in Greece, which culminated in its occupation of the Athens Polytechnic University in November 1973. It was the first real uprising of the Greeks against the military

⁷³⁸ Letter, Lúðvíksson to Magnússon, November 12, 1970, ICE/LBS/710-NF Sigurður A. Magnússon.

⁷³⁹ Letter, Lúðvíksson to Magnússon, November 12, 1970. In the original Icelandic: "Aðra eins stórskammta af borgarahjali og snobberíi hef ég aldrei fengið í einu á jafnskömmum tíma. Hafi ég verið bóka-marxisti þegar ég kom, var ég byltingarsinnaður kommúnisti þegar ég fór. Og að sitja fund á föstudaginn hjá FNL-grúppunum hér í Stokkhólmi og koma svo í þetta daginn eftir, það er að ríða frá Hólum í Hákot."

⁷⁴⁰ Letters from "Monica Alexanderson," April 16, 1972 and "Maud Lindblad," February 29, 1972, Korrespondens 1971–75, SWE/ARAB/1093-1, Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati.

⁷⁴¹ Protocol, "reprezentantsskapsmöte," January 25, 1974," Verksamhetsberättelser 1970–74, SWE/ARAB/1093-1, Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati.

regime, and it was savagely crushed after only three days. The Junta used tanks and live ammunition against the protesters, resulting in 24 confirmed deaths and another 15 missing. The occupation of the university had been initiated, spontaneously, by a diverse group of students, with anarchists taking the lead. The pro-Moscow communists in the Anti-Dictatorial Committees in Greece were, at first, opposed to the occupation, seeing it as too anarchic. And during the uprising, there were constant tensions and conflicts between anarchists driven by ideas of insurrection and communists that preferred pragmatism. Eventually, a broad-based but communist-dominated Organizing Committee came to dominate the uprising. Through radio broadcasts, it called for popular freedom, national sovereignty, exit from NATO, and opposition to “foreign monopolies.” Slogans directed specifically against the United States were also common. One of the lasting slogans was “Bread—Education—Freedom.”

The communists used their preponderant power within the Committee to brutalize the anarchists, threatening to exclude them from participating in the occupation. There were also calls for a national unity government to depose the Junta, but they were contested by radical leftists who saw the revolt as a means to achieve revolutionary goals. Thus, the uprising never managed to mobilize a large segment of Greeks in Athens; only about 100,000 protesters came out on the streets in a city of two million. The bloody suppression paralyzed the student movement, with no opposition activity taking place until the fall of the Junta the following year. Shortly after the uprising, there was an internal coup within the Junta, resulting in hardliners taking power. As a result, the regime became more authoritarian and aggressive. Thus, it attempted through a coup in Cyprus to annex the island, which, in turn, triggered a Turkish invasion. The military adventure was, as mentioned, a complete failure. The prospect of a war with Turkey led to a regime change, forcing a return to democracy with the return of Konstantinos G. Karamanlis from exile on July 24, 1974.⁷⁴²

At the January 1974 Swedish Committee meeting, Emmanuel Poniridis had commented on the Athens Polytechnic uprising and the second military coup, revealing the contradictory political discourse that characterized the exiled Greek communities over the Junta, which differed markedly from that of the Nordic Committees. Poniridis argued that the uprising showed that the Greek people understood that they had the same enemy as the Vietnamese—namely, the Americans. Growing resistance against fascism and the Americans expressed a feeling of hate that had not been seen before because now everyone knew that they were the biggest enemy of the people. He argued that the U.S. government wanted to

⁷⁴² Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship*, 1, 255–265, 269–270, 287–291.

make a satellite state out of Greece. Thus, the Junta was a fascist regime as well as an American colonial dependency, with the conditions of the Greeks likened to those of the Vietnamese.⁷⁴³

It was a strategy of the PAK to bring relevance to the Greek issue by comparing it to other contemporary and topical issues such as Czechoslovakia or Vietnam. A case in point was when Papandreou spoke together with the Vietcong Foreign Minister Nguyễn Thị Bình at a political rally in Stockholm in October 1972. The rally was organized by the Swedish Social Democratic Party in support of liberation movements in Greece, Vietnam, Latin America, and South Africa. In his speech, the Greek Junta was characterized as embodying—simultaneously—neo-colonialism, fascism, and foreign occupation. Neo-colonialism was used to tie Greece to the war in Vietnam. The reason why there were dictatorships in Southern Europe was because the Europeans had not been as vigorous in their defense against American imperialism as the Vietnamese. This was also true of Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and Greece. Yet Greece was special because it was a “full-fledged colony of the United States of Europe.” The Junta was, thus, not really Greek but American, or, in other words, an expression of a “U.S-sponsored militarized neo-colonialism.” Still, portraying the Junta as fascist was still important for Papandreou as he invoked the memory of the sacrifices made during the Second World War. Papandreou also compared the Vietnam War to the Holocaust.⁷⁴⁴ The instrumentalization of the Vietnam War to highlight the situation in Greece reached a peak when the PAK’s newsletter asked its readers to replace the word “Vietnam” with “Greece” in a quoted article about the Vietnam War.⁷⁴⁵

Even in the Junta coup against itself in November 1973, Papandreou saw no agency in the actions of the coup-makers. Instead, he argued that the CIA had replaced one lackey with another.⁷⁴⁶ The evidence for this was that one of the new Junta leaders had once worked in the United States.⁷⁴⁷ The insistence on denying the Junta any agency and on portraying it as being non-Greek enabled exiled politicians like Papandreou to absolve themselves of any responsibility for the failure of democracy in Greece. It also distracted from the fact that they had still not managed to oppose the regime effectively. In contrast, the Swedish Committee adopted a predominantly anti-fascist understanding of the situation in Greece and toyed with

⁷⁴³ Protocol, “represtatantsskapsmöte,” January 25, 1974, SWE/ARAB/1093-1, Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati.

⁷⁴⁴ “Address to rally by Andreas Papandreou,” *PAK Newsletter*, 1, no. 10 (1972): 1–3.

⁷⁴⁵ “Colonialists,” *PAK Newsletter* 1, no. 2 (1972): 6–7.

⁷⁴⁶ “CIA bakom nya regimen,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, November 26, 1973.

⁷⁴⁷ “Stor i orden,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, November 27, 1973

the idea of depicting the Junta as a form of “Mediterranean fascism.” The purpose was to revitalize the struggle by cooperating closely with other anti-fascist committees that focused on Spain, Portugal, and Turkey.⁷⁴⁸ The idea never came to fruition.

In 1974, the Swedish Committee interviewed one of the Greek students who had organized the Polytechnic uprising. The anonymous student credited the New Left and autonomous groups for the action, that is, groups that were independent of the old political organizations. The rebelling students broadcasted—through the university radio station—a call for unity in the struggle against the Junta. The student, who was interviewed, argued that the protests were meant to criticize the failure of the Greek political parties and resistance organizations to forge a united front, which they felt was needed to topple the dictatorship and reestablish democracy. If this admonition went unheeded, the people themselves would be forced to engage in a more violent struggle.⁷⁴⁹ The unifying message echoed what the Nordic Committees had so desperately attempted to achieve. Unfortunately, more violence was needed before the Greek Junta fell. This would, however, come in the shape of the Turkish military invasion and partition of Cyprus.

Historian Federico Romero argues that the 1973 Oil Crisis and the advent of neoliberalism in the following years marked an end to an era. The Western powers no longer viewed the Soviet Union as an ideological threat, only a geopolitical issue. The Soviet and socialist regimes struggled for relevance as the state was supposed to facilitate the marketization of society, with neoliberalism becoming the symbol for innovation and progress. Romero argues that this cultural shift was linked to the increasing emphasis on human rights. It became a new master narrative espoused and articulated by NGOs and the political spectrum from liberals to conservatives. Having been spurred by the 1975 Helsinki Accords and the foreign policy of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, it undermined the Left’s reliance on the state as the main agent of progressive change. The new social movements concerned with environmentalism, feminism, and anti-nuclear activism were indicative of this shift.

A human rights agenda took center stage at the expense of mnemonic anti-fascist politics, revealing a tension that has been illustrated throughout the thesis.⁷⁵⁰ Romero writes: “The peaceful demise of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and the

⁷⁴⁸ Meeting protocols, “styrelsesammanträde,” October 2, 1973, and May 9, 1973, Protokoll 1971-75, SWE/ARAB/1093-1, Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati.

⁷⁴⁹ “En motståndsmän,” *Greklands-Bulletin* 19 (1974): 9–10.

⁷⁵⁰ Federico Romero, “Cold War historiography at the crossroads,” *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (2014): 701–703.

subsequent transition to democracy not only paved the way to an expanded integration of Western Europe. It also eclipsed the emotional, cultural, and political traction of anti-fascism.⁷⁵¹ Thus, the only remaining dictatorships left were the socialist ones in Eastern Europe. And ever since the 1968 Soviet suppression of the Prague Spring, ideas of a shared future between the socialist regimes and the Western Left—through the legacy of an anti-fascist Popular Front—had been badly undermined.⁷⁵² Yet anti-fascism was not dead: Although momentarily eclipsed, it made a forceful reentry into European politics following the fall of the Berlin Wall to respond to the reemergence of fascism in the shape of domestic and violent neo-Nazi subcultures and movements.

⁷⁵¹ Romero, “Cold War historiography,” 703.

⁷⁵² Romero, “Cold War historiography,” 703.

Conclusion

Anti-fascism is often expressed through epic heroic struggles against the mortal enemy of democracy. What has been overlooked is how anti-fascist narratives became an inspiration to the following generations. This is the question that this thesis has grappled with: What happened with anti-fascism after the Second World War? The answer is that it lived on, not as an ideology or a political program but as a memory. Thus, anti-fascism became mnemonic. The memory, in turn, shaped an identity that has ensured its longevity and resilience. Those fighting historical fascism may have perceived the world through the eyes of a child, as it were for the first time (to quote the Louise Glück poem), but afterwards, it was done through remembrance. Seeing the world through memory. The enormous sacrifices created a legacy and lessons of the past, which had to be reckoned with. The death and destruction generated by the war urgently called for a post-war meaning; otherwise, humanity in its totality might as well perish in its wake. One such meaning was anti-fascism—the defeat of fascism.

The argument has been made here that notions of an anti-fascist minimum need to be complemented with memory. Anti-fascism was an injunction to remember fascism in the form of a mnemonic collective identity. It involves both cultural and collective memory. The longevity of societal memories is maintained through culture, with memories of fascism and anti-fascism being transnational. Simultaneously, anti-fascism is a collective process of social relations. It is a political practice within social movements that carries with it the production and reproduction of memories through action that plays an essential part in the formation of collective identities. While social movements occasionally lack a clear social appropriation of the past, they seldom lack identities. And the most forceful collective identities are formulated through ideas of a shared past. It is a dialectic between identity and memory with a powerful synthesis that points not only to the present but also the future. Accordingly, the severity of the threat is determined through memory by interpreting present conditions in addition to predictions of the future. The urgency demands solidarity—and the severity calls for uncompromising resistance: to unite forces and to refuse appeasement.

Remembering, which is always selective, creates mythologies rather than narratives. Through its selectiveness, memory not only obscures and simplifies but also lacks the nuances that are enabled in narratives. Remembering does not exclude truths, but they tend to be tendentious. In this way, forgetting becomes integral to remembering, with contradictions being removed for the sake of coherence. Critical scholars need to expose this tension and to unmask its inner workings. While allowing for contradictions makes the past memorable, it

becomes problematic when they are profuse, since they tend to lead to the instrumentalization of memory by justifying the violent objectives of states instead of defending a common humanity. Imperialism and wars of aggression—whether Soviet or American—were rationalized in such a way during the Cold War. Anti-colonialism is surely essential to bring light to aspects of Western hypocrisy and racism within its legacy of democracy. The continuation of European colonial empires after the Second World War is its clearest manifestation. Yet using the concept without a critical distance risks making it into a monolith. Anti-colonial struggles were not always anti-imperial as they often used one empire to undermine another. Neither were they always anti-capitalist or anti-racist, as they most often ended up reproducing structures of class and race in their new nations. Discarding ideas of democracy for the sake of a developmental dictatorship enabled autocracies to flourish. Anti-fascism is useful because it acknowledges the agency of the dictator despite the outside influence of imperial forces. These aspects should be accounted for by scholars that grapple with ideas of decolonialization. The success of anti-fascism depends largely on the ability to consume its memory—to accept its stories of the past and let them shape one’s identity. If there is no shared past, why should one express anxiety in the present? Why should one be concerned with a particular type of authoritarian regime, when there are so many? Why should one be concerned with fascism if it is merely one of many political ideologies?

Georg Branting engaged in memory politics in his attempts to organize the Swedes against Franco. The Swedes might have remembered, he noted, but they did not remember enough, for they did not recollect the Spanish Civil War. The Norwegians did not have to remember Spain; they had their own memories of fascism, which ensured that they remembered enough. Anti-fascist activists only had to make the connection between the present and the past. To be sure, the Norwegian government failed in its attempts to convince the “international community” of the threat of the Franco regime, but Spain was, at least, kept out of NATO. The Norwegian Spanish Committee mobilized Norwegians through anti-fascism, providing humanitarian work—such as opening up their homes for Spanish refugee children—without providing legitimacy to a brutal regime by operating this aid in Spain. While human rights campaigns accomplished amnesty for prisoners, they could not mobilize the population as anti-fascism did. The rise to dominance of the politics of human rights during the latter half of the 1970s did so at the expense of a long tradition of international solidarity and anti-fascism. It destroyed older notions of revolution and utopia and replaced it with a set of international laws that cannot be enforced because there is no world government. Nonetheless, there is internationalism and universalism inherent in the idea of human rights.

All these aspects were important to all those who opposed dictatorships during the post-war period, and still are to this day.

There is, however, an inherent limitation to human-rights based politics; it can never question the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes because it would deprive them of interlocutors to negotiate with. Unlike anti-fascism, it is eternally corrective, not revolutionary or liberatory. Engagement with Spanish, and later Greek, refugees was predicated on a deep understanding of the political systems they had escaped from and a simultaneous commitment to changing them. Assistance was often conditioned on political values held in common, and a-political immigrants or those supportive of the regimes were turned away. This may be a lesson for present-day activists concerned with the plight of refugees. There is a danger of lapsing into pure humanitarianism; in the unequal relations of charity, there is no exchange of ideas. The effort becomes solely reformist without questioning the root cause—or why people are forced to flee. In this sense, the dynamic impedes integration because there is no reason to engage with the refugees or to understand them. Refugee activists would benefit from an anti-fascism that engages critically with the authoritarian regimes many of the refugees are forced to flee from.

The memory of the Holocaust came late to anti-fascism. Only with the Swastika Epidemic were nascent attempts made to reckon with its consequences. It was the double crime of European civilization to allow for the extermination of European Jews and, subsequently, to deny the survivors of their testimonies or impede them from appearing as witnesses. In a bizarre twist, the Soviet disinformation campaign, whose aim was to damage the international standing of West Germany, opened a space where it was possible to speak about the true horror of the Holocaust, even if the particularity of antisemitism was soon denied as the world preferred universal notions of racism. It was an unfortunate development, if understandable, considering the huge task undertaken by colonized peoples to free themselves from centuries of European subjugation. Thus, anti-fascist narratives traveled between Southern European dictatorships, global anti-colonial struggles, and transnational manifestations of domestic fascism and antisemitism.

In the case of the white minority regimes of Southern Africa, anti-fascist conceptualizations were sometimes superfluous. This was also the case with the Vietnam War. These instances produced their own atrocities; there was no need to refer to memory because Europe was finally witnessing them for the first time one could say—through the eyes of a child. The Swastika Epidemic only triggered nominal anti-fascist activity, expressed mainly through calls for proper history education of children. A generation without collective

memory had to be taught to remember through cultural memory. Aase Lionæs expressed righteous rage over the thought that Norwegian Holocaust survivors had to witness a resurgence of antisemitism without a proper societal response. Lionæs stated the true meaning of the Holocaust in the Norwegian Parliament in a political language that differed from that of everyday. Laws on incitement to racial hatred led to a state response to this misanthropic behavior, but it could not stop a possible resurgence of fascism. At the time, domestic Nordic fascism was dormant and marginal—to the extent that explicit anti-fascist groups like CNR prioritized Spain, Greece, and, to a lesser degree, Portugal. This changed with the advent of new neo-Nazi movements and subcultures in the 1980s–1990s, when the memory of the Holocaust became pivotal.

From the first days, the Greek military coup was understood and articulated by Nordic activists in terms of an anti-fascist collective identity and memory. To them, the Greek Junta represented the resurgence of fascism in Europe; the anti-fascist response became mnemonic, reminding the public why and how the Junta had to be opposed. Almost all acts of resisting the military regime in the Nordic countries were put within the context of remembering past resistance against fascism. Through this mnemonic practice, legitimacy and respectability were brought to a struggle that objectively concerned itself with a military dictatorship in a far-away country. This powerful narrative triggered social mobilization in the Nordic countries against the new regime. The popular backing was exemplified, powerfully, by actions, such as large demonstrations, concerts, and transnational conferences as well as by the political highpoint—the Nordic action against Greece in the Council of Europe. By referring to the military coup as fascist, a meaning was created that would otherwise not have been present.

It is a fact worth remembering today. We live in a world where the threat to democracies often comes from their own militaries. In recent years democracies have been toppled in Thailand (2014), Burma (2021), Gabon (2023), and Niger (2023) to name a few. Turkey has been especially plagued by military coups; the most recent one in 2016 was averted, but the subsequent purges and constitutional reform led to a deterioration of democracy.⁷⁵³ It could be argued that obscure and poor terrorist groups pale in comparison to this threat against democracy—a fact that security scholars have, in many cases failed to grasp. It enhances the case for arguing that the definition of a fascist regime should be

⁷⁵³ Kareem Shaheen, “Turkey vote curtailed fundamental freedoms, say European observers,” *The Guardian*, April 17, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/17/turkey-vote-referendum-curtailed-fundamental-freedoms-european-observers>.

expanded to military dictatorships. It could be argued that the popular engagement in Europe, and within international institutions, against the Greek Junta put limits on its brutality. This could be contrasted with the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, a regime that proved to be more resilient and murderous. Still, even the campaigns against the Chilean Junta were dominated more by anti-fascism than anti-colonialism, with the addition of human rights. The credibility of the Maoists was, after all, questioned, considering the close relations between the People's Republic of China and the Pinochet dictatorship. Even here, international scholars tends to forget the prominent role of Nordic Social Democracy in opposing the Junta.

In Sweden, a country that had not experienced the tyranny of fascism and whose complicit neutrality during World War II denied it heroic memories, the tragedy of the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent resilience of the Franco regime became the strongest reference of concern and comparison. From the anti-fascist collective memory reservoir, the lessons of the dangers of non-intervention and appeasement were drawn: that the betrayal of Spain should not be repeated in Greece. Simultaneously, the heroism of those who fought against fascism in the past was honored and remembered by the formation of Nordic Committees in the spitting image of the committees that had been established to defend democracy in Spain. The Swedish Committee, which became the largest of the Nordic Committees and the inspiration for the others, sought to unite civil society behind the cause, gathering support from the entire labor movement and all political parties except for the conservatives.

In practice, however, the Nordic Committees were often led by prominent social democrats who were preoccupied with preventing radical communist and socialist influence or dominance. As a social movement, the Committees were formed as extra-parliamentary organizations, but they cooperated closely with the political establishment, often with direct lines of communication to prime ministers, foreign ministers, and parliaments. It was truly a transnational and trans-institutional social movement. The goal of the Committees was not limited to humanitarianism but expanded to encapsulate a new struggle to halt the spread of fascism in Europe. It was not enough to help those affected by the violence of the new Greek regime; the dictatorship had to be defeated and democracy reinstated. Thus, in one of the very first protest marches in Sweden against the Junta, Hans Göran Franck conjured the memories of the Spanish Civil War and the anti-fascist committees back then. Anti-fascism was also something that Franck identified with on a personal level, seeing it as his calling, no doubt influenced by his own parents' anti-fascist solidarity work during World War II.

In Denmark, the recent memory of Nazi occupation, although a very mild one compared to the rest of Europe, was alive and well. This was the collective memory, the reservoir, from which Mogens Camre drew his inspiration as he returned home after witnessing the military coup first-hand. Thus, the first major manifestations against the Junta in Copenhagen coincided with the Liberation Day of Denmark. On this occasion, Camre remembered his own father returning home from German concentration camps, the mistakes that had been made before the war in appeasing Nazi Germany, and the failure to intervene and put an end to fascism before it was too late. In this context, anti-fascism was expressed not as an ideology but rather as part of a mnemonic social movement. It was a collective political expression of remembrance as well as of premonition. The collective already knew that what it protested against was bad and that it could only get worse—if it was not stopped—for it was already a lived experience. This postwar anti-fascism was built on the legacy of anti-fascism of the 1930s and 1940s, which was articulated as a united defense of democracy and the labor movement. But it was also different because it opposed a regime that did not identify itself as fascist and because it legitimized itself through the memorialization of this legacy. Thus, the delegitimization of the Junta was to be accomplished by classifying it as fascist. This crucial aspect explains much of the initial support for the Greek cause. The post-war anti-fascism was also infused by the ideas of the New Left, when it emerged in the Nordic countries in the mid-1960s. While espousing criticism both towards pro-capitalist social democracy as well as dogmatic communism, it still propagated ideas of uniting the broad Left based on economic democracy. The legacy of anti-fascism rhymed well with these aspirations. Thus, many of those who participated in post-war anti-fascism were part of the New Left. Nonetheless, the main issue of contention among them was the NATO membership of Denmark and Norway. It also led to a surge in leftist nationalist narratives that eventually transcended smoothly into Maoism (Sweden and Norway). Thus, the resurgence of dogmatic communism among young people in the 1970s not only undermined the New Left but also its notions of a Left unity.

Camre also had a personal connection to Greece. He was motivated by a commitment to save the life of his new friend Andreas Papandreou and return him to his family. Political links had already been forged between the Danish Social Democratic Party and Center Union before the coup. A Cold Warrior, Camre predicted at an early stage that the future political career of Papandreou could be compromised by the communists. Hence, he felt the need to balance issues of prestige and power for the sake of both his own Social Democratic Party and for Papandreou and his political career, while working, simultaneously, for a return to

democracy in Greece. In many ways, Camre was not a conventional social movement actor, preferring the adventurism of secret diplomacy designed to achieve quick political results. He arguably broke the social democratic legalistic mold when he repeatedly—in his private correspondence—propagated the killing of Junta officials. He most likely drew his inspiration from the assassinations conducted by Danish resistance members during the Nazi occupation in the Second World War. “Accelerationism” may be the most fitting word for such ultra-radical tactics.

This militant potentiality within the memory of anti-fascism can also be detected in Aase Lionæs’s admiration for her conservative colleague Otto Lyng when he physically forced himself into the offices of Junta officials during the visit of the Scandinavian delegation to Greece. Such direct action was, after all, atypical behavior for a parliamentarian. In making sense of the quietness of Greece at that time, Lionæs and Lyng remembered how they themselves had experienced Norway under Nazi occupation: a situation where there was a state of fear and silence in the population, with many of the bravest already having been killed or rounded up and thrown into concentration camps. Lionæs, however, would not keep quiet and told Constantine Kollias to his face that his regime was an affront to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. She knew because she had worked on it together with Eleanor Roosevelt. The Nordic parliamentary delegation was another expression of an anti-fascist collective identity. What was more, if normalization and appeasement with the new Greek regime was out of the question, it was desirable, too, to unite all democratic forces to oppose it. This sense of prioritizing a united front against fascism was most powerfully evoked by the Norwegians and Danes. It meant that all political forces—from the communists to conservatives, even the King—had forged solidarities to face a common foe. Even Hans Jørgen Lembourn, who had witnessed communist atrocities in the Greek Civil War, looked upon the visit of the Nordic delegation to Greece as an intrinsic success because it spanned the entire political spectrum. It represented, in a sense, a popular front in action. The book the delegates published after the trip was a testimony to the formation of a Nordic mnemonic anti-fascist collective identity, with references to past struggles against fascism to make sense of the Greek Junta.

Pekka J. Korvenheimo stood out in his unique comparison with the Finnish Civil War. His political text also underscored Finland’s place as a Nordic outlier; because of “Finlandization,” the country was not a member of major international institutions, which had a constraining role and prevented it from putting real pressure on Greece. Presumably, this also hindered the work of the Finnish Committee, which came under the watchful eye of the

Foreign Ministry. As it happened, it never managed to build up strength or to participate, properly, in the Nordic network of committees.

The Nordic network also contributed to the creation of an Icelandic Committee on Greece. Swedish-Greek activists, such as Theodor Kallifatides, had to experience the brutality of the Icelandic police before the task was accomplished. Iceland could be seen as a microcosm for the political tensions generated by organizing around the Greek cause. In the minds of many far-left, young activists, American imperialism and the Vietnam War were far more prominent points of reference than the events in Greece or a past and distant struggle against fascism. In all the Nordic countries, the Greek cause was in constant competition for attention with what was happening in Vietnam. When setting up the Icelandic Committee, Sigurður A. Magnússon tried to bridge the gap between conservatives and radicals by uniting them against the Junta. He probably failed to gain the respect of either of them. Not least because of financial reasons, the Icelandic Committee never became a full participant in the Nordic networks the Committees built. The disinterest of the Icelandic government in confronting the Greek Junta in Council of Europe or NATO also stands out. What helps explain its passivity and ambiguity was its conservative foreign policy—before a left-wing government came to power in 1971—and its subservience to the United States as well as the Icelandic Committee's lack of political influence. Undoubtedly, it would have been significant if Iceland had joined its Scandinavian neighbors in protests in NATO.

Yet, even if the transnational Nordic anti-Junta network was dominated by the Swedish, Danish and Norwegian Committees, their anti-fascist line failed to attract full support from the other international committees. Even Greek Marxist intellectuals struggled to adopt an anti-fascist discourse against the Junta since they did not define the regime as fascist. To be sure, Nicos Poulantzas managed to illuminate the mobilizing strength of anti-fascism, but, reflecting his own ambivalence on the question, he did not do so without ridiculing it in the same sentence. He resorted to the term “specter of fascism” as a way of expressing justification: Those that had experienced the fascist nightmare would subsequently see it everywhere. To him, it would, however, be foolish to ignore the stark differences between the historical fascist regimes and the Junta. These distinctions were not only observed by Marxist intellectuals in France but also by journalists in the Nordic countries. Thus, the process of analogizing, to compare and contrast, was often made to reject the classification of the Junta as fascist—in other words, to dispel the historical analogy. There was no need to employ memory to analyze, in objective terms, the phenomenon. They pointed out that the Junta had no clear ideology, no mass movement, and no party; it was a

military dictatorship—nothing more, nothing less. These theoretical discussions were extremely important in the minds of many activists who were quick to respond that the Junta was still fascist; it simply did not need a mass movement since it had already gained power. If this explanation did not suffice, the dissimilarities were explained away as an updated version of fascism in the guise of neo-fascism. Whether the Junta was objectively fascist was, in the end, secondary; what mattered was the mobilizing strength of a mnemonic anti-fascist collective identity and memory that was summoned as part of defining and classifying it in such terms.

The Nordic Committees played a crucial role in mobilizing elite political support for confronting the Junta in the Council of Europe. Previous research has credited Amnesty International and “public pressure” for the engagement of the Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian governments on this issue. It has been shown here that Mogens Camre and Hans Göran Franck—together with the Nordic Committees—were instrumental in organizing and articulating such “private” and “public pressure.” They cooperated closely with government legal teams to provide them with testimonies of torture and abuse. Finally, the leaking of the official report of the European Commission on Human Rights about torture confirmed the truthfulness of the allegations against the Junta. To be able to expel Greece from the Council of Europe was a huge win for the movement and set the stage for putting pressure on Greece in NATO. Paradoxically, anti-colonial sentiments within the UN contributed to the organization’s failure to condemn the Junta. The clear disinterest of the Third World in condemning human right abuses in Greece illustrated some of the limitations of the humanism of anti-colonialism. Still, outside official communiqués, many UN representatives associated the regime with fascism.

As historians have pointed out, the General Secretary of NATO and U.S. officials made sure that Denmark and Norway refrained from putting pressure on Greece in NATO. By 1969, it was clear that American support for the Junta would not change unless the Greeks themselves revolted against the regime, which had succeeded in consolidating its hold on power and even to attract public support. Meanwhile, the Greek political opposition and resistance organizations were deeply divided and fractured. The solution suggested by the Norwegian Committee was, as noted, to unite all political forces in a popular-front style campaign against the Junta. The creation of such an anti-fascist collective identity became a fixation, which, again, harkened back to Scandinavian experiences in World War II. The idea of a Greek popular front became a litmus test of the worthiness of the Greek resistance and political opposition. In the end, nothing came of the Norwegian initiative because the

divisions within the opposition were greater than their combined dislike for the military regime. The Greeks did not share the same collective memories as the Scandinavians. Whereas the Norwegians remembered uniting and defeating fascism, the Greeks remembered a horrible Civil War. Therefore, it was impossible for Greek conservatives to cooperate with the communists. The differing experiences revealed a significant split in European memory. What was more, Papandreou failed to see the relevance of the anti-fascist collective identity in a Greek context since he rejected a popular front strategy against the Junta. In his mind, it would only dilute the struggle for national liberation that the Greeks had to fight against the Americans. To him, the Junta did not represent a fascist state, but embodied a colonial dependency, which was comparable to that of Czechoslovakia under the thumb of Soviet control or Vietnam in the service of U.S. imperialism. Paradoxically, the Nordic Committees were, in part, responsible for enabling Papandreou to gain such prominence among the exiled Greek opposition, even if he was primarily to blame for limiting its anti-fascist potential. Ironically, the demand for unity was not a standard that the Nordic Committees themselves were willing to live up to. The hegemonial tendencies of anti-communist Social Democrats did not only generate splits among the membership but also contributed to keeping out younger and more radical activists. Still, the split in the Norwegian Committee was resolved without abandoning its commitment to an anti-fascism that sought the restoration of democracy instead of engaging in pure humanitarianism. This could be contrasted to the Nordic Committees on Spain that shifted to focus on humanitarian work early on.

In the Nordic countries, interest in the Greek case began to wane when it became clear that Greek opposition groups were powerless to dislodge the Junta. This became already evident in 1971–1972 as tourism to Greece exploded, exemplifying, after its initial success, the failure of the tourist boycott. When the Swedish government capitulated and normalized diplomatic relations with Greece on economic grounds, it marked a decline in the activities of all the Nordic Committees. Their bureaucratic and centralized political culture, which was attracting increased criticism on the Left, also stifled the kind of dynamism and vitality of young people, needed to stimulate another wave of popular mobilization. The Nordic Committees' strained relationship with the Greek exiles and immigrants and their organizations probably contributed to their decline. For a contemporary reader, it may seem strange that a movement that fought for Greek democracy was not led by Greeks themselves, or that they did not have a more prominent role in the Committees. Nonetheless, Nordic leadership probably made the Greek issue more digestible to domestic and transnational audiences in the Nordic countries. Whether this was a question of xenophobia will be left

unanswered here. It is interesting, however, to observe the great difficulty that exile-led social movements have with putting their issues on the agenda in today's societies as testified to by the often forgotten Palestinian and Kurdish Questions. What is also striking is the absence of connections to the halls of power within these contemporary movements; the trans-institutional character of the Nordic Committees for Democracy in Greece was unique in this regard.

The far left's obsession with laying blame on American imperialism for the Greek coup arguably undermined anti-fascist unity. It did not only simplistically reduce the Greek cause to the question of Danish, Norwegian, and Icelandic NATO membership and, thereby, alienate large parts of the population. It also denied the Junta agency, which rendered the characterization of the regime as fascist meaningless, except for in a pejorative, terminological sense. Still, the insistence of two U.S. administrations to defend the existence of an anti-democratic, torturous dictatorship in the "cradle of democracy" closed off venues for political changes in Greece. What the sly political maneuvering of U.S. officials did was to make sure that situation in Greece was kept off NATO's agenda. In the end, it resembled a tragic farce—when the Greek people rebelled against the Junta in 1973—that some of the students demanded that their politicians stop their infighting and unite against the regime. This call for unity was at the heart of a Nordic, mnemonic, anti-fascist, collective identity, but was rejected by Greek opposition political elite as a form of external interference. The lesson of the past was that when facing fascism—the mortal enemy of democracy—one must put aside differences. Once again, the call went unanswered.

Epilogue

The contemporary relevance of studying anti-fascism may not be apparent if it is viewed through the prism of left-wing activists confronting the activities of neo-Nazis and the far right. Yet, as I have stressed here, anti-fascism cannot be reduced to a left-wing or communist ideology. To grasp its history, one needs to account for the multiplicity and diversity of its practitioners, for, as Seidman has pointed out, anti-fascism “sought consensus, not synthesis.”⁷⁵⁴ The more anti-fascism encompassed a broad range of opinion, the more successful it became in the struggle against fascism. When considering the discourse on war and conflict in the present, anti-fascist narratives have become more powerful than those associated with anti-communism. This is striking in a period that followed the “defeat of communism.”

The employment of mnemonic aspects of anti-fascism has not been restricted to political movements. It has been practiced by states as well. As sociologist Charles Tilly argued, “War made States, and Vice Versa.”⁷⁵⁵ Since the end of the Cold War, the “specter of fascism” has been raised to legitimize military action. During the Kosovo War in 1999, U.S. President Bill Clinton not only compared Serbian President Slobodan Milošević to Adolf Hitler but also evoked the memory of appeasement by asking how many lives could have been saved if one had listened to Winston Churchill. Unsurprisingly, Milošević countered by engaging in his own brand of memory politics, comparing the West to Hitler and by reminding the Serbs of the brave Yugoslav partisans who fought fascism during the Second World War.⁷⁵⁶ And in 2002, a year before the catastrophic and illegal U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. President George W. Bush sought to garner support among NATO partners for a war of aggression by claiming that it was vital not to repeat the mistake the West had made in its dealings with Hitler. In this narrative, the danger posed by Saddam Hussein and global terrorism was as serious in the present as fascism had been in the past.⁷⁵⁷ Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, also exhorted the “international community” to listen to the

⁷⁵⁴ Seidman, *Transatlantic Antifascism*, 1.

⁷⁵⁵ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 68–69.

⁷⁵⁶ Timothy Garton Ash, “The new Adolf Hitler?” *TIME*, April 5, 1999, accessed November 19, 2023, <https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,990678-1,00.html>.

⁷⁵⁷ “Saddam the new Hitler, Bush tells Europeans,” *The Sydney Morning Herald*, November 22, 2002, accessed November 19, 2023, <https://www.smh.com.au/world/middle-east/saddam-the-new-hitler-bush-tells-europeans-20021122-gdfum6.html>.

Churchills of their time.⁷⁵⁸ The Iraq War destabilized the Middle East, created a refugee crisis, and gave rise to the terror group Islamic State. In the ensuing fight against it in 2013, Kurdish militant groups in Syria (YPG and YPJ) gained much international attention for their combat effectiveness and their democratic and emancipatory ideas. Like many volunteers who joined them from around the world, they often described their fight in anti-fascist terms, conjuring memories of the Spanish Civil War.⁷⁵⁹

Anti-fascist agitation has also become an important part of contemporary social movements. During the xenophobic presidency of Donald Trump (2017–2021), there was a resurgence of the far right or alt-right in the United States, including neo-Nazi groups. Activists from socialist, communist, and anarchist milieus organized in response and sought to deplatform their leaders. These militant activist groups became known as Antifa and built on the legacy of similar groups in Europe, which were active in the 1980s and 1990s. Historian Mark Bray has argued that they represent an unbroken continuity of historical anti-fascism.⁷⁶⁰ On the other side were conservative Republicans—disgusted by Trump’s policies—who created a multimillion dollar lobbying group called the Lincoln Project. In one of their videos, they argued that the real Antifa was the American tradition of anti-fascism. Thus, the form of anti-fascism, which motivated the storming of the Normandy beaches, belonged to the same tradition as that opposing Trump. In their words, “anti-fascism is not a cable news talking point. It’s an American ideal that should be memorialized because it was paid for in blood.”⁷⁶¹ It was a clear illustration that anti-fascism cannot be reduced to left-wing activism.

The question of whether Trump should be considered a fascist preoccupied the whole political spectrum. Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote a book warning of a return of fascism after Trump’s accession to power.⁷⁶² Yet historians of fascism, like the world-renowned Robert O. Paxton, were initially hesitant to call Trump a fascist. Paxton argued that the differences with historical fascism were greater than the similarities, that is, until the January 6, 2020 Capitol attack that Trump arguably incited. For Paxton, it symbolized a breaking point: An “open encouragement of civic violence to overturn an

⁷⁵⁸ “Saddam Hitler? Why should U.S. officials be cautious about historic comparisons?” *The Globalist*, September 5, 2002, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://www.theglobalist.com/saddam-hitler/>.

⁷⁵⁹ “The Irish man ‘fighting fascism’ in Syria: ‘I was always curious how I’d react to battle’,” *The Irish Times*, March 24, 2018, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/the-irish-man-fighting-fascism-in-syria-i-was-always-curious-how-i-d-react-to-battle-1.3435174>.

⁷⁶⁰ Mark Bray, *Antifa: The Anti-fascist Handbook*, xi–xxiv.

⁷⁶¹ The Lincoln Project, “The Real Antifa,” YouTube Video, 1:09, June 4, 2021, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3xtLXDTxJsA>.

⁷⁶² Madeleine Albright, *Fascism: A Warning* (New York: HarperCollins, 2018).

election crosses a red line. The label now seems not just acceptable but necessary.”⁷⁶³ The storming of the Capitol reminded Paxton of the failed French fascist coup during the February 6, 1934 crisis in Paris.⁷⁶⁴ It evoked a memory of a fascist past and of how to resist it.

Then there is a distinctly more nefarious use of anti-fascism or rather its abuse. It is about legitimizing conflict, not for the sake of uprooting any form of dictatorship but for pure imperialist ambition. This was the case when Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to invade Ukraine, first in 2014 by annexing Crimea, and then, again, in 2022, by launching a war of aggression. A “cult of anti-fascism” was employed by the Putin regime, stemming from the state ideology of the Soviet Union, to combat generic enemies, while, at the same, engaging in nationalist remembrance of the sacrifices made by the Soviet people during the Second World War.⁷⁶⁵ This mnemonic hotchpotch, where memory and history were distorted, served the purpose of justifying a brutal war and Russian annexation of large parts of Ukraine.⁷⁶⁶ At the beginning of the war, Putin’s goal was to “denazify” Ukraine, a democracy with a Jewish head of state.⁷⁶⁷

Historian Timothy Snyder argues that because of the Ukraine War, Russia should now be viewed as a fascist state. Soviet anti-fascism of the past merely defined enemies as fascists; it was a nationalist narrative that did not properly define fascism. One consequence, according to Snyder, was that actual Russian fascists were publicly accepted by the current regime in Russia. Snyder labels Putin’s act of calling others fascists while being one himself “schizofascism.”⁷⁶⁸ It was the invasion of Ukraine that made Snyder reinterpret the ideological nature of Russia, illustrating how, yet again, an “eventful transition” evoked memories of historical fascism and its wars of aggression.

⁷⁶³ Robert O. Paxton, “I’ve Hesitated to Call Donald Trump a Fascist. Until Now,” *Newsweek*, January 11, 2021, accessed November 19, 2023, <https://www.newsweek.com/robert-paxton-trump-fascist-1560652>.

⁷⁶⁴ Paxton, “I’ve Hesitated.”

⁷⁶⁵ José María Faraldo, “An Antifascist Political Identity? On the Cult of Antifascism in the Soviet Union and post-Socialist Russia,” in *Rethinking Antifascism*, 202–216.

⁷⁶⁶ On Putin’s historical views, see his article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainian,” July 12, 2021, Office of the President of Russia, accessed November 20, 2023, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>; see also Georgi Verbeeck, “The Return of History as Tragedy: The ‘Struggle against Fascism’ in the Russian-Ukrainian War,” *Journal of Applied History* 4 (2022): 76–84; Lien Verpoest, “From Defiance to Civilizationalism: The Securitization of Humiliation in Russia,” *Journal of Applied History* 4 (2022): 85–101.

⁷⁶⁷ “Putin’s claim of fighting against Ukraine ‘neo-Nazis’ distorts history, scholars say,” *NPR*, March 1, 2022, accessed November 1, 2023, <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/01/1083677765/putin-denazify-ukraine-russia-history>.

⁷⁶⁸ Timothy Snyder, “We Should Say It. Russia Is Fascist,” *The New York Times*, May 19, 2022, accessed October 20, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/opinion/russia-fascism-ukraine-putin.html>.

In their defense of their country, the Ukrainians have grappled with two competing narratives of past national struggles.⁷⁶⁹ President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has continued the ritual of commemorating the victory over Nazi Germany in Europe with references to the Holocaust and to the struggle of the Ukrainian people against Nazism, racism, and antisemitism. Yet, to counter the Russian narrative of the Great Patriotic War, he has projected the Second World War as an Allied and European war against Nazism. For him, fascism manifests itself as “Ruscism,” a Russian form of fascism. Hence, the comparison between Nazi aggression and the present Russian invasion. And as was the case in the 1940s, the aggressor would be defeated through an alliance.⁷⁷⁰ Zelenskyy’s narrative has been contested by the Ukrainian far right, which has been emboldened by state-sponsored anti-communism. It has even gone as far as to exonerate and commemorate those Ukrainians who fought on the side of the Nazis in the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician). Zelenskyy has condemned these commemorations, describing them as totalitarian propaganda of the Nazi kind.⁷⁷¹ The far-right idolization of the Ukrainian fascist nationalist leader Stepan Bandera, whose organization took active part in the Holocaust in Ukraine and Poland,⁷⁷² shows that there is no uniform interpretation of Ukrainian nationalism during the Second World War. Yet when Zelenskyy travels the world to garner support for the Ukrainian cause, he evokes the memory of historical battles with fascism rather than with communism.⁷⁷³

This text is written in November 2023, at a time when the war in Ukraine has been overshadowed by a new conflict in the Middle East between Israel and Hamas in the besieged

⁷⁶⁹ See Andreas Kappeler, “Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the imperial past and competing memories,” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 5 (2014): 107–115; Alexander Maxwell, “Popular and Scholarly Primordialism: The Politics of Ukrainian History during Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine,” *Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language* 16, no. 2 (2022): 151–172; Serhii Plokhy, *The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2023); Plokhy, *The Frontline: Essays on Ukraine's Past and Present* (Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 2021).

⁷⁷⁰ Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “Звернення Зеленського з нагоди Дня пам’яті й перемоги над нацизмом у Другій світовій війні 1939–45,” YouTube Video, 12:47, May 8, 2023, accessed November 10, 2023, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=djsbRyLcYEw>.

⁷⁷¹ Cnaan Liphshiz, “Hundreds in Ukraine attend marches celebrating Nazi SS soldiers,” *The Times of Israel*, May 4, 2021, accessed October 19, 2023, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/hundreds-in-ukraine-attend-marches-celebrating-nazi-ss-soldiers/>.

⁷⁷² Roman Goncharenko, “Stepan Bandera: Hero or Nazi collaborator?” *Deutsche Welle*, May 22, 2022, accessed October 10, 2023, <https://www.dw.com/en/stepan-bandera-ukrainian-hero-or-nazi-collaborator/a-61842720>; see also Maryna Shevtsova, “Looking for Stepan Bandera: The Myth of Ukrainian Nationalism and the Russian ‘Special Operation’,” *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 16, no. 3 (2022): 132–150.

⁷⁷³ Chris McGreal, “Zelenskyy invokes fight against Nazi Germany in speech to US Congress in Washington,” *The Guardian*, December 22, 2022, accessed October 30, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/22/zelenskyy-invokes-fight-against-nazi-germany-in-speech-to-us-congress>.

Gaza Strip (Palestinian Territories). Like the former conflict, in this new, extremely bloody war, both warring parties and their allies invoke the crimes of the Nazis to condemn each other. What is particular with this war is how the memory of the Holocaust is continuously evoked, either to justify or to oppose the war.⁷⁷⁴ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine whether the above-mentioned examples constitute anti-fascism. They differ greatly from each other, even if they conjure mnemonic aspects of anti-fascism. One could be tempted to see them as simplistic instrumentalizations of history, with politicians resorting to analogies of fascism to stigmatize their opponents. Still, these temporal connections are made to mobilize support and create legitimization for actions. Fascism is continuously deployed not only as a pejorative marker of significance but also as a mnemonic one.

These mnemonic practices encourage remembrance of events, perceiving the present through memory. Reducing anti-fascism to a political movement is not sufficient to understand the phenomenon. Anti-fascism is a form of collective memory—articulated by different actors at different times—to use the past to justify or condemn the present. Even world-epochal crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic or global climate change, cannot escape the grip of anti-fascist politics of memory. Some scholars have argued that high mortality rates during pandemics fuel political radicalization, such as fascism.⁷⁷⁵ Others believe, in contrast, that highly restrictive pandemic measures—enacted by power-grabbing governments—have the same effect.⁷⁷⁶ And still others speculate about, and warn against, a climate-induced crisis that might lead to a future of “fossil fascism.”⁷⁷⁷ One would have thought that it might be possible to perceive these existential challenges through the eyes of a child, but not even here is it possible to hide from the gaze of memory. Mnemonic anti-fascism creates a meaning—and without some form of meaning, there is nothing to say.

⁷⁷⁴ Raz Segal, “Israel must stop weaponising the Holocaust,” *The Guardian*, October 24, 2023, accessed October 30, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/oct/24/israel-gaza-palestinians-holocaust>; “ Hamas leader: We need the blood of women, children and the elderly of Gaza,” *Jewish News Syndicate*, October 29, 2023, accessed November 1, 2023, <https://www.jns.org/hamas-leader-we-need-the-blood-of-women-children-and-the-elderly-of-gaza/>.

⁷⁷⁵ Gregori Galofré-Vilà, et al., “The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and the Rise of Italian Fascism: A Cross-City Quantitative and Historical Text Qualitative Analysis,” *American Journal of Public Health* 112, no. 2 (2022): 242–247.

⁷⁷⁶ David Bell, “Pandemic preparedness and the road to international fascism,” *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (July 30, 2023): 1–15, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12531>.

⁷⁷⁷ Andreas Malm, *White Skin, Black Fuel: On the Dangers of Fossil Fascism* (London: Verso, 2021).

Addendum: The Lives of the Nordic Protagonists after the Fall of the Greek Junta

After leaving his job as vice-chairman in the Swedish chapter of the Amnesty International in 1973,⁷⁷⁸ Hans Göran Franck concentrated his political work on the military coup in Chile. Franck co-founded the International Chile Commission—a fact-finding body that focused on exposing the crimes of the Pinochet regime—and became its general secretary. The Commission provided evidence to the UN and the public at large, showing that the Chilean government was responsible for thousands of executions and for the torture of tens of thousands of individuals. Franck interviewed witnesses and experts and prepared resolutions for the group. He often disagreed with the Soviets who sought to tone down the wording of resolutions condemning the regime. As had been the case with the Greek Junta, there was much initial optimism that Pinochet’s reign would be short lived. Conferences were organized around the world, with heads of states giving the opening speeches and exiled Chilean politicians in attendance. The new democratic governments of Spain and Portugal were especially active in this oppositional work. In 1982, a conference was held in Athens, where Franck was reunited with Mikis Theodorakis, Melina Mercouri, and Andreas Papandreou, who had become the Prime Minister of Greece.

The Chilean issue is a testimony to Franck’s continued commitment to anti-fascism. Yet, instead of building a large social movement through committees, he opted for a far narrower and elitist venue in the form of a commission. Perhaps it reflected his experience of his previous work with the Swedish Committee for Democracy in Greece. The Chile Commission ceased its work in 1990 when Patricio Aylwin was elected President of Chile.⁷⁷⁹ In the 1980s, Franck became involved in another commission that investigated the crimes of Apartheid South Africa. During the 1990s, he worked for the Council of Europe as a lawyer, reporting on capital punishment, asylum rights, prison conditions, and conscientious objectors. Like Georg Branting before him, Franck remained on the left in the Swedish Social Democratic Party. He represented his party in parliament from 1982 to 1994. He often went against the party line on such questions as the persecution of PKK sympathizers that were active in Sweden. He died in 1998 at the age of 72.⁷⁸⁰

The most peculiar fate is that of Mogens Camre. His strange version of anti-fascist persuasion eventually pulled him forcefully to the Right; he left the Danish Social Democrats

⁷⁷⁸ “Dödsfall: Hans Göran Franck,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, March 21, 1998.

⁷⁷⁹ Jacob Söderman, “Min färd i rörelsen del 9: Chile-kommissionen,” *Demokraatti*, March 3, 2018, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://demokraatti.fi/jacob-soderman-min-fard-i-rorelsen-del-9-chile-kommissionen>.

⁷⁸⁰ “Dödsfall: Hans Göran Franck.”

for the right-wing populist Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*) in 1999. Camre compared the fascist Junta with religious fundamentalism, both being forms of tyranny. He was convicted of hate speech in 2014 when he tweeted that Muslims have continued the legacy of Hitler, and the only way to stop them is for them to get the same treatment that the German dictator received. He saw his newfound political mission to restrict immigration as important as that of the Danish resistance during the Nazi occupation.⁷⁸¹ As he put it in his autobiography: "The conflict between democracy and dictatorship is eternal. Our enemies can be German Nazis, Russian Communists, fascist Greek colonels or fundamentalist Muslims..." and "[w]e have to face the fight, wherever it is."⁷⁸²

Providing support for the right-wing Danish minority government of Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Danish People's Party voted in parliament in favor of the invasion of Iraq.⁷⁸³ Among the Nordic countries, Denmark and Iceland were the only ones that supported the U.S. decision. Yet the burden of causing—among other things—the single greatest wave of immigration to Europe since the Second World War was not shared by Denmark and Iceland. The Syrian Civil War was the major driving force for the 2015 European migrant crisis, but the rise of the Islamic State, with its origins in Iraq, exacerbated it. Camre's suggestions to Papandreou about assassinating Junta officials can be contrasted with his 2016 suggestion that all those hindering the work of Danish emergency services should be shot. Praising Putin, he stated that if the Russian leader had been in power in Denmark, the problems in Copenhagen's Freetown Christiania would have been easily solved.⁷⁸⁴ From early on, Camre had been a firearms aficionado, and on several occasions he encouraged Papandreou to bear arms for his own security. In 1968, Camre even "borrowed" a pistol from the Danish Police for Papandreou, while he was living in Stockholm.⁷⁸⁵ And in 1972, he was caught smuggling a pistol, which he claimed he was transporting to Papandreou.⁷⁸⁶ Mogens Camre died in 2016 at the age of 80.

⁷⁸¹ David Rehling, "Kontroversiel, markant og rabiati," *Information*, December 7, 2016, accessed November 20, 2023, https://www.information.dk/indland/2016/12/kontroversiel-markant-rabiati?lst_tag. The tweet: "Muslimer fortsætter, hvor Hitler sluttede. Kun den behandling, Hitler fik, vil ændre situationen."; Camre, *Knus tyrannerne*, 327–330.

⁷⁸² Camre, *Knus tyrannerne*, 156. In the original Danish: "Konflikten mellem demokrati og diktatur er evig. Vore fjender kan være nazistiske tyskere, kommunistiske russere, fascistiske græske oberster eller fundamentalistiske muslimer. Vi må tage kampen, hvor den er."

⁷⁸³ Emil Eller, "Dansk Folkeparti: Vi skulle ikke have væltet Saddam Hussein," *DR*, February 7, 2019, accessed November 25, 2023, <https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/dansk-folkeparti-vi-skulle-ikke-have-vaeltet-saddam-husseini>.

⁷⁸⁴ Rehling, "Kontroversiel, markant og rabiati".

⁷⁸⁵ Letter, Mogens Camre to Stephen W. Rousseas, June 17, 1968, DK/RA/07680-11, Camre, Mogens.

⁷⁸⁶ Rehling, "Kontroversiel, markant og rabiati".

Aase Lionæs was one of the most influential female politicians within Norwegian Social Democracy. She remained an MP until 1977, making her mark by fighting for free access to abortion and equal pay. For thirty years, or until 1978, she was a member of the Norwegian Nobel Committee charged with awarding the Nobel Peace Prize. Many of the more controversial awards were handed out during her ten-year tenure as chairwoman, with Henry Kissinger being the most conspicuous one.⁷⁸⁷ Le Duc Tho—Kissinger’s Vietnamese counterpart in the Paris peace talks on ending the war in Vietnam—declined the prize, arguing that the Nobel Committee’s decision put the aggressor on par with the victim of aggression. Two committee members resigned to protest the selection of Kissinger.⁷⁸⁸ Lionæs became 91 years old and died in 1999.⁷⁸⁹

The single most scandalous biographical trajectory was that of Arne Treholt. He became a close confidant to Jens Evensen, working with him in international negotiations on the Law of the Sea and Norway’s expansion of its territorial waters, which made it the petroleum state it is today. Later, Treholt worked for the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and Norway’s UN delegation in New York. In 1984, he was arrested for spying for the Soviet Union in one of the most sensationalist espionage scandals in Norwegian history. A year later he was sentenced to a 20-year prison term for spying for the Soviet Union and Iraq.⁷⁹⁰ In a recent documentary, it was suggested that a KGB agent had made initial contact with Treholt when he was working on the Greek issue. If true, it opens an avenue for further research of possible attempts by the KGB to infiltrate the anti-Junta movement.⁷⁹¹ Treholt was pardoned in 1992. After his release, he received the equivalent of about \$100,000 from an anonymous donor, which he used to start a new life in Russia.⁷⁹² In 2022, he publicly supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and died in 2023 in Moscow at the age of 80.⁷⁹³

Theodor Kallifatides is one of Sweden’s most renowned foreign-born writers. He has received several awards for his work and was one of the first writers to explore Sweden from an immigrant perspective. In an interview, Kallifatides explained how formative the

⁷⁸⁷ “Aase Lionæs er død,” *Dagsavisen*, January 4, 1999.

⁷⁸⁸ “Personality Spotlight: Le Duc Tho: Vietnam’s poet-revolutionary,” *UPI*, December 17, 1986, accessed November 25, 2023, <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1986/12/17/Personality-Spotlight-Le-Duc-Tho-Vietnam-poet-revolutionary/1693535179600/>.

⁷⁸⁹ “Aase Lionæs er død.”

⁷⁹⁰ “Arne Strand om Treholt: – Han ga meg aldri noen god forklaring,” *NRK*, February 12, 2023, accessed December 1, 2023, https://www.nrk.no/norge/arne-treholt-_80_-er-dod-1.16294579.

⁷⁹¹ NRK Radio, “Spionen Treholt,” October 10, 2019, accessed December 6, 2023, https://radio.nrk.no/podkast/hele_historien/sesong/spionen-treholt/_663d8c75-d5bd-44e0-bd8c-75d5bd94e092.

⁷⁹² “Arne Treholt, 80, Dies; Diplomat Convicted of Spying for Soviets,” *The New York Times*, February 16, 2023, accessed December 5, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/16/world/europe/arne-treholt-dead.html>.

⁷⁹³ “Arne Strand om Treholt.”

experience was for Greek immigrants to take part in the movement against the Greek Junta. It was a learning experience that led many to continue their involvement in Swedish politics after the return of democracy in Greece. Some became involved in party politics, becoming members of parliament and city councils. Kallifatides argues that the movement against the Greek military regime marked the beginning of political career paths pursued by foreign-born Swedes, which continue to this day. Eventually, the Greeks were joined by members of other immigrant communities such as the Kurds and Iranians. To Kallifatides, the involvement of these groups in social movements meant that they became part of Swedish politics instead of retreating into passivity and victimhood.

As a rich lawyer, who added bourgeoisie respectability to political struggles, Hans Göran Franck played a role in legitimizing the participation of immigrants in Swedish politics. Earlier, there had been a widespread belief among immigrants that they should avoid political participation in their host country. That all changed with the Swedish Committee for Democracy in Greece and with the celebrities who were involved in the struggle. Kallifatides, whose son is a prominent social democrat and economist, believes this history explains the strong presence of immigrants and Swedes of foreign descent in politics today.⁷⁹⁴

⁷⁹⁴ Interview with Theodor Kallifatides, September 19, 2022.

Bibliography

Archival Material

Sweden

Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek [The Labor Movement's Archives and Library], Stockholm

Biografica – organisationer [samling]. SWE/ARAB/3170/3/10

Biografica – organisationer [samling]. SWE/ARAB/3170/3/5

Biografica – organisationer [samling]. SWE/ARAB/3170/3/35

Biografica – organisationer [samling]. SWE/ARAB/3170/3/8

Eriksson, Nancy. SWE/ARAB/1611/4/1/8

Eriksson, Nancy. SWE/ARAB/1611/4/1/9

Franck, Hans Göran. SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-1

Franck, Hans Göran. SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-2

Franck, Hans Göran. SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-5

Franck, Hans Göran. SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-6

Franck, Hans Göran. SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-8

Franck, Hans Göran. SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-10

Franck, Hans Göran. SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-11

Franck, Hans Göran. SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-25

Franck, Hans Göran. SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-27

Franck, Hans Göran. SWE/ARAB/28-4-7-31

Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien. SWE/ARAB/1247/1

Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien. SWE/ARAB/1247/2

Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien. SWE/ARAB/1247/3

Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien. SWE/ARAB/1247/5

Svenska hjälpkommittén för Spanien. SWE/ARAB/1247/6

Svenska kommittén för Greklands demokrati. SWE/ARAB/1093-1

Svenska Spanienfrivilligas kamratförening. SWE/ARAB/1237/22

Svenska Spanienfrivilligas kamratförening. SWE/ARAB/1237/3

Swedish South Africa Committee. SWE/ARAB/2994/1

Denmark

Rigsarkivet [The National Archives], Copenhagen

Camre, Mogens. DK/RA/07680-10

Camre, Mogens. DK/RA/07680-11

Camre, Mogens. DK/RA/07680-12

Camre, Mogens. DK/RA/07680-13

Camre, Mogens. DK/RA/07680-14

Arbejdermuseet og Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv [The Workers Museum Library and Archive], Copenhagen

Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti. DK/ABA/921/472

Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti. DK/ABA/921/538

Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti. DK/ABA/921/622

Danmarks socialdemokratiske Ungdom. DK/ABA/570/21

Danmarks socialdemokratiske Ungdom. DK/ABA/570/24

Danmarks socialdemokratiske Ungdom. DK/ABA/570/25

Demos arkiv. DK/ABA/3281/19

Demos arkiv. DK/ABA/3281/83

Demos arkiv. DK/ABA/3281/84

Demos arkiv. DK/ABA/3281/85

Demos arkiv. DK/ABA/3281/86

Demos arkiv. DK/ABA/3281/89

Demos arkiv. DK/ABA/3281/90-91

Demos arkiv. DK/ABA/3281/95-96

Demos arkiv. DK/ABA/3281/129-130

Gruppe 61. DK/ABA/3257/1

Nørlund, Jørgen Ib. DK/ABA/255/104

Socialdemokratiet. DK/ABA/500/148

Norway

Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek [The Labor Movement Archives and Library], Oslo

AKP(m-l). NOR/AAB/ARK-2704/K/L0007

Arbeidernes ungdomsfylking. NOR/AAB/ARK-1409/Da/L0091

Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas. NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/A/L0001
Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas. NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0001
Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas. NOR/AAB/ARK-2192/D/L0002
Den norske Spaniakomiteen. NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0001
Den norske Spaniakomiteen. NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0007
Den norske Spaniakomiteen. NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0010
Den norske Spaniakomiteen. NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0011
Den norske Spaniakomiteen. NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0012
Den norske Spaniakomiteen. NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0014
Den norske Spaniakomiteen. NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0017
Den norske Spaniakomiteen. NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0018
Den norske Spaniakomiteen. NOR/AAB/ARK-2181/D/L0019
Lionæs, Aase. NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0016
Lionæs, Aase. NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0017
Lionæs, Aase. NOR/AAB/ARK-2812/D/L0030

Iceland

Landsbókasafn Íslands – háskólabókasafn [The National and University Library of Iceland], Reykjavik

Fylkingin (Æskulýðsfylkingin). ICE/LBS/223-NF
Magnússon, Sigurður A. ICE/LBS/710-NF, [1–2]

Þjóðskjalasafn Íslands [The Icelandic National Archives], Reykjavik

Utanríkisráðuneytið. ICE/ÞÍ/B/324
Utanríkisráðuneytið. ICE/ÞÍ/B/325
Utanríkisráðuneytið. ICE/ÞÍ/B/326
Utanríkisráðuneytið. ICE/ÞÍ/B/123
Æskulýðsfylkingin. ICE/ÞÍ/E.51.12
Æskulýðsfylkingin. ICE/ÞÍ/E.51.8

Newspapers and Journals

Aftenposten (1960–1969)

Aftonbladet (1967–1971)
Aktuelt (1963–1971)
Alþýðublaðið (1967–1968)
Arbeiderbladet (1960–1980)
Arbetet (1964–1972)
B.T. (1968)
Berlingske Tidende (1946)
Boston Globe (1967)
Dagbladet (1967–1971)
Dagens Nyheter (1948–1972)
Dagsavisen (1999)
Demokraatti/Arbetarbladet (2018)
Deutsche Welle (2022)
DR [Danmarks Radio] (2019)
Ekstrabladet (1964–1965)
Expressen (1967–1972)
Folket i bild/Kulturfront (1973)
Friheten (1946–1970)
Grekländs-Bulletin (1974)
Helikon (2010)
Helse Miljø Trivsel: Norsk Folkehjelp (1975)
Information (1963–2016)
Information Bulletin of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Greek Democrats (1969)
Jewish News Syndicate (2023)
Land og Folk (1946–1964)
Morgunblaðið (1967–1969)
Moss Avis (1971)
Neisti (1968)
Nordlands framtid (1975)
Norges Handels og Sjøfartstidende (1967)
Norrskensflaman (1967)
NPR [National Public Radio] (2022)
NRK [Norsk rikskringkasting AS] (2023)
Ny Dag Arbetar-Tidningen (1965–1970)

PAK Newsletter (1972)
PAX Spania i dag (1965)
Politiken (1946–1967)
Rjukan Arbeiderblad (1970)
Roglands Avis (1968)
Spanien solidaritet (1976)
Stockholms Tidningen (1983)
Svenska Dagbladet (1946–1998)
Sydsvenska Dagbladet (1969)
The Globalist (2002)
The Guardian (2017–2023)
The Irish Times (2018)
The New York Times (2022–2023)
The Sydney Morning Herald (2002)
The Times of Israel (2021)
The Washington Post (1970)
Þjóðviljinn (1952–1968)
TIME (1999)
UPI [United Press International] (1986)
Veckojournalen (1971)
Verdens Gang (1967)

Interviews

Kallifatides, Theodor. September 19, 2022.

Stefánsson, Ragnar. September 26, 2022.

Websites

Christiansen, Allan. “Erik Stinus om Spanienskomitéen.” August 19, 2019.
<http://spanishsky.dk/erik-stinus-om-spanienskomiteen/>.

Glavind, Johannes, Lone Klemm and Ivan Malinovski. *Jeg anklager. Den danske Komité for amnesti til de spanske politiske fanger og flyninge*. Copenhagen, 1963. Digitalized by Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv.
<https://abm.reindex.net/ABA/main/T.php?Ifm=Pz&zoomed=1108&qe=mta=8533>.

Glück, Louise. “Nostos.” <https://drunkenlibrary.com/2019/01/09/nostos-louise-gluck/>.

- Grekiska Riksförbundet. "Till minne: Charalampos 'Babis' Kalantzis" [2021?].
<http://www.grekiskariksforbundet.se/index.php/el/epikairofita-menu/deltia-typou-menu/672-till-minne-babis-kalantzis-20210226>.
- Grækenlandskomiteen [1948-1949]. Flyer, "Undertegnede kreds af danske kvinder og mænd." Digitalized by Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv.
<https://abm.reindex.net/ABA/main/T.php?Ifm=Pz&Zoomed=1108&qe=id=GG2014-11-18094>.
- Hoover Institution Library & Archives. "Firing Line with William F. Buckley Jr.: The Greek Dilemma." YouTube Video, 59:22. Recorded April 20, 1972.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nNQrrTKSYSA&t=2625s>.
- NRK Radio. "Spionen Treholt," October 20 – November 10, 2019.
https://radio.nrk.no/podkast/hele_historien/sesong/spionen-treholt/1_663d8c75-d5bd-44e0-bd8c-75d5bd94e092.
- Paxton, Robert O. "I've Hesitated to Call Donald Trump a Fascist. Until Now." *Newsweek*. January 11, 2021. <https://www.newsweek.com/robert-paxton-trump-fascist-1560652>.
- Putin, Vladimir. "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians," July 12, 2021. Office of the President of Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>.
- Store norske leksikon. "Carsten Boysen." https://snl.no/Carsten_Boysen.
- Store norske leksikon. "Fellesprogrammet." <https://snl.no/Fellesprogrammet>.
- Store norske leksikon. "Sosialistisk Folkeparti." https://snl.no/Sosialistisk_Folkeparti.
- The Lincoln Project. "The Real Antifa." YouTube Video, 1:09, June 4, 2021.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3xtLXDTxJsA>.
- UN General Assembly Resolution 386. "Relations of States Members and specialized agencies with Spain: resolution/adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/386(V)," November 4, 1950. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/670295?ln=en>.
- UN General Assembly Resolution 39. "Relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain: resolution/adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/39(I)," December 12, 1946. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/671249?ln=en>.
- UN General Assembly. "27th session: 2062nd plenary meeting," October 11, 1972.
<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/753751?ln=en>.
- Zelensky, Volodymyr. "Звернення Зеленського з нагоди Дня пам'яті й перемоги над нацизмом у Другій світовій війні 1939–45." YouTube Video, 12:47, May 8, 2023.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=djsbRyLcYEW>.
- Žižek, Slavoj. "Saying, Keeping Silent, and Showing: Notes on a Scandal in Frankfurt." *The Philosophical Salon*, October 30, 2023. <https://thephilosophicalsalon.com/saying-keeping-silent-and-showing-notes-on-a-scandal-in-frankfurt/>.

Books and Articles

- [Schori, Pierre and Bengt Holmqvist]. *Förräderiet mot Grekland Svenska Kommittén för Greklands demokrati*. Borås: Sjuhäradsbygdens Tryckeri, 1971.
- Accornero, Guya. *The Revolution before the Revolution Late Authoritarianism and Student Protest in Portugal*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2016.
- Andersson, Ingemar, Anders Carlberg, Ulf Ellemark, Lennart Ingberg, Kjell E. Johanson and Klas-Göran Warginger. *Unga kommunister – aktuellt alternativ*. Stockholm: Albert Bonniers förlag, 1966.
- Albright, Madeleine. *Fascism: A Warning*. New York: HarperCollins, 2018.
- Apfelbaum, Erika. “Halbwachs and the Social Properties of Memory.” In *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates*, edited by Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz, 77–92. New York: Fordham University Press, 2010.
- Aronson, Ronald. “Review Article: Communism’s Posthumous Trial.” *History and Theory* 42 (May 2003): 222–245.
- Arvanitopoulos, Constantine. “Praetorian military regimes: The Greek case.” In *The Greek Junta and the International System: A Case Study of Southern European Dictatorships, 1967–74*, edited by Antonis Klapsis, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou and Effie G. H. Pedaliu, 228–243. New York: Routledge, 2020.
- Assmann, Aleida. “Canon and Archive.” In *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, edited by Astrid Erll, Ansgar Nünning, Sara Young, and Ansgar Nünning, 97–107. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008.
- Assmann, Jan. “From Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism and Collective Memory and Cultural Identity.” In *The Collective Memory Reader*, edited by Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, 207–215. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Bauerkämper, Arnd. “Marxist Historical Cultures, ‘Antifascism’ and the Legacy of the Past: Western Europe, 1945–1990.” In *Marxist Historical Cultures and Social Movements during the Cold War Case Studies from Germany, Italy and Other Western European States*, edited by Stefan Berger and Christoph Cornelissen, 33–64. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
- Bell, David. “Pandemic preparedness and the road to international fascism.” *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (July 30, 2023): 1–15, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12531>.
- Benun, Edgeir. *Maktsentra og opposisjon: Spaniasaken i Norge 1946 og 1947*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969.

- Branting, Georg. *Bryt med Franco*. Stockholm: Arbetarnas Tryckeri, 1947.
- Braskén, Kasper and Johan A. Lundin. "Introduction." In *Anti-fascism in the Nordic Countries: New Perspectives, Comparisons and Transnational Connections*, edited by Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey, and Johan A. Lundin, 1–17. London: Routledge, 2019.
- Braskén, Kasper, Nigel Copsey, and David Featherstone. "Introduction: Towards a Global History of Anti-Fascism." In *Anti-Fascism in a Global Perspective: Transnational Networks, Exile Communities, and Radical Internationalism*, edited by Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey, and David Featherstone, 1–20. Oxon: Routledge, 2021.
- Braskén, Kasper. "'Whether black or white – united in the fight!' Connecting the resistance against colonialism, racism, and fascism in the European metropolises, 1926–1936." *Twentieth Century Communism* 18, no. 1 (2020): 126–149.
- Bray, Mark. *Antifa: The Anti-fascist Handbook*. Brooklyn, New York: Melville House, 2017.
- Bredsdorff, Lene. *Halfdan En biografi om Halfdan Rasmussen*. Viborg: Aschehoug Dansk Forlag, 2005.
- Buchanan, Tom. *Amnesty International and Human Rights Activism in Postwar Britain, 1945–1977*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.
- Buchanan, Tom. "The Dark Millions in the Colonies are Unavenged': Anti-Fascism and Anti-Imperialism in the 1930s." *Contemporary European History* 25, no. 4 (2016): 645–665. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777316000394>.
- Camre, Mogens. *Knus tyrannerne, Erindringer og selvbiografi*. Odense: Trykkefrihedsselskabets Bibliotek, 2011.
- Christiaens, Kim. "'Communists Are No Beasts': European Solidarity Campaigns on Behalf of Democracy and Human Rights in Greece and East–West Détente in the 1960s and Early 1970s." *Contemporary European History* 26, no. 4 (2017): 621–46. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777317000364>.
- Christiaens, Kim. "European Reconfigurations of Transnational Activism: Solidarity and Human Rights Campaigns on Behalf of Chile during the 1970s and 1980s." *International Review of Social History* 63, no. 3 (2018): 413–448. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859018000330>.
- Colodny, Robert G. *Spanien och Vietnam ett historiskt perspektiv*. Gävle: Ih grafik, 1968.
- Copsey, Nigel. "Afterword: Are you a communist? No, I am an anti-fascist." In *Anti-Fascism in European History. From the 1920s to Today*, edited by Jože Pirjevec, Egon Pelikan and Sabrina P. Ramet, 269–279. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2023.
- Copsey, Nigel. "Preface: Towards a New Anti-Fascist 'Minimum'?" In *Varieties of Anti-Fascism. Britain in the Inter-War Period*, edited by Nigel Copsey and Andrzej Olechnowicz, xiv–xxi. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

- Craine, Susan A. "Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory." *The American Historical Review* 102, no. 5 (1997): 1372–1385. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2171068>.
- Dalsager, Anders. "Framing anti-fascism in the Cold War: The Socialist Youth International and Franco's regime after the Second World War." In *Anti-fascism in the Nordic Countries: New Perspectives, Comparisons and Transnational Connections*, edited by Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey, and Johan A. Lundin, 219–235. Oxon: Routledge, 2019.
- Daphi, Priska and Lorenzo Zamponi. "Exploring the Movement-Memory Nexus: Insights and Ways Forwards." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (2019): 399–417.
- Della Porta, Donatella, Massimiliano Andretta, Tiago Fernandes, Eduardo Romanos, and Markos Vogiatzoglou. *Legacies and Memories in Movements: Justice and Democracy in Southern Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Diner, Dan. "On the Ideology of Antifascism." *New German Critique* 67, Winter (1996): 123–132. <https://doi.org/10.2307/827781>.
- Draenos, Stan. "Andreas Papandreou's Exile Politics: The First Phase (1968-1970)." *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique* 11, (2014): 35–66. <https://doi.org/10.12681/hr.332>.
- Eley, Geoff. "Legacies of Antifascism: Constructing Democracy in Postwar Europe." *New German Critique* 67 (1996): 73–100. <https://doi.org/10.2307/827778>.
- Erll, Astrid. "Traumatic pasts, literary afterlives, and transcultural memory: new directions of literary and media memory studies." *Journal of Aesthetics & Culture* 3, no. 1 (2011): 1–5. <https://doi.org/10.3402/jac.v3i0.7186>.
- Eyerman, Ron. "Social movements and memory." In *Routledge International Handbook of Memory Studies*, edited by Anna Lisa Tota and Trever Hagen, 79–83. Oxon: Routledge, 2016.
- Faraldo, José María. "An Antifascist Political Identity? On the Cult of Antifascism in the Soviet Union and post-Socialist Russia." In *Rethinking Antifascism History: Memory and Politics, 1922 to the Present*, edited by Hugo García, Mercedes Yusta, Xavier Tabet, and Cristina Clímaco, 202–227. New York: Berghahn Books, 2016.
- Featherstone, David. *Solidarity. Hidden Histories and Geographies of Internationalism*. London: Zed Books, 2012.
- Fischer, Fritz. *From Kaiserreich to Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German History, 1871–1945*. London: Routledge, 1986.
- Furet, François. *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

- Førland, Tor Egil. "Introduction to the Special Issue on 1968." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 33, no. 4 (2008): 317–325. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03468750802529676>.
- Galofré-Vilà, Gregori, et al. "The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and the Rise of Italian Fascism: A Cross-City Quantitative and Historical Text Qualitative Analysis." *American Journal of Public Health* 112, no. 2 (2022): 242–247. <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306574>.
- Garcia, Hugo. "Transnational History: A New Paradigm for Anti-Fascist Studies?" *Contemporary European History* 25, no. 4 (2016): 563–572. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777316000382>.
- Gerhardsen, Einar. *Mennesker og politikk. Erindringer 1965–78*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1978.
- Gerolymatos, André. *An International Civil War Greece, 1943–1949*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.
- Gerschenkron, Alexander. "On the Concept of Continuity in History." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 106, no. 3 (1962): 195–209.
- Ghilani, Djouaria, Olivier Luminet, Hans-Peter Erb, Christine Flassbeck, Valérie Rosoux, Ismee Tames and Olivier Klein. "Looking forward to the past: An interdisciplinary discussion on the use of historical analogies and their effects." *Memory Studies* 10, no. 3 (2017): 274–285. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698017701609>.
- Glondys, Olga. "Cold war controversies in the pro-amnesty campaigns of the Spanish political prisoners (1961) and the erosion of Spanish exiles' leadership in the anti-Francoist policies." *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies* 27, no. 1 (2021): 63–77. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14701847.2021.1898154>.
- Gongaware, Timothy B. "Collective Memory Anchors: Collective Identity and Continuity in Social Movements." *Sociological Focus* 43, no. 3 (2010): 214–239.
- Griffin, Roger. *The Nature of Fascism*. London: Routledge, 1991.
- Griffiths, Richard. "Fascist or Conservative? Portugal, Spain and the French Connection." *Portuguese Studies* 14, no. 1 (1998): 138–151.
- Grinell, Klas. "Att sälja världen. Omvärldsbilder i svensk utlandsturism." PhD diss., University of Gothenburg, 2004.
- Gustavsen, Finn, Peka J. Korvenheimo, Hans Jørgen Lembourn, and Ola Ullsten. *Rapport fra Athen: Nordiske politikere i Hellas*. Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S, 1967.
- Halbwachs, Maurice. "From the Collective Memory." In *Theories of Memory: A Reader*, edited by Michael Rossington and Anne Whitehead, 139–147. Edinburgh: Edingburgh University Press, 2008.

- Haraldstad, Hilde. "Norsk nei til Franco i NATO." *Forsvarsstudier*, no. 4 (1995).
<https://fhs.brage.unit.no/fhsxmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/99437/FS0495.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.
- Hálfdanarson, Guðmundur. "The Beloved War.' The Second World War and the Icelandic National Narrative." In *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited*, edited by Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg and Johan Östling, 68–89. Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011.
- Heiberg, Morten. *KGB's kontakt- og agentnet i Danmark: Sagerne i PET's arkiv vedrørende Arne Herløv Petersen og Jørgen Dragsdahl PET-Kommissionens beretning Bind 13*, accessed December 2, 2023, https://www.leksikon.org/images/pet_bind13.pdf.
- Hobuß, Steffi. "Aspects of memory acts: transnational cultural memory and ethics." *Journal of Aesthetics & Culture* 3, no. 1 (2011): 1–5. <https://doi.org/10.3402/jac.v3i0.7188>.
<https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-24-4-399>.
- Ingimundarson, Valur. *The Rebellious Ally: Iceland, the United States, and the Politics of Empire, 1945–2006*. Dordrecht and St. Louis: Republic of Letters Publishing, 2011.
- Ingimundarson, Valur. *Uppgjör við umheiminn. Samskipti Íslands, Bandaríkjanna og NATO 1960-1974. Íslensk þjóðernishyggi, vestrænt samstarf og landhelgisdeilan*. Reykjavík: Vaka-Helgafell, 2001.
- Jóhannesson, Guðni Th. *Óvinir ríkisins. Ógnir og innra öryggi í kalda stríðinu á Íslandi*. Reykjavík: Mál og menning, 2006.
- Johanson, Kjell E. *Fascism, Nazism, Racism*. Malmö: Cavefors, 1966.
- Johanson, Kjell E. *Solidaritet: antifascistisk årsbok 1968-69*. Uddevalla: Cavefors, 1968.
- Johnson, Edward. "Early Indications of a Freeze: Greece, Spain and the United Nations, 1946-1947." *Cold War History* 6, no. 1 (2006): 43–61.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740500395436>.
- Jordanova, Ludmilla. *History in Practice*. London: Hodder Education Publishers, 2000.
- Judt, Tony. *Postwar a History of Europe since 1945*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2005.
- Jämte, Jan. "Antirasismens många ansikten." PhD diss., Umeå University, 2013.
- Järvstad, Pontus. "The Committee against Neofascism and Racial Prejudice. Nordic Anti-Fascist Organizing and International Solidarity in the 1960s." In *Anti-Fascism in European History. From the 1920s to Today*, edited by Jože Pirjevec, Egon Pelikan and Sabrina P. Ramet, 123–141. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2023.
- Jørgensen, Thomas Ekman. "The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 33, no. 4 (2008): 326–338.
<https://doi:10.1080/03468750802423136>.

- Jørgensen, Thomas Ekman. *Transformations and Crises: The Left and the Nation in Denmark and Sweden, 1956–1980*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2008.
- Kallifatides, Theodor. “Grekland.” In *Solidaritet: antifascistisk årsbok. 1968–69*, edited by Kjell E. Johanson, 60–73. Uddevalla: Cavefors, 1968.
- Kappeler, Andreas. “Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the imperial past and competing memories.” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 5 (2014): 107–115.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2014.05.005>.
- Karakatsanis, Neovi M. and Jonathan Swarts. *American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels’ Greece Uncertain Allies and the 1967 Coup d’État*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
- Karpantschhof, René. *Nynazismen og dens modstandere i Danmark- politiske bevægelser i internationale rammer 1980-1998*. Sydjysk Universitetsforlag, 1999.
- Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Keys, Barbara. “Anti-Torture Politics. Amnesty International, the Greek Junta, and the Origins of the Human Rights ‘Boom’ in the United States.” In *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History*, edited by Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock, 201–221. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Kjærsgaard, Kristine. “Confronting the Greek Military Junta Scandinavian Joint Action under the European Commission on Human Rights, 1967–70.” In *The ‘Long 1970s’: Human Rights, East-West Détente and Transnational Relations*, edited by Poul Villaume, Rasmus Mariager, and Helle Porsdam, 51–71. New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Kornetis, Kostis. *Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics, and the “Long 1960s” in Greece*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2016.
- Kouki, Eleni and Dimitris Antoniou. “Making the Junta Fascist: Antidictatorial Struggle, the Colonels, and the Statues of Ioannis Metaxas.” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 35, no. 2 (2017): 451–480. <https://doi.org/10.1353/mgs.2017.0027>.
- Kousouris, Dimitris. “From Revolution to Restoration. Transnational Implications of the Greek Purge of Wartime Collaborators.” In *Dealing with Wars and Dictatorships: Legal Concepts and Categories in Action*, edited by Liora Israël and Guillaume Mouralis, 145–161. The Hauge: Asser Press, 2014.
- Loeffler, James. *Rooted Cosmopolitans. Jews and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018.
- Lööw, Heléne and Lotta Nilsson. “Hets mot folkgrupp BRÅ-rapport 2001:7.”
Brottsförebyggande rådet: Brå.
https://bra.se/download/18.cba82f7130f475a2f1800019149/1371914731775/2001_7_hets_mot_folkgrupp.pdf.

- Lööw, Heléne. *Nazismen i Sverige 1925–1979: Pionjärerna, Partierna, Propagandan*. Stockholm: Ordfront, 2016.
- Magnússon, Sigurður A. *Á hnífsins egg. Átakasaga*. Reykjavík: Mál og menning, 2001.
- Malm, Andreas. *White Skin, Black Fuel: On the Dangers of Fossil Fascism*. London: Verso, 2021.
- Maxwell, Alexander. “Popular and Scholarly Primordialism: The Politics of Ukrainian History during Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine.” *Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language* 16, no. 2 (2022): 151–172. <https://doi.org/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0008>.
- Mercer, Ben. “Specters of Fascism.” *The Journal of Modern History* 88, no. 1 (2016): 96–129.
- Miller, James Edward. *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
- Moen, Jo Stein. “Aktivisme og avmakt. Norsk fagbevegelse of den spanske borgerkrigen.” *Arbeiderhistorie* 1, no. 7 (2011): 152–183.
- Moyn, Samuel. *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.
- Munro, John. *The Anticolonial Front: The African American Freedom Struggle and Global Resistance to Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- Neijmann, Daisy. “The Allied Occupation of Iceland: Indriði G. Þorsteinsson’s North of War.” In *Nordic War Stories: World War II as History, Fiction, Media, and Memory*, edited by Marianne Stecher-Hansen, 216–232. New York: Berghahn Books, 2021.
- Nora, Pierre. *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, Vol. 1 – Conflicts and Divisions*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- Olga Ivinskaya, *A Captive of Time: My Years with Pasternak*. New York: Doubleday, 1978.
- Olick, Jeffrey K. and Joyce Robbins. “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 24, no. 1 (1998): 105–140.
- Olsson, Folke. “Solidaritetsens soldater.” In *¡No Pasarán! Spanska inbördeskriget och uppgörelsen med fascismen*, edited by Patrik Helgeson, Richard Jändel, and Nils Weijdegård, 152–213. Linköping: Nixon, 2008.
- Paxton, Robert O. *The Anatomy of Fascism*. London: Penguin, 2005.
- Pedaliu, Effie G. H. “A clash of cultures? The UN, the Council of Europe and the Greek dictators.” In *The Greek Junta and the International System: A Case Study of Southern European Dictatorships, 1967–74*, edited by Antonis Klapsis, Constantine

- Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, and Effie G. H. Pedaliu, 87–109. New York: Routledge, 2020.
- Pedaliu, Effie G. H. “‘A Discordant Note’: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974.” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 22, no.1 (2011): 101–120.
- Pelt, Mogens. “The Colonels’ coup of 1967 and the military takeovers in Turkey in 1960 and 1971.” In *The Greek Junta and the International System: A Case Study of Southern European Dictatorships, 1967–74*, edited by Antonis Klapsis, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, and Effie G. H. Pedaliu, 167–178. New York: Routledge, 2020.
- Pelt, Mogens. “West Germany’s Policy toward Greece during the Junta Period in the Context of ‘Burden-Sharing.’” In *The Greek Military Dictatorship: Revisiting a Troubled Past, 1967–1974*, edited by Othon Anastasakis and Katerina Lagos, 295–319. New York: Berghahn Books, 2021.
- Pharo, Helge Øystein. “Small State Anti-Fascism: Norway’s Quest to Eliminate the Franco Regime in the Aftermath of World War II.” *Culture & History Digital Journal* 7, no. 1 (2018): 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2018.008>.
- Pinto, Andrés Brink and Johan Pries. “Challenging fascist spatial claims. The struggle over the 30 November marches in southern Sweden.” In *Anti-fascism in the Nordic Countries: New Perspectives, Comparisons and Transnational Connections*, edited by Kasper Braskén, Nigel Copsey, and Johan A. Lundin, 254–270. Oxon: Routledge, 2019.
- Plokhly, Serhii. *The Frontline: Essays on Ukraine's Past and Present*. Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 2021.
- Plokhly, Serhii. *The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2023.
- Polletta, Francesca and James M. Jasper. “Collective Identity and Social Movements.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 27, no. 1 (2001): 283–305. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.283>.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. *Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism*. London: Verso, 1979.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain*. London: Humanities Press, 1976.
- Rabinbach, Anson. “Communist Crimes and French Intellectuals.” *Dissent* 45, no. 4 (1998): 61–66.
- Rabinbach, Anson. “Introduction: Legacies of Antifascism.” *New German Critique* 67, (1996): 3–17. <https://doi.org/10.2307/827774>.

- Rasmussen, Halfdan. Ivan Malinovski, and Erik Stinus. *Mørke over Akropolis*. Copenhagen: Forlaget Rhodos 1967.
- Rasmussen, Halfdan. Ivan Malinovski, and Erik Stinus. *Med solen i ryggen*. Copenhagen: Forlaget Rhodos, 1963.
- Retzer, Berit Ruud. *Jens Evensen: Mannen som gjorde Norge større*. Trondheim: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2017.
- Ricoeur, Paul. "History and Hermeneutics." *The Journal of Philosophy* 73, no. 19 (1976): 683–695.
- Romero, Federico. "Cold War historiography at the crossroads." *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (2014): 685–703.
- Rothberg, Michael. "Lived multidirectionality: 'Historikerstreit 2.0' and the politics of Holocaust memory." *Memory Studies* 15, no. 6 (2022): 1316–1329. <https://doi.org/10.1177/17506980221133511>.
- Rousseas, Stephen W. "Memoire on the 'Second Solution'." *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 2, no. 1 (1975): 22–35.
- Ryan, Lorraine. "Memory, power and resistance: The anatomy of a tripartite relationship." *Memory Studies* 4, no. 2 (2011): 154–169. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698010366502>.
- Schmid, Regin. *Pet's overvågning af politiske partier 1945-1989: PET, Folketingets partier og østlig efterretningsaktivitet PET-Kommissionens beretning Bind 7*. https://www.leksikon.org/images/pet_bind7.pdf.
- Schori, Pierre. *Minnet och elden. En politisk memoar med samtida synpunkter*. Stockholm: Leopard förlag, 2014.
- Scott, Carl-Gustaf. "The Swedish Left's Memory of the International Brigades and the Creation of an Anti-Fascist Postwar Identity." *European History Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (2009): 217–240. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0265691408101439>.
- Seidman, Michael. *Transatlantic Antifascisms: From the Spanish Civil War to the End of World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Sellström, Tor. *Sweden and national liberation in Southern Africa. Vol. 1. Formation of a popular opinion (1950–1970)*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999.
- Shevtsova, Maryna. "Looking for Stepan Bandera: The Myth of Ukrainian Nationalism and the Russian 'Special Operation'." *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 16, no. 3 (2022): 132–150.
- Sköld, Johanna and Ingrid Söderlind. "Vi måste rädda barnen'. Svenska hjälpkommittéer för krigsdrabbade barn i andra länder under 1930- och 1940-talen." *Historisk tidskrift* 142, no. 4 (2022): 533–563.

- Snyder, Sarah B. “The situation in Greece’ American human rights activism in the wake of the 1967 coup.” In *The Greek Junta and the International System: A Case Study of Southern European Dictatorships, 1967–74*, edited by Antonis Klapsis, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, and Effie G. H. Pedaliu, 137–148. New York: Routledge, 2020.
- Späth, Jens. “The Unifying Element? European Socialism and Anti-Fascism, 1939–1945.” *Contemporary European History* 25, no. 4 (2016): 687–706.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777316000400>.
- Stearns, Monteagle. *Gifted Greek: The Enigma of Andreas Papandreou*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2021.
- Stefánsson, Ragnar. *Það skelfur endurminningar*. Reykjavík: Skrudda, 2013.
- Stenius, Henrik, Mirja Österberg and Johan Östling. ”Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: An Introduction.” In *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited*, edited by Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg and Johan Östling, 7–25. Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011.
- Stoltzfus, Nathan and R.J.B Bosworth. “Memory and Representations of Fascism in Germany and Italy.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism*, edited by R. J. B. Bosworth, 566–585. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Stone, Dan. *Goodbye to All That? A History of Europe Since 1945*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Svavarsson, Stefán. “Frá saltfiski til sólarferða. Stjórn mála- og viðskiptatengsl Íslands og Spánnar 1939–1959.” MA thesis, University of Iceland, 2017.
- Søberg, Anette. “Rasediskriminering og hjemlig relevans? Norges rolle i FN’s arbeid for avskaffelse av rasediskriminering, 1960-1970.” MA thesis, University of Oslo, 2016.
- Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
- Traverso, Enzo. “Intellectuals and Anti-Fascism: For a Critical Historization.” *New Politics* 9, no. 4 (2004): 91–101.
- Tremlett, Giles. *The International Brigades: Fascism, Freedom and the Spanish Civil War*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020.
- Tsoucalas, Constantine. “Class Struggle and Dictatorship in Greece.” *New Left Review* 56 (July-August 1969): 3–16.
- Verbeeck, Georgi. “The Return of History as Travesty: The ‘Struggle against Fascism’ in the Russian-Ukrainian War.” *Journal of Applied History* 4 (2022): 76–84.
<https://doi.org/10.1163/25895893-bja10030>.

- Vergnon, Gilles. "The Burden of the Rear-View Mirror: Myth and Historiography of Republican Antifascism in France." In *Rethinking Antifascism History: Memory and Politics, 1922 to the Present*, edited by Hugo García, Mercedes Yusta, Xavier Tabet, and Cristina Clímaco, 228–240. New York: Berghahn Books, 2016.
- Verpoest, Lien. "From Defiance to Civilizationalism: The Securitization of Humiliation in Russia." *Journal of Applied History* 4 (2022): 85–101.
<https://doi.org/10.1163/25895893-bja10028>.
- Viedma, Lucy. "'Hade vi bott i Chile hade det varit vi som spärrats in' Chile i samlingarna." *Arbetarhistoria* 134–135, no. 2–3 (2010): 50–57.
- Vik, Hanne Hagtvedt and Skage Alexander Østberg. "Sweden, Amnesty International and Legal Entrepreneurs in Global Anti-Torture Politics, 1967–1977." *The International History Review* 44, no. 3 (2022): 633–53.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2021.1955726>.
- Werner, Kåre B. *Spania 1946–1979. Norsk støtte til Spanias frihetskamp*. Fjellhamar: O.K.-Trykk A/S, 1987.
- Winn, Peter. "Flyktingar och emigranter: Chiles historia och chilena i Sverige." *Arbetarhistoria* 134–135, no. 2–3 (2010): 8–22.
- Östberg, Kjell. "Sweden and the Long '1968': Break or Continuity?" *Scandinavian Journal of History* 33, no. 4 (2008): 339–352. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03468750802472554>.